PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  MANCHESTER 


HISTORICAL  SERIES 
No.  Ill 


The  Old  Colonial 
System. 


JV 
.H5 


SHERRATT  &  HUGHES 

Publishers  to  the  Victoria  University  of  Manchester 

Manchester  :    27  St.  Ann  Street 

London  :    65  Long  Acre 


•The    Old    Colonial 
System  - 


GERALD  BERKELEY  HERTZ,  M.A.,  B.C.L. 

Lecturer  on  Constitutional  Law 


V 

or  THE 

UNIVERSITY 
or 


MANCHESTER 

AT  THE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
1905 


UNIVERSITY   OF    MANCHESTER    PUBLICATIONS 
No.   VII 


PREFACE 

IN  1902  I  published  a  sketch  of  "English  Public  Opinion 
after  the  Restoration,"  and  it  seemed  natural  to  follow  the 
colonising  ideals  of  that  period  into  a  subsequent  age  of 
more  self-conscious  empire.  I  found  an  additional  incentive 
in  courses  of  lectures  on  the  rise  of  Greater  Britain  and 
kindred  topics,  which  I  have  given  during  the  last  few  years 
in  various  parts  of  Lancashire  and  Cheshire  in  connection 
with  the  University  Extension  scheme  of  the  Manchester 
University.  One  feature,  which  has  characterised  every 
audience  with  whom  I  have  come  in  contact,  is  a  complete 
misunderstanding  of  the  old  colonial  system. 

That  system  was  in  truth  marked  by  many  faults  in  theory 
and  practice,  and  in  the  ensuing  pages,  it  will,  I  trust,  be 
seen  how  unfitted  it  was  to  sustain  a  great  empire  without 
radical  amendment.  Yet  it  is  wrong  to  regard  the  policy 
under  which  Greater  Britain  evolved,  and  for  which  most 
English  statesmen  f  rom  Cromwell  to  Chatham  strained  every 
effort,  as  selfish  fatuity,  unworthy  of  the  race.  In  the 
United  States,  this  superficial  view  is  no  longer  deemed  a 
necessary  tenet  for  the  patriotic,  and  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  War  of  Independence  arose  have  been 
approached  in  a  truly  scientific  spirit,  but  in  our  own 
country,  a  traditional  Whiggism  still  permeates  most  popular 
histories. 

The  genesis  of  the  present  volume  lies  in  my  desire  to 
treat  the  question  in  a  more  impartial  manner,  and  in  my 
concern  at  the  exasperating  prevalence  of  this  misconcep- 
tion of  imperial  history.  Since  I  first  studied  the  subject 


vi  PREFACE 

as  an  undergraduate  of  Lincoln  College,  I  have  tried  to 
dissociate  discussion  of  the  controversies  of  the  past  from  the 
political  partisanship  of  the  present. 

The  materials  which  I  have  used  are  sufficiently  indicated 
by  the  footnotes.  I  have  had  access  to  the  numerous  tracts 
and  pamphlets  therein  referred  to,  in  the  Bodleian,  in  the 
Manchester  University  Library,  and  in  the  Manchester  Free 
Reference  Library.  In  regard  to  the  due  choice  and 
appreciation  of  authorities,  and  to  the  general  handling  of 
the  theme,  I  am  greatly  indebted  to  Professor  Tout.  His 
criticisms  have  made  me  aware  how  hard  it  is  even  to  try  to 
epitomise  a  vast  subject  in  the  compass  of  a  single  volume. 
I  also  owe  thanks  to  Mr.  J.  A.  Doyle  of  All  Souls'  College, 
Oxford,  for  valuable  suggestions. 

Manchester, 

October,  1905. 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Introduction          ...         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  ix. 

Great  Britain  and  the  Seven  Years'  War          ...         ...  i 

Pitt's  Influence  as  Minister         ...         ...         ...         ...  23 

The  Old  Colonial  Theory           ...         ...         ...         ...  37 

Dialectics  on  the  Question  of  Taxation            ...         ...  70 

British  Feeling  towards  America  in  1775          ...         ...  91 

Chatham  and  Burke         ...         ...         ...         ...         ...  105 

"  United  Empire  "  Loyalty         118 

The  War  Spirit  in  England  1775-1783             131 

Britain's  Conduct  of  the  War     ...         ...         ...         ...  155 

Colonial  Theory  in  1783             ...  187 

"  Hands  Across  the  Sea  "            199 

Lessons  of  the  American  Revolution  210 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  present  work  is  intended  to  weigh  the  causes, 
character  and  results  of  Great  Britain's  old  colonial 
system.  It  is  proposed  to  examine  the  popular  conception 
of  the  uses  of  empire  during  those  portions  of  the  reigns 
of  George  II.  and  George  III.,  when  that  system  reached 
its  zenith.  In  this  respect,  the  ideas  which  led  the  nation 
to  choose  its  distinctive  imperial  policy,  and  to  embark 
upon  the  two  wars  of  the  period  will  be  dealt  with  at 
greater  length  than  the  actual  details  of  any  legislation 
or  campaigns.  Such  details  are  ascertainable  exactly  and 
are  familiar  to  the  world,  but  on  the  other  hand  there  can 
be  infinite  variety  in  representations  of  public  opinion.  It 
is  however  probable  that  this  subject  is  characterised  by 
unity,  that  the  contrast  between  the  Britain  of  1756  and 
the  Britain  of  1775  is  only  superficial,  that  cleavage  from 
America  was  due  to  no  sudden  accident  of  haphazard 
impolicy,  and  that  there  is  nothing  to  dissociate  the 
statesmanship  which  directed  Wolfe  to  strike  at  Quebec, 
and  Hawke  at  Quiberon,  from  that  which  allowed 
Burgoyne  to  drift  to  Saratoga,  and  Cornwallis  to  Yorktown. 
In  each  case  the  national  aim  was  the  maintenance  of  the 
same  imperial  ideal,  and  only  the  concurrence  of  colonial 
with  British  interests  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  disabled 
the  politicians  of  the  time  from  betraying  that  their  ideal 
had  feet  of  clay.  At  all  events,  the  forces  in  English  life, 
which  made  the  struggle  with  France  so  popular  and 
successful  under  Pitt,  led  obviously  to  the  policy  that 
culminated  in  the  War  of  Independence;  and  for  this 


x  INTRODUCTION 

reason  we  propose  to  review  the  nature  of  that  struggle 
and  the  character  of  Pitt's  own  statesmanship  before 
dealing  at  length  with  the  theory  of  colonial  government, 
which  ruled  British  aspirations  until  the  American 
Revolution. 

A  topic  like  that  which  is  indicated  above  hardly  needs 
an  apology.  The  growth  of  our  dominions  over  sea  is 
now  deemed  the  chief  feature  in  the  modern  history  of 
Great  Britain,  and  as  statesmanship  rarely  comes  by 
instinct,  those  who  interest  themselves  in  the  politics  of 
the  present  day  are  willing  to  study  every  aspect  of  the 
annals  of  the  past.  Most  experiments  are  at  least  instruc- 
tive, and  we  cannot  be  too  well  acquainted  with  the 
virtues  and  defects  of  the  old  colonial  system,  under  which 
our  country  won  North  America  and  lost  the  United 
States.  In  this  volume  therefore  after  discussing  the 
tendency  in  British  political  thought  which  animated  the 
ardour  for  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  which  created  the 
colonial  ideals  of  the  time,  we  shall  investigate  more  closely 
England's  attempt  to  organise  what  she  had  won. 

Such  an  investigation  leads  directly  to  a  survey  of  the 
British  standpoint  during  the  conflict  with  the  colonies 
over  the  Stamp  Act,  and  during  the  Revolution  itself. 
History  should  be  free  from  passion  if  not  from  partisan- 
ship, and  it  is  surely  possible  to  view  the  theories  upon 
which  England's  case  rested  without  heat.  It  is  suggested 
that  those  theories  had  a  far  more  general  acceptance  in 
the  country  than  has  often  been  alleged  by  critics  of  the 
government  then  actually  in  office,  and  that  they  followed 
naturally  upon  the  conquest  of  Canada.  There  was  no 
cataclysm  whatever  in  the  evolution  of  the  old  colonial 
system. 

The  last  portion  of  this  work  is  concerned  with  the 
reaction  in  British  imperial  theory  after  1783,  and  with 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

other  results  of  the  downfall  of  the  lately  triumphant 
school  of  political  thought.  It  is  possible  that  men  hardly 
realise  how  accurately  the  colonial  ideas  of  the  Manchester 
economists  were  anticipated  by  the  disputants  who  wrote 
in  the  morning  of  the  "laisser  f  aire  "  era.  The  closing 
chapter  attempts  to  sketch  how  far  their  contentions 
embraced  the  true  lessons  of  the  fall  of  the  old  colonial 
system. 

Throughout  this  book,  the  materials  are  derived  from 
the  immense  storehouses  of  the  writings  of  the  day, 
rather  than  from  more  modern  commentaries.  However 
inadequate,  the  picture  of  Britain's  conception  of  its 
mission  in  the  world  in  the  eighteenth  century  is  drawn 
from  the  versions  given  by  its  own  exponents.  Pamphlet 
and  tract  are  often  as  illustrative  of  popular  beliefs  as  the 
speech  of  a  minister  or  the  text  of  a  statute,  and  they  give 
freshness  and  light  to  historical  narrative.  The  chapters 
which  describe  the  old  colonial  theory  and  the  character 
of  British  opinion  during  the  years  1765  to  1783,  are 
especially  based  upon  the  voluminous  polemical  literature 
of  that  age  of  controversy.  Under  such  circumstances, 
there  is  perhaps  a  danger  of  losing  the  bold  outlines  of  the 
general  theme  under  a  mass  of  incidental  detail,  but  it  is 
hoped  that  the  ensuing  effort  to  keep  the  nature  of  the 
colonial  scheme  of  the  day  always  before  the  reader's  eye 
will  conquer  the  difficulties  inherent  to  all  subjects,  which 
enjoy  innumerable  authorities. 


The  Old  Colonial 
System 


2  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

Canada  the  Indians  were  drawn  by  tactful  diplomacy  into 
a  valuable  alliance,  which  made  the  1  French  "coureur  de 
bois"  a  master  of  woodcraft  and  an  adept  in  forest  warfare. 
The  Jesuits  mastered  the  Iroquois  tongue  in  order  to  con- 
vince their  hearers.     Moreover,  the  Canadians  were  united 
under  the  despotism  of  their  Intendants,  and  knew  nothing/ 
of  the  religious  and  racial  feuds  which  split  Greater  Britain 
".jfoto  incong^qu?  and  weakened  units.     2  Less  hampered 
than   the   British  .colonists   by   economic   restraints,   and 
/enfe'ly::free:  from':  the   toils   of   party   government,   the 
hunters  and  trappers  of  French  North  America  were  able 
to  make  a  bold  bid  for  supremacy  at  the  beginning  of  their 
last  struggle  against  England.  Lord  Chancellor  Hardwicke 
said  justly  in  1755  that  "'the  oldest  man  livinS  never  saW 
such  a  scene.      'Tis  a  time  of  great  thoughtfulness  and 

anxiety." 

In   1754    the   French   had   descended   upon   the 
beyond   the   Blue   Ridge  held  by  the   Six  Nations   and 
claimed  as  British  territory  by  the  English  Ohio  Company, 
which  had  been  founded  in  1748  to  exploit  over  half  a 
million  acres  lying  chiefly  to  the  north  of  that  river, 
occupation  had  never  been  effective,  and  the  invaders 
mastered  the  Ohio  valley.     Fort  Duquesne  was  built 
July    1754   Fort   Necessity   fell.      A  year  later   General 
Braddock  led  an  army  of  regulars  and  colonials  into  an 
ambuscade   ten   miles   from   Fort   Duquesne,   where   two 
hundred  of  his  men  were  killed  and  four  hundred  wounde 
He  himself  died  of  wounds,  and  no  fewer  than  sixty-eigh 
of  his  officers  fell.     He  had  handled  his  men  with  a  dif 

1  Gent.  Mag.  (1755),  p.  436;  Charlevoix'  Journal  of  a  Voyage  to  North 

America  (1761),  i.  123;  Kalm's  Travels  (1772),  ii.  379;  Pownall  i 
Administration  of  Brit.  Colonies  (1774),  ii.  187. 

2  Sensible  Observations  on  General  Commerce  (1737),  p.  6: 

3  Harris's  Hardwicke  (1847),  iii.  37. 


THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  3 

astrous  contempt  for  colonial  methods  of  forest  warfare. 
An  attempt  to  take  Fort  Ticonderoga  also  failed.     In  May 
1T56  England  formally  declared  war,  but  the  government 
was  inefficient  and  slow,  and  the  colonies  were  backward 
with  assistance.     i"I  dread  to  hear  from  America,"  Pitt 
wrote  to  Gren  ville  in  June  1756,  and  in  August  the  French  cap- 
tured Oswego  with  a  hundred  guns  and  took  sixteen  hundred 
prisoners.    In  Europe  Minorca  was  lost,  and  early  in  1T57 
Byng  was  shot  for  not  having  saved  it;  but  the  example 
failed  to  turn  the  tide  of  the  war.     Notwithstanding  Pitt's 
advent  to  power  and  the  greater  zeal  of  the  new  govern- 
ment, Loudon  failed  to  take  Louisburg  in  August  1757, 
and  the  fall  and  massacre  of  Fort  William  Henry  took 
place   in   the   same   month.       In   September   Cumberland 
was  forced  to  conclude  the  convention  of  Closterseven. 

Certain  inherent  defects  in  the  state  of  Greater  France 
helped  to  save  England's  colonies.      Canada  had  not  the 
solid  basis   of  a   successful   settlement.      Its   inhabitants 
were    absorbed    either    in    missionary    work    among    the 
Indians,  or  in  the  pursuit  of  furs  and  fish,  2 "  leading,"  in 
Doctor  -Johnson's  words,  "  a  laborious  and  necessitous  life 
in  perpetual  regret  of  the  deliciousness  and  plenty  of  their 
native  country."      3Their  population  was  a  mere  fraction 
of  that  of  the  British  colonies,  and  infinitely  less  pros- 
perous.    Their  capacity  to  settle  effectually  was  spoilt  by 
feudalism  and  religious  bigotry.     They  had  no  town  life 
at  all,  and  were  mentally  and  politically  stagnant.     More- 
over,  there   was   no   force   in   France   to   neutralise   such 
sources    of    weakness    in    America.       King    and    nobles 
looked  exclusively  upon  the  Continent  as  the  proper  field 
for  their  warlike  ambitions,  and  the  colonial  struggle  was 

1  Grenville  Papers  (ed.   1852),  i.   165. 

2  Introduction  to  the  Political  State  of  Great  Britain  (1774),  p.  41. 

3  Charlevoix'  Journal  (1761),  i.  113. 


4  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

noticed  only  with  a  dull  apathy.  Since  Colbert's  day, 
Canada  had  been  to  the  French  nation  no  more  than  a 
waste  of  snow. 

In  contrast  with  such  indifference,  there  were  several 
tendencies  in  English  public  opinion  at  the  time,  which 
led  directly  to  the  popularity  of  a  war  for  empire  over 
sea.  In  the  first  place,  social  life  was  dominated  by  com- 
mercialism, and  this  spirit  made  men  believe  in  the  efficacy 
of  wars  of  trade.  National  policy  was  governed  by  trade 
considerations,  and  in  the  light  of  contemporary  economics, 
such  considerations  pointed  towards  colonial  aggrandise- 
ment, and  gave  England  a  predisposition  to  meet  the 
crisis  in  America  in  a  manner  worthy  of  a  fighting  race. 
All  observers  of  British  ideas  at  this  time  agree  as  to  the 
strength  of  this  mercantile  war  spirit,  and  to  pessimists  it 
was  even  a  source  of  misgiving.  They  argued  that  the 
fruits  of  England's  wars  fell  to  the  prudent  not  to  the 
brave,  and  that  to  play  the  part  of  a  modern  Carthage  was 
fatal.  Wealth  had  no  saving  virtue  on  the  day  of  battle, 
and  the  custom  of  entrusting  a  large  share  in  national 
defence  to  alien  mercenaries  was  thought  ignobly  character- 
istic. John  Brown's  "  Estimate  of  the  Manners  and 
Principles  of  the  Times,"  and  John  Shebbeare's  "Letters 
on  the  English  Nation"  painted  the  people  as  sordid, 
avaricious  and  immoral.  Self-interest  certainly  swayed 
the  corrupt  and  oligarchic  legislature,  and  politics  were 
always  discussed  on  a  plane  from  which  principles  were 
banished.  The  excise  was  opposed  in  1T33,  as  being 
imposed  upon  iathe  sweat  of  the  laborious  brows  of 
brewers  and  distillers."  Men  fought  avowedly  for  the 
most  material  objects  only.  Gold  ruled  the  aspirations  of 
the  greatest,  and  India  afforded  many  examples  of  its  fatal 

l  The  Excise  Anatomized,  by  Z.  G.  (1733),  p.  9. 


THE  SEVEN   YEARS'  WAR  5 

power  at  the  time,  especially  during  the  years  between 
1760  and  1765.  The  significant  trail  of  commercialism  lay 
so  markedly  over  all  national  thought,  that  even  poets 
delighted  in  the  growth  of  manufacturing  towns  at  the 
expense  of  the  country  districts.  Thus  John  Dyer,  in 
"  The  Fleece,"  says  of  the  aspect  of  ancient  Carthage, 

1 ".  ...  So  appear 

Th'  increasing  walls  of  busy  Manchester, 
Sheffield  and  Birmingham,  whose  redd'ning  fields 
Rise,  and  enlarge  their  suburbs." 

Fancy  loved  to  frolic  over  British  markets. 

2  "On  Guinea's  sultry  strand  the  drap'ry  light 
Of  Manchester  and  Norwich  is  bestowed," 

while  Lancashire  was  said  to  provide 

3"The  thin  shading  trail  for  Agra's  nymphs." 

To  optimists  of  course,  this  dominance  of  trade  motives 
was  something  to  be  proud  of,  and  certainly  it  showed  the 
practical  nature  of  English  enthusiasm,  as  distinguished 
from  the  fever  of  French  militarism,  which  drained  the 
life  blood  of  that  country  to  maintain  the  spurious  glory 
of  Continental  dominion. 

Side  by  side  with  this  predominance  of  mercantilism, 
was  another  tendency  in  English  life,  leading  towards  the 
popularity  of  wars  for  empire.  The  people  were  under- 
going a  wave  of  sensationalism.  A  love  of  excitement 
characterised  all  classes,  and  this  trait  has  helped  to 
support  war  policies  in  every  age.  4In  1741  the  London 
mob  celebrated  Yernon's  exploit  at  Carthagena  by  four 

1  The  Fleece,  by  J.  Dyer    LL.B.   (1757),  p.   101. 

2  ibid,  p.  129. 

3  ibid,  p.  109. 

4  Paston's  Little  Memoirs  (1901),  p.  36. 


6  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

nights  of  orgy,  in  which  every  window  that  was  not 
illuminated  was  broken,  and  in  which  Westminster  was 
pampered  by  the  gift  of  free  beer.  There  was  a  general 
thirst  for  novelty.  Selwyn's  impetuosity  to  obtain  a  good 
view  of  the  breaking  of  Damiens  on  the  wheel  at  Paris  led 
the  French  crowd  to  make  way  for  him  as  l "  an  English- 
man and  an  amateur."  Speculation  did  not  end  with  the 
South  Sea  bubble,  when  the  most  sober  of  citizens  2"  never 
dreamt  of  less  than  three  or  four  thousand  a  year."  When 
Goldsmith  studied  medicine  at  Leyden  he  wrote  home 
that  3"  the  Dutch  slumber,  the  French  chatter,  the  English 
play  at  cards."  4Westminster  Bridge  and  the  British 
Museum  were  largely  built  by  means  of  the  proceeds  of 
lotteries.  In  the  world  of  fashion,  the  craving  for  excite- 
ment was  hardly  satisfied  by  the  most  extravagant  games 
of  chance,  while  the  lower  orders  indulged  in  bull  and 
bear-baiting  and  cock-fights,  and  played  football  recklessly 
in  the  streets.  Naval  officers  were  the  terror  of  seaports. 
"  Good  Lord !  What  men ! "  wrote  a  traveller  from 
Lausanne,  who  saw  them  rioting  at  Portsmouth  in  the 
reign  of  George  II.  The  excitable  and  adventurous  char- 
acter of  British  society  at  the  time,  made  it  very  liable  to 
the  influence  of  a  war  spirit,  and  a  conflict  for  high  stakes 
in  America  and  in  the  east  offered  allurement  to  the  jaded. 
A  third  feature  in  the  England  of  that  day,  which  gave 
the  nation  a  bias  towards  favouring  a  French  war  was  the 
state  of  political  life.  Walpole's  finance  had  provided  the 
country  with  ample  means  wherewith  to  carry  on  a  success- 
ful struggle,  while  at  the  same  time,  the  parliamentary 

1  H.  Walpole's  Memoirs  (ed.  1851),  ii.  97. 

2  James  Houstoun's  Works  (1753),  p.   119. 

3  Prior's  Life  of  Goldsmith  (1837),  i.  163. 

4  The  Lottery  Displayed  (1771),  p.  7. 

5  Letters  of  de  Saussure  (ed.  1902),  p.  360. 


THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  7 

system  of  intrigue  and  dishonesty,  which  he  had  en- 
couraged, made  men  weary  of  confining  public  events  to 
the  category  of  aristocratic  wrangles.  England  now 
sighed  for  something  more  exhilarating.  She  was  utterly 
tired  of  such  leaders  as  Pelham  who  had  no  ardour,  and  of 
Henry  Fox  who  had  no  principles,  of  Granville  who  had 
sunk  into  premature  dotage,  and  of  Newcastle  the  prototype 
of  the  politically  corrupt.  She  was  weary  of  their  lordly 
cliques,  of  favouritism  and  bribery,  of  places  and  pensions. 
There  was  indeed  a  great  opportunity  for  a  man  of  genius 
to  break  away  from  the  hated  network  of  oligarchy,  to 
clear  the  public  mind  from  the  parliamentary  cant,  which 
represented  the  Revolution  settlement  of  1689  as  an  ideal 
constitution.  The  nation  longed  for  a  statesman  to  arise 
from  the  ruck  of  office-hunters.  For  this  reason,  it  cannot 
be  surprising  to  find  Englishmen  keenly  susceptible  to  the 
teachings  of  William  Pitt,  who  emerged  from  this  wilder- 
ness of  sordid  egoism  to  preach  a  new  Crusade — a  Crusade 
moreover,  which  appealed  to  the  already  prevailing  passions 
of  the  hour.  A  great  man  fighting  against  the  current  of 
public  opinion  rarely  conquers  it;  swimming  with  the 
stream,  he  is  irresistible. 

One  secret  of  Pitt's  success  is  that  he  was  barely  ahead 
of  his  age.  He  had  his  contemporaries'  hatred  of  France ; 
he  had  their  love  of  national  aggrandisement,  and  their 
belief  in  colonial  trade  restrictions.  His  character  and 
statesmanship  are  therefore  particularly  worthy  of  study, 
and  it  is  probably  more  important  to  examine  his  personal 
view  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  than  the  views  of  the  people 
who  gave  him  their  support.  However,  in  the  present 
chapter,  it  is  proposed  to  ignore  the  Great  Commoner 
himself — if  such  a  course  is  possible — and  to  deal  with  the 
people  only.  We  have  to  understand  the  nature  of  English 
political  thought  while  Pitt  was  transforming  the  war  into 
scenes  of  British  glory. 


8  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

With,  the  exception  of  two  months  in  1757  Pitt  was  chief 
minister  from  December  1756  to  October  1761,  and  the 
successes  of  the  remaining  two  years  of  the  war  were  the 
heritage  of  his  administration.  Nominally  one  of  the 
heads  of  the  political  clique  formerly  led  by  Pelham,  but 
really  welcomed  for  the  moment  by  all  the  Whig  factions, 
he  gave  the  people  a  new  interest  in  public  affairs.  •  The 
hold  of  the  Whig  nobles  upon  political  power  was  more 
solid  and  lasting  than  his  own  personal  influence,  but  the 
glamour  of  success  was  his,  if  only  for  a  day,  and  the 
country  acknowledged  him  the  creator  of  its  triumphs  in 
the  war.  In  1758  Senegal  and  Goree  were  conquered  :  in 
the  July  of  the  same  year,  Louisburg,  a  great  fort  in  Cape 
Breton  Island  and  the  key  of  Canada,  surrendered,  with  a 
garrison  of  nearly  six  thousand  men,  to  Amherst  and 
Wolfe.  In  the  same  month,  Abercromby  was  repulsed  at 
Ticonderoga,  but  the  enthusiasm  at  home  was  shared  by 
army  and  navy,  and  after  the  fall  of  Louisburg,  Wolfe 
wrote,  "  It  is  my  humble  opinion  that  the  French  may  be 
rooted  out,"  while  Amherst  stated  that  1<rWhat  I  wish  to 
do  is  to  go  to  Quebec."  In  November  1758  Fort  Duquesne 
was  taken  at  last  by  General  Forbes  and  re-named 
Pittsburg.  In  May  1759  Guadeloupe  was  subdued,  and  in 
August  Boscawen  gained  a  great  naval  victory  off  Cape 
Lagos  in  Portugal.  In  September  Wolfe  took  Quebec. 
Of  the  actual  details  of  his  generalship  there  is  no  need  to 
speak  here,  but  it  is  worth  noticing  that  only  four  days 
before  his  death  and  triumph,  he  wrote:  2"My  constitu- 
tion is  entirely  ruined  without  the  consolation  of  having 
done  any  considerable  service  to  the  state  or  without  any 
prospect  of  it."  Wolfe's  work  was  soon  followed  by  the 

1  Chatham  Correspondence  (ed.  1838),  i.  330. 

2  ibid,  i.  425. 


THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  9 

conquest  of  Canada.  In  November  1759  Hawke  dashed 
Conflans'  fleet  to  pieces  among  the  rocks  of  Quiberon  Bay. 
In  Germany,  English  troops  had  done  much  to  win  the 
battle  of  Minden  in  August.  Before  the  peace  of  1763 
the  French  West  Indies  were  reduced,  while  in  the  east, 
the  genius  of  Clive  had  supplanted  France  by  England 
as  destined  arbiter  of  India.  In  January  1762  war  was 
declared  against  Spain,  and  Havannah  and  Manila  were 
conquered  in  the  autumn.  By  the  peace  of  Paris  of  1763 
France  ceded  Canada,  Cape  Breton,  St.  John,  Senegal, 
St.  Yincent,  Grenada,  Dominica,  and  Tobago  to  England, 
and  Louisiana  to  Spain,  which  in  turn  gave  up  Florida  and 
the  right  to  cut  timber  in  Honduras  to  Great  Britain. 

Nothing  gains  adherents  for  a  government  more  speedily 
than  military  success,  and  no  one  will  wonder  at  the  volume 
of  enthusiasm  evoked  by  such  a  roll  of  victories.  Pitt 
found  a  large  part  of  the  nation  already  only  waiting  for 
some  break  in  the  continuity  of  England's  misfortunes  to 
become  rapturous  for  the  war,  and  his  deft  choice  of  good 
men,  and  good  plans  of  campaign  in  1759  created  what  is 
probably  still  the  high-water  mark  in  the  history  of  the 
spirit  of  militarism  in  Great  Britain.  By  that  time,  he 
had  learnt  the  mistake  of  wasting  resources  upon  unprofit- 
able raids  on  the  French  coast,  and  he  gave  the  people 
some  substantial  fruits  of  their  eagerness  for  conflict.  The 
intensity  of  their  zeal  for  the  colonial  war  was  so  great 
that  even  the  magnitude  of  the  armies  and  subsidies 
lavished  upon  the  German  struggle  had  come  to  pass 
almost  uncriticised. 

It  would  however  be  most  unfair  to  attribute  England's 
zeal  during  the  Seven  Years'  War  to  mere  intoxication 
with  success.  As  we  have  seen  above,  the  general  tendency 
of  the  time  lay  in  the  direction  of  fighting  trade  rivals, 
such  conflicts  being  considered  so  essential  to  commercial 


10  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

greatness  that  Hhe  Turkey  company  tried  to  exclude  a 
Quaker  from  its  councils  in  1759  as  professing  opinions 
detrimental  to  the  waging  of  trade  wars.  Long  before 
1756,  the  people  had  tried  to  interest  their  government  in 
the  cause  of  expansion.  It  was  the  trading  class,  who 
forced  Walpole  into  the  Spanish  war  of  1739  in  spite  of 
his  love  of  peace  and  contempt  for  all  such  imperial  pro- 
jects as  Berkeley's  scheme  of  founding  a  university  in 
Bermuda,  and  the  pamphlets  of  the  day  attest  to  the 
eagerness  of  the  nation  at  large  to  divert  the  aristocracy 
from  its  absorption  in  domestic  cabals  to  the  larger  question 
of  the  struggle  for  survival  in  America.  2It  was  urged 
that  all  England  would  support  a  war  to  secure  colonial 
supremacy.  3A11  our  troubles  were  attributed  to  Trench 
schemes  to  subvert  our  empire.  While  the  ministry  was 
dallying  with  European  diplomacy,  4  England's  legs  were 
being  hamstrung  across  the  Atlantic.  No  force  in  the 
world  could  withstand  British  infantry,  and  so  the  country 
should  strike  at  once.  The  only  sensible  policy  in  view  of 
the  French  depredations  of  1754  was  to  move  energetically, 
argued  the  "Cobbler's  Letter"  of  1756;  5"war,  my  brave 
Britons,  war." 

Thus  the  spirit  of  battle  awoke  in  England.  6It  was 
then  the  vogue  to  pelt  foreigners  in  London  with  dead 
dogs  and  cats  on  Lord  Mayor's  day,  and  now  the  mob 
assuming  that  all  foreigners  were  Frenchmen,  hurled  in 
addition  the  old  epithet  of  7" French  dog"  at  every 

1  Burr's  Eeports,  ii.   1003  (R.  v.  March). 

2  Present  State  of  the  Revenues  of  France  and  Spain  (1740),  p.  45. 

3  A  Letter  from  a  Cobbler  to  the  People  of  England  (1756),  p.  9. 

4  ibid,  p.  12. 

5  ibid,  p.  29. 

6  Letters  of  de  Saussure  (ed.  1902),  p.  111. 

7  ibid,  p.  112;  Baretti's  Journey  from  London  to  Genoa  (1770),  i.    64. 


THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  11 

stranger.  In  November  1755  1Garrick  was  attacked  for 
employing  French  actors  on  the  stage  in  Noverre's  Chinese 
ballet,  and  it  is  suggestive  to  read  that  in  1760  2the 
theatres  were  considered  to  support  the  war  feeling  even 
more  warmly  than  the  press.  In  general  however,  the 
zealots  of  the  day  were  as  sober  as  they  were  ambitious. 
The  war  party  knew  what  it  wanted.  Thus  in  a  "  Letter 
from  a  Merchant  of  the  city  of  London,"  the  writer  pointed 
at  3  North  America  as  the  prize  for  which  his  country  had 
then  to  contend.  With  such  an  end  before  it,  parsimony 
was  absurd.  4  If  she  had  spent  two  millions  instead  of 
£200,000  in  1756  she  would  have  won  and  held  Crown  Point 
and  Oswego.  American  colonists  should  be  made  to  con- 
tribute more  adequately  towards  the  cost  of  their  own 
defence.  All  writers  of  this  school  followed  Pitt  in 
emphasising  the  imperial  character  of  the  war.  It  was 
being  waged  for  the  maintenance  of  British  interests  all 
the  world  over.  One  essayist  said  very  correctly,  5"If  ever 
there  was  a  national  war,  this  is  truly  such  a  one."  The 
future  of  the  whole  race  was  in  the  balance,  and  the 
quarrel  with  France  was  vital  to  every  Briton,  and  not 
merely  a  dispute,  personal  to  "the  weavers  of  Yorkshire, 
Norwich  or  the  west,  the  cutlers  of  Sheffield,  or  the 
button  makers  of  Birmingham." 

For  the  time,  the  nation  forgot  its  old  terror  of  a 
standing  army.  The  evils  of  the  press-gang  were  forgiven. 
It  was  not  the  people's  fault  if  supplies  for  the  soldiery 
were  diverted  by  dastardly  contractors,  for  money  was 


1  Private  Correspondence  of  David  Garrick  (ed.  1831),  p.  xxx. 

2  Grosley's  Tour  to  London  (1772),  i.  97. 

3  Letter  from  a  Merchant  (1757),  p.  9. 

4  ibid.  p.  30. 

5  Interest  of  Great  Britain  (1759),  p.  20. 


12  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

lavished  upon  their  comforts,  and  l  AVolfe  even  complained 
that  they  suffered  from  too  much  pay  and  too  much  rum. 
Benevolence  was  then  a  strong  factor  in  English  life,  and 
combined  with  patriotism,  it  gave  impetus  to  the  Marine 
Society,  founded  by  Fowler  Walker,  a  barrister  in  1756  for 
the  purpose  of  collecting  waifs  and  strays  for  the  navy. 
The  scheme  was  forwarded  with  spirit  by  Sir  John  Fielding 
and  Jonas  Hanway,  the  oriental  traveller,  and  subscrip- 
tions were  contributed  by  the  corporations  of  London, 
Bristol,  Leeds,  York  and  Norwich.  2  Between  1756  and 
1762,  5451  boys  were  drafted  from  the  streets  to  the  navy, 
and  4787  enlisted  as  naval  volunteers.  Youths  flocked 
into  both  branches  of  the  service,  and  3special  perform- 
ances were  given  by  Garrick,  Rich  and  the  proprietors  of 
Ranelagh,  to  raise  funds  for  the  Marine  Society.  In  May 
1756  the  government  waived  its  right  to  share  in  prize 
money  accruing  from  subsequent  French  captures,  with  a 
view  to  encourage  officers  and  seamen,  while  4  the  King 
devoted  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  prizes  taken  before  the 
declaration  of  war,  amounting  to  over  £700,000,  to  the 
national  cause.  5In  1759  the  Court  of  Common  Council 
subscribed  £1,000  towards  a  voluntary  London  fund  to 
bestow  bounties  upon  recruits,  to  which  6  the  City 
Companies  contributed  liberally.  7  The  people  of  New- 
castle raised  sufficient  money  to  furnish  each  recruit  who 
joined  the  Royal  Volunteers  or  the  sixty-ninth  regiment 
then  quartered  in  the  town,  with  a  gratuity  of  two  guineas, 


1  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Eep.  ix. ;  pt.  3,  75. 

2  J.  Pugh's  Life  of  Hanway  (1768),  p.  143. 

3  ibid,  p.  142. 

4=  Consideration  on  the  Trade  of  this  Kingdom  (1766),  p.  30. 
s  Annual  Register  (1759),  p.  106. 

6  ibid,  p.  115. 

7  ibid,  p.  116. 


THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  13 

while  Berwick  emulated  Newcastle  by  offering  three 
guineas.  For  once  England  made  light  of  the  difficulty  in 
completing  her  establishment,  under  which  she  laboured 
during  the  whole  century.  Every  county  encouraged  its 
soldiery.  Isaac  Barre,  afterwards  an  adherent  of  Shelburne 
and  an  opponent  of  the  forward  policy  in  America,  fought 
under  Wolfe  at  Rochefort,  and  organised  the  Black 
Musqueteers  in  1761 ;  Gibbon  and  his  father  served  in  the 
Hampshire  militia  for  over  three  years.  l  In  1759  fourteen 
thousand  militiamen  did  not  object  to  remaining  under 
arms  in  spite  of  the  haymaking  and  harvest  seasons. 
2  "You  may  be  easy  as  to  the  consequences  of  invasion," 
wrote  Lord  Holderness  laughingly  to  Lord  George  Sackville, 
"  as  the  Yorkshire  militia  is  ready  to  take  the  field."  Large 
sums  were  raised  for  the  relief  of  widows  and  orphans. 
In  1762  upwards  of  3  337,000  men  were  employed  on  land 
and  sea  in  the  British  service,  of  whom  57,000  were  German 
mercenaries  and  20,000  colonials.  The  ratio  of  British- 
born  soldiery  was  for  that  age  remarkably  high,  and  their 
morale  never  better.  The  heroes  of  the  war  live  still  in 
song  and  story.  An  eloquent  contemporary  said  of 
Boscawen  that  he  4"  established  the  British  fame  in 
remotest  Asia,  and  made  the  Indies  echo  with  his  thunder" ; 
the  Marquis  of  Granby  became  a  popular  idol,  while 
Hawke,  when  thanked  for  his  deeds  by  the  Houses  of 
Parliament,  answered  simply,  5  "In  doing  my  utmost,  I 
only  did  the  duty  I  owed  my  King  and  country." 

It  cannot  be  disputed  that  the  polemical  literature  which 
supported   the   work   of   these   men   of   action   reached   a 

1  Bedford  Correspondence  (ed.  1842),  ii.  393. 

2  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  ix. ;  pt.  3,  79. 
;3  Annual  Register  (1763),  p.  50. 

4=  The  Real  Character  of  the  Age  (1757). 
s  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.  xv.    958. 


14  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

comparatively  high  level  of  good  sense.  If  the  enemy 
were  assailed  with  scurrility,  such  abuse  was  not  levelled 
against  them  as  Frenchmen,  but  rather  as  against  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  the  national  mission.  Men  felt  very  honestly 
on  the  question  of  America.  It  was  thought  essential  to 
England  to  save  her  own  territory,  and  win  that  of  the 
French.  Politicians  had  unsound  views  as  to  the  true  uses 
of  a  colony,  but  of  its  value  as  a  market  they  had  very 
clear  perception,  and  this  calculating  statesmanship  was 
never  wholly  obscured  by  the  enthusiasm  with  which  it 
was  supported.  Most  apostles  of  the  war  policy  remained 
cool  and  alert,  even  when  Pitt  himself  seemed  to  lose  his 
feet  in  the  rush  of  triumphs. 

The  foundation  of  a  firm  empire  was  thus  a  genuine 
object  of  the  majority  of  Englishmen,  who  little  dreamed 
then  that  their  choice  of  means  was  destined  shortly  to 
subvert  it.  x"  Farewell  imperial  England,"  wrote  Joseph 
Baretti,  Doctor  Johnson's  Italian  friend  in  1759,  a 
significant  term  in  the  mouth  of  one  who  knew  the  mean- 
ing of  empire,  and  had  seen  2 militiamen  drilling  at 
Honiton.  Hundreds  of  poems  proclaimed  the  virtues  of 
England's  new  militant  ideal.  3"( Britannia  resting  on 
her  ported  spear"  supplanted  the  complacent  goddess  of 
the  days  of  Walpole's  peace.  One  Jones  dedicated  his 
"Patriot  Enterprize"  to  Pitt,  and  vaunted  "the  crimson 
cross  of  England"  in  1758; 

4  "Around  the  globe  her  dreaded  flag  display, 
Let  ocean's  utmost  bounds  her  flag  obey." 

James  Ogden  chose  the  same  stirring  theme  for  his  poem, 
called  "  The  British  Lion  Roused." 

1  Baretti's  Journey  from  London  to  G«noa  (1770),  i.  3. 

2  ibid,  i.  8. 

3  W.  Dobson's  Prussian  Campaign  (1759),  p.  25. 

4  Gent.  Mag.  (1758),  p.  282. 


THE  SEVEN   YEARS'  WAR  15 

1  "Aloft  the  British  flag  defiance  hurls 

Her  topsail  lately  loos'd  the  Frenchman  furls." 

Sheer  exultation  breathes  in  every  line  of  such  appeals  to 
popular  ardour,  though  the  Annual  Register  of  1762  is 
careful  to  explain  that  the  nation's  self-confidence  was  not 
based  on  arrogance  or  presumption,  but  on  2"  a  just  opinion 
of  superior  courage."  Patrick,  a  volunteer  who  fought  at 
Quebec,  wrote  a  "Poetical  Essay,"  in  which  patriotism 
burned  very  brightly. 

3  "Short  the  dispute,  for  when  could  Gallic  strength 
Withstand  a  British  arm?" 

He  ranged  over  the  world-wide  scenes  of  English  conquest, 
including  even  "  inmost  Af  ric,"  while  4  another  bard 
treated  the  flag  as  supreme  from  the  sands  of  Africa  to  the 
snows  of  Nova  Zembla.  Patrick  however,  saw  the  practical 
side  of  the  war  as  well,  and  in  discussing  its  chief  issue,  he 
said  with  much  truth  and  acumen  that  it  was  5 "  a  war 
perhaps  the  most  just  and  simple  that  ever  nation  engaged 
in,  and  entered  into  with  uncommon  spirit  by  King  and 
people."  In  the  struggle  for  survival  among  would-be 
world  empires,  each  combatant  has  a  just  cause' and  a  clear 
issue  at  stake. 

Such  then  was  the  general  impression,  and  the  Great 
Commoner  found  it  easy  to  stir  men's  already  kindling 
thoughts.  London,  as  the  centre  of  English  commerce, 
throbbed  with  the  war  spirit,  and  furnished  the  army  with 
as  many  recruits  as  did  the  whole  of  Protestant 
Ireland;  Catholics  were  not  allowed  to  enlist.  6 Flags 

1  Ogden's  British  Lion  (1758),  p.  13. 

2  Annual  Register  (1762),  p.  6. 

3  Patrick's  Quebec  (1760),  p.  20. 
*  Annual  Register  (1763),  p.  226. 
s  Patrick's  Quebec  (1760),  p.  2. 

«  H.  Walpole's  Letters  to  Mann  (ed.  1833),  iii.  292. 


16  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

captured  at  Louisburg  were  carried  in  triumph  to  St. 
Paul's,  and  cannon  taken  at  Cherbourg  were  trailed  into 
Hyde  Park.  The  rich  "  Nabobs,"  who  were  just  entering 
English  society  now  that  dive's  genius  had  for  the  first 
time  opened  the  way  to  making  large  private  fortunes  in 
India,  gave  solid  support  to  those  who  preached  the  uses 
of  trade  wars.  Clive  was  devoted  to  Pitt,  and  when  the 
great  victory  of  Plassey  had  made  him  master  of  northern 
India,  he  presented  him  with  a  very  beautiful  and  un- 
common animal  from  Bengal.  *A  Cambridgeshire  vicar 
called  Wilson  made  the  first  recorded  suggestion  of  con- 
structing a  Panama  canal,  calling  upon  the  government  to 
conquer  the  Isthmus.  Success  in  Canada  converted  many 
of  the  Whig  nobles  from  their  early  indifference.  2  "  Great 
and  most  seasonable  news,"  wrote  Newcastle  to  Bedford 
after  Quebec.  3  "  Interesting  news,  and  I  hope  to  find  the 
price  of  beaver  hats  much  lowered,"  was  Baretti's  drier 
comment.  Newcastle  indeed,  though  remaining  4  jealous 
of  Pitt,  and  pleased  when  he  fell  in  1761,  realised  some- 
thing of  the  glory  of  the  new  efficiency.  5  "  My  heart  is  so 
full  of  the  joyful  news,"  he  said  after  the  taking  of 
Louisburg,  and  certainly  such  successes  were  so  captivating 
that  there  seemed  to  be  need  no  longer  of  the  artificial 
propaganda  of  an  6Anti-Gallican  Association,  which  had 
been  called  into  being  for  the  diffusion  of  odes  to  Pitt,  and 
invectives  against  France.  7The  gallery  and  pit  inter- 
rupted the  Drury  Lane  pantomime  in  order  to  make  the 
band  play  "  God  save  great  George  the  King."  In  1759 

1  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  vi. ;  pt.  1,  316. 

2  Bedford  Correspondence,  ii.  415. 

s  Baretti's  Journey  from  London  to  Genoa  (1770),  iv.  44. 

4  Nicholls'  Recollections  (1822),  i.  9. 

s  Grenville  Papers,  i.  259. 

e  For  Our  Country  (1757),  p.  17. 

7  Kilmansegg's  Journey  in  England  (ed.  1902),  p.  225. 


THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  17 

one  writer  treated  England's  various  acquisitions  as  already 
her  children; 

iaHere  Senegal  hold  up  your  head; 
This  tawny  boy,  his  parents'  boast, 
Shall  bring  us  gold  from  Afric's  coast, 
And  mark  these  twins  of  Indian  mien, 
This  Louisburg,  and  this  Du  Quesne." 

After  all,  it  is  not  often  that  a  country  can  claim  without 
dispute  that  its  chief  minister  is  the  greatest  figure  in  the 
world,  and  sueh  indeed  was  Pitt.  2In  regions  as  remote  as 
Armenia  and  Georgia,  men  looked  to  him  for  deliverence 
from  the  Turkish  yoke.  Every  Englishman  who  thought 
himself  a  bard  sought  to  do  him  honour,  from  Goldsmith 
and  Mark  Akenside  down  to  "William  Whitehead,  the 
laureate  himself. 

However,  the  Judges  were  no  less  successful  than  the 
poets  in  exemplifying  the  mercantile  aspect  of  the  war. 
When  the  great  Sir  William  Scott  delivered  judgment  in 
the  leading  case  of  The  Immanuel  in  1799,  he  alluded 
deferentially  to  "the  revered  decisions"  of  the  Court  of 
Appeal  of  1756.  That  Court  had  expressed  the  so-called 
Rule  of  the  "War  of  1756  that  no  neutral  could  trade 
between  a  belligerent  country  and  such  of  that  country's 
colonies,  from  which  neutrals  had  been  excluded  before 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The  French  had  opened  the 
doors  of  their  colonial  markets  under  stress  of  the  war,  but 
the  English  courts  deemed  any  Dutch  or  Hamburg  neutrals, 
who  availed  themselves  of  this  too  opportune  free  trade, 
interlopers  in  a  belligerent  traffic,  and  as  such  incorporated 
into  the  French  navigation  and  liable  to  be  condemned. 
This  is  a  clear  instance  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Judges 

1  Annual  Register  (1759),  p.  442. 

2  Original  Letters  (ed.  Rebecca  Warner,  1817),  pp.  176,  178. 


18  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

have  treated  English  customary  ideas  as  law.  The  country 
was  but  a  novice  in  International  Law.  Murray  had  com- 
posed his  famous  refutation  of  Prussian  claims  in  the 
affair  of  the  Silesian  loan  in  1753,  simply  by  means  of 
special  research.  The  device  of  France  in  opening  her 
colonial  trade  to  neutrals  puzzled  English  jurists  at  first, 
and  as  Anne,  Princess  of  Orange  and  guardian  of  the 
young  stadtholder,  William  V.,  was  an  English  princess, 
1  Pitt  favoured  her  by  releasing  certain  Dutch  offenders  in 
1758.  The  question  however  soon  rose  again  when  Anne 
died,  and  Pitt  changed  his  attitude.  Jenkinson,  who  had 
already  proved  that  the  Netherlands  were  bound  by  the 
treaty  of  1717  to  give  England  active  assistance  instead  of 
covert  hostility,  had  already  2  searched  London  for  Dutch 
authorities  on  International  Law,  there  being  no  English 
book  on  the  subject  later  than  that  of  Zouch  (1650),  and 
had  advised  the  government  in  1757  that  the  trade  com- 
plained of  was  illegal.  By  the  middle  of  1759  the  English 
principle  was  established,  largely  owing  to  the  determina- 
tion of  3Pitt  and  the  opinions  of  4Hardwicke  and  Mansfield. 
Thenceforward,  5few  cases  arise  on  the  point,  as  most  of 
the  French  colonies  had  been  conquered,  and  trade  with 
the  remainder  had  become  too  hazardous.  Two  Dutch 
ships  were  condemned  by  the  Lords  of  Appeal  in  March 
1760,  and  two  more  in  the  following  June.  The  judicial 
decisions  on  the  question  show  clearly  that  colonies  were 
then  considered  to  have  no  independent  existence  apart 
from  their  Mother  Country,  and  to  have  by  nature  what  a 
later  age  has  called  "  closed  doors." 

1  Chatham  Correspondence,  i.  357. 

2  Grenville  Papers,  i.  270. 

3  Authentic  Memoirs  of  Chatham  (1778),  p.  20. 

4  Grenville  Papers,  ii.  295. 

s  Annual  Pvegister  (1759),  p.  5. 


THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  19 

Of  course,  there  were  doubters,  for  even  Pitt  could  not 
charm  all  Britain  into  unanimity.  The  bulk  of  the  nation 
echoed  his  colonial  ambitions,  but  one  section  stood  aloof 
from  the  war  policy  altogether.  The  Leicester  House 
clique  did  not  disagree  on  the  American  question,  but  they 
hated  the  waste  of  men  and  money  on  Continental  battle- 
fields. In  opposition  to  George  II. 's  schemes,  they  had  no 
patience  for  the  sounding  paradox,  "  conquering  America 
on  the  plains  of  Germany." 

1  "Yes,  he  forsook  the  empire  of  the  main, 

With  British  blood  dy'd  every  German  plain." 

There  were  however  others,  who  objected  to  the  whole 
theory  of  empire  upon  which  Pitt's  policy  was  based. 
They  would  rather  have  seen  the  French  carve  out  what 
dominions  they  might  choose  to  exploit  in  the  west,  than 
incur  the  long  exhaustion  involved  by  even  successful 
warfare.  Shebbeare  for  instance,  ridiculed  the  scheme  of 
American  supremacy.  2  Our  alarm  of  French  attacks  on 
our  colonies  was  attributed  to  the  private  interest  and 
backstairs  influence  of  a  certain  Quaker.  The  dull  3Lord 
Hillsborough,  who  was  afterwards  made  Secretary  of  State 
for  India  before  he  knew  the  geographical  whereabouts  of 
Bengal,  refused  to  believe  that  the  French  had  en- 
croached upon  the  Ohio  valley  at  all.  Grenville,  a  far 
abler  man,  disclaimed  the  prevailing  habit  of  fighting  for 
mere  trade  interests.  With  a  dim  premonition  of  the 
future  problem  of  ways  and  means,  that  was  destined  to 
lead  him  to  suggest  the  Stamp  Act,  he  opposed  the  forward 
school  in  1755,  as  bent  on  dragging  England  into  a  war  for 

1  The  Patriot  Poet,  a  Satire  (1764),  p.  10. 

2  A  Letter  to  the  People  of  England  on  the  Present  Situation  (1755), 

p.  33. 
s  Wraxall's  Memoirs  (ed.  1818),  ii.  156. 


20  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

gold,  l" vexing  your  neighbours  for  a  little  muck." 
2 Horace  Walpole  objected  to  endangering  our  own  island 
for  visionary  empire  on  the  Ohio.  When  the  war  had 
lasted  several  years,  the  voice  of  opposition  became  more 
articulate.  The  severe  winter  of  1759-60  occasioned  dis- 
tress, while  Pitt  had  no  mastery  of  finance,  and  critics 
complained  that  the  incidence  of  his  taxation  of  beer,  malt 
and  cider  fell  3"upon  the  most  useful  and  laborious  part 
of  the  nation."  This  was  no  idle  charge,  as  the  liquor 
interest  procured  the  passing  of  4  an  act  enabling  victuallers 
and  others  to  raise  the  price  of  strong  beer  and  ale,  and 
thereby  to  transfer  their  own  burden  to  the  consumers. 
In  1761  David  Hume  deplored  5"this  miserable  war."  In 
1762  one  writer  pointed  out  the  horrors  of  the  protracted 
struggle  with  more  than  a  touch  of  Swift,  and  asked 
whether  6"a  few  wooden  legs  or  a  battered  French  ship" 
were  worth  the  price  of  war.  7 Would  it  not  be  better  to 
till  the  earth  and  throw  the  shuttle?  Similar  doubts  led 
8  Sir  Samuel  Romilly  in  after  days  to  declare  that  all  the 
glories  of  Pitt's  policy  and  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  did 
not  confer  a  moment's  happiness  to  humanity,  but  merely 
much  bloodshed  and  a  burdensome  debt. 

In  general  however,  the  war  party  predominated,  and  in 
few  British  wars  has  a  government  been  able  to  rely  on  so 
effective  a  majority.  9  The  Senegal  expedition  was  made 

1  G.  Bubb  Dodington's  Diary  (July  21,  1755). 

2  H.  Walpole's  Letters  to  Mann,  iii.    326. 

3  An  Enquiry  into  the  Conduct  of  a  late  Rt.  Hon.  Commoner  (1766), 

p.    15;    cf.    Consideration   on  the   Trade     etc.     of   this   kingdom 
(1766),  p.  6. 

4  2  Geo.  iii.  c.  14. 

5  Hume's  Private  Correspondence  (ed.  1820),  p.  3. 

6  Some  Reasons  for  Serious  Candor  (1762),  p.  7. 

7  ibid,  p.  8. 

8  Romilly's  Memoirs  (ed.  1840),  i.    402. 

9  Authentic  Memoirs  of  Chatham  (1778),  p.  19. 


THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  21 

at  the  suggestion  of  Gumming,  a  Quaker,  and  every  class 
1  contributed  towards  providing  the  army  with  thousands 
of  flannel  waistcoats,  woollen  gloves  and  caps,  and  half- 
gaiters.  Among  the  ministers  of  the  time,  Pitt,  and  Pitt 
alone,  was  essentially  the  people's  choice.  There  is  so 
great  a  volume  of  evidence  as  to  England's  practical 
unanimity  in  her  colonial  aspirations  during  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  that  one  cannot  help  asking  why  so  vast  a 
power  for  good  was  frittered  away  in  a  decade.  It  is  true 
that  her  theory  of  empire  was  as  yet  crude  and  fallacious, 
and  that  much  of  her  zeal  was  undisciplined,  but  it  is  just 
possible  that  such  defects  could  have  been  cured  by  a  wise 
leader.  The  empire  was  young,  and  her  children  over  sea, 
like  Washington,  rejoiced  with  her  children  in  the  home 
country  that  2  "the  French  are  so  well  drubbed."  The 
motive  power  which  had  constructed  Greater  Britain,  was 
surely  capable  of  something  more  than  conquest.  Yet 
though  the  conquerors  thus  required  immediate  education, 
their  master's  hand  shook  at  the  crucial  moment,  for  Pitt 
allowed  their  imperial  ardour  to  sink  into  the  profitless 
channels  of  Continental  militarism.  He  did  not  rise  above 
his  generation  to  find  the  true  science  of  colonial  govern- 
ment. Great  as  he  was,  he  fell  just  short  of  that  con- 
summate statesmanship,  which  might  possibly  have  made 
the  elements  in  English  life  evoked  by  the  French  war  a 
source  of  perpetual  union  among  Britons  rather  than  seeds 
of  separation.  Be  that  as  it  may,  there  are  few  war 
administrations  to  which  Englishmen  can  look  back  with 
more  respect  than  that  which  witnessed  Plassey  and 
Quebec.  The  country  then  showed  a  wonderful  capacity 
to  understand  and  to  endure  a  most  momentous  crisis. 

1  Annual  Register  (1760),  p.  67. 

2  Sparks'  Writings  of  Washington  (1847),  ii.  332. 


22  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

Unfortunately  the  subsequent  necessity  to  organise  and 
perpetuate  the  empire  she  had  created  proved  too  great  a 
task  and  Pitt's  warning  to  Hardwicke  after  the  capture  of 
Quebec  dipped  into  an  actual  future.  x"  Sustaining  this 
war,  arduous  as  it  has  been  and  still  is,  may  not  be  more 
difficult  than  properly  and  happily  closing  it." 

1  Harris's  Hardwicke,  iii.  193. 


PITT'S    INFLUENCE  23 


CHAPTER    II. 

PITT'S  INFLUENCE  AS  MINISTER. 

PITT'S  chief  title  to  fame  lies  in  his  power  to  awaken 
enthusiasm  for  the  cause  of  Greater  Britain.  He  found 
dormant  possibilities  in  English  life,  and  he  made  them 
valuable  realities.  He  saw  tendencies,  which  might  be 
utilised  for  the  empire,  and  he  made  them  do  service  for 
that  purpose.  His  boast,  "  I  alone  can  save  this  country," 
was  true,  and  he  guided  the  state  in  the  Seven  Years'  War 
towards  vast  territorial  aggrandisement.  For  this  reason, 
we  can  be  too  censorious  as  to  the  crooked  paths  by  which 
Pitt  groped  his  way  to  power.  They  are  really  irrelevant 
to  his  place  in  history.  Like  most  great  statesmen,  he 
considered  that  the  end  justified  the  means,  and  so  he 
truckled  to  the  prejudices  of  the  hour  until  he  was  once 
supreme.  Then  he  showed  his  real  convictions,  and  after 
1755,  he  never  conceded  an  iota  to  any  popular  clamour, 
with  which  he  did  not  agree.  Thus  as  a  "boy  patriot," 
yearning  for  opportunities,  he  had  denounced  l  Hanover  as 
u  a  despicable  electorate,"  and  as  "  an  execrable  mill-stone 
hung  about  the  neck  of  Great  Britain."  As  minister,  he 
styled  it  2"  as  dear  to  us  as  Hampshire,"  and  the  mill-stone 
became  3"a  cork  jacket."  In  opposition,  he  had  received 
in  1744  a  legacy  of  £10,000  from  the  Duchess  of 

1  An  Enquiry  into  the  Conduct  of  a  late  Rt.   Hon.  Commoner  (1766), 

p.  12;  A  Letter  to  Will  Chat-em  (1766),  p.  19. 

2  Dodington's  Diary  (Aug.  6,  1755). 

3  A  Vindication  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Great  Commoner  (1766),  p.  9. 


24  THE   OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

Marlborough  to  enable  him  to  work  l "  unplaced  and  un- 
pensioned  " ;  in  office,  he  was  lavish  in  such  instruments  of 
allurement.  2As  late  as  November  1755,  he  had  denounced 
foreign  wars  and  subsidies;  his  own  ministry  thought  of 
little  else.  Judged  however,  as  empire-builder  and  colonial 
theorist,  Pitt's  past  inconsistencies  should  not  be  treated 
too  seriously.  They  had  no  bearing  upon  the  influence 
which  he  exercised  over  the  country  during  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  and  it  is  this  influence  that  is  really  all- 
important  in  estimating  Pitt's  share  in  the  evolution  of 
British  imperial  policy.  It  has  been  suggested  that  possibly 
his  change  of  front  can  be  justified  by  the  change  in  the 
character  of  the  European  conflict;  German  campaigns 
were  no  longer  of  merely  Hanoverian  interest. 

Undoubtedly,  Pitt's  greatest  work  was  to  give  the  nation 
scope  for  its  latent  capacity  for  expansion.  For  many 
years,  the  potentiality  of  a  Crusade  against  France  had 
been  there.  Pitt  made  the  Crusade  a  practical  and  success- 
ful undertaking.  He  was  indifferent  to  finance;  he  was 
given  to  acting,  and  often  lacked  balance  and  sobriety,  but 
no  Englishman  has  ever  attained  to  his  power  to  evoke 
enthusiasm,  or  to  his  genius  for  sustaining  that  enthusiasm 
by  efficiency  in  action.  In  this,  he  showed  himself  a  man 
of  the  times.  He  was  distinguished  from  the  average 
citizen  only  by  his  far  greater  talents;  he  had  the  same 
national  ambitions,  and  the  same  sound  appreciation  of 
how  best  to  carry  out  a  working  project.  Careless  though 
he  was  of  popular  criticism,  he  was  the  first  to  learn 
wisdom  through  experience,  and  men  recognized  how 
directly  he  was  the  cause  of  their  triumphs  on  sea  and  in 
the  field.  He  had  a  genius  for  discovering  talent,  and 

1  An  Enquiry    etc.,  p.  11. 

2  An  Examination  of  the  Principles  of  a  late  Rt.  Hon.  Gentleman  (1766), 

p.  29. 


PITT'S    INFLUENCE  25 

Wolfe  and  Boscawen,  Amherst  and  Pocock  were  all  objects 
of  his  own  personal  choice,  as  were  the  diplomatists, 
Louis  Dutens,  and  Hans  Stanley.  Pitt  was  bent  on  making 
Greater  Britain  a  permanent  empire,  and  with  that  end 
in  view,  he  never  hesitated  to  stimulate  the  general  hatred 
of  the  house  of  Bourbon.  1In  1T55  he  urged  that  the 
government  ought  never  to  have  allowed  the  French  to 
establish  themselves  in  America  at  all,  and  he  clung  to 
this  principle  to  the  last.  His  resignation  in  October  1761 
was  directly  due  to  the  King's  aversion  to  declaring  war  on 
Spain,  and  in  1763,  when  it  looked  as  if  some  of  the  fruits 
of  his  work  might  be  lost  through  the  shallow  leniency  of 
Bute,  he  declaimed  against  the  retrocession  of  Manila  and 
Havannah,  and  declared  maritime  and  colonial  supremacy 
to  be  essentials  of  British  policy.  Even  William  of  Orange 
did  not  evince  greater  animus  against  France  than  did 
Pitt  during  the  years  of  his  power.  2When  the  Due  de 
Nivernois  remonstrated  against  certain  acts  of  piracy  by 
Englishmen,  he  was  told  that  if  Great  Britain  were  only 
just  to  her  neighbour,  the  latter's  existence  would  not  last 
another  fifty  years. 

Pitt's  influence  upon  the  people  was  naturally  immense, 
and  their  consequent  realisation  of  the  issues  involved  by 
the  war  won  the  struggle  for  England.  3In  America 
Dinwiddie  explained  the  true  gravity  of  the  situation  to 
the  Virginia  assembly,  while  Arthur  Dobbs  enlisted  support 
in  North  Carolina  in  1755,  by  dilating  upon  French 
depredations  in  Protestant  Germany,  and  along  the 
frontier  of  our  American  colonies.  He  said  that  Britain's 
object  was  to  confine  the  enemy  to  inhospitable  Canada 
and  the  hot  sands  of  Louisiana,  instead  of  suffering  them 

1  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xv.    605. 

2  Soulavie,  Memoires  du  regne  de  Louis  xvi.  (ed.  1801),  iii.  372. 

3  Gent.  Mag.  (1755),  p.  305. 


26  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

to  perfect  their  own  plans  of  conquest,  l "  hatched  in  hell, 
and  supported  by  the  court  of  Rome."  In  England  Pitt 
did  much  to  encourage  national  self-confidence,  or  (as 
some  will  say)  vainglory,  for  choice  between  two  such 
terms  is  usually  arbitrary.  Pessimists,  who  had  lamented 
the  futility  of  British  efforts  in  1754  and  1755,  and  the 
seeming  decadence  of  national  spirit,  were  now  attacked 
with  vigour.  2 Brown,  who  had  pointed  with  dismay  at 
our  reliance  on  foreign  mercenaries  in  1745,  and  3had 
questioned  the  efficacy  of  subsidies  if  an  invader  once 
reached  Salisbury  Plain,  was  now  judged  to  be  refuted. 
The  army  had  disproved  their  alleged  inability  to  do  more 
than  polish  helmets,  and  march  past  correctly.  4"0ur 
soldiers  dress  better  than  others,"  wrote  one  of  Pitt's 
adherents  in  1757,  "but  sir,  they  also  fight  better.  We 
have  beau  Admirals,  and  the  prettiest  gentleman  of  the 
age  commands  a  ship  of  war.  You  infer  from  hence  they 
will  not  fight  but  ....  if  an  enemy  takes  your  word,  I 
am  persuaded  he  will  repent  it  bitterly.  There  is  nothing 
inconsistent  in  valour  and  a  clean  shirt.  The  best  dressed 
head  may  face  an  enemy  as  erect  as  the  uncombed  Charles 
of  Sweden."  This  writer  looked  forward  to  England  out- 
shining Greece  and  Eome  under  Pitt's  guidance.  He 
deemed  his  country  naturally  supreme,  not  only  in  war 
but  also  in  the  arts  of  peace.  It  had  even  shown  its 
appreciation  of  music  by  welcoming  the  "Messiah,"  and 
as  to  our  chances  in  the  struggle  for  America  they  were 
bright  indeed.  "  The  reverence  for  liberty  and  property 
is  so  religiously  stamped  on  every  breast  that  the  meanest 
Briton  (if  it  be  possible  a  Briton  can  be  mean)  would  wish 

1  ibid,  p.  306. 

2  Brown's  Estimate  of  the  Manners  of  the  Times  (1757),  p.  91. 

3  ibid,  p.  201. 

4  The  Eeal  Character  of  the  Age  (1757). 


PITT'S    INFLUENCE  27 

to  live  free  rather  than  be  a  Frenchman  and  a  slave."  In 
Scotland,  Pitt's  wisdom  led  to  the  raising  of  two  Highland 
regiments — Montgomery's  (the  77th)  and  Eraser's  (the 
78th)  in  1757,  a  step  which  led  to  the  formation  of  others 
in  1759  and  1760. 

It  seems  to  have  been  also  largely  due  to  Pitt,  that 
George  II.  earned  popularity  in  the  last  years  of  his  reign. 
Previously  the  King  had  hated  him  for  his  opposition,  but 
Court  support  was  still  most  useful  to  a  ministry,  and  Pitt 
won  it  by  his  conversion  to  a  policy  of  self-assertion 
abroad.  He  assured  Cumberland  of  his  wish  iuto  efface 
the  past."  In  return,  he  defended  that  unlucky  general 
after  Closterseven,  and  always  identified  the  Crown  with 
the  national  ambitions  in  the  war.  2In  Parliament,  the 
old  King  became  universally  popular.  He  was  at  last  in  a 
situation  for  which  he  had  qualifications,  and  his  candid 
preference  for  English  generals  like  Clive  over  Germans 
like  Eerdinand  of  Brunswick,  and  his  liking  for  Hawke, 
whom  he  called  "my  captain,"  showed  the  new  relation- 
ship between  King  and  people.  They  began  to  appreciate 
his  good  work  in  keeping  the  army  free  from  corrupt 
patronage. 

However,  the  most  important  historical  question  which 
arises  in  reference  to  this  time,  is  how  far  Pitt  turned  the 
enthusiasm  which  he  so  largely  created  to  the  best  advant- 
age. We  must  ask  whether  he  utilised  the  new  imperial 
ardour  to  the  full,  and  whether  he  could  control  the  flood 
of  national  feeling  which  he  had  evoked,  in  order  to 
organise  an  empire  as  well  as  victories. 

It  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  surmise  whether  Pitt  con- 
templated any  remodelling  of  colonial  relations  as  a 
necessary  sequel  to  the  conquest  of  North  America.  It  is 

1  P.  Fitzgerald's  Townshend  (1866),  p.  97. 

2  Arthur  Young's  Autobiography  (ed.  1898),  p.  17. 


28  THE   OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

probable  that  he  had  drifted  away  from  his  single-minded 
endeavours  to  expand  the  empire  long  before  his  fall  in 
1761.  Undoubtedly,  he  did  aim  consistently  at  the  sup- 
planting of  a  French  by  a  British  world  empire,  but  in 
the  whirl  of  military  triumphs,  this  scheme  appears  to 
have  sunk  into  a  group  of  other  aims  of  far  less  national 
moment,  and  this  modification  of  his  policy  of  1756  had 
very  serious  influence  upon  popular  thought.  Men  were 
so  subject  to  his  personal  opinions,  that  his  subordination 
of  colonial  dreams  to  European  policy  led  to  absolute 
popular  neglect  of  the  far  more  vital  question  of  how  to 
govern  America  after  1763.  Converted  to  the  plan  of  in- 
juring France  in  Europe,  Pitt  never  taught  them  that  the 
expulsion  of  the  French  from  Canada  necessitated  a  re- 
adjustment of  the  existing  colonial  system,  and  even  in 
his  subsequent  wealth  of  oratory  on  the  subject  of  American 
taxation,  he  never  pointed  out  any  concise  scheme  of  re- 
construction. English  indifference  to  the  need  for  a  new 
imperial  policy  can  therefore  be  attributed  largely  to  Pitt's 
exclusive  attention  to  conquering  America  on  the  plains  of 
Germany.  1  That  policy  was  abhorrent  to  him  in  1755, 
but  by  three  subsequent  treaties  Great  Britain  agreed  to 
subsidise  Frederick  the  Great,  and  men  and  money  were 
sent  to  the  Continent  in  profusion,  for  the  purpose  of 
aiding  him  in  his  struggle  against  France,  Austria  and 
Russia.  The  alliance  clearly  injured  France;  it  was 
probably  necessary  at  the  time  though  Bute's  reckless 
abandonment  of  Prussia  in  November  1762  forfeited 
England's  claims  upon  her  gratitude.  It  is  doubtful  how- 
ever, if  Pitt's  famous  paradox  was  much  better  than  a  bare 
excuse.  It  is  true  that  France's  absorption  in  the 
Continental  war  proved  her  ruin  over  sea,  but  such  was 
the  customary  trend  of  her  .politics ;  and  the  same  conflict 
i  Harris's  Hardwicke,  iii.  33. 


PITT'S    INFLUENCE  29 

would  have  diverted  her  from  America,  even  if  Pitt  had 
not  stiffened  Prussian  resistance  by  soldiers  and  subsidies. 
The  tendency  in  France  to  prefer  European  dominion  to 
colonial  expansion  was  already  irresistible,  and  if  the 
dust  was  in  the  eyes  of  the  French  government,  it  was  not 
of  Pitt's  throwing. 

Moreover,  Pitt's  interest  in  the  German  war  seems  to 
have  encroached  on  his  interest  in  purely  colonial  policy, 
when  once  the  conflict  had  taken  a  decisive  turn.  At  all 
events,  his  joy  over  Prussian  victories  was  not  expressed 
in  a  manner  calculated  to  give  the  impression  that  he 
regarded  the  war  as  primarily  maritime  and  colonial. 
1 "  Here's  enough  to  make  one  giddy,"  he  wrote  delightedly 
after  Frederick's  victory  at  Breslau.  In  June  1758  he 
wrote  to  Grenville  that  2"we  are  all  joy  here,"  on  account 
of  the  battle  of  Creveld.  "We  are  sending  twelve 
squadrons  of  English  cavalry  to  this  glorious  school  of 
war,  and  I  hope  to  share  a  sprig  of  Germanic  laurel  very 
soon," — words  which  are  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  idea 
that  he  had  engaged  in  the  German  war  as  a  disagreeable 
necessity  for  the  sake  of  more  English  issues.  After  3"  our 
happy  victory  "  of  Minden,  he  sems  to  have  believed  in  the 
expediency  of  continuing  to  support  the  campaigns  of 
4  "our  immortal  Frederick"  for  mere  glory's  sake. 
Ferdinand  of  Brunswick,  who  led  English  troops  in 
Prussian  service  with  skill  and  success,  was  5  rewarded  by 
a  grant  of  £25,000,  a  sword  worth  £1,000,  a  blue  ribbon, 
and  £2,500  a  year  secured  on  the  Irish  establishment, 
while  English  officers  who  were  "  conquering  America  "  in 

1  Chatham  Correspondence,  ii.    2. 

2  Grenville  Papers,  i.    244. 

3  Chatham  Correspondence,  ii.    7. 

4  ibid,  ii.    9. 

5  Letter  to  Will  Chat-em  Esquire  of  Turn-about  Hall  (1766),  p.  28. 


30  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

America  itself  had  no  such  favours.     Nor  was  Hawke  re- 
warded with  a  peerage  until  1765. 

It  must  indeed  be  admitted  that  ^ome  Englishmen 
believed  that  no  trans-Atlantic  war  could  be  waged 
successfully  against  France,  without  some  Continental 
alliance.  One  of  Pitt's  supporters  argued  in  Parliament 
in  1762  that  2 "  the  minister  who  goes  to  war  with  France, 
when  that  nation  is  in  her  full  vigour,  without  a  diversion 
on  the  Continent  does  it  with  a  halter  about  his  neck," 
and  a  typical  Whig  of  1781  ascribed  our  failures  in  the 
American  War  to  its  being  3"one  of  those  stupid  wars 
which  the  Tories  have  always  clamoured  for — a  naval  war 
with  France  without  any  land  war  in  which  our  men  might 
die  in  German  ditches."  On  the  other  hand,  contemporary 
evidence  rather  points  to  the  conclusion  that  Pitt  was 
simply  carried  off  his  feet  by  the  flood  of  military 
successes.  4  "  Happy,  happy  day,"  he  wrote  on  hearing 
the  escape  of  Quebec  from  the  pressing  danger  of  recapture 
in  1760.  "  My  joy  and  hurry  are  inexpressible."  In  the 
rush  of  the  busy  war  administration,  which  made  such 
hurry  inevitable,  he  had  little  time  to  look  beyond  the 
present,  and  after  Wolfe's  triumph,  he  seems  to  have 
allowed  public  opinion  to  be  more  centred  in  the  European 
war  than  in  the  prospect  opened  out  for  England  in  the 
west.  He  did  indeed  enlist  sympathy  for  the  coming 
maritime  struggle  with  Spain,  but  he  none  the  less  looked 
on  Germany  with  a  gaze  more  rapt  than  discriminating. 
He  was  very  sensitive  to  what  Junius  mockingly  described 
as  5 "  the  guttural  pomp  of  a  German  campaign,"  and  his 

1  The  Case  of  the  British  Troops  serving  in  Germany   (1761),   p.   29; 

Reasons  in  support  of  the  War  in  Germany  (1762),  p.  28. 

2  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xv.  1226. 

3  Arthur  Young's  Autobiography,  p.  108. 

4  Chatham  Correspondence,  ii.    45. 
s  Letters  of  Junius,  ii.    186. 


PITT'S    INFLUENCE  31 

advocacy  of  the  Prussian  cause  was  so  earnest  that  even 
in  America  itself,  we  find  George  Washington  writing  in 
1760,  luWe  are  in  pain  here  for  the  King  of  Prussia,  and 
wish  Hanover  safe,  these  being  events  in  which  we  are 
much  interested."  In  England,  Pitt  made  Frederick  a 
popular  hero,  although  a  few  years  earlier  no  German 
prince  could  have  won  even  respect.  2  General  Oglethorpe 
compared  him  with  Henry  Y.  and  Sir  Walter  Raleigh. 
In  1790  London  contained  no  fewer  than  twenty  inns  with 
the  sign  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  several  with  the  sign 
of  the  Protestant  Hero,  all  relics  of  the  dead  enthusiasm  of 
1756. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  many  Englishmen  had 
as  yet  hardly  felt  the  glow  of  purely  colonial  ambition. 
In  1755  a  Whig  politician  wrote,  3 "  There  is  not  the  least 
tittle  of  other  public  news  from  America,  or  (more  import- 
ant) Germany."  His  choice  of  language  is  significant. 
4  Bedford  complained  of  the  transference  of  soldiery  from 
Ireland  to  America,  while  already  in  1759,  the  representa- 
tion of  the  Continental  war  as  an  English  necessity  had 
provoked  plenty  of  satire. 

5 "The  Hanoverians,  Hessians,  Prussians, 

Are  paid  to  oppose  the  French  and  Russians, 

Nor  scruple  they  with  truth  to  say 

They  are  fighting  for  America. 

No  more  they  make  a  fiddle-faddle 

About  a  Hessian  horse  or  saddle, 

No  more  of  Continental  measures, 

No  more  of  wasting  British  treasures, 

Ten  millions  and  a  vote  of  credit,"  etc. 

1  Sparks'  Washington,  ii.    333. 

2  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  ix. ;  pt.  2,  229. 
s  Bedford  Correspondence,  ii.    164. 

*  ibid,  ii.    360. 

s  Annual  Register  (1759),  p.  440. 


32  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

It  looks  as  if  the  destruction  of  French  power  was  a 
livelier  motive  with  Pitt  than  the  consolidation  of  the 
British  empire.  At  least,  during  his  ministry  he  had  no 
time  nor  inclination  to  dwell  on  any  topic  but  the  conduct 
of  the  war.  In  that,  he  was  indeed  successful,  notwith- 
standing some  deviations  into  valueless  schemes  like  the 
fatal  raid  on  St.  Malo  in  1758 ;  but  he  was  only  inspired 
while  playing  the  war  minister.  He  was  so  immersed  in 
his  work  as  such,  that  he  had  no  moment  to  attend  to 
finance.  He  could  only  trust  in  the  patience  of  the  people, 
and  the  talents  of  his  subordinates.  luThe  Hessian 
demand  for  forage  is  preposterous,  and  would  revolt  att 
the  world/'  he  writes  wearily  in  1758;  "I  wish  to  God  I 
could  see  my  way  through  this  mountain  of  expense/'  In 
1760  the  wide  extension  of  the  war  from  its  original 
objects  necessitated  the  raising  of  sixteen  millions  of 
revenue.  In  1763  the  consequent  taxes  on  beer  and  cider 
were  much  disliked.  When  the  war  was  over,  the  new 
problem  of  imperial  relations  afforded  perhaps  a  fairer  test 
for  Pitt's  policy,  and  it  was  then  clear  that  he  had  not 
shaken  off  the  fetters  of  the  old  English  economics,  and 
believed  as  thoroughly  as  ever  in  the  virtues  of  restricting 
colonial  trade.  Even  if  he  had  escaped  from  that  delusion, 
it  is  very  open  to  question  whether  his  influence  on  the 
people  was  of  such  a  nature  as  to  lead  them  in  any  con- 
structive direction.  It  is  obvious  that  he  could  inspire  all 
that  makes  a  war  spirit  effective,  that  he  could  choose 
excellent  leaders,  and  turn  enthusiasm  to  the  most  practical 
uses.  Thus  Lyttelton,  writing  to  Pitt  on  2  "  the  great  and 
glorious  news"  of  the  capture  of  Quebec,  and  deploring 
Wolfe's  death,  pointed  out  how  Townshend  and  other 
devoted  leaders  were  left  in  Canada,  all  "  animated  by  your 

1  Chatham  Correspondence,  i.    305. 

2  ibid,  i.    442. 


PITT'S    INFLUENCE  33 

spirit,  and  by  you  brought  forward  into  action."  On  the 
other  hand,  there  is  nothing  to  give  rise  to  the  supposition 
that  Pitt  could  have  guided  the  populace  towards  a  policy 
of  self-restraint  and  discretion.  The  Seven  Years'  War 
required  only  a  judicious  handling  of  public  opinion  in  a 
course  for  which  the  people  had  every  natural  predisposi- 
tion. There  was  no  such  inclination  towards  the  imperial 
policy  necessitated  by  the  new  conditions  of  the  British 
realm. 

It  will  be  seen  hereafter  that  Pitt's  conception  of  the 
empire  was  limited  by  the  traditions  of  his  age,  and  that 
just  as  his  delight  in  dive's  successes  did  not  involve  any 
luminous  insight  into  the  destinies  of  India,  so  his  great- 
ness during  the  Seven  Years'  War  did  not  involve  greatness 
as  an  imperial  organiser  in  times  of  peace.  It  is  however, 
necessary  to  recognize  the  superficial  nature  of  his  influence 
on  England  in  1756,  in  view  of  its  otherwise  extraordinary 
disappearance  within  a  few  years  of  reaching  its  highest 
pitch.  The  explanation  lies  rather  in  his  personal  char- 
acter than  in  his  political  ideas.  He  seems,  even  at  the 
height  of  his  popularity,  to  have  discouraged  the  sympathy 
which  his  oratory  invited.  He  won  men's  hearts  by 
appealing  to  those  inclinations  which  he  best  understood, 
but  he  was  too  proud  to  try  to  hold  them,  or  to  attach 
himself  to  any  political  party.  Occasionally  he  unbent,  as 
when  he  wrote  to  Wolfe's  mother  in  November  1759, 
1 "  May  Heaven  who  assists  the  virtuous  grant  you  every 
possible  comfort  under  a  loss  which  nothing  can  repair  to 
you  or  to  England,"  but  in  general  he  disdained  the  arts 
of  politicians,  and  departing  from  the  common  English 
habit  of  paying  homage  to  the  mob,  he  kept  his  reverence 
for  the  state,  and  his  flattery  for  the  Crown. 

When  once  in  power,  Pitt  showed  rare  courage  in 
i  ibid,  i.  451. 


34  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

ignoring  the  clamour  of  men  on  whose  support  he  relied. 
So  great  was  their  belief  in  his  matchless  competence  to 
beat  the  French,  that  for  the  time  they  swallowed  his 
contempt.  They  allowed  him  to  defend  Byng  after  his 
failure  off  Minorca,  and  Cumberland  after  the  Convention 
of  Closterseven.  He  feared  nothing;  he  championed  the 
Highlanders  during  the  outcry  against  Bute  and  Scotland, 
and  denounced  the  maladministration  of  the  East  India 
Company  in  defiance  of  the  rich  Nabobs,  who  had  inclined 
to  follow  his  leadership.  He  had  not  the  patience  to 
satisfy  popular  expectations  and  neglected  to  attend  the 
coronation  of  George  III.  He  lost  touch  with  the  rank 
and  file  of  his  adherents.  Even  in  1758  1Waldegrave 
foretold  that  he  was  too  masterful  and  imperious  to  keep 
his  popularity  long,  and  consequently  his  ability  to  carry 
the  country  with  him  did  not  last  when  his  figure  was  once 
dissociated  from  its  original  glory.  At  the  close  of  the 
war,  Pitt  had  a  great  claim  to  gratitude,  and  most  men 
were  proud  of  him;  2 innkeepers  chose  his  name  for  their 
signs,  and  the  bridge  then  being  built  at  Blackfriars  was 
called  for  the  time  Pitt's  Bridge,  in  his  honour.  In  1766 
3Burgoyne  found  his  name  a  touchstone  in  Germany.  He 
had  no  longer  however,  the  capacity  to  extort  support  from 
doubters.  Under  the  prevailing  political  conditions,  it 
was  essential  for  him  to  attach  himself  to  one  of  the  great 
Whig  connexions  like  that  of  Rockingham,  but  his  pride 
debarred  him  from  such  a  course.  He  trusted  simply  in 
the  glamour  of  his  own  name,  forgetting  that  purely 
personal  causes  can  at  most  be  but  transient.  His  fascina- 
tion therefore  ended  with  the  war,  and  had  he  known  the 
future  effects  of  his  isolation  from  every  parliamentary 

1  Waldegrave's  Memoirs  (1821),  p.  16. 

2  Grosley's  Tour  to  London  (1772),  p.  241. 

3  Chatham  Correspondence,  iii.     41. 


PITT'S    INFLUENCE  35 

party,  there  would  have  been  less  sincerity  than  there 
actually  was  in  his  prayer  after  Minden,  l "  May  happy 
peace  wind  up  the  glorious  work,  and  heal  a  bleeding 
world." 

Such  limitations  to  Pitt's  power  as  a  statesman 
contributed  to  weaken  that  empire,  which  his  war 
policy  had  done  so  much  to  promote.  Amid  his  many 
speeches  and  voluminous  correspondence  there  is  no  trace 
of  an  attempt  to  create  a  form  of  colonial  policy,  which 
might  perpetuate  the  fabric.  A  man  of  the  age,  he  uncjer- 
stood  acquisition  better  than  organisation.  Consequently, 
the  Seven  Years'  War  conduced  in  effect  to  the  subsequent 
outbreak  of  the  War  of  Independence.  Obviously,  the 
removal  of  the  standing  menace  of  a  French  invasion  freed 
the  colonies  from  a  fear  which  had  hitherto  enhanced  their 
reliance  upon  Great  Britain,  but  Pitt's  influence  on 
English  public  opinion  led  to  less  general  causes  for  the 
coming  schism.  In  the  first  place,  his  variation  of  the 
original  aim  of  England's  warfare  had  caused  an  expendi- 
ture of  blood  and  treasure,  far  in  excess  of  that  necessarily 
involved  in  a  straightforward  struggle  with  France  purely 
for  colonial  ascendency.  The  effect  of  this  course  was  to 
increase  the  apparent  burden  of  empire  to  an  extent, 
certain  to  invite  the  fatal  suggestion  of  direct  taxation  of 
the  colonies  from  home. 

Secondly,  the  brilliancy  of  British  triumphs  over  sea 
captivated  popular  imagination.  It  diverted  men's  minds 
from  the  crying  need  of  purging  the  parliamentary  system, 
admitted  by  Pitt  himself  to  be  2"the  rotten  part  of  the 
constitution."  His  great  war  administration  had  thus  sub- 
merged old  partisan  distinctions,  and  hence  the  opportunity 

i  ibid,  ii.    9. 

^  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvi.    100. 


36  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

laid  open  to  the  young  King  George  III.,  who  had  been 
bred  in  the  principles  of  Bolingbroke,  and  desired  nothing 
more  than  to  play  the  patriotic  despot  among  the  ruins 
of  parliamentary  parties. 

Lastly,  it  may  justly  be  complained  that  Pitt's  belief  in 
the  adequacy  of  the  prevailing  colonial  theory,  and  his 
partiality  towards  German  connexions  disabled  him  from 
educating  his  party.  He  was  master  of  British  thought, 
but  he  neglected  his  power  to  teach  ideas,  other  than  those 
which  had  a  natural  self-commendation  to  the  patriotic 
citizens  of  the  day.  Indeed,  he  merely  acquiesced  in  the 
current  beliefs  as  to  the  art  of  governing  an  empire,  and 
failed  to  realise  how  much  more  was  to  be  conquered  than 
mere  territory.  Marvellous  as  was  Pitt's  capacity  to 
inspire  true  patriotism,  to  organise  victory,  to  point  out 
splendid  ideals,  he  had  not  that  cool  and  calculating 
insight  into  men  and  affairs,  which  could  alone  perpetuate 
his  gains.  In  this  respect,  he  was  inferior  to  Franklin,  a 
man  of  far  commoner  clay,  but  of  greater  penetration. 
l"No  man  can  more  sincerely  rejoice  than  I  do  on  the 
reduction  of  Canada,"  wrote  Franklin  to  Lord  Kames  in 
1760,  "and  this  is  not  merely  as  I  am  a  colonist,  but  as  I 
am  a  Briton.  I  have  long  been  of  opinion  that  the  founda- 
tions of  the  future  grandeur  and  stability  of  the  British 
empire  lie  in  America,  and  though  like  other  foundations, 
they  are  low  and  little  now,  they  are  nevertheless  broad 
and  strong  enough  to  support  the  greatest  political  struc- 
ture that  human  wisdom  ever  yet  erected." 

i  Bigelow's  Franklin,  i.    399. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL   THEORY  37 


CHAPTER   III. 
THE   OLD   COLONIAL   THEORY. 

WITHOUT  the  magic  of  such  an  influence  as  William  Pitt's, 
it  was  impossible  in  1763  to  move  the  English  people  from 
the  traditional  lines  of  their  colonial  system.  As  no  such 
influence  was  forthcoming,  that  system  reached  its  natural 
and  inevitable  conclusion  in  open  breach  between  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies.  With  its  actual  operation,  the 
world  has  long  been  familiar,  thanks  to  the  historical 
writings  of  English  Whigs  and  American  patriots.  The 
Navigation  Acts  had  restricted  colonial  carrying  trade  to 
English  ships  ever  since  1651.  Many  "enumerated 
articles  "  could  be  exported  to  Europe  by  way  of  England 
alone,  to  the  detriment  of  colonial  producers,  but  to  the 
supposed  advantage  of  British  shipping.  Such  articles 
included  tobacco,  ginger,  sugar  and  cotton  in  1706,  and 
copper  and  beaver  skins  in  1722.  A  concession  whereby 
Carolina  could  ship  rice  direct  to  lands  south  of  Cape 
Finisterre  was  made  in  1730,  and  subsequently  Georgia 
and  Florida  were  granted  similar  relief ;  but  four-fifths  of 
that  export  trade  continued  to  pass  through  English  ports. 
Furthermore,  several  manufactures  likely  to  compete  with 
those  of  England  were  suppressed  in  what  Adam  Smith 
confessed  to  be  x"a  manifest  violation  of  the  most  sacred 
rights  of  mankind," — wool  and  bar  iron  in  1719,  felt  hats 
in  1732,  molasses  in  1733,  and  steel  furnaces  in  1750.  In 
view  of  such  apparent  injustice,  it  is  clearly  important  to 
examine  the  theory  as  to  the  uses  of  colonies,  and  their 

l  Wealth  of  Nations  (ed.  "World  Library"),  p.  459. 


38  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

place  in  the  imperial  system,  upon  which  these  severe  and 
oppressive  measures  purported  to  be  based.  After  all,  it 
was  this  theory  which  braced  England's  activity  in  her 
struggle  with  France,  and  in  support  of  its  tenets,  she 
faced  the  world  in  arms.  It  cannot  have  been  wholly 
arbitrary  and  perverse. 

I  In  actual  fact,  the  old  colonial  policy  was  based  upon  J 
'the  very  sensible  ideal  of  a  self-sufficing  empire.  That  ' 
ideal  was  applied  with  a  selfish  bias  by  British  ministers, 
but  it  was  common  at  the  time  throughout  Christendom, 
and  was  much  encouraged  by  the  popularity  of  mer- 
cantilism. Business  men  believed  implicitly  in  the  idea 
of  the  balance  of  trade,  and  considered  English  independ- 
ence of  all  other  states  in  every  necessity  of  life  to  be  a 
proper  aim  of  policy.  In  some  respects  its  effects  were 
bad;  1the  high  duties  imposed  upon  yarn  from  Hamburg, 
Dantzig  and  Konigsberg  enabled  the  Dutch,  who  only 
imposed  a  duty  of  one  per  cent.,  to  undersell  British  linen 
merchants  in  the  West  Indies  and  Guinea.  Its  political 
advantages  were  less  questionable.  Economic  mercantilism 
was  indeed  a  declining  force  after  1720.  Walpole  cleared 
away  all  export  duties,  and  2Hume  suggested  in  1740  that 
Britain  might  even  benefit  from  Continental  prosperity. 
Trade,  not  mere  bullion,  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  chief 
source  of  a  nation's  wealth.  Nevertheless,  the  old  theory 
of  a  self-sufficing  empire  still  held  the  field.  Colonial 
importations  enjoyed  preferential  rates,  and  large  bounties 
were  given  to  stimulate  such  colonial  industries  as  would 
enable  England  to  avoid  having  recourse  to  foreign 
countries  for  their  purchase.  3The  production  of  indigo, 

1  Keports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees,  1715 — 73  (1751;  ii.  291, 

294). 

2  Hume's  Essays  (ed.  1903),  p.  333. 

3  The  Rights  of  Great  Britain  Asserted  (1776),  p.  14. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  39 

tobacco,  hemp,  flax,  raw  silk,  iron,  pipe-staves,  vegetable 
oils,  cod,  whale  oil,  vines,  olive  trees,  rosin,  myrtle-wax, 
pearlash,  potash,  indigo,  cochineal,  raisins,  gum,  logwood, 
pitch,  tar,  and  turpentine,  was  thus  forwarded  not  only  by 
the  government,  but  also  in  some  cases  by  a  voluntary 
''Society  for  the  Encouragement  of  Arts  and  Commerce," 
which  was  founded  in  1754,  and  which  bestowed  nearly 
£2,800  and  twelve  gold  medals  upon  colonial  producers 
between  that  year  and  1776.  The  utility  of  bounties  is  of 
course  an  open  question,  but  those  upon  pitch,  tar  and 
turpentine  bore  good  fruit  as  the  price  of  a  barrel  had 
sunk  1to  ten  shillings  in  1766  after  having  been  fifty 
shillings  in  the  days  of  Swedish  monopoly.  Owing  to 
bounties  the  2  Irish  were  enabled  to  undersell  German 
competitors  in  the  West  Indian  linen  market. 

All  colonial  expansion  had  this  end  of  self-sufficiency 
in  view.  When  Oglethorpe  colonised  Georgia  in  1732,  he 
aimed  at  supplying  England  with  wine  and  silk,  so  as  to 
free  her  from  seeking  either  abroad.  It  was  thought 
possible  to  obtain  3  cheaper  iron  ore  from  America  than 
from  Russia,  as  the  cost  of  transit  down  the  colonial  water 
ways  was  much  less  than  the  cost  of  transit  from  the  Urals 
to  St.  Petersburg,  but  even  if  this  was  not  the  case,  price 
was  deemed  a  less  material  point  than  the  place  of  origin. 
British-grown  commodities  were  worth  a  somewhat  higher 
price,  if  the  alternative  entailed  buying  goods  from  an 
alien  market,  and  it  was  better 4  to  clothe  the  seventy 
thousand  slaves  in  Barbados  with  English  and  Irish  stuff 
than  with  the  cheaper  goods  offered  by  Hamburg  shippers. 
Therefore  John  Dyer  asks  us  in  "  The  Fleece  "  to 

1  Morgan's  Dissertation  on  Advantages  of  Union  (1766),  p.  14. 

2  Reports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees,  1715 — 73  (1751;  ii.    290). 

3  Adair's  Hist.  Am.  Indians  (1775),  p.  452. 

4  Reports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees,  1715—73  (1744;  ii.    72). 


40  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

1  "Pray  for  the  culture  of  the  Georgia  tract, 
Nor  slight  the  green  savannahs  and  the  plains 
Of  Carolina." 

2  Rhenish  vines  were  planted  in  Pennsylvania,  and  one 
of  the  many  tracts  written  to  support  Oglethorpe's 
experiment  exclaimed, 

3 "Now  bid  thy  merchants  bring  thy  wine  no  more 
Or  from  th'  Italian  or  the  Tuscan  shore, 
No  more  they  need  th'  Hungarian  vineyards  drain, 
And  France  herself  may  drink  her  best  champagne ; 
Behold  at  last,  and  in  a  subject  land 
Nectar  sufficient  for  thy  large  demand." 

It  was  argued  that  4  England  would  obtain  as  much  raw 
silk  from  Georgia  as  she  had  previously  bought  from 
Piedmont  for  <£200,000  a  year.  5  She  would  also  have  a 
cheaper,  and  at  the  same  time  a  British,  source  of  supply 
of  coffee,  tea,  raisins,  currants,  olives,  almonds,  cochineal 
and  potash.  It  was  then  assumed  that  Georgia  would 
fulfil  such  promises  as  might  well  be  held  out  By  a  state 
6  "  in  the  same  latitude  as  the  promised  Canaan."  The  sequel 
proved  that  not  every  Canaan  flows  with  milk  and  honey, 
but  as  fjohn  Wesley  had  wanted  Georgia  to  be  religious 
rather  than  rich,  there  was  consolation  for  the  pious. 

"With  similar  motives,  the  English  empire  builders  of 
the  eighteenth  century  gave  consistent  help  to  the  silk 

1  Dyer's  Fleece  (1757),  p.  147. 

2  John  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  ii.    81. 

3  Narrative  of  the  Colonization  of  Georgia  (1741),  p.  xii. 

4  Oglethorpe's  Brief  Account  (1733),  p.  3. 

5  Mountgomry's  Discourse  concerning  a  new  Colony  (1717),  p.  11. 

6  ibid,  p.  6. 

7  Narrative  of  the  Colonization  of  Georgia  (1741),  p.  30. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  41 

industry  in  Carolina,  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania,  to  the 
fisheries  of  Newfoundland  and  New  York, l  the  coal  mines 
of  Cape  Breton,  the  tobacco  culture  of  Virginia  and 
Maryland,  the  sugar,  coffee,  cocoa,  and  cotton  plantations 
of  the  2West  Indies.  The  production  of  naval  stores  in 
Newfoundland  and  North  Carolina  was  designed  to 
dispense  with  the  timber  of  Sweden  and  the  tar,  pitch  and 
turpentine  of  Norway,  and  to  free  England  from  having 
to  pay  the  3  exorbitant  export  duties  and  4  extortionate 
prices  of  Sweden  and  Russia.  By  dint  of  unsparing 
efforts,  the  government  succeeded  in  making  such  timber 
producing  colonies  as  Massachusetts  and  New  Hampshire 
of  the  utmost  use  to  naval  constructors.  The  dread  of 
wasting  British  money  upon  imports  from  abroad  was 
very  strong,  and  was  especially  directed  against  French 
goods.  5The  German  traveller,  Keysler  estimated  that 
Englishmen  spent  £450,000  annually  on  foreign  silks,  but 
6  £900,000  would  probably  have  been  nearer  the  truth. 
In  any  case  it  was  contended  that  the  empire  ought  to 
benefit  instead  by  her  own  custom.  Hence  the  sympathy 
given  to  thousands  of  journeymen  silk  weavers  who 
marched  in  7  procession  from  Spitalfields  to  St.  James's 
in  1764,  to  represent  the  misery  to  which  they  were 
reduced  by  the  clandestine  importation  of  French  silks, 
though  Italy  was  in  actual  fact  the  chief  source  of  supply. 
Accordingly,  England  became  zealous  for  the  growth  of 
colonies,  which  might  relieve  her  from  all  economic 

1  Regulations  lately  made  concerning  the  Colonies  (1765),  p.  11. 

2  Loftt's  Reports  (1776),  p.  661;  Report  on  the  African  Slave  Trade 

(1789)  passim. 

3  An  Appeal  to  the  Justice  of  Great  Britain  (1775),  p.  29. 

4  Galloway's  Cool  Thoughts  (1780),  p.  29. 

5  Keysler's  Travels  (1760),  i.    355. 

6  Contrast  between  Woollen  and  Silk  Manufactures  (1782),  p.  15. 

7  Annual  Register  (1764),  p.  64. 


42  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

dependence  on  the  foreigner.  1Eaw  silk  should  be 
produced  more  cheaply  in  North  Carolina  than  in  Italy, 
where  land  was  two  hundred  times  as  dear,  and  labour  far 
more  costly.  2Pitt  himself  was  anxious  to  grow  cotton 
in  Dominica  rather  than  import  it  from  Dutch  or  French 
possessions,  and  3in  spite  of  cotton  requiring  light,  dry 
soil  rather  than  the  deep,  rich  mould  and  clay  subsoil  of 
the  Bullish  West  Indies,  efforts  were  made  to  cultivate  it 
in  Nevis,  Antigua,  St.  Yincent,  and  more  successfully  in 
Barbados.  The  chief  rivals  of  these  West  Indian  islands 
were  at  this  time  4the  French  and  Spanish  Indies, 
Demerara,  Brazil  and  Turkey,  while  cotton  growing  in  the 
East  Indies  was  in  a  similar  experimental  state.  The 
public  was  not  yet  satisfied  with  the  outlook  for  empire- 
grown  cotton.  The  commodity  could  be  obtained  very 
cheaply  from  shippers  in  France,  50stend  and  Smyrna, 
while  an  abundant  supply  of  cotton  in  the  West  Indies 
would  only  serve  6to  depress  the  more  important  woollen 
trade,  and  to  raise  the  cost  of  freight  for  7  sugar  and 
rum.  Consequently  in  this  respect  the  usual  policy  of  the 
Empire  was  not  carried  through  with  vigour,  for  the 
demand  for  raw  cotton  was  never  great  until  after  the 
fall  of  the  old  colonial  system.  8  Only  four  million  pounds 

1  Gent.  Mag.   (1756),  pp.  161-2. 

2  Chatham  Correspondence,  ii.    420. 

3  Report  of  the  Slave  Trade  (1789)  ;  evidence  as  to  Jamaica  (question 

33),  Nevis  (q.  31),  Antigua  (q.  31),  St.  Vincent  (q.  31),  Barbados 
(q.  31),  Dominica  (q.  33). 

4  An  Important  Crisis  in  the  Calico  and  Muslin  Manufacture  explained 

(1788),  pp.  8-9. 

5  Contrast   between   Woollen,    Linen,    Cotton   and    Silk    Manufactures 

(1782),   p.    12;   Report  House  of  Commons   Committees   1715—73 
(1751;  ii.    295). 

6  Contrast  etc.,  p.  14. 

7  ibid,  p.  11. 

8  Quarterly  Review  (1861),  pp.  422-3. 


THE   OLD   COLONIAL  THEORY  43 

were  imported  here  in  1764  and  seven  in  1780,  as  compared 
with  thirty  million  pounds  in  1790,  fifty  million  in  1800, 
and  two  hundred  and  twenty-nine  million  in  1825. 
It  is  singular  that  the  hopes  of  those  who  dreamed  of 
imperial  self-sufficiency  in  the  reign  of  George  III.,  as 
regards  the  supply  of  raw  cotton,  centred  in  the  West 
Indies  and  not  in  the  provinces  on  the  American  mainland. 
In  1770  two  thousand  pounds  weight  of  cotton  was 
exported  from  the  latter  market  to  England,  this  trivial 
quantity  being  almost  the  only  shipment  before  the 
Revolution. 

1  Indigo  was  cultivated  after  1742. in  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia  to  avoid  spending  £200,000  a  year  in  France. 
In  1731,  2  Joshua  Gee  published  a  strong  plea  for  self- 
sufficiency,  exposing  the  then  state  of  the  balance  of  trade 
in  a  way  which  3  "struck  the  nation  with  universal  panic," 
and  4  economists  never  tired  of  exhorting  Englishmen  to 
import  hemp  and  fiax,  timber  and  deals  from  America, 
rather  than  from  Norway  and  Riga,  and  5  alkalies  from 
New  England  rather  than  from  Hungary.  They  should 
purchase  their  6  isinglass  from  London  rather  than  from 
Russia,  their  7  porcelain  from  Worcester  rather  than  from 
Dresden  or  Chatillon,  8  their  hats  from  Stockport  rather 
than  from  France,  and  should  buy  9  linen  from  Ireland, 

10  thread  from  Glasgow,  and  rely  on  their  own  colonists  for 

11  sugar  and  tobacco. 

1  An  Appeal  to  the  Justice  of  Great  Britain  (1775),  p.  29. 

2  Gee's  Trade  and  Navigation  of  Great  Britain  (1731). 

3  Hume's  Essays,  p.  317. 

4  Present  State  of  Great  Britain  and  North  America  (1767),  p.  129. 

5  Annual  Register  (1765),  p.  115. 

6  ibid,  (1760),  p.  67. 

7  ibid  (1763),  p.  105. 

8  Reports  of  the  Commons  Committees,  1715 — 73  (1752;  ii.    372). 

9  Ashley's  Trade  of  Colonies  (1740),  p.   128. 

10  Gee's  Trade,  etc.,  p.  157. 

11  Dyer's  Fleece  (1757),  p.  129. 


44  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

It  was  disappointing  to  find  that  political  artifice  could 
not  overcome  natural  disadvantages  in  respect  of  colonial 
silk  and  wine.  In  Virginia  one  out  of  every  ten  trees 
planted  had  to  be  a  mulberry;  ten  had  to  be  planted  on 
every  acre  granted  to  settlers  in  Georgia,  while  all  the 
colonies  were  exhorted  l  to  choose  sites  for  mulberry  trees 
in  rich,  loose  mould  remote  from  marshes,  woods  and 
north  and  north-west  winds.  2  When,  however,  the  bounty 
on  silk  expired  in  1766,  the  Savannah  market  collapsed, 
and  though  George  III.  dressed  his  Queen  in  New  Jersey 
silk  in  1771,  the  industry  flickered  out  before  the  more 
profitable  competition  of  other  trades.  Similarly  the  wine 
of  Virginia  was  never  able  to  emulate  the  cheaper  vintages 
of  Portugal  and  Madeira;  3  a  French  traveller  suggested 
that  one  reason  lay  in  the  destructiveness  of  American 
blackbirds.  No  better  fate  awaited  the  efforts  of  the 
government  to  implant  exotics  like  madder,  hops  and  woad 
on  American  soil,  to  cultivate  4  indigo  in  South  Carolina 
and  to  extend  to  Connecticut  the  struggling  cotton-growing 
industry  of  the  West  Indies.  We  can  only  say  that  the 
ideal  for  which  such  sacrifices  were  made  was  in  itself 
great  and  good. 

The  wish  to  make  colonial  industry  as  productive  as 
possible  led  incidentally  to  the  slave  trade.  5  Between 
1676  and  1776  three  and  a  half  millions  of  negroes  were 
carried  from  Africa  to  British  North  America  and  the 
West  Indies.  One-fifth  of  that  number  died  on  the 
voyage,  and  a  quarter  of  the  rest  perished  in  6  "  their 

1  Samuel  Pullein's  Culture  of  Silk  for  the  use  of  the  American  Colonies 

(1758),  pp.  3,  4,  25. 

2  See  Eggleston's  article  in  Cent.  Mag.,  v.    431. 

3  Brissot's  Travels  in  U.S.A.  in  1788  (1794),  p.  212. 

4  Whitney's  Government  of  S.C.  (1895),  p.  56. 

5  Considerations  on  Abolition  of  Slavery  (1789),  p.  68. 

6  Benezet's  Caution  to  Gt.  Britain  (1767),  p.  6. 


vx* 

THE   OLD   COLONIAL  THEORY 


seasoning.57  They  seem  to  have  been  worst 
Barbados,  where  the  penalty  imposed  on  a  master  for 
killing  a  slave  was  but  l  a  fine  of  fifteen  pounds,  yet 
everywhere  there  was  at  least  a  possibility  of  merciless 
owners,  and  the  2  defence  that  the  blacks  were  much  less 
to  be  pitied  than  the  beggars  of  England  is  not  convincing. 
The  system  is  to  be  attributed  partly  to  the  British  resolve 
to  force  the  colonies  to  cultivate  tobacco  rather  than  to 
follow  industries  calculated  to  compete  with  home  manu- 
factures, and  partly  to  the  somewhat  loftier  desire  to  assist 
those  branches  of  trade  for  which  the  southern  provinces 
seemed  to  have  a  natural  aptitude.  For  instance,  3  all 
the  naval  and  military  experts,  who  gave  evidence  before 
the  Privy  Council  Committee  on  the  slavery  question  in 
1789 — Rodney,  Barrington,  Parker,  Hotham — considered 
its  maintenance  essential  to  the  West  Indian  industries, 
and  when  the  proprietors  of  Georgia  surrendered  their 
charter  in  1752,  that  colony  was  freed,  in  spite  of  Oglethorpe's 
resistance,  from  its  previous  inability  to  import  slaves, 
in  view  of  the  alleged  requirements  of  its  staple  trades. 
4  For  the  sake  of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  the  framers 
of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  forebore  to  denounce 
England  for  her  furtherance  of  the  slave  trade. 

This  theory  as  to  the  usefulness  of  colonisation  did  not 
necessarily  involve  the  friction  to  which  it  led  in  actual 
fact.  But  for  the  concurrent  tendency  to  regard  the 
interests  of  the  home  country  as  the  paramount  object  of 
state  interference  in  the  normal  course  of  trade,  it  might 
as  easily  have  induced  some  popular  form  of  imperial 
federation.  In  practice,  the  econo'mic  measures  of 

1  Hoare's  Memoirs  of  G.  Sharp  (1820),  p.  79. 

2  Strictures  on  Slave  Trade  (1787),  p.  37. 

3  Eeport  on  the  African  Slave  Trade  (1789),  part  iii. 

4  Jefferson's  Memoirs  (ed.  1829),  i.    16. 


46  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

government  were  confined  to  creating  a  self-sufficing 
empire  at  the  cost  of  colonial  industries,  but  in  theory 
there  was  no  such  need.  Englishmen  desired  nothing 
more  than  the  development  of  industries  upon  lines  not 
only  conducive  to  their  own  political  ideal,  but  also  to 
colonial  prosperity.  Bounties  and  prizes  stimulated  the 
natural  resources  of  British  settlements.  *  Timber  was  an 
American  product  which  every  theorist  praised.  The 
immensity  of  the  supply  and  the  ease  of  its  transport 
created  the  prosperity  of  the  shipyards  of  Philadelphia  and 
Norfolk.  In  1740,  2  John  Ashley  argued  how  greatly  it 
was  to  be  preferred  to  that  of  the  Baltic,  and  indeed  it 
had  fascinating  possibilities  in  the  day  of  "  wooden  walls." 
Every  observer  noticed  its  promise.  The  Swedish  traveller, 

3  Kalm,  admired  the  oak,  hiccory  and  firs  of  Pennsylvania. 

4  Governor  Pownall  applauded  the  white  pines  of  Virginia ; 

5  Bruce,  the  mulberry  trees,  live  oak,  pines  and  mahogany 
planks  of  Carolina;   6Lord   Sterling,  the  white  pines  of 
Massachusetts  and  New  Hampshire;   Pennington,  7"the 
beautiful  New  England  pine."     Taylor,  a  traveller  whose 
voyage  to  Philadelphia  is  memorable  for  the  straits  which 
made  the  crew  feed  on  human  flesh  (8"like  young  pork, 
very  sweet")  remarked  on  the  9 prosperous  saw  mills  around 
New  York.     10  There  were   fifty  saw  mills   on   one   river 


1  Gee's  Trade  of  Gt.  Britain  (1731),  p.  104. 

2  Ashley's  Trade  of  Brit.  Colonies  (1740),  p.  23. 

3  Kalm's  Travels  (1772),  i.    8. 

4  Pownall's  Administration  of  Brit.  Colonies  (1774),  i.    282. 

5  P.  H.  Bruce's  Memoirs  (1783),  p.  522. 

6  Conduct  of  Major-Gen.  Shirley  (1758),  p.  2. 

7  W.   Pennington's  Pveflections  on  Large  Commons   (1759),   p.    71;   cf. 

Adair's  Hist.  Am.  Indians  (1775),  p.  452. 

8  Taylor's  Voyage  to  N.  America  (1771),  p.  34. 

9  ibid,  p.  147. 

10  Bigelow's  Franklin  (1890),  i.  569. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  47 

alone  in  North  Carolina,  l  White  pines  made  the  best 
masts,  and  so,  except  in  Massachusetts,  they  could  not 
be  cut  down  on  unappropriated  land  without  a  government 
licence,  while  after  the  loss  of  the  United  States,  2  patriots 
consoled  themselves  with  the  oak  of  Upper  Canada,  and 
the  hardwood  and  pine  timber  of  Cape  Breton.  It  is 
indeed  clear  that  the  British  government  exerted  itself 
to  develope  colonial  resources  on  these  lines.  The  old 
bounty  of  twenty  shillings  per  ton  on  masts,  yards  or 
bowsprits  exported  to  England  was  extended  by  a  statute 
(5  Geo.  III.  c.  45)  to  deals,  planks,  boards  and  timber. 
The  actual  success  of  the  policy  is  more  doubtful.  From 
the  report  of  a  House  of  Commons  Committee  which  sat  in 
1771,  we  gather  that  the  Americans  had  3  to  compete  with 
timber  exporters  in  Hamburg,  Stettin  and  Dantzig.  The 
first  was  the  depot  of  4  Bohemian  timber,  the  second  of 
5  Silesian,  the  third  of  6  "  Prussian  deals,"  the  local  name 
for  Baltic  fir  plank.  Upon  the  whole,  the  navy  was  advised 
to  prefer  the  foreign  woods  unless  the  nature  and  methods 
of  the  colonial  market  were  improved.  ''"Virginia's  oak 
plank  was  better  than  that  of  New  York,  and  its  pitch 
pine  was  excellent,  but  good  and  bad  timber  was  shipped 
indiscriminately  to  England  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  well- 
regulated  and  carefully  chosen  shipments  from  Dantzig. 
The  8  oak  of  the  southern  provinces  was  not  fitted  for  the 
navy,  nor  was  American  as  good  as  Baltic  fir.  Quebec  oak 

1  Pownall's  Administration    etc.,i.    126;  Whitney's  Government  of  S.C. 

(1895),  p.  21. 

2  Gray's  Letters  from  Canada  (1809),  pp.  19,  207. 

3  Reports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees,  1715 — 73  (1771;  iii.  16). 

4  ibid,  iii.    22. 

5  ibid,  iii.    17. 

6  ibid,  iii.    21. 

7  ibid,  iii.    24. 

8  ibid,  iii.    22. 


48  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

was  probably  admirable,  but  the  contractor  had  failed  to 
supply  it.  The  proposed  cedar  and  mahogany  venture  in 
the  l  Mosquito  country  had  come  to  nothing.  In  short, 
even  the  highest  ideal  cannot  be  forced  into  practice  by 
legislation  alone. 

The  question  of  the  practicability  of  England's  dream  of 
self-sufficiency  in  the  eighteenth  century  is  now  of  little 
more  than  academic  interest,  as  the  conditions  of  her 
empire  have  since  been  profoundly  modified  by  the 
chances  of  time  and  fortune.  No  historian  however  can 
look  without  respect  upon  this  side  of  the  imperial  theory 
of  the  day.  It  was  one  of  the  chief  factors  of  the  old 
colonial  system ;  it  was  the  force  which  made  commercialism 
so  strong  an  ally  of  the  forward  policy  during  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  and  so  strong  a  foe  to  any  economic  re- 
construction of  the  imperial  system  after  1763.  There  is 
no  reason  to  doubt  its  intense  hold  upon  English  political 
thought  throughout  the  whole  period  of  colonial  expansion. 

2  Gee    urged  men  to  prefer  Somerset  and  Dorset  linen  to 
French,    and    plantation    rum    to    French    brandy,    and 

3  Otis  Little  pleaded  for  the  American  iron  industry  as  a 
means  to  avoid  spending  <£200,000  annually  in  Sweden  and 
Spain.     George  Berkeley,  Bishop  of  Cloyne,  asked  in  the 
"Querist"    4"whether  if  our  ladies  drank  sage  or  blaum 
tea  out  of  Irish  ware  it  would  be  an  insupportable  national 
calamity,"  and  protested  against  the  general  use  of  foreign 
5  pottery,    6tapestry,  lace  and  linen.     Nor  did  this  ideal 
die  with  the   old   colonial  system,   for   7John  Hunter,   a 

1  ibid,  in.    17. 

2  Gee's  Trade,  etc.,  p.  5. 

3  Little's  State  of  Trade  in  the  Northern  Colonies  (1748),  p.  39. 

4  Berkeley's  Querist  (1751),  p.  18. 

5  ibid,  p.  54. 

6  ibid,  p.  9. 

7  Hunter's  Historical  Journal  of  Transactions  at  Port  Jackson  (1793), 

p.   x. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  49 

naval  captain,  who,  after  service  in  North  America,  carried 
convicts  to  "the  east  coast  of  New  Holland"  in  1786, 
anticipated  that  New  South  Wales  had  a  future  as  a 
1  wine-growing  and  limestone  country,  whereby  the 
productive  capacity  of  the  empire  might  become  more 
catholic,  and  2  Hugh  Gray  pleaded  in  1806  for  the  diversion 
of  England's  custom  from  Eussia  to  Canada  in  respect  of 
hemp.  Export  duties  3  upon  English  coal  were  applauded 
as  the  burden  of  their  incidence  fell  wholly  on  the 
foreigner,  who  found  no  Continental  coal,  not  even  that 
of  Liege,  equal  to  that  of  Sunderland  and  Newcastle. 

The  consequent  leaning  towards  the  use  of  artificial 
means  to  direct  the  channels  of  British  activity,  led 
Englishmen  to  adopt  a  cast  of  thought  very  alien  to  the 
ideas  which  were  springing  up  at  the  same  time  in  the 
colonies.  There,  people  felt  principally  the  harsher  side 
of  the  ideals  of  the  Parliament  at  Westminster.  As  they 
could  ship  tobacco,  ginger,  sugar,  cotton,  copper,  beaver 
skins,  and  4  four-fifths  of  their  export  of  rice  to  Europe, 
only  by  way  of  England,  they  were  impeded  in  their 
competition  with  foreign  plantations.  Although  the 
prohibitive  acts  were  5very  loosely  enforced,  their  wool, 
iron,  hat,  molasses  and  steel  industries  were  at  least 
hampered  for  the  benefit  of  other  portions  of  the  empire, 
and  naturally  they  lost  pleasure  in  a  policy,  however 
patriotic,  which  led  to  such  unfortunate  manipulation  of 
private  trades  by  public  authorities.  It  was  exasperating 
to  be  forced  by  the  Navigation  Act  of  1733  to  prefer  the 

1  ibid,  p.  525;  Tench's  Narrative  of  Expedition  to  Botany  Bay  (1789), 

p.    141. 

2  H.  Gray's  Letters  from  Canada  (1809),  p.  206. 

3  Consideration  on  the  Trade  of  this  Kingdom  (1766),  pp.  9,  10. 

4  Ashley's  Trade  of  Colonies  (1740),  p.  16. 

5  J.  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  iv.    49. 


50  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

molasses  of  Jamaica  to  the  cheaper  molasses  of  the  French 
West  Indies.  In  English  eyes,  tbeir  best  function  was 
merely  to  produce  such  goods  as  Great  Britain  could  not 
herself  produce,  and  thus  to  obviate  the  need  for  recourse 
to  imports  from  abroad.  England  dreaded  the  balance  of 
trade  going  against  her,  and  this  fear  induced  widespread 
government  interference.  Exactly  the  same  political 
view  of  economics  prompted  the  preference  given  to 
Portugal  over  France.  The  Methuen  Treaty  was  deemed 
a  model  of  admirable  policy,  and  the  most  common  English 
1  drink  was  stated  to  be  port,  not  claret,  by  all  foreign 
observers  from  Casanova  to  St.  Fond. 

In  Pitt's  time,  the  prejudice  against  foreign,  and 
especially  French,  imports,  gained  in  intensity.  Patriots 
protested  against  the  common  use  of  French  words,  and 
such  irritating  fashionable  nomenclature  as  2  "the 
Pompadour  cap,"  "the  Orleans  handkerchief,"  and  "the 
Conti  mantlet. "  3  Shebbeare  complained  that  for  every 
Englishman  who  visited  Wales,  a  hundred  toured  in  Italy, 
and  his  school  scorned  those  who  4  wasted  English  money 
abroad. 

5"  Each  year  how  many  English  visit  France 
To  learn  the  language,  and  to  learn  to  dance. 
'Twixt  Dover  cliffs  and  Calais  in  July, 
Observe  how  thick  the  birds  of  passage  fly, 
Fair  weather  fops  in  swarms,  fresh  water  sailors, 
Cooks,  mantua-makers,  milliners  and  taylors." 
There  was  a  general  wish  to  keep  the  nation's  skill  at  home, 

1  Casanova's  Memoirs   (ed.   1902),  p.    156;   St.   Fond's  Travels   (1799), 

i.    58;  De  Saussure's  Letters,  p.   159. 

2  Letters  on  the  English  Nation  (1755),  ii.    229. 

3  ibid,  ii.    33. 

4A    British    Philippic    (1756),    p.    13;    J.    Hope's    Letters    on    Certain 

Proceedings  (1772),  p.  79;  Tucker's   Cui  Bono  (1781),  p.  19. 
5 Annual  Eegister  (1767),  p.  246. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  51 

and  many  1laws  were  passed  to  punish  those  who  enticed 
British  artificers  abroad.  Alien  immigration  was  disliked, 
and  in  1765  2the  peruke  makers  petitioned  George  III. 
to  discharge  foreign  hairdressers,  and  the  hatters  asked 
for  similar  redress.  Clearly  however,  the  chief  incentive 
towards  both  the  mercantile  zeal  for  expansion  and  the 
mercantile  insistence  on  the  state  regulations  of  colonial 
industries  was  the  jealousy  of  French  imports.  3  In  1753 
Sir  John  Barnard's  attempt  to  repeal  acts  against  the 
wearing  and  importation  of  cambrics  and  French  lawn  was 
defeated,  the  4  opinion  being  expressed  that  it  was  better 
that  Dresden  manufacturers  should  draw  £200,000  a  year 
from  England  in  this  branch  of  trade  than  that  Frenchmen 
should  draw  £100,000.  It  was  hoped  that  5  the  cambric 
industry  at  Winchelsea  would  enable  the  country  to 
dispense  altogether  with  such  foreign  imports  in  the  course 
of  time.  In  "Trade  Revived,"  a  dialogue  in  verse  "between 
Mrs.  Alamode,  an  eminent  London  milliner,  and  Mrs. 
Edging,  a  noted  Bucks  lace  woman,"  composed  in  1739, 
the  former  says  of  the  latter' s  English-made  goods  : 

6"I  can't  think  what  you  do  with  all  your  geer, 
The  ladies  will  have  none  but  Mechlin  here." 

Mrs  Edging  answers : 

"  What  strange,  what  savage  notions  fill  their  head 
To  give  to  strangers  their  own  people's  bread." 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  her  scorn  stung  the  conscience  of 
"the    modish,"    for    they    did    not    usually    accept    such 

1  5  Geo.  i.  c.  27;  23  Geo.  ii.  c.  13. 

2  Annual  Register  (1765),  p.  64. 

3  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xv.    163 

4  ibid,  xv.    181. 

5  Annual  Register  (1763),  p.  100. 

6  Trade  Revived  (1739),  p.  4. 


52  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

arguments,  and  it  was  already  the  vogue  for  English  play- 
actors and  singers  to  pose  as  aliens.  When  iJVlark  Moore 
turned  from  the  navy  to  the  stage,  he  became  Moreo,  and 
when  his  wife  sang  "Eileen  Aroon"  in  Irish,  the  fashion- 
able took  it  for  Italian,  and  cheered.  The  middle  classes 
were  more  susceptible  to  the  patriotic  plea.  Lord  Clare 
however,  encouraged  the  demand  for  British  manufactures 
at  Court  by  presenting  Queen  Charlotte  in  1775  with  some 
Irish  goods  and  his  poems,  and  in  Beawes's  time  (1787) 
Dunstable  and  Luton  straw  hats  and  bone  lace  were 
2  "  worn  by  multitudes  of  the  principal  ladies  of  England." 
The  drinking  of  3rum  was  encouraged  as  its  consumption 
enriched  West  Indian  planters,  and  much  resentment  was 
felt  because  Hhe  cosmopolitan  population  of  New  York 
bought  Dutch  rather  than  Lancashire  checked  and  striped 
linens,  which  cost  more  than  the  foreign-made  goods 
owing  to  the  dearness  of  yarn  in  England. 

The  effect  of  this  political  sentiment  upon  the  old 
colonial,  system  was  therefore  twofold.  It  led  first,  to  an 
ardent  desire  to  expand  British  territory,  as  that  would 
involve  an  expansion  of  the  empire's  productive  capacity, 
and  secondly,  to  a  strong  leaning  to  regulate  colonial 
enterprise  in  accordance  with  the  English  conception  of 
imperial  economics. 

Colonial  policy  was  affected  with  identical  results  by 
the  Navigation  Acts  of  1651,  1660  and  1663.  These  also 
aimed  at  a  patriotic  ideal,  the  expansion  of  the  British 
carrying  trade,  and  like  the  creed  of  self-sufficiency,  they 
met  with  considerable  success  in  this  direction.  At  the 
same  time,  like  that  creed,  they  contributed  to  confirm  the 

1  Moore's  Memoirs  (1795),  pp.  315 — 7. 

2  W.  Beawes's  Lex  Mercatoria  (ed.  1813),  ii.  6. 

3  Massie's  State  of  Brit.  Sugar  Colonies'  Trade  (1759),  p.  75. 

4  Reports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees  1715—73  (1751);  ii.    291-2). 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  53 

extravagant  use  of  state  interference  in  American 
activities.  With  regard  therefore  to  both  the  economic 
and  maritime  aspects  of  the  theory  of  empire  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  it  may  be  said  that  while  each  helped 
Pitt  to  inspire  national  enthusiasm  for  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  each  helped  George  III.  to  alienate  America. 

The  Navigation^ Acts  were  prompted  directly  by  English 
ambitions  for  sea  power  and  trade  supremacy.  l  That  of 
1660  laid  down,  so  far  as  the  colonies  were  concerned, 
that  no  ships  could  carry  their  goods  to  England  (and 
indirectly  to  Europe  at  all)  unless  truly  owned  by  British 
subjects,  manned  by  a  crew  of  whom  three-quarters  at 
least  were  Britons,  and  navigated  by  a  British  captain. 
2  That  of  1663  insisted  upon  the  additional  proviso  that 
ships  so  plying  should  be  English-built.  The  effect  was 
that  colonial  commodities  could  only  be  exported  in  the 
vessels  of  owners,  who  could  fix  their  own  arbitrary  freights 
in  the  absence  of  foreign  competition.  This  policy  would 
have  ruined  the  colonists  if  thoroughly  carried  out,  and 
as  it  was,  it  crippled  them.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
thought  by  men  of  every  school  that  England  benefited  by 
such  a  system,  and  it  was  for  this  reason  that  3  John  Ashley 
in  1740  deemed  the  colonies  the  chief  source  of  our  wealth 
and  naval  strength.  In  many  respects  his  opinion  was 
probably  true,  for  while  the  carrying  trade  with  America 
was  always  lucrative,  its  fisheries  were  also  ideal  nurseries 
of  seamanship.  The  Navigation  Acts  were  symptoms  of 
the  general  wish  to  force  national  character  into  a 
maritime  groove.  4In  1734  it  was  suggested  that  every 
British  herring  buss  should  carry  four  charity  boys  as 

1  11  Car.  ii.  c.  18. 

2  14  Car.  ii.  c.  11. 

3  Ashley's  Trade  of  Brit.  Colonies  (1740),  p.  11. 

4  The  British  Fishery  recommended  to  Parl.  (1734),  p.  42. 


54  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

apprentices,  and  the  youth  of  the  nation  were  attracted  to 
the  hard  life  oft'  the  dreary  Newfoundland  banks,  as  men 
were  sure  to  grow  lusty  and  skilful  among  the  l  everlasting 
fogs  of  that  sodden  clime.  In  1756  the  "  British 
Philippic  "  ascribed  our  superiority  over  2 "  the  starveling 
Gaul"  to  the  prowess  on  sea,  which  the  possession  of  our 
colonies  involved.  The  patriotic  opera  of  "  Eliza," 
performed  in  Drury  Lane  during  the  war  fever  of  1757, 
and  set  to  music  by  Arne,  had  maritime  greatness  as  its 
leading  topic.  The  navy  was  always  more  popular  than 
the  army,  and  war  at  sea  than  war  on  land,  and  one  writer 
argued  ingeniously  that  an  alliance  with  Austria  must 
be  inherently  unnatural,  as  the  English  people  could  have 
no  feelings  in  common  with  a  nation  possessing  3  "  scarce  a 
cockboat."  It  is  also  important  to  observe  that  the 
colonies  shared  the  advantages  offered  to  sailors  by  the 
British  government,  and  Franklin  himself  could  not  but 
recognize  that  in  some  ways  the  Navigation  Act  then  in 
force  was  to  their  advantage.  In  1754  the  four  New 
England  provinces  employed  4  six  thousand  men  in  the 
cod,  mackerel  and  whale  fisheries ;  5  by  1774  Marblehead 
alone  had  four  thousand  fishermen,  and  Gloucester  three 
hundred  schooners,  the  seamanship  of  6  New  York  and 
Rhode  Island  being  also  particularly  good.  In  1780  the 
number  of  Americans  engaged  in  the  fisheries  had  risen 
7  to  thirty-five  thousand.  The  people  of  8  Bermuda  were 

1  Cassini's  Voyage  to  Newfoundland  (1778),  pp.  115 — 23. 

2  The  British  Philippic  (1756),  p.  17. 

3  Pasquin  and  Marforio  (1783),  p.  81. 

4  Ramsay's  Hist.  Amer.  Rev.   (1793),  i.     161. 

5  Friendly  Address  to  Reasonable  Americans  (1774),  p.  40. 

6  Little's  State  of  Trade  etc.   (1743),  p.  30;  Pownall's  Administration 

etc.  (1774),  p.  251. 

7  Cool  Thoughts  (1780),  p.  25. 

8  Bruce's  Memoirs  (1783),  p.  510. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  55 

said  to  be  the  best  fishermen  in  the  world,  while  the  ship- 
building of  Philadelphia  and  Boston  repaid  the  fostering 
care  of  the  legislature. 

The  Navigation  Act  however  was  no  doubt  designed 
primarily  for  the  good  of  England,  for  besides  closing 
British  trade  with  foreign  states  to  neutral  carriers,  it 
confined  colonial  exports  and  imports  in  effect  to  British 
ships,  as  colonial  shipping  was  in  its  infancy,  and  was 
only  able  to  transport  about  one-eighth  of  the  tobacco 
despatched  to  Europe  from  the  Chesapeake.  The  Act  was 
considered  essential  to  English  maritime  greatness.  To 
Josiah  Child  in  1692,  it  was  "  our  Charta  Maritima." 
1  Gee  in  1731  considered  that  to  allow  any  direct  trade 
between  British  colonies  and  foreign  countries  would  be 
inviting  ruin.  To  2  Decker  in  1766  the  Act  seemed  "  that 
most  glorious  bulwark  of  our  trade ;"  to  3  Grenville  in 
1771,  and  also  to  4  Gibbon,  it  seemed  "  the  palladium  of 
British  commerce."  5  Pitt  himself  believed  in  its 
excellence,  and  even  6  Adam  Smith  thought  that  its 
political  advantages  outweighed  its  theoretic  failings. 
Lord  Sheffield  in  1783  called  it  7  "  the  guardian  of  the 
prosperity  of  Britain,"  and  8Beawes  in  1787  deemed  it 
the  basis  of  our  pre-eminence  in  shipping  and  seamanship. 
In  a  modified  form  it  survived  until  1849,  and  it  was 
adopted  as  a  model  by  the  American  Congress  itself  after 
independence  had  been  won. 

1  Gee's  Trade,  etc.  (1731),  p.  49. 

2  Decker's  High  Duties  (1766),  p.  21. 

3  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvi.    101. 

4  Gibbon's  Autobiography  (ed.  1896),  p.  334. 

5  A  Vindication  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Great  Commoner  (1766),  p.  22. 

6  Wealth  of  Nations  (ed.  World  Library),  p.  361. 

7  Sheffield's    Observations   on   the    Commerce   of   the   American   States 

(1783),  p.  1. 

8  Beawes's  Lex  Mercatoria,  i.    54,  55,  98. 


56  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

In  a  scientific  light  the  merits  of  this  policy  have  often 
been  questioned  in  England,  although  it  has  since  been  at 
least  partially  adopted  by  most  civilised  states.  It  fostered 
commerce  within  the  empire,  but  unduly  discouraged 
foreign  trade,  a  defect  according  to  l  Adam  Smith,  a  merit 
according  to  Pownall,  who  thought  that  Americans  were 
safer  customers  than  Germans.  From  the  American  and 
Irish  points  of  view,  it  had  several  ill-effects.  The  British 
West  Indians  were  ousted  from  neutral  Spanish  markets 
by  the  French,  who  were  freed  from  the  necessity  of 
employing  their  mother  country  as  an  intermediate  depot, 
while  Ireland  suffered  from  its  forced  inability  to  trade 
directly  with  France  and  America.  The  chief  grievance, 
however,  was  the  restriction  of  all  exports  to  England. 
Virginia  and  Maryland  shipped  2  90,000  hogsheads  of 
tobacco  a  year  to  British  ports,  of  which  3  60,000  were  re- 
shipped  here  with  a  rebate.  4  Nearly  all  the  Maryland  or 
Oronoko  tobacco  was  re-exported.  Although  the  govern- 
ment connived  at  a  general  evasion  of  the  law  in  this 
respect,  the  nominal  disabilities  of  the  colonies  were 
objected  to  in  Virginia  as  early  as  1671  by  Sir  William 
Berkeley,  but  they  never  decreased.  The  locking  up  of 
capital  and  waste  of  energy  and  time,  which  resulted  from 
this  policy  of  "  a  roundabout  trade "  was  regretted  by 
competent  judges  like  5  Pownall,  who  suggested  the 
establishment  of  British  factories  on  the  Elbe  or  Weser, 
whither  colonial  goods  might  be  allowed  to  travel  direct 
without  a  halt  and  trans-shipment  in  England.  6  France, 

1  Pownall's  Letter  to  A.  Smith  (1776),  p.  46;  Wealth  of  Nations,  p.  471. 

2  J.    Carver's   Travels  through   N.   America  in   1766-8    (1779),    p.    21; 

Morgan's  Advantages  of  a  Perpetual  Union  (1766),  p.  40. 

3  Dulaney's  Considerations  on  the  Propriety  of  imposing  Taxes  (1766), 

p.  75. 

4  Reports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees,  1715—73  (1733;  i.    637). 

5  Pownall's  Letter  to  Adam  Smith  (1776),  p.  26. 

6  Jefferson's  Memoirs  (1829),  i.    379. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  57 

wliicli  might  well  have  bought  British  colonial  rice  under 
a  free  system  of  commerce,  procured  it  instead  from  Egypt 
and  the  Levant.  Incidentally,  the  Navigation  Act  was 
the  cause  of  the  vast  extent  l  of  smuggling,  and  of  the 
consequent  embitterment  of  feeling  between  government 
officials  and  collectors  and  the  colonists,  as  soon  the  three 
surveyors-general  of  the  customs  in  America,  were  directed 
by  Grrenville  to  enforce  the  operation  of  the  Act.  This 
ill-effect  of  the  policy  was  its  most  important  influence  on 
the  conditions  of  the  time,  especially  as  the  Dutch  were 
eager  accomplices  of  the  colonial  smugglers,  but  the 
2  difficulties  met  with  in  English  custom  houses  and  the 
degeneration  of  3  the  Isle  of  Man  into  a  sanctuary  of 
thieves  and  smugglers  were  also  minor  sources  of  trouble. 
In  England  itself  the  constant  running  of  forbidden 
cargoes  gave  French  seamen  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the 
stretch  of  coast  between  Plymouth  and  Land's  End,  and 
even,  according  to  one  writer,  a  fatal  familiarity  with  the 
British  shore  as  far  north  as  4  Yorkshire.  On  the  other 
hand,  5  llodney  complained  of  similar  effects  produced  by 
the  opening  of  free  ports  in  Jamaica  and  Dominica  in 
1766  on  French  knowledge  of  their  coasts,  so  that 
according  to  partisans  of  both  schools  of  economics,  either 
policy  would  place  our  shores  at  the  mercy  of  foreign  spies. 
Seriously  however,  this  aspect  of  the  old  colonial 
system,  while  conducive  to  such  enthusiasm  as  that  which 
won  victory  for  England  in  the  struggle  for  survival  in 
America  against  the  Dutch  in  the  seventeenth  century, 

1  An  Appeal  to  Landowners  (1733),  p.  31;  Grosley's  Tour  to  London 

(1772),  i.    119. 

2  Casanova's  Memoirs,  ii.    137;  Baretti's  Journey,  ii.    65;  Grosley,  i.    8. 

3  Consid.   of  the  Trade  of  this  Kingdom   (1766),   p.   55;    Hist.   MSS. 

Comm.  Rep.  xv. ;  pt.  1,  176. 

*  History  of  the  loyal  Town  of  Ripon  (1733),  p.  44. 
5  Mundy's  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rodney  (1830),  i.    136 — 8. 


xt^RA^N 

f        or  THE        \ 
I  UNIVERSITY  ) 

\  or 


58  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

and  against  the  French  in  the  eighteenth,  led  ultimately  to 
the  loss  of  her  earliest  settlements.  Its  framers  showed  a 
want  of  proportion  in  thus  neglecting  all  interests  but  that 
of  the  Mother  Country.  It  was  indeed  tyrannical  to  force 
Britons  over  sea  to  pay  l  twenty-five  per  cent,  more  for 
the  wine,  oil  and  fruit  which  they  procured  from  Spain 
and  Portugal  than  they  need  have  paid  if  not  forced  to 
import  by  way  of  England  alone.  It  was  unjust  to  force 
colonists  to  buy  hats  from  a  market  3,000  miles  off  at 
treble  their  intrinsic  cost.  They  would  be  infinitely  more 
prosperous  if  enjoying  merely  normal  freedom  in  their 
trade,  and  the  home  country  would  only  benefit  by  such 
prosperity.  Washington  argued  that  money  would  still 
2 "centre  in  Great  Britain  as  the  needle  will  settle  to  the 
pole."  Moreover  this  side  of  the  current  colonial  policy 
was  so  dear  to  British  people  that  it  could  not  expand 
under  the  new  conditions,  which  governed  national  affairs 
after  the  expulsion  of  foreign  powers  from  North  America, 
though  even  at  home  some  thinkers  questioned  the  utility 
of  bolstering  decayed  West  Indian  industries  at  the 
expense  of  3New  England,  just  as  4 colonial  consumers 
complained  that  the  Jamaican  planters  were  the  only 
persons  benefited  by  the  duty  on  foreign  molasses. 

Another  characteristic  of  the  country's  theory  of  empire 
in  Pitt's  day  also  tended  indirectly  towards  separation. 
One  of  the  chief  uses  of  colonisation  is  its  provision  for  the 
surplus  population  of  a  state,  for  there  is  always  a  margin 
of  efficient  inhabitants  above  the  contemporary  level  of  the 
demand  of  the  labour  market.  Now  during  the  first  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  this  margin  was  very  small,  for 

1  Gent.  Mag.  (1775),  p.  476. 

2  Sparks'  Washington,  iii.    345. 

3  Dickens'  Late  Regulations  (1765),  p.  11. 

4  The  Controversy  between  Gt.  Brit,  and  Colonies  (1769),  p.  40. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  59 

the  land  was  prosperous,  and  population  almost  stationary. 
Consequently,  the  character  of  British  emigration  did  not 
tend  to  bind  Britain  and  her  colonies  any  more  closely  to 
each  other,  for  a  large  proportion  of  the  emigrants  were 
miserable  and  shiftless,  and  not  fit  apostles  of  unity. 
They  carried  with  them  to  America  little  love  for  England, 
and  the  avowed  desire  of  the  home  government  to  "dump" 
the  derelicts  of  society  upon  the  soil  of  thrifty  and  religious 
colonies  was  by  no  means  calculated  to  please.  The 
"  Brief  Account  of  the  Establishment  of  Georgia " 
contemplated  the  creation  of  a  haven  for  people,  luwho 
would  otherwise  starve  and  burden  England."  As  a  field 
for  the  deportation  of  idle  rogues,  America  offered  many 
attractions.  As  early  as  1619  Virginia  was  treated  as  a 
fitting  bourne  for  "dissolute  persons,"  and  by  2a  statute 
of  Charles  II. 's  reign,  Judges  were  empowered  to  ship 
Cumberland  and  Northumberland  moss-troopers  to  the 
plantations.  During  the  seventeenth  century  a  succession 
of  lost  causes — Royalist,  Irish,  Covenanter — furnished  their 
quotas  of  involuntary  emigrants  for  the  colonies,  which 
were  described  by  3  Child  in  1692  as  sites  for  our 
superfluous  malefactors — and  Quakers.  In  1732  4  South 
Carolina  appealed  for  carpenters,  vine  planters,  husband- 
men, or  labourers  from  the  Swiss  Protestant  cantons,  with 
three  or  four  good  shirts  apiece,  in  place  of  pauper  wastrels 
'  from  England,  and  in  1742  5  Georgia  asked  for  good 
English  or  Welsh  servants.  Otherwise  the  provinces 
would  naturally  prefer  industrious  foreigners  like  the 
6Crefeld  weavers  who  founded  Germanstown  in  Pennsyl- 
vania. 

1  Oglethorpe's  Brief  Account  (1733),  p.  5. 

2  18  Car.  ii.    c.  3. 

3  Child's  Discourse  concerning  Plantations  (1692),  p.  35. 

4  Description  of  S.  Carolina  (1732),  p.  14. 

5  State  of  the  Province  of  Georgia  (1742),  p.  13. 

6  Holcomb's  Pennsylvania  Boroughs  (1886),  p.  24. 


60  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

In  conflict  with  such  desires,  the  British  people 
deemed  America  simply  a  land  of  hope  for  those  whom 
fortune  had  treated  unkindly  at  home,  and  so  l  humanity 
supported  expediency  in  teaching  that  no  better  method 
than  transportation  could  be  devised  for  the  reform  of 
criminals.  Estimates  differ  very  widely,  but  after  1719, 
several  hundred  convicts  were  shipped  annually  to 
2  Virginia,  by  virtue  of  3  two  statutes  of  George  I.  and 
under  indentures  made  between  the  government  at  home 
and  masters  in  the  provinces,  though  a  4  large  number  of 
these  convicts  managed  to  return  to  England.  They  were 
assigned  for  various  terms  of  years  to  their  contractors, 
and  sent  off  sometimes  in  weekly-, batches  from  Newgate. 
For  them  5  the  change  from  the  pestilential  English  gaols 
could  only  be  for  the  better.  6  "  Last  week,  as  the  convicts 
were  passing  to  the  waterside  in  order  to  be  shipped  for 
America  with  fifes  playing  before  them  '  Thro'  the  wood, 
laddie,'  a  gentleman  observed  to  another  that  they  were 
very  joyous;  to  which  a  droll  convict  replied,  ' Joyous? 
Aye,  so  we  are,  master;  and  if  you  will  but  go  along  with 
us,  you  will  be  quite  transported.' '  When  America  had 
been  lost,  the  same  considerations  led  to  the  Order  in 
Council  of  1786,  authorising  convict  settlements  in 

7  Australia,  a  scheme  more  humane,  after  all,  than  the 

8  counter  proposal  of  using  felons  to  exploit  Gambia  and 
the  Gold  Coast,  and  one  thought  likely  to  promote  trade 

1  Gee's  Trade    etc.,  p.  62. 

2  Letters  on  the  English  Nation  (1755),  i.    142. 

3  4  Geo.  i.  c.  2;  6  Geo.  i.  c.  23. 

4  Observations  on  the  Causes  of  Dissoluteness  (1772),  p.  39. 

5  Eeasons  for  Establishing  Georgia  (1733),  p.   18. 

6  Annual  Register  (1766),  p.  85. 

7  Tench's  Narrative  of  the  Expedition  to  Botany  Bay  (1789),  p.  138. 

8  Short  Review  of  Present  State  of  Gt.  Britain  (1797),  p.  80;  16  Geo. 

iii.  c.  43. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  61 

with  China.  l  The  Newgate  prisoners  petitioned  for  leave 
to  go  to  Botany  Bay,  that  spot  being  thought  so  preferable 
to  the  hulks  that  2  Judges  sentenced  felons  to  periods  of 
imprisonment  longer  than  seven  years  from  motives  of 
mercy  to  ensure  transportation.  Such  a  source  of  emigra- 
tion tended  to  fill  the  colonies  with  restless  and  violent 
inhabitants,  whose  influence  was  bound  to  demoralise  both 
the  British  and  native  peoples  among  whom  they  came  to 
settle.  As  Churchill  wrote  in  1764,  when  the  tide  of 
convict  influx  into  America  was  high : 

3"  Happy,  thrice  happy  now  the  savage  race 

Since  Europe  took  their  gold,  and  gave  them  grace  ! 
And  on  sure  grounds  the  gospel  pile  to  rear 
Sends  missionary  felons  once  a  year." 


4  There  was  also  an  unfortunate  tendency  to  regard  all 
" indented"  servants,  whether  voluntary  or  convict,  as 
their  masters'  property,  service  becoming  a  status  rather 
than  a  contract. 

There  was  however  a  far  brighter  side  to  the  old 
colonial  system.  If  public  opinion  did  wander  into 
many  impolitic  deviations  from  what  our  far  longer 
and  wider  experience  has  shown  to  be  the  best  type 
of  a  colonial  policy,  it  had  at  the  same  time  a  very 
thorough  appreciation  of  some  of  the  national  advantages 
accruing  from  the  possession  of  an  empire.  It  was  this 
understanding  which  gave  the  Seven  Years'  War  its  great 
hold  upon  British  feeling,  and  which  made  the  country 
withstand  the  forces  of  disintegration  with  much  constancy 
and  patience  during  the  War  of  Independence. 

1  Dibdin's  Musical  Tour  (1788),  p.  235 

2  Atkinson's  Bentham  (1905),  p.  39. 

3  Annual  Register  (1764),  p.  235. 

*  See  J.  C.  Ballagh's  White  Servitude  in  Virginia  (1895). 


62  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

In  clear  contrast  to  France,  England  thought  that 
colonies  were  prizes,  for  which  she  ought  to  strive  hard. 
In  America  were  wide  domains,  where  Britons  could  make 
easier  livelihoods  than  at  home  without  sacrificing  their 
nationality,  and  it  must  not  be  imagined  that  the  most 
common  type  of  emigrant  was  the  one  pilloried  by 
Churchill.  Every  traveller  told  the  same  tale  of  wealth  to 
be  won  in  the  colonies,  and  so  appealed  to  the  ambitious 
and  the  able.  In  1768  a  Sheffield  man,  called  Taylor, 
heard  the  praises  of  America  from  merchants  at  a 
1  Whitehaven  inn,  and  tested  their  accuracy  by  a  tour  over 
sea.  He  reported  the  prosperity  of  colonial  towns  where 
English  life  was  reflected,  the  wealth  of  New  York,  the 
culture  of  Boston.  Philadelphia  boasted  a  bull-ring  and 
horse  races  2  after  Newmarket  rules,  as  well  as  ironworks 
and  shipyards.  The  productive  capacity  of  the  colonies 
was  generally  rightly  estimated,  although  3  the  climate  of 
South  Carolina  proved  bad  for  potters'  work.  4  In  Georgia 
a  labourer  was  expected  to  earn  six  times  the  amount  of 
wages  he  could  obtain  in  London,  and  5  the  South  Carolina, 
government  offered  Wedgwood's  workmen  three  and  a  half 
times  the  wages  they  earned  in  Staffordshire.  Land  was 
so  boundless  across  the  Atlantic  that  England  needed  no 
other  territory;  over-population  was  an  absurdity.  One 
acre  in  Jamaica  or  Barbados  was  said  by  6  Penn  to  be 
worth  three  British  acres.  7  In  1765  it  was  argued  that  a 
poor  settler  with  ten  acres  of  land  became  at  once  happier 
than  an  English  labourer,  and  with  but  thirty  acres,  he 

1  Taylor's  Voyage  to  N.  America  (1771),  p.  1. 

2  ibid,  p.  175. 

3  Wedgwood's  Address  to  Workmen  in  the  Pottery  (1783),  p.  5. 
*  Narrative  of  the  Colonization  of  Georgia  (1741),  p.  xi. 

5  Wedgwood's  Address,  pp.  7,  11. 

«  Penn's  Benefit  of  Colonies  or  Plantations,  p.  27. 

7  Begulations  lately  made  concerning  the  Colonies  (1765),  p.  29. 


THE  OLD   COLONIAL  THEORY  63 

was  as  prosperous  as  an  English  farmer.  Sometimes  these 
promises  ended  in  x  ruin  and  despair,  but  in  the  main 
they  were  well  kept.  Here  then  was  the  panacea  for 
sufferings  at  home.  2  One  writer  alleged  that  the  policy 
of  expansion  would  clear  the  last  beggar  and  stroller  from 
English  streets.  A  tract  industriously  circulated  by  the 
authorities  of  South  Carolina  to  the  effect  that  even  tailors 
and  shoemakers  rode  their  own  horses  in  that  ideal 
province  drew  hundreds  of  Germans  and  Swiss  to  settle  at 
Purrysburg.  If  there  was  little  luxury  in  America,  there 
was  3no  squalor.  In  41763,  51773  and  61779  acute 
observers  remarked  on  the  fascination  exercised  by  the 
prospect  of  riches  in  the  new  continent  upon  the  Irish 
people.  Between  1740  and  1745  South  Carolina  gave  a 
cow  and  calf  to  each  group  of  five  emigrants  settling  in  a 
frontier  township,  while  tools  and  free  conveyance  were 
always  offered  to  settlers,  who  were  chiefly  German, 
Huguenot,  Scotch  and  Welsh.  7  Grants  of  land  were 
made  liberally  to  retired  soldiers  in  1765,  and  America  was 
always  thought  to  hold  out  to  the  young  and  uninfluential 
the  possibility  of  careers  denied  to  them  at  home.  Illiberal 
landlords  drove  the  ambitious  from  British  soil  to  act  as 
pioneers  of  civilisation  in  the  backwoods  of  America. 
William  Grant,  a  future  English  Master  of  the  Rolls,  but 
then  only  a  newly-called  barrister,  emigrated  to  Canada  in 
1774  to  become  Attorney-General  there  in  1776,  at  the  age 


1  Wedgwood's  Address,  pp.  7,  8. 

2  Letter  from  a  French  Refugee  in  America  (1774),  p.  114. 

3  Lauzun's  Memoirs  (ed.   1896)  ii.  271;  Brissot's  Travels  in  U.S.A.  in 

1788  (1794),  p.  71. 
*  Annual  Register  (1763),  p.  79. 

5  Reports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees,  1715 — 73  (1773;  iii.  109). 

6  Bigelow's  Franklin  (1890)  ii.  476. 

7  Annual  Register  (1763),  p.  21. 


64  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

of  23.  l  Burke  thought  of  going  to  America  in  1754,  and 
2  Arthur  Young  in  1779.  3In  1782  Jefferson  said  that  he 
had  never  yet  seen  a  native  American  begging  in  the 
streets  or  highways.  Nor  was  this  an  idle  boast,  for  even 
during  the  Revolution  4  Englishmen  were  amazed  at  the 
absence  of  beggars  in  New  York. 

The  zeal  for  empire  was  heightened  by  the  prospect 
of  an  illimitable  market,  which  lay  behind  the  obvious 
benefit  of  colonisation  to  individuals.  Emigrants  from 
England  were  not  lost  to  her,  for  they  became  purchasers 
of  her  goods  in  a  market  from  which  foreign  competition 
was  excluded.  Hence  the  general  indifference  to  the  fear 
of  depopulation,  which  .might  otherwise  have  troubled 
a  nation  of  mercantilists^  and  which  made  the  King  of 
Prussia  hang  5 "  newlanders,  or  those  who  seduced  his 
subjects  to  emigrate."  Thus  many  districts  like  6the 
Highlands  of  Scotland  lost  a  large  number  of  their  in- 
habitants. Trade  and  empire  were  deemed  to  outweigh 
the  evils  incidental  to  rural  decay,  and  resulting  from  their 
persuasiveness  to  English  villagers 

7"  To  traverse  climes  beyond  the  western  main ; 
Where  wild  Oswego  spreads  her  swamps  around, 
And  Niagara  stuns  with  thundering  sound." 

Perhaps  some  of  the  best  blood  in  England  thus  left  her 
for  ever,  for  8  Child  thought  that  the  most  active  thinkers 

1  Burke's  Correspondence  (ed.  1844),  i.  32. 

2  A  Young's  Autobiography,  p.  83. 

3  Jefferson's  Notes  on  Virginia  (1782),  p.  242. 

4  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Eep.  xv. ;  pt.  6,  365. 

5  Candidus'  Plain  Truth  (1776),  p.  17. 

<3  Johnson's  Journey  to  the  Western  Islands  of  Scotland  (1773) ;  Han- 
way's  Defects  of  Police  (1775),  pp.  199,  291. 

7  Goldsmith's  Traveller  (1764). 

8  Child's  Discourse  (1692),  p.  33. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  65 

are  a  nation's  first  emigrants;  but  British  merchants  were 
compensated  by  their  possession  of  an  empire  of  customers, 
confined  to  English  goods  by  the  closed  doors  of  the  old 
colonial  system. 

Hence  the  zest  with  which  emigration  was  furthered. 
General  Oglethorpe  carried  Protestant  refugees  from  the 
Palatinate  to  Georgia,  and  his  philanthropy  was  approved 
by  men  of  business.  In  1764  the  London  crowd  demonstrated 
in  favour  of  German.  Protestants,  who  were  moved  from 
their  camp  at  Whitechapel  to  the  river  side,  and  iuwere 
carried  in  lighters  to  the  ships  lying  at  Blackwall,  singing 
hymns  all  the  way,"  outward  bound  for  South  Carolina, 
refugees  to-day,  customers  to-morrow.  Manufacturers 
needed  markets  of  this  nature.  2  "  Great  Britain,"  wrote 
a  pamphleteer  of  1767,  "  wants  nothing  more  than  people, 
which  the  narrow  and  limited  bounds  of  her  possessions 
at  home  cannot  maintain.'3  Moreover  the  Salzburgers 
proved  themselves  the  best  road  makers  in  America,  a 
useful  capacity  at  a  3  time  when  roads  were  few  and  bad. 
The  tendency  to  rely  too  much  on  the  American  trade  was 
clearly  bad,  but  during  the  years  of  dependence  it  brought 
much  wealth  to  England,  creating  the  prosperity  of 
Manchester  and  Liverpool,  Kendal,  Lancaster  and  Bristol, 
of  the  leather  industry  of  Glasgow,  and  the  export  trade 
in  stuffs  from  the  West  Hiding.  Even  when  the  colonists 
began  to  make  their  own  clothes,  they  came  to  England 
for  higher  class  goods,  their  own  being  4  inferior  to  our 
best  drabs,  while  the  need  to  clothe  slaves  in  cotton  resulted 
in  5  Manchester  exporting  half  a  million  pounds  worth  of 

1  Annual  Register  (1764),  p.  147. 

2  Present  State  of  Gt.  Britain  and  N.  America  (1767),  p.  viii. 

3  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Kep.  xiv. ;  pt.  10,  52. 

4  Taylor's  Voyage  to  N.  America  (1771),  p.  145. 

5  Report  on  the  Slave  Trade  (1789),  part  iv.  no.  3. 


66  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

cotton  goods  a  year  to  the  West  Indies  and  Africa. 
1  Unfashionable  articles  could  be  safely  shipped  to 
American  markets,  which  were  barred  to  foreign  com- 
petitors, and  where  the  current  exigencies  of  London 
fashion  were  unknown.  2  The  retention  of  Canada  in  1763 
was  only  insisted  on  under  the  belief  that  the  colonists  in 
America  would  derive  so  much  benefit  by  its  acquisition  as 
to  have  a  greater  purchasing  power,  and  so  furnish  3"a 
demand  of  our  manufactures  as  large  as  all  the  working 
hands  of  Great  Britain  could  possibly  supply."  The 
devout  were  drawn  to  support  the  same  cause  by  the  idea 
of  doing  good  among  the  Indians,  and  the  dissenting 
ministers  of  London  hailed  the  glories  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War  as  giving  an  opportunity  4"for  imparting  even  to 
the  most  uncultivated  of  our  species  the  happiness  of 
Britons."  Behind  such  edifying  philanthropy  lurked 
6  the  knowledge  that  even  the  Red  Indian  brave,  when  on 
the  point  of  death,  desired  to  meet  his  fate  in  a  white  shirt 
and  Stroud  blanket. 

C"  Thus  the  old  colonial  system  was  prompted  by  a  curious 
compound  of  great  ideals  and  petty  prejudices.  Behind 
the  clumsy  fabric  of  shameless  restrictions  and  liberal 
bounties  lay  plenty  of  patriotism.  The  empire-builders  of 
the  age  did  not  mind  making  sacrifices  for  the  sake  of  the 
expansion,  which  was  to  excel  that  of  RomeA  When 
the  French  traveller,  6  Grosley  asked  an  B-nglishman 
sarcastically  in  Drury  Lane,  whether  he  considered  bread 
at  threepence  a  pound,  and  beer  at  threepence  halfpenny 
a  pot  brilliant  trophies  of  the  struggle  that  closed  in  1763, 

1  Gee's  Trade   etc.    p.  102. 

2  Bigelow's  Franklin,  i.    402. 

3  Annual  Eegister  (1762),  p.  60. 

4  ibid  (1763),  p.  204. 

5  Adair's  Hist.  Am.  Indians  (1775),  p.  331. 

6  Grosley's  Tour  to  London  (1772),  i.    98. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  67 

he  was  answered,  that  it  did  not  matter;  "We  have  got 
Canada  and  beaver."  xThe  skins  of  the  beaver,  deer, 
racoon,  otter,  bear  and  martin  were  for  some  years 
the  solitary  exports  of  Canada,  2some  thirty  to  forty 
thousand  beaver  skins  being  annually  required  for  the  hat 
trade.  Pitt  imposed  taxes  deliberately  upon  the  working 
classes,  who  had  made  themselves  responsible  for  the  war 
by  their  clamours  against  France,  but  who  asked 
for  little  in  return,  f  The  colonial  charters  were 
nearly  all  drafted  by  Americans,  and  indeed  apart 
from  industrial  matters,  Great  Britain  gave  her  colonies 
absolute  self-government,  and  tolerated  slavery  as  necessary 
to  the  welfare  of  the  south  long  after  it  was  considered 
unlawful  here,  and  was  3"an  abomination  to  the  middle  and 
northern  colonies."  The  constitutions  of  all  the  provinces 
were  democratic,  each  possessing  one  elective  assembly, 
and  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut  electing 
their  upper  houses  as  well.  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut 
chose  their  own  governors,  and  along  with  Maryland, 
could  enact  laws  without  the  Crown's  approval.  It  must 
also  be  remembered  that  some  of  the  commercial  restrictions 
were  designed  to  assist  other  parts  of  the  Empire.  4By 
Act  of  Parliament,  Great  Britain  denied  herself  the 
cultivation  of  tobacco.  The  restraint  on  the  making  of 
molasses  in  America  and  on  its  importation  from  non- 
British  sources  aimed  at  helping  West  Indians,  and  the 
unpopular  tea  duty  of  1773  was  itself  contrived  so  as  to 
relieve  the  East  India  Company  and  actually  to  benefit 
the  American  colonists  at  the  same  time^>  Its  incidence 
would  have  fallen  most  lightly  on  tKe  consumer,  in  view 

1  Hugh  Gray's  Letters  from  Canada  (1809),  p.  383. 

2  Reports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees,  1715—73  (1752;  ii.  377). 

3  Controversy  between  Gt.  Britain  and  Colonies  (1769),  p.  95. 

4  22  Car.  ii.  c.  26. 


68  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

of  the  privilege  given  to  dispense  with  the  intermediate 
landing  of  tea  in  England.  Moreover, l  the  governors  who 
abetted  the  policy  of  coercion  had  in  many  cases  high 
ideals  of  duty  to  their  provinces.  Hutchinson  himself  was 
a  thoroughly  patriotic  New  Englander,  and  Bernard's  chief 
fault  was  want  of  sympathy  with  colonial  thought,  not 
want  of  principle. 

COn  the  other  ha-nd,  in  the  new  preacher  of  empire  there 
was  much  of  the  old  Adam.  The  policy  of  shackling  the 
commercial  energy  of  fellow  citizens  across  the  seas  was 
ignoble  to  a  degreeN  2  Franklin  remarked  on  the  ceaseless 
hum  of  the  English  press  against  a  colonist's  free  use  of 
his  faculties,  notwithstanding  the  existing  repressive  laws, 
and  the  impossibility  of  any  real  colonial  competition  at 
that  time(  British  manufacturers  need  not  have  prohibited 
the  woollen  industry  in  America  where  labour  was  dear, 
and  native-grown  wool  scarce.  Nor  was  it  reasonable  for 
Birmingham  traders  to  have  petitioned  the  government  in 
1773  to  refuse  to  relax  its  regulations  against  the  making 
of  steel  and  of  tilt  hammers  in  the  colonies.  Yet  even 
Pitt  acquiesced  in  the  policy  of  curbing  their  industry  at 
every  turn.  Great  as  the  British  theory  of  empire  was 
in  certain  aspects,  this  side  of  the  old  colonial  system  was 
fatally  bad.  The  country  wanted  some  leader  with  genius 
to  point  out  the  necessity  for  adapting  its  modes  of 
government  to  new  phases  of  dominion,  but  Pitt's  role  was 
only  that  of  the  enthusiast,  and  he  did  not  combine 
Franklin's  saneness  with  his  own  fire.  Though  he  was  not 
the  actual  promoter  of  the  measures  which  led  to  Lexington 
and  Bunker  Hill,  he  was  an  adherent  of  that  restrictive 
colonial  theory,  which  was  the  deeper  cause  of  separation. 

1  See  Prof.  Hosmer's  Samuel  Adams  (1884),  pp.  29,  30. 

2  Bigelow's  Franklin,  1.    569. 


THE  OLD  COLONIAL  THEORY  69 

He  believed  in  a  policy  which  was  shaped  by  the 
mercantilist  creed  of  the  age,  and  which  made  men  haggle 
for  legal  rights  instead  of  judging  policies  on  principle. 
Such  a  narrow  vision  was  not  by  any  means  peculiar  to 
English  statesmen ;  they  but  shared  it  with  their  European 
contemporaries.  Nevertheless,  it  cost  us  America,  for  as 
Burke  said,  1 "  magnanimity  in  politics  is  not  seldom  the 
truest  wisdom;  and  a  great  empire  and  little  minds  go  ill 
together.'^ 

1  Burke's  Select  Works  (ed.  Payne),  i.    233. 


70  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 


CHAPTEE    IV. 
DIALECTICS  ON  THE  QUESTION  OF  TAXATION. 

GRENVILLE  succeeded  Bute  as  Prime  Minister  in  April 
1763,  and  in  March  1765,  lie  passed  the  Stamp  Act,  which 
levied  duties  upon  deeds,  cards,  dice,  pamphlets,  advertise- 
ments, licenses,  newspapers  and  legal  proceedings  within 
the  American  colonies.  At  the  same  time  he  tried  to 
enforce  the  Navigation  Acts,  and  to  suppress  the  importation 
of  smuggled  molasses  from  the  French  West  Indies.  Both 
projects  evoked  indignation  in  America.  Grenville  resigned 
in  1765,  and  was  succeeded  by  Buckingham,  who  repealed 
the  Stamp  Act  early  in  1766,  but  the  repeal  was  accompanied 
by  a  declaration  affirming  the  soundness  of  the  principle 
upon  which  the  Act  had  been  based,  in  that  the  colonies 
were  alleged  "  to  be  subordinate  unto  and  dependent  upon 
the  imperial  crown  and  Parliament  of  Great  Britain." 
Rockingham  failed  to  secure  the  co-operation  of  Pitt,  whose 
distaste  for  all  party  connections  remained  unabated,  and 
he  retired  from  office  in  the  summer  of  the  same  year.  A 
new  ministry  was  formed  under  Pitt,  who  accepted  the 
earldom  of  Chatham  at  the  same  time,  but  he  was  too  ill 
to  be  more  than  a  nominal  leader.  Grafton  acted  as  his 
deputy,  and  finance  was  left  in  the  hands  of  Charles 
Townshend.  Like  Grenville,  Townshend  misunderstood 
the  character  of  American  resistance,  and  possibly  he  even 
entertained  the  idea  of  subverting  the  existing  colonial 
constitutions.  At  all  events,  he  introduced  a  Revenue  Act, 
which  became  law  in  June  1767,  and  provided  for  the 
imposition  of  duties  upon  tea,  paper,  glass  and  painters' 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  71 

colours  in  the  colonies.  As  in  the  case  of  the  preceding 
measure,  the  product  of  the  duties  was  much  less  than  the 
cost  of  collection.  The  new  regulations  were  however 
enforced  by  an  army  of  revenue  officers,  backed  by  a  few 
thousand  regular  troops.  The  outcry  in  the  colonies,  and 
the  open  sympathy  of  many  Whigs  with  the  policy  of 
evasion  and  resistance  during  Grafton's  ministry  (1768-70) 
led  to  the  repeal  of  all  the  duties  except  that  on  tea  in 
1770.  This  was  insisted  on  by  Lord  North,  who  had  just 
become  Prime  Minister,  and  who  thought  concession  would 
be  imputed  as  surrender.  The  Boston  tea  riot  in  December, 
1773  was  punished  by  the  closing  of  the  port  of  Boston 
and  by  the  nullification  of  the  charter  of  Massachusetts. 
Government  coercion  was  met  by  colonial  violence,  and 
the  Continental  Congress  of  September  1774  declared 
definitely  for  the  cause  of  resistance  to  all  taxation  for 
raising  a  revenue  from  American  subjects*  without  their 
consent.  The  first  shot  of  the  War  of  Independence  was 
fired  at  Lexington  in  April  1775. 

-  Thus  the  question  of  direct  taxation  was  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  struggle  for  independence,  and  for  this  reason 
that  struggle  has  often  been  attributed  to  the  personal 
work  of  George  III.  and  of  his  Tory  adherents.  This 
however  is  an  entirely  wrong  view.  No  doubt  that  impolitic 
king  was  largely  responsible  for  the  actual  incidents 
leading  to  rebellion.  American  resistance  was  to  him  as 
much  an  obstacle  to  his  own  monarchical  ideal  as  to  British 
public  policy.  No  doubt  also  the  Tories  would  be  more 
disposed  than  the  Whigs  to  treat  the  colonial  opposition 
as  a  national  menace  rather  than  as  the  assertion  of  a 
constitutional  theory,  internal  to  the  empire.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  King's  friends  formed  but  a  small  clique ; 
the  Bedford  and  Grenville  factions,  which  supported  him, 
were  thoroughly  Whig,  and  the  government  policy  was  a 


72  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

far  more  logical  outcome  of  the  accepted  colonial  system 
than  any  conciliation  could  have  been.  Indeed,  it  is 
impossible  to  dissociate  the  insistence  on  direct  taxation 
from  the  general  spirit  of  the  current  theory  of  empire. 
To  understand  the  English  side  of  the  dialectics,  which 
spurred  the  controversy  of  the  time,  it  is  necessary  to 
imbibe  for  the  moment  the  spirit  of  the  old  colonial 
system.  Imagine  that  expansion  is  essential  to 
the  mother  country,  and  that  colonies  exist  primarily  to 
further  its  material  welfare.  Then  recall  the  vast  exertions 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  in  which  England  had  safeguarded 
the  future  of  her  colonists  by  fighting  all  over  the  globe. 
1  Nothing  could  be  more  natural  than  the  inference  that 
America  should  contribute  its  share  towards  sustaining  the 
burden  of  empire. 

Questions  like  that  involved  by  Grenville  and  North's 
policy  of  taxing  colonies  directly  from  Westminster  are 
now  old  enough  to  be  judged  without  passion.  It  is  not 
for  an  historian  to  declaim  on  their  justice  or  injustice. 
Concerned  as  he  is  with  causes  for  which  great  masses  of 
men  honestly  contended,  it  is  more  his  province  to  explain 
why  they  appealed  so  successfully  to  so  many  minds  than 
to  balance  their  ethics  and  moralities.  At  all  events,  it  is 
palpably  unfair  to  assume  that  righteousness  was  on  the 
side  of  the  victors  in  the  American  War,  and  even  if  this 
be  assumed,  it  does  not  follow  that  an  average  follower 
of  that  side  had  better  reasons  for  his  partnership  than  a 
sincere  opponent.  Certainly  the  abuse  so  often  lavished 
upon  George  III.  and  his  ministers  has  been  unwarranted. 
Politically,  their  minds  were  opaque  where  clear  vision  was 
essential,  but  as  typical  men  of  the  day  they  could  not 
have  been  properly  expected  to  see  beyond  their  fellows, 

1  Conduct  of  the  late  Administration  (1767),  p.  12. 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  73 

for  figs  do  not  grow  on  thistles.  Living  in  the  atmosphere 
of  the  old  colonial  system,  it  would  have  been  unnatural 
had  such  men  of  small  talent  more  than  but  partially 
conceived  the  true  uses  of  an  empire.  Polemics  must  be 
ephemeral,  and  therefore  the  nature  of  English  arguments 
on  the  question  of  taxation  cannot  but  appear  reasonable, 
if  we  place  ourselves  in  the  position  of  their  exponents, 
and  accept  the  truth  of  premises,  which  have  only  been 
discarded  as  false  in  the  light  of  later  and  larger  experience. 
Their  policy  may  well  appear  now  to  have  been  indefensible 
as  statesmanship,  but  it  was  none  the  less  a  very  natural 
outcome  of  the  contemporary  theory  of  empire. 

The  Seven  Years'  War  had  involved  1  brisk  trade  for 
the  time,  especially  during  its  last  years,  and  the  taxes 
to  the  amount  of  twenty-five  millions,  which  it  entailed, 
were  not  severely  felt.  It  added  however  nearly  seventy- 
five  millions  to  the  National  Debt,  and  it  left  war's  usual 
legacy  of  distress  behind  it.  There  was  some  suffering  in 
England  as  soon  as  she  began  to  feel  the  exhaustion 
incident  to  all  such  gigantic  efforts,  while  2  commercial 
panics  in  Berlin,  Hamburg  and  Holland  lessened  the 
demand  for  British  goods  in  those  markets.  Men  wondered 
then  why  they  had  ever  enabled  Pitt,  the  quondam 
champion  of  peace  and  isolation,  to  3 "  conquer  America 
in  Germany  at  the  cost  of  eighty  millions."  Here  and 
there,  the  return  of  soldiery  to  civil  occupations  overstocked 
the  labour  market;  a  great  storm  broke  over  England  in 
December  1763,  and  harvests  were  bad  for  some  years. 
4  Dundee  and  Edinburgh  had  thriven  on  the  transient 

1  A.  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations,  p.    343. 

2  Consideration  of  the  Trade  of  this  Kingdom  (1766),  p.  6. 

3  An  Enquiry  into  the  Conduct  of  a  late  Bt.  Hon.  Commoner  (1766), 

p.  14. 

4  Reports  of  House  of  Commons  Committees,  1715—73  (1773;  iii.   101, 

105,  109). 


74  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

demand  for  shirtings  for  the  army;  they  drooped  after 
the  war.  The  Irish  had  benefited  while  the  struggle  had 
disabled  Germans  from  competing  with  their  linen  industry ; 
they  lost  the  whole  trade  when  the  Continent  was  free  to 
try  again,  with  its  cheaper  yarn  and  underpaid  labour. 
The  prospect  of  maintaining  a  considerable  army  in  the 
newly  ceded  territories  was  therefore  not  pleasing,  although 
no  less  than  ten  thousand  troops  had  been  left  in  North 
America  and  the  West  Indies  in  1763.  1  It  was  estimated 
that  the  annual  Ordnance  charge  after  the  war  was  on 
an  average  sixty  thousand  pounds  more  than  before  its 
outbreak,  and  that  2  the  cost  of  the  American  establishment 
was  about  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  pounds  a  year. 

Under  these  circumstances,  there  is  no  reason  to  wonder 
why  Grenville  should  ha,ve  proposed  to  exact  direct 
contributions  towards  the  cost  of  empire-building  from  the 
colonies  themselves.  3' Three  millions  sterling  were  being 
spent  every  year  upon  imperial  defence,  towards  which  sum 
the  Americans,  though  constituting  one-fifth  of  the  British 
population,  paid  nothing  whatever.  Any  Englishman  who 
had  learnt  the  doctrines  of  the  system  under  which  the 
colonies  had  been  brought  into  being,  would  naturally  fall 
in  with  such  a  clear  application  of  those  doctrines.  In 
1757  it  was  suggested  that  the  Pennsylvania^  should 
4  "  pay  those  who  fought  their  battles."  In  1761  a  judicial 
decision  enabled  the  government  to  repress  American 
smuggling  more  effectually  by  means  of  writs  of  assistance, 
enabling  collectors  of  customs  to  command  the  help  of 
sheriffs  and  constables  in  searching  for  smuggled  goods, 

1  Consideration  of  the  Trade  of  this  Kingdom  (1766),  p.  28. 

2  ibid,  p.  70. 

3  ibid,  p.  73. 

4  A  Letter  from  a  Merchant  of  London  to  Rt.   Hon.  W.   Pitt  (1757), 

p.  33. 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  75 

and  a  writer  in  the  "Annual  Register"  of  1763,  who  was 
almost  certainly  a  Whig,  for  that  publication  was  conducted 
by  Burke  himself,  said  of  the  garrison  in  Canada :  l "  For 
the  present  these  troops  are  maintained  by  Great  Britain. 
When  a  more  calm  and  settled  season  comes  on,  they  are  to 
be  paid,  as  is  reasonable,  by  the  colonies  they  are  intended 
to  protect."  Early  in  1764  Governor  Bernard  sent  certain 
definite  proposals  on  this  point  to  the  government,  and  in 
March  the  House  of  Commons  passed  a  resolution  that  it 
was  proper  to  charge  certain  stamp  duties  in  the  colonies. 
Such  a  view  was  surely  characteristic  of  the  utilitarian, 
and  by  no  means  altruistic  side  of  the  war  spirit  of  Pitt's 
time.  Grenville  himself  described  his  aim  as  being  the 
establishment  of  2 "  settled,  moderate  and  frugal  govern- 
ment "  by  the  choice  of  such  methods  of  taxation  as 
would  fall  least  heavily  upon  the  taxpayer.  He  did  not 
anticipate  resistance  in  America.  The  colonists  had 
gained  enormously  by  the  war,  and  if  they  had  submitted 
in  the  past  to  the  many  restrictive  measures  of  the  old 
imperial  system  without  demur,  it  seemed  probable  that 
they  would  accept  state  interference  in  a  new  form  for 
a  necessary  purpose.  3In  the  winter  of  1763  he  had 
interviewed  the  agents  of  various  colonies  in  order  to  be 
advised  as  to  the  names  of  tax  collectors  likely  to  be 
acceptable  to  the  inhabitants.  It  was  palpable  that 
the  alternative  method  of  making  direct  and  distinct 
requisitions  for  proportionate  contributions  to  each  of  the 
colonial  assemblies  would  fail  utterly. 

The  English  disputants  laid  great  stress  afterwards  on 
the  claim  of  Great  Britain  to  colonial  gratitude  arising 
from  the  general  neglect  of  the  colonists  in  British  North 

1  Annual  Register  (1763),  p.  21. 

2  Bedford  Correspondence,  iii.    397. 

3  Bigelow's  Franklin,  i.    464. 


76  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

America  to  provide  for  their  own  defence.  The  ministry 
believed  that  the  whole  brunt  of  the  late  war  had  been 
borne  by  soldiers  and  sailors  from  home.  In  actual  fact, 
numerous  colonial  levies  had  fought  with  the  same 
gallantry  and  skill  which  had  won  Louisburg  from  the 
French  in  1745,  but  upon  the  evidence  actually  coming  to 
English  ears,  the  prevailing  partial  misconception  of  facts 
was  not  unnatural.  Certainly  it  added  to  the  popularity 
of  the  claim  to  tax  America.  During  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  the  many  extreme  sectaries  in  the  colonies  had 
vented  their  theories  of  unpractical  quietism  with  foolish 
ostentation.  The  Dutch  of  x  Albany  had  shown  themselves 
avaricious  and  disloyal,  while  2  Pennsylvania  in  particular, 
ignored  the  danger  of  French  and  Indian  forays  with  fatal 
composure.  In  1754  its  people  refused  to  supply  Braddock 
with  3  waggons,  and  4  complained  that  the  British  army 
was  depriving  provincials  of  their  indented  servants. 
Indeed,  their  attitude  goes  far  to  justify  that  general's 
refusal  to  rely  on  colonial  military  advice.  One  infatuated 
enthusiast  preached  to  the  Quakers  :  5  "  If  the  potsherds  of 
the  earth  clash  together,  what  is  that  to  us?"  Such  men 
considered  English  troops  6  "poisonous,"  and  Maryland 
contributed  practically  nothing  to  the  cost  of  their  main- 
tenance. Both  7  these  provinces  were  still  proprietary,  and 
their  efforts  to  escape  expense  were  no  more  edifying  than 
the  similar  attempts  of  their  narrow-minded  proprietors. 
Lord  Baltimore  refused  to  pay  anything  by  way  of  taxation 

1  Kalm's  Travels  (1772),  i.  100. 

2  ibid,  i.    36. 

3  Brief  View  of  the  Conduct  of  Pennsylvania  (1755),  p.  31. 

4  An  Answer  to  an  Invidious  Pamphlet   etc.  (1755),  p.  11. 

5  Brief  View    etc.,  p.  23. 

6  J.  Dickinson's  Speech  at  Philadelphia  (1764),  p.  29. 

7  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvi.    146;  Black's  Maryland's  Attitude  in  the 

Struggle  for  Canada  (1892),  pp.  19,  25,  55. 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  77 

while  the  French  were  ravaging  the  borders.  In  many 
colonies  the  danger  of  French  invasion  was  thought  remote, 
and  the  peace-loving  population  left  defence  to  others,  the 
Quakers  in  some  cases  1  excommunicating  active  resisters 
to  invasion.  Washington  described  provincial  recruits  in 
1754  as  being  chiefly2  "loose,  idle  persons,  quite  destitute 
of  hearth  and  home,  and  I  may  truly  say,  many  of  them 
of  clothes."  The  wealthier  were  often  incorrigibly  selfish, 
and  with  a  singular  apathy  towards  the  welfare  of  the 
empire,  3New  England  traders  plied  their  business  under 
fictitious  flags  of  truce  on  the  Mississippi  and  Mobile 
throughout  the  war.  4  Bossu  saw  these  disloyal  pedlars 
chaffering  at  New  Orleans,  while  Wolfe  was  struggling  to 
win  Quebec,  and  similar  indifference  was  shown  in  the 
next  wax,  when  the  revolutionary  army  were  starved  in 
consequence  of  local  "  corners  "  in  food-stuffs.  Washington 
then  said.:  5  "Shall  a  few  designing  men  for  their  own 
aggrandisement,  and  to  gratify  their  own  avarice,  overset 
the  goodly  fabric  we  have  been  rearing  at  the  expense  of 
so  much  time,  blood  and  treasure?"  These  causes  of 
complaint  were  foreshadowed  repeatedly  in  America  during 
the  Seven  Years'  War ;  6  General  Forbes  was  compelled  to 
take  300  soldiers  at  Forts  Cumberland  and  Frederick 
into  his  own  pay  in  1758,  as  Maryland  would  not  save 
them  from  starvation,  and  we  cannot  wonder  that  such 
incidents  weighed  more  with  English  politicians  than  facts 
which  reflected  the  better  side  of  American  thought.  They 
deserve  considerable  weight,  even  when  we  recognize  that 


1  Brissot's  Travels  in  U.S.A.  in  1788  (1794),  p.  350. 

2  Sparks'  Washington,  ii.    2. 

3  Gent.  Mag.  (1759),  p.  629. 

4  Bossu's  Travels  through  Louisiana  (1771),  i.    237. 

5  Sparks'  Washington,  vi.    211. 

<3  Black's  Maryland  (1892),  p.  64. 


78  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

in  1740  r  15,000  New  England  seamen  were  willing  to  fight 
Spain,  that  2  Franklin  did  as  much  to  stimulate  the  war 
spirit  in  America  in  1756  as  Pitt  did  in  England,  and  that 
altogether  the  colonies  sent  3  23,800  men  and  400  privateers 
to  do  battle  for  the  race  in  the  Seven  Years'  War.  The 
lion's  share  in  the  fighting  was  borne  by  British  troops, 
even  if  the  future  revolutionary  leaders,  Washington,  Lee, 
Prescott,  Putnam,  Montgomery  and  Gates  all  fought 
against  the  French. 

Therefore,  in  the  war  of  words  between  Great  Britain 
and  her  colonies,  which  began  in  1764,  the  British 
controversialists  found  their  most  effective  argument  in 
the  plea  that  every  portion  of  the  empire  should  bear  its 
quota  of  the  common  burden.  To  sustain  this  contention 
most  successfully,  they  did  not  admit  that  America  had 
herself  made  great  sacrifices  in  the  French  struggle. 
Whatever  might  be  alleged  against  England's  choice  of 
means,  her  end  was  deemed  just  in  this  respect.  As  one 
writer  said,  4"If  the  Americans  enjoy  the  privileges,  let 
them  participate,  in  some  degree,  of  the  burthens  of  their 
fellow  subjects."  Taking  America's  economic  disabilities 
as  matters  of  course  and  irrelevant,  English  disputants 
pointed  out  how  much  the  Mother  Country  had  done  for 
her  children.  The  very  able  author  of  "The  Eights  of 
Great  Britain  Asserted"  showed  that  the  old  colonial 
system  had  provided  the  colonies  with  nearly  two  and  a 
half  millions  sterling  in  bounties  between  1706  and  1774. 
In  the  Seven  Years'  War  England  had  done  much  for 
them.  5In  1756  £115,000  were  sent  us  "a  free  gift"  to 

1  Present  State  of  France  and  Spain  (1740),  p.  41. 

2  Bigelow's  Franklin,  i.    278. 

3  Eamsay's  Hist.  Amer.  Eev.  (1793),  i.    40. 

4  Conduct  of  the  late  Administration  (1767),  p.  153. 

5  The  Eights  of  Great  Britain  Asserted  (1776),  pp.  12-3. 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  79 

New  England.  In  1757  £50,000  were  sent  for  "the  use 
and  relief  "  of  North  and  South  Carolina  and  Yirginia ;  in 
1758  £41, 000  were  given  to  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut. 
The  vaunted  Louisburg  expedition  of  1745  had  been 
financed  by  the  home  government,  and  between  1759  and 
1763  £870,000  were  paid  to  the  colonies  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  army  in  America.  Townshend  said  with  some  force 
that  the  colonists  were  only  asked  to  give  their  mite 
towards  a  common  fund.  Their  contribution  would  be 
expended  in  America  itself.  Adam  Smith,  while 
1  condemning  the  monopolist  tendencies  of  the  old  colonial 
system  in  1776,  argued  that  the  Americans  had  no  just 
ground  for  exemption  from  helping  to  bear  the  cost  of  a 
war  waged  as  well  for  their,  as  for  English  interests,  and 
that  there  was  no  good  in  2"the  splendid  and  showy 
equipage  of  empire,"  if  England  had  to  bear  the  whole 
burden  of  its  maintenance. 

Of  course,  the  most  efficient  weapon  in  the  armoury  of 
colonial  dialectics  was  the  argument  against  England's 
choice  of  means  to  effect  her  end.  It  was  however 
considered  necessary  to  combat  the  justice  of  that  end  as 
well.  The  American  case  on  this  point  rested  on  three 
pleas.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  argued  that  there  was  no 
necessity  at  all  to  quarter  an  army  among  the  colonists. 
3  They  could  hold  their  own  against  any  French  or  Indian 
incursion,  and  desired  no  protection.  The  troops,  for 
whom  they  were  asked  to  pay  were  garrisoned  in  Canada, 
and  would  therefore  only  benefit  that  province  by  their 
expenditure.  4If  England  herself  disliked  a  standing 

1  Wealth  of  Nations  (ed.  "World  Library"),  p.  485. 

2  ibid,  p.  760. 

3  Considerations  on  behalf  of  the  Colonists  (1765),  p.  11. 

4  An  Appeal  to  the  World   (1769),   p.   27;  Adair's   Hist.   Am.   Indians 

(1775),  p.  463. 


80  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

army,  she  should  not  force  one  on  her  colonies,  and  risk 
creating  another  Ireland.  Secondly,  Franklin  urged  that 
America  had  made  equal  sacrifices  with  England  in  the 
French  war.  She  had  put  nearly  25,000  men  in  the  field, 
and  in  the  later  Indian  war  1,000  men  out  of  the  British 
force  of  1,300  were  colonial.  The  payments  made  to  the 
colonies  were  far  less  than  their  disbursements  for  the 
purposes  of  the  war.  Pennsylvania  spent  £440,000  more 
than  she  received.  So  willing  was  America  to  fight  for 
any  English  interest  that  she  had  sent  3,000  men  to  the 
Carthagena  expedition  in  1739,  and  would  help  the  Mother 
Country  even  in  the  event  of  a  purely  European  conflict. 
Thirdly,  the  country  was  said  to  be  l  too  poor  in  gold  and 
silver  to  pay  the  duties  demanded. 

None  of  these  pleas  however  were  conclusive,  and  the 
colonial  controversialists  directed  their  opposition  rather 
against  England's  choice  of  means.  Though  there  was  no 
precedent  to  favour  imposing  duties  directly  upon  colonies, 
British  policy  had  been  exercised  again  and  again  in 
controlling  the  economics  of  Greater  Britain  for  the  benefit 
of  vested  interests  at  home.  The  American  provinces  had 
entire  self-government  in  internal  affairs,  and  Massachusetts 
was  2  admittedly  a  genuine  democracy ;  but  they  had  always 
been  regarded  as  subject  to  the  paramount  exigencies  of 
the  imperial  system.  Hence  the  natural  drift  of  the 
government  to  the  policy  of  the  Stamp  Act,  which  obviated 
the  difficulties  of  separate  appeals  to  a  dozen  different 
unwilling  legislatures.  It  was  said  very  truly  that  direct 
taxation  from  home  was  3  "  to  the  great  ease  of  the  Mother 

1  Present  State  of  Gt.  Britain  and  N.  America,  p.  285 ;  Late  Regulations 

respecting  Brit.  Colonies,  p.  23 ;  Bigelow's  Franklin,  i.  468.     See 
however    J.  Adams'  Twenty-one  Letters  (ed.  1789),  p.  41. 

2  Bernard  and  Gage's  Letters  to  Hillsborough  (1769),  p.  43. 

3  Two  Papers  on  Taxing  the  British  Colonies  in  America  (1767),  p.  14. 


DIALECTICS   ON   TAXATION  81 

State,  and  without  the  trouble  of  applying  to  the  several 
assemblies  in  so  many  distinct  and  independent  provinces." 
The  question  of  legality  played  a  great  part  in  the 
dialectics  of  the  day.  The  colonial  lawyers  were  then 
almost  l  notorious  for  their  fine  verbal  distinctions,  and 
their  genius  for  evasion  and  chicane.  They  claimed  to 
discriminate  between  the  previous  indirect  taxation  from 
home  as  external,  and  the  new  taxation  as  internal.  With 
regard  to  the  latter,  they  claimed  to  have  been  always 
exempt  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  English  Houses  of 
Parliament.  2"  We 'owe  them  no  more  subjection  than 
the  Divan  of  Constantinople."  3  Washington  seems  to 
have  deemed  the  Stamp  Act  simple  robbery  and  "  a  direful 
attack  upon  our  liberties,"  and  4  John  Adams  thought  that 
there  was  no  more  justice  in  Britain  than  in  hell.  More 
learned  and  precise  critics  like  James  Otis  sought  con- 
troversial weapons  in  the  past  history  of  English  freedom, 
to  prove  the  unlawfulness  of  direct  taxation  of  the  colonies 
from  Westminster,  and  though  Mansfield  deemed  his  views 
5 "  full  of  wildness,"  he  found  plenty  of  matter  in  the 
writings  of  Locke  and  other  political  philosophers  6to 
support  the  plea  of  no  taxation  without  representation. 
7  Writing  upon  paper  made  at  Boston  in  support  of  the 
proposal  to  import  no  English  goods,  Otis  asked  8why 
America  should  be  governed  by  the  electors  of  Old  Sarum, 
and  the  occupants  of  Cornish  barns  and  alehouses.  9The 

1  See  Douglas'  Reports  (1781),  p.  647;  Bernard  and  Gage's  Letters  to 

Hillsborough  (1769),  p.  39. 

2  Conduct  of  the  late  Administration  (1767),  p.  91. 

3  Sparks'  Washington,  ii.    543;  iii.    394. 

4  J.  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  ii.    308. 

5  Holliday's  Life  of  Mansfield  (1797),  p.  248. 

6  Rights  of  Parliament  Vindicated  (1766),  p.  8. 

7  Tudor's  Life  of  Otis  (1823),  p.  35. 

8  ibid,  p.  191. 

9  ibid,  p.  165. 


82  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

in  jury  to  the  colonists  arising  from  their  forced  inability  to 

accept  molasses  from  the  French  West  Indies  in  return  for 

fish  was  the  work  of  the  Sugar  Act  of  1733  and  was  already 

intolerable.     On  the  other  hand,  like  John  Dickenson  and 

other  moderate  reformers,  Otis  abandoned  the  plea  as  the 

alleged  difference  between  external  and  internal  taxation. 

That  plea  is  indeed  difficult  to  maintain,  and  if  to-day  we 

can  agree  that  it  was  fallacious,  it  is  clear  that  apart  from 

the  deterrent  effects  of  long  disuse  the  government  might 

have  been  legally  entitled  to  extend  its  admitted  right 

to  regulate  the  affairs  of  the  colonies  without  consulting 

them,  in  order  to  cover  the  claim  to  levy  taxes.     This  is 

the    view    of    the    best    American    authorities,    such    as 

1  Professor  Woodburn,  and  in  any  case,  we  should  hesitate 

to  term   illegal  a  course   considered   constitutional   by   a 

lawyer  as  profound  as  Mansfield,  and  an  historian  as  great 

as  Gibbon.     It  is  especially  difficult  to  accept  the  American 

contention  as  correct  if  we  believe  in  the  juristic  rather 

than    in    the    political    conception    of    sovereignty.       A 

philosopher  might  hold  that  all  the  power  of  a  government 

is   derived   from   and   delegated   by   the   people,   but  the 

custom  of  the  British  constitution  has  discarded  such  an 

abstract  proposition  and  made  Parliament  absolute.     By 

accepting  the  trade  restrictions   imposed   upon  them  by 

those    in    authority    at    Westminster,    the    colonies    had 

habitually  admitted  in  effect  their  illimitable  sovereignty. 

Justice  and  expediency  should  no  doubt  temper  the  exercise 

of  legal  rights,  but  they  do  not  themselves  alter  or  abridge 

such  rights,  and  the  declaration  of  Parliament  in  1766 

(6  Geo.  III.  c.  12)  that  it  had  full  power  "to  make  laws 

and  statutes  of  sufficient  force  and  validity  to  bind  the 

colonies  and  people  of  America  in  all  cases  whatever"  is 

not  technically  open  to  objection. 

1  Woodburn's  Causes  of  the  Am.  Rev.  (1892),  p.  51. 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  83 

The  disputation  of  that  day  is  far  more  suggestive  in  the 
spirit  than  the  letter.  Arguments  "  ad  hoc  "  may  have  no 
lasting  value,  but  the  general  tone  of  this  controversy  is 
most  suggestive,  as  the  best  American  writers  made  amends 
in  the  early  years  of  the  struggle  for  any  legal  flaws  in 
their  political  case.  Otis  said  :  1 "  God  forbid  (that)  these 
colonies  should  ever  prove  undutiful  to  their  Mother 
Country,"  but  he  brushed  aside  the  sophistry  of  forensic 
quibbles,  realising  that  there  are  occasions  when  political 
principles  must  outweigh  bare  legal  rights.  Englishmen 
were  arguing  that  many  districts  at  home  paid  taxes 
without  returning  members  to  Parliament,  but  it  was 
madness  to  extend  such  an  anomaly.  A  trained  disputant 
— witness  his  admirable  argument  against  the  legality  of 
writs  of  assistance  as  being  general  not  special,  perpetual 
not  returnable, — he  appealed  to  English  Whigs  to 
sympathise  with  men  struggling  for  2"the  laws,  customs 
and  usages  of  our  ancestors,  bravely  supported  and 
defended  with  the  monarchy,  and  from  age  to  age  handed 
down."  He  argued  that  the  economic  restrictions  were  in 
effect  America's  taxes,  and  that  further  interference  would 
be  tyranny.  3  Richard  Bland  of  Virginia  pointed  out 
how  even  the  system  of  bounties  was  really  devised  for 
the  sake  of  Britain. 

Such  contentions  enabled  the  opposition  at  home  to 
evade  treating  the  question  as  a  national  issue,  while  at  the 
same  time  its  appeal  to  abstract  principles  opened  the  way 
to  a  repudiation  of  England's  repressive  colonial  theory 
altogether.  When  once  the  "  locus  standi "  of  the  old 
colonial  system  was  disputed  it  was  but  a  step  to  the 
avowed  republicanism  of  Paine.  Franklin  held  out  long 

1  James  Otis'  Vindication  of  the  British  Colonies  (1769),  p.  22. 

2  ibid,  p.  47. 

3  Eland's  Enquiry  into  the  Eights  of  British  Colonies,  p.  19. 


84  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

for  peace,  but  in  time  lie  saw  that  Britain  would  never 
give  way,  and  he  was  then  willing  to  avail  himself  of  this 
opportunity.  He  perceived  that  when  once  the  colonies 
could  be  persuaded  that  their  previous  subjection  to  British 
mercantilism  was  but  arbitrary  and  terminable,  there 
would  be  an  open  road  to  a  new  career  of  freedom, 
unimpeded  by  British  interests,  wars  and  debts.  Such 
a  dream  animated  the  heated  abstractions  of  Paine' s 
"  Common  Sense  and  Plain  Truth,"  where  alleged  "  natural 
rights"  are  preferred  to  the  old  political  ties.  1  "In  England 
the  King  hath  little  more  to1  do  than  to  make  war  and  give 
away  places,  which,  in  plain  terms,  is  to  impoverish  the 
nation  and  set  it  together  by  the  ears.  ...  Of  more  worth 
is  one  honest  man  to  society  and  in  the  sight  of  God  than 
all  the  crowned  ruffians  that  ever  lived."  When  we  read 
such  language  we  cannot  but  feel  in  a  new  atmosphere, 
where  history  and  tradition  are  treated  with  contempt,  and 
where  the  formal  pleading  of  old  world  constitutional 
lawyers  sounds  like  a  dead  tongue.  2  Blackstone  was 
quoted  to  support  the  since  exploded  doctrine  that  human 
laws  which  conflict  with  those  of  nature  are  invalid.  The 
admission  of  alleged  eternal  "laws"  into  the  category  of 
legal  arguments  and  Paine's  rancorous  invective  against 
3  "the  royal  brute  of  Great  Britain,"  4"Mr.  Guelph,"  were 
clear  steps  towards  the  unhistorical  rhetoric  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence.  They  marked  a  distinct  departure 
from  the  earlier  and  far  more  closely  reasoned  appeals  to 
juristic  principles;  and  revolutionaries  of  the  saner  sort  like 
5  John  Adams  deplored  Paine's  "Newgate"  epithets,  and  the 

1  Common  Sense  (1776),  p.  23. 

2  The  Farmer  Refuted  (1775),  p.  6. 

3  Common  Sense  (1776),  p.  40. 

4  22  State  Trials,  p.  406. 

5  J.  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  ii.    507-9. 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  85 

coarse  abuse,  which,  alienated  many  moderate  reformers. 
Indeed  the  years  between  1765  and  1775  witnessed  a  steady 
growth  of  this  new  republicanism  under  the  influence  of 
hot-headed  zealots  of  the  type  of  Warren  and  Samuel 
Adams.  1  The  burning  of  effigies  on  the  liberty  tree  at 
Boston,  the  2  cruelty  and  violence  of  "the  Sons  of  Liberty" 
towards  the  Tories,  the  innumerable  libels  on  loyalty,  the 
practice  of  tarring  and  feathering  opponents,  were  all 
novel  applications  of  the  notion  of  man's  natural  rights. 
Temperate  patriots  like  Benjamin  Thompson,  afterwards 
celebrated  as  Count  Eumf  ord,  were  thus  driven  unwillingly 
into  the  loyalist  camp.  Men  said  that  if  all  American 
fancies  were  true,  3  "we  are  as  abject  slaves  as  France  and 
Poland  can  show  in  wooden  shoes  and  with  uncombed 
hair,"  and  they  listened  willingly  to  the  passionate 
eloquence  of  Jefferson,  whose  hatred  of  the  British  people 
was  intense,  and  whose  4 expurgated  passages  in  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  ring  with  sonorous  and 
trenchant  denunciations. 

English  arguments  were  cast  in  an  utterly  different 
mould.  The  generation  of  Adam  Smith  and  Josiah  Tucker 
hated  fanciful  abstractions;  they  wanted  facts  alone, 
and  judged  policies  from  business  experience,  not  from 
commentaries  on  Locke  or  Filmer.  They  clung  probably 
too  closely  to  the  assertion  of  legal  rights  without  consider- 
ing the  larger  question  of  expediency.  John  Wesley  said 
that  no  charter  had  ever  given  an  American  colony  5"the 
illegal  privilege  of  being  exempt  from  parliamentary 

1  Bernard's  Letters  (1765),  p.  13. 

2  What  think  ye  of  Congress  Now?  (1775),  p.  12. 

3  Letters  from  a  Farmer  in  Pennsylvania  (1768),  p.  25. 

•i   See  the  fine  passage  beginning  with  "  the  road  to  happiness  "  etc.,  in 

Jefferson's  Memoirs  (1829),  i.    21. 
5   Wesley's  Journal  (ed.  1902),  p.  405. 


86  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

taxation,"  and  thought  this  defect  conclusive.  His  cast  of 
thought  was  not  characterised  by  particularly  elevated 
philosophy,  but  it  was  eminently  logical.  No  pamphleteer 
of  the  age,  who  wrote  in  support  of  the  British  government, 
ever  approached  the  burning  hatred  of  Paine,  who  had 
become  even  more  bitter  than  native-born  Americans.  In 
fact,  the  dominant  note  of  the  tracts  which  vindicated  the 
policy  of  Lord  North  was  the  simplicity  of  their  practical 
self-interest.  Samuel  Johnson's  violence  was  only  in 
expression.  With  massive  bigotry,  he  said  in  1769  that 
the  malcontents  were  l  "  a  race  of  convicts,  and  ought  to 
be  thankful  for  anything  we  allow  them  short  of  hanging," 
and  that  if  they  had  their  deserts,  2"we  should  have  at 
once  razed  their  towns,  and  let  them  enjoy  their  forests." 
Those  who  recognize  the  habitual  dogmatism  of  the 
writer,  will  see  in  such  words  merely  a  keen  dislike  to 
speculative  theorists  and  mob  orators.  In  "  Taxation  no 
Tyranny,"  he  compared  the  constitutional  functions  of  the 
colonial  assemblies  to  those  of  parish  vestries  in  England, 
and  refused  to  see  in  their  pretensions  to  a  greater  province 
anything  more  than  pretexts  to  avoid  taxation.  He  did 
not  admit  that  the  cry  of  liberty  among  colonists  was 
genuine  at  all.  If  they  believed  in  it  they  would  have 
freed  their  own  slaves  first.  As  a  defence  in  the  present 
case  the  plea  of  freedom  was  a  mere  excuse.  Johnson's 
school  of  thought  always  inculcated  resignation  to  fate, 
and  acquiescence  in  established  forms  of  government.  The 
fact  that  eight-ninths  of  our  own  population  were  un- 
represented in  Parliament  was  thought  to  prove  that  the 
principle,  "  no  taxation  without  representation "  was 
inadmissible,  and  existing  laws,  whether  as  to  the  franchise 
here  or  taxation  in  America,  needed  no  reform,  living  as 

1  Boswell's  Johnson  (ed.  1896),  iii.    163. 

2  E.  Napier's  Johnsoniana  (1884),  p.  273. 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  87 

we  did,  *• "  in  Britain  not  Utopia."  2  No  one  could  say  that 
hop  or  cider  growers  had  willingly  "consented"  to  the 
hop  or  cider  tax  in  England,  and  yet  such  taxes  were 
binding  on  them.  A  minority's  grievance  did  not  justify 
a  revolution  of  the  existing  constitution.  England  was 
proud  of  not  applying  "the  rule  of  three"  to  representation, 
and  3  Tucker  explained  that  a  town  had  no  right  to 
additional  members  by  virtue  of  having  become,  like 
London,  "  swollen  and  bloated."  What  would  become  of 
the  constitution  if  the  theory  of  "  no  taxation  without 
representation"  were  applied  to  the  4" thousands  of  poor 
journeymen  day  labourers  and  low  ignorant  mechanics 
residing  in  Birmingham,  Manchester,  Leeds  and  Halifax?" 
5  "  0  Liberty  !  0  my  Country  !"  exclaimed  the  Tory  dean. 
Johnson,  with  a  similar  distaste  for  democratic  dreams, 
shuddered  at  the  idea  that  the  rebels  would  increase  in 
numbers  at  the  rate  of  progression  suggested  by  Franklin. 
6 "When  the  Whigs  of  America  are  thus  multiplied,  let 
the  princes  of  the  earth  tremble  in  their  palaces." 

This  indifference  to  all  arguments  except  those  derived 
from  actual  constitutional  law  was  eminently  characteristic 
of  the  partisans  of  England's  old  colonial  theory.  John 
Wesley's  addresses  at  the  time  are  admirable  examples  of 
clear  and  moderate  statement,  but  they  all  assume  that  the 
existing  conception  of  empire  is  adequate  for  every 
purpose.  7"Do  you  not  sit  without  restraint,  every  man 
under  his  own  vine  ?"  he  writes  in  his  "  Calm  Address  to 
our  American  Colonists,"  as  if  personal  freedom  necessarily 

1  An  Answer  at  large  to  Mr.  Pitt's  Speech  (1766),  p.  12. 

2  Controversy  between  Gt.  Britain  and  Colonies  (1769),  p.  87. 

3  Tucker's  Four  Letters  (ed.  1783),  p.  59. 

4  ibid,  p.  117. 

5  ibid,  p.  61. 

6  Boswell's  Johnson  (ed.  1896),  iii.    166. 

7  Calm  Address  (1775),  p.  15. 


88  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

atoned  for  economic  repression.  To  men  of  his  school  of 
thought  all  political  agitation  seemed  worthless,  so  long  as 
he  who  ploughed  the  field  was  allowed  to  reap  it  in  peace, 
and  he  who  built  a  house  remained  master  of  the  door.  So 
long  as  person  and  property  were  safe,  it  was  wrong  to  disturb 
a  state  on  behalf  of  immaterial  doctrines.  1Adam  Smith 
admitted  that  any  representation  of  America  in  England 
was  impracticable,  and  it  was  thought  absurd  to  allow  this 
difficulty  to  present  the  enforcement  of  a  just  demand. 
Politicians  so  different  from  one  another  as  Grenville  and 
Junius  considered  that  colonial  resistance  was  based  on  the 
most  sordid  motives,  and  even  2Wilkes  was  opposed  to 
American  claims  until  won  over  by  a  flattering  address 
from  Boston. 

A  similar  vein,  of  thought  ran  through  the  contemporary 
loyalist  literature  of  America,  which  assumed  3that  the 
rebellious  colonists  wanted  England  to  draw  water  and 
hew  wood  for  America  without  reward.  It  will  indeed  be 
seen  later  how  Joseph  Galloway,  sometime  Speaker  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Assembly,  conceived  4a  plan  of  union  between 
Great  Britain  and  her  colonies,  but  5it  is  clear  that  he 
saw  in  the  pioneers  of  the  United  States  only  frantic 
zealots,  6when  he  pointed  out  that  if  the  colonists  desired, 
they  need  not  buy  any  tea  at  all,  but  that  they  were  only 
hurting  themselves  by  such  abstinence.  7  They  had 
implored  help  from  England  in  1754,  and  now  dared  to 
incite  the  British  army  to  attack  them.  The  able  tracts 
of  Samuel  Seabury  and  the  sermons  of  Jonathan  Boucher 

1  Wealth  of  Nations,  p.  494. 

2  Stephens'  Memoirs  of  J.  H.  Tooke  (1813),  i.,  178. 

3  Galloway's  Reflections  on  the  Rise  of  the  Am.  Rebellion  (1780),  p.  23. 

4  Candid  Examination  of  the  Mutual  Claims    etc.  (1775),  p.  53. 

5  ibid,  p.  47. 

6  A  Friendly  Address  to  all  Reasonable  Americans  (1774),  p.  7. 

7  ibid,  p.  27. 


DIALECTICS  ON  TAXATION  89 

exposed  the  legal  fallacies  of  the  American  disputants, 
showing  Hhe  inconsistency  of  their  tenets  with  their 
charters,  and  2the  humble  reality  of  their  subordination  to 
Parliament,  contrasted  the  justice  of  England  with  3the 
violent  methods  of  colonial  mob  law,  and  showed  how 
hardly  the  non-importation  policy  would  weigh  on  4  the 
poor  farmer.  The  Hutchinson  letters  breathe  horror  of 
the  wild  sentiments  of  the  5  "  Boston  Gazette/'  and  are 
themselves  written  with  coolness  and  composure.  Temper- 
ance alone,  however,  cannot  win  battles,  and  the  loyalists 
thought  it  hopeless  to  attempt  to  organise  resistance  to  the 
rise  of  the  demagogues.  Their  dry  contempt  for  the  fire- 
brands of  the  coming  Revolution  faithfully  reflected  the 
tone  prevailing  in  Great  Britain. 

The  truest  deduction  therefore,  that  we  can  draw  from 
the  dialectics  of  the  day  on  the  question  of  taxation,  is 
that  each  side  adopted  an  attitude  inevitable  during  the 
sway  of  the  old  colonial  theory.  Both  indeed  drifted 
into  spheres  of  thought,  not  necessarily  following  from 
that  theory.  The  forward  party  in  America  became 
immersed  in  a  new  ideal  of  republicanism,  while  in 
England  the  chance  influence  of  domestic  politics  gave  to 
the  government  policy  a  partisan  character  wholly  alien  to 
its  origin.  The  energetic  effort  of  George  III.  to  reverse' 
the  work  of  two  centuries  of  political  development 
complicated  the  colonial  issue  by  partially  identifying 
the  national  theory  of  empire  with  his  own  personal  greed 
for  power.  If  however  we  hold  the  opinion  that  the 
English  people  were  already  committed  to  the  policy  of 

1  A  View  of  the  Contest  (1774),  p.  14. 

2  ibid,  pp.  15,  35. 

3  Free  Thoughts  by  a  Farmer  (1774),  p.  16. 
*  ibid,  p.  17. 

5  Hutchinson  Letters  (1773),  p.  25. 


90  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

direct  interference  in  America,  by  their  deep  convictions 
as  to  the  adequacy  of  the  prevailing  colonial  system,  there 
is  no  reason  to  paint  George  III.  as  the  sole  author  of  the 
war.  iJohn  Adams  himself  alleged  that  the  roots  of  the 
Revolution  lay  in  the  aspiration  after  a  free  trade  with 
all  the  world,  in  place  of  subjection  to  a  mean  monopoly. 
Under  the  same  circumstances  and  conditions,  it  is  probable 
that  the  American  colonies  would  have  tried  to  sever 
themselves  from  Great  Britain,  had  she  been  a  republic 
instead  of  a  monarchy,  and  George  III.  been  a  cypher 
instead  of  a  despot. 

i  Adams'  Twenty-one  Letters  (ed.  1789),  p.  9. 


ENGLISH    FEELING  91 


CHAPTER    T. 
ENGLISH  FEELING  TOWARDS  AMERICA  IN  1775. 

WHEN  Bra-ddock's  army  marched  to  its  ruin  in  the  woods 
near  Fort  Duquesne,  its  contempt  for  colonial  allies  earned 
it  deserved  unpopularity.  x  Franklin  was  always  stung  by 
the  common  British  opinion  that  colonists  were  "Yahoos." 
For  example,  an  essay  on  the  Militia  in  1757  referred 
scornfully  to  the  fact  that  2" every  Indian  incursion  alarms 
the  American  militia."  3  Wolfe  described  the  Americans 
in  1758  as  "  in  general  the  dirtiest,  most  contemptible 
cowardly  dogs  that  you  can  conceive."  4  In  1765  a 
provincial  writer  complained  that  the  colonies  were  spoken 
of  as  the  property  of  Englishmen  at  home  by  "  every 
gazeteer  from  the  environs  of  Grub  Street  to  the  purlieus 
of  St.  James's,"  and  English  officials  themselves  deplored 
the  provoking  insolence  of  British  garrisons  towards  the 
American  populace.  Already  in  1769  Washington  spoke 
bitterly  of  5"our  lordly  masters."  In  1774  a  member  of 
Parliament  called  Yan,  described  by  6  Governor  Hutchinson 
as  "a  plain,  blunt  man,"  styled  Boston  7"a  nest  of  locusts," 
which  ought  to  be  destroyed,  and  in  1775  one  8  Colonel 
Grant  alleged  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the  colonists 

1  Bigelow's  Franklin,  iii.    284. 

2  An  Essay  on  the  Expediency  of  a  National  Militia  (1757),  p.  15. 

3  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  ix. ;  pt.  3,  76. 

4  Considerations  on  behalf  of  the  Colonists  (1765),  p.  14. 

5  Sparks'  Washington,  iii.    351. 

6  Hutchinson's  Diary  (ed.  1883),  i.    319. 

7  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.  xvii.  1178. 

8  Gent.  Mag.  (1775),  p.  63. 


92  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

would  never  face  any  army  in  the  field,  while  Lord 
Sandwich,  a  responsible  minister,  declared  in  the  House 
of  Lords  that  the  Americans  were  l "  raw,  undisciplined, 
cowardly  men/3  a  taunt  which  2  rankled  long.  A  much 
greater  Englishman,  Rodney  wrote  to  his  wife  from  Paris 
in  1778  of  three  captains  of  American  warships  then  in 
that  city :  3 "  They  talk,  I  hear,  much  of  fighting,  for 
which  reason  I  helieve  they  are  cowards."  In  1776  Aaron 
Burr  said  that  the  British  officers  4  "  hold  us  in  the  utmost 
contempt,  talk  of  forcing  our  lines  without  firing  a  gun," 
for  the  war  was  well  advanced  before  the  army  admitted 
that  the  colonists  had  the  same  courage  as  themselves, 
5  "  though  their  hair  may  not  be  so  well  powdered."  We 
can  see  the  glimmering  of  a  truer  view  in  the  vivid 
account  of  Bunker  Hill  by  the  commander  of  the  Light 
Infantry  in  that  action.  6  "  The  rebels  were  very  numerous 
and  behaved  far  beyond  any  idea  I  could  have  formed  of 

them We  have  paid  for  our  victory,  lost  a  great 

number  of  our  officers — I  am  told  abqut  eighty  killed  and 
wounded — a  great  smash  by  such  miscreants."  Yet  Lady 
Sarah  Bunbury  wrote  of  Howe  in  1775,  that  she  hoped  he 
7  "will  not  be  employed  long  in  so  vile  and  fruitless  a 
service,  where  he  may  be  killed  and  cannot  get  any 
honour."  Even  loyalists  like  8  Joseph  Galloway  and 
Samuel  Curwen  resented  the  attitude  adopted  towards  their 
fellow  countrymen  by  9"  these  conceited  islanders." 

1  Russell's  Life  of  Fox  (1859),  i.    83. 

2  Sparks'  Washington,  iii.    407. 

3  Mundy's  Rodney,  i.    170. 

4  M.  L.  Davis'  Memoirs  of  Aaron  Burr  (1838),  i.    97. 

5  Lord  Stair's  Facts  and  their  Consequences  (1782),  p.  31. 

6  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  xi. ;  pt.  5,  381. 

7  Life  and  Letters  of  Lady  S.  Lennox  (ed.  1902),  i.    235. 

8  Considerations  upon  the  Am.  Enquiry  (1779),  p.  7. 
9Curwen's  Journal  and  Letters  (ed.  1842),  p.  90. 


ENGLISH    FEELING         Ve*,  ,^o*vKX  93 


Such  examples  of  English  feeling  display  the  common 
want  of  that  political  sentimentality,  with  which  we  now 
associate  our  conception  of  the  British  empire.  The  idea 
of  racial  brotherhood,  now  so  popular  with  all  classes,  made 
no  appeal  to  men  of  that  day.  It  was  an  unimaginative 
age  in  England,  and  much  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
government  during  the  war  for  America  had  been  derived 
from  the  severely  practical  nature  of  England's  colonial 
ambitions.  The  war  benefited  the  colonies,  but  its  aim 
was  rather  to  expand  our  imperial  market,  and  its 
popularity  owed  nothing  to  the  modern  fancy  that  it  was 
waged  to  rescue  brothers  beyond  the  sea  from  oppression 
by  the  French.  In  that  respect,  the  age  of  chivalry  had 
gone,  for  even  the  best  and  most  disinterested  side  of 
national  activity  was  then  eminently  unemotional^ 
Eeligion  had  thus  sunk  into  creedless  benevolence. 
Charity  was  as  yet  as  soberly  administered,  that  the  idea 
that  every  citizen  had  a  right  to  outdoor  relief  and  to 
state  help  in  maintaining  his  family  was  only  a  delusion 
of  the  next  generation;  but  philanthropy  was  practised 
with  visible  effect  and  with  better  results.  ^In  the  same 
simple  spirit,  the  uses  of  the  empire  were  estimated  by 
its  material  fruits  alone,  and  a  colonist  was  weighed 
critically  in  the  balance  as  a  customer,  without  being 
privileged  by  his  fellow  citizenship  in  the  same  imperial 
community.  Men  saw  no  advantages  in  territory  per  se, 
and  never  appreciated  the  sentimental  aspect  of  a  British 
North  America/ 

A  number  of  active  minds  among  the  colonists 
approached  far  more  nearly  than  the  thinkers  of  the 
Mother  Country  to  the  modern  idealism.  When  the 
New  Englanders  captured  Louisburg,  ^'the  Dunkirk  of 

l  Letter  from  a  French  Refugee  in  America  (1774),  p.  13. 


94  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

America,"  in  1745,  they  exulted  over  "  the  sixpence-a-day  " 
regulars,  in  having  proved  the  efficiency  of  untrained 
Anglo-Saxons  in  furthering  the  common  cause.  l"  What 
is  it  that  Britons  cannot  do  ?"  wrote  one  of  them  to  James 
Houstoun,  thus  identifying  himself  with  the  Englishman 
at  home.  In  1755  Dinwiddie  appealed  to  the  Virginians 
to  atone  for  the  sluggishness  of  some  of  the  other  colonists 
by  2  "distinguishing  yourselves  the  sons  of  Britons."  In 
the  Seven  Years'  War  the  relations  between  the  English 
regulars  and  the  colonial  levies  improved  with  experience 
of  each  others'  worth.  Thomas  Pownall,  once  Governor 
of  Massachusetts,  attempted  to  infuse  a  wider  and  more 
lasting  geniality  into  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain  and 
America  towards  each  other.  Like  Franklin,  he  saw  the 
need  to  impress  upon  each  the  lesson  that  unity  should 
mean  more  than  mere  business  relationship.  3He  wrote 
that  the  colonies  were  as  much  part  of  the  home  country 
as  the  Palatine  counties,  that  they  were  constituents  of 
4  the  same  empire  as  England  herself,  and  it  will  be 
seen  how  he  5  recommended  colonial  representation  at 
Westminster,  a  scheme  which  ignored  the  prevailing 
conditions  of  Parliament.  That  haughty  oligarchy 
would  never  understand  the  reasoning,  whereby  rugged 
backwoodsmen  and  austere  New  England  traders  were 
to  intrude  upon  an  assembly,  which  had  treated  repre- 
sentation as  only  a  legal  fiction  for  generations.  The 
colonists  in  this  respect  were  far  more  modern  in  their 
view  of  political  systems,  and  Dulaney  claimed  that  they 

1  James  Houstoun's  Works  (1753),  p.  366. 

2  Gent.  Mag.  (1755),  p.  305. 

3  Pownall's  Administration  of  British  Colonies  (1774),  i.    x. 

4  ibid,  i.    10. 

5  ibid,  ii.    82. 


ENGLISH    FEELING  95 

should  be  treated  as  1 "  other  Englishmen."  Great  Britain 
was  often  called  2 "  by  the  tender  endearing  appellation  of 
'  home '  "  in  these  days  before  the  Revolution.  3  "  They 
may  be  looked  on  as  foreigners,"  wrote  Franklin  of  his 
compatriots,  "but  they  do  not  consider  themselves  as  such." 
They  thought  that  an  empire  was  more  than  a  mere 
commercial  appendage  to  a  Mother  Country,  and  had 
plenty  of  sentiment  for  the  4"  Old  England  men."  What- 
ever were  the  true  feelings  of  the  Congress  of  5  1765  and 
of  that  of  6  1774,  each  expressed  lip  loyalty  to  the  Crown, 
and  it  is  to  be  observed  that  7  the  much  abused  Germans 
and  Quakers  of  Pennsylvania  were  among  those  most 
disinclined  to  resist  English  claims. 

S  jlence  the  surprised  character  of  much  of  the  colonial 
dialectics,  when  the  British  government  treated  the 
American  provinces  as  negligible  factors  in  formulating 
the  public  policy  of  the  empire.  It  was  said  that 
Englishmen  only  lost  their  votes  by  leaving  Britain  for 
a  foreign  country,  not  by  migrating  from  Yorkshire  to 
London,  and  it  was  argued  that  migration  to  British 
America  was  on  the  same  footing  as  the  latter.  The 
colonists  were  "fellow-subjects"  with  Britons  at  home, 
and  not  "  their  subjects."  The  Congress  of  Pennsylvania 

1  Dulaney's  Considerations  on  the  Propriety  of  imposing  Taxes  (1766), 

p.  39. 

2  Dissertations  on  the  Advantages  of  Perpetual  Union  (1766),  p.  97. 

3  Bigelow's  Franklin,  i.    495-6. 

4  ibid,  i.    476. 

5  Authentic  Account  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Congress  at  N.Y.  (1765), 

p.  25. 

6  Journal  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Congress  at  Philadelphia  (1774), 

pp.  25,  65. 

7  Galloway's  Reflections  on  the  Rise  of  the  Am.  Rebellion  (1780),  p.  115. 


96  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 


said  that  they  were  only  acting  l "  like  the  descendants  of 
Britons.^/  In  1748  2  Otis  Little  wrote  that  there  were  no 
people  on  earth  more  loyal  than  the  colonists.  3In  1764 
an  advocate  of  the  colonies  protested  that  nothing  was 
further  from  their  nature,  their  interest,  their  thoughts, 
than  revolt,  and  in  1765  the  Massachusetts  assembly 
considered  dependence  on  the  Mother  Country  "  a  great 
blessing."  4  Philadelphia  was  Tory  to  the  last,  and  5the 
Anglican,  Lutheran,  Quaker,  Calvinist  and  German 
elements  among  the  American  people  largely  inclined 
towards  the  British  cause  throughout  the  Revolution. 
Numbers  of  loyalist  corps  served  valiantly  in  the  war, 
such  as  the  Corps  of  Pioneers,  De  Lancey's  Regiment,  the 
Florida  Grenadiers,  the  Loyal  Refugees  of  West  Florida, 
the  King's  American  Dragoons  and  Orange  Rangers,  the 
Loyal  American  Regiment,  the  Maryland  Loyalists,  the 
Yolunteers  of  New  Jersey,  New  York,  North  Carolina  and 
Nova  Scotia,  the  Pennsylvania  Loyalists  and  Royal 
Fencible  American  Regiment.  These  represented  the 
class  who  invented  the  phrase  "  United  Empire." 
^In  England  itself  there  was  far  less  feeling  of  sentimental 
affinity.  Its  people  had  always  been  willing  to  fight  for 
a  colonial  cause,  but  they  looked  for  some  reward,  more 
immediate  and  material  than  airy  gratitude  and  un- 
substantial protestations.  They  realised  how  useful 
British  protection  had  been  to  the  colonies,  and  how 
liberal  the  colonial  policy  was  with  regard  to  internal 
self-government,  in  comparison  with  that  of  Spain  or 
Holland.  It  was  therefore  the  general  belief  that  England 

1  Gent.  Mag.   (1775),  p.  496. 

2  State  of  the  Northern  Colonies  (1748),  p.  15. 

3  The  Administration  of  the  Colonies  (1764),  p.  25 

4  J.  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  ii.    437. 

5  Galloway's  Eise  of  the  Am.  Bebell.  (1780),  p.  115. 


ENGLISH    FEELING  97 

deserved  in  return  every  solid  advantage  that  could 
possibly  accrue  from  the  possession  of  dependencies. 
1  It  was  thought  that  a  desire  for  separation  could  not 
be  produced  by  such  a  policy,  in  view  of  England's  mild 
laws  and  generous  defence  in  war.  2The  want  of  fellow 
feeling  between  the  Puritans  of  New  England,  the 
Anglicans  of  Virginia,  the  Quakers  of  Pennsylvania,  the 
Germans  of  Georgia,  the  Catholics  of  Maryland,  and  the 
Dutch  of  New  York,  was  deemed  to  make  a  colonial 
league  against  Britain  an  impossibility,  and  it  should  not 
be  forgotten  that  far  better  informed  judges  like  Otis  and 
Franklin  were  surprised  by  the  strength  of  American 
unity  in  1765.x 

Moreover^  although  some  enlightened  colonists  might 
proclaim  the  unity  of  all  Britons  in  the  common  empire, 
emigration  across  the  Atlantic  did  mean  in  actual  fact  a 
real  drift  away  from  the  contemporary  evolution  of 
European  thought  and  character,  in  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  century.  The  Puritans  who  had  fled  to 
Massachusetts  in  the  reign  of  Charles  I.,  did  not  bequeath 
to  their  descendants  of  1775  anything  analogous  to  the 
spirit  of  Hanoverian  England.  The  Americans  were  still 
eminently  Cromwellian  in  their  conception  of  life  and 
duty;  the  Bostonians,  who  listened  to  Samuel  Adams  at 
their  town  meetings,  were  wholly  Puritan,  and  New 
England  was  still  swayed  by  theologians ;  she  delighted  in 
sermons,  and  3  celebrated  every  5th  of  November  by 
burning  the  Pope  in  effigy,  and  burlesquing  Catholic  rites. 
Such  colonies  had  little  of  the  Englishman's  sober 
callousness  to  political  anomalies.  So  far  from  having 
been  planted  by  our  care,  as  Townshend  alleged  in  1767, 

1  Reasons  for  Establishing  Georgia  (1733),  p.  15. 

2  Interest  of  Great  Britain  considered  (1759),  p.  39 

3  Tudor's  Otis  (1823),  p.  25. 


98  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

they  were  largely  the  products  of  government  intolerance, 
and  naturally  the  Puritan  element  feared  episcopacy, 
hated  any  possible  extension  of  royal  prerogative,  and 
was  devoted  to  pulpit  oratory.  The  Mother  Country 
possessed  nothing  analogous  to  the  way  men  lived  in 
1  Philadelphia,  where  a,n  austere  theology  had  for  many 
years  condemned  fencing,  dancing  and  play-acting  as 
diabolical,  and  the  use  of  wall-papers,  carpets,  tombstones 
and  tooth-brushes  as  equally  vain  and  unseemly,  and  where 
such  small  sums  as  the  Assembly  could  be  induced  to  grant 
for  local  defence  were  raised  as  "  tokens  of  respect  "  to 
the  Crown,  and  not  for  their  true  purpose.  These  provinces 
in  fact,  were  so  far  removed  from  British  thought  that 
the  community  of  faith  and  sentiment,  which  so  largely 
supports  the  sense  of  imperial  brotherhood  to-day,  was 
genuinely  absent  from  the  empire  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  ^There  is  no  doubt  also  that  while  the  opinions 
of  emigrants  to  America  remained  almost  unchanged,  their 
actual  natures  had  been  modified  under  the  quick  influence 
of  a  new  clime.  The  distance  between  England  and 
America  could  only  be  spanned  in  a  month,  and  the  citizen 
at  home  rarely  visited  his  compatriot  over  sea.^0tis  justly 
said,  2"We  are  little  more  known  thair^me  savages  of 
California."  National  character  is  probably  but  a 
patriotic  myth,  for  history  proves  that  it  can  rarely  resist 
physical  influences,  and  3  the  drinking  and  gaming  slave 
owners  of  the  West  Indies  had  little  of  their  original 
ancestors;  4John  Adams  said  that  their  nerves  had  been 
relaxed  by  the  great  heat.  5A  traveller  described  the 

1  A.  C.  Applegarth's  Quakers  in  Pennsylvania  (1892),  pp.   13,  15,  24, 

42. 

2  Otis's  Vindication  of  the  British  Colonies,  p.  25. 

3  J.  Atkins'  Voyage  to  Guinea    etc.  (1757),  p.  206. 

4  J.  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  ii.    174. 

5  Atkins,  p.  208. 


ENGLISH    FEELING  99 

women  of  beautiful  Barbados  in  1757,  as  nearly  all  Scotch 
or  Irish,  "  very  homely  and  great  swearers."  In  America 
itself,  the  colonial  type  had  already  diverged  slowly  from 
the  English,  changing  every  characteristic,  from  the 
inflection  of  the  voice  to  the  form  of  the  face  and  frame 
itself.  "Yankee"  was  a  distinctive  term  applied  to  the 
New  Englander  early  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and 
the  phrase,  x"an  Americanism/'  which  has  suggestive 
analogues  in  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  languages,  was 
already  current  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution.  In  the 
Pennsylvania  Chronicle  of  1768  we  find  the  un-English 
but  American  expression,  2"this  fall,"  and  the  un-English 
but  American  name,  3"  Silas  Yerkes."  4  Paine  was 
particularly  eager  to  dissociate  the  colonies  from  British 
traditions,  alleging  that  two-thirds  of  their  inhabitants 
were  of  foreign  descent,  and  that  their  motherland  was 
Europe  not  England.  5Tohn  Adams,  afterwards  President 
of  the  United  States,  said  that  no  relation  for  whom  he 
cared  a  farthing  had  been  in  England  for  one  hundred 
and  fifty  years,  and  that  he  himself  was  purely  American. 
Under  these  circumstances/ English  feeling  towards 
America  in  1774  was  naturally  wanting  in  the  sentiment 
which  normally  flows  from  a  people's  realisation  of  the 
tie  of  kinship.  The  armies  which  fought  for  England 
in  the  War  of  Independence  treated  loyalist  allies  with 
ill-advised  neglect.  The  average  Briton  knew  little  of  the 
colonies  beyond  their  exigencies  in  time  of  war,  and  their 
utility  as  market^/  It  is  curious  to  read  in  George  Yeal's 
"  Musical  Travels  through  England,"  that  6  while  strolling 

1  Ramsay's  Hist.  Amer.  Rev.  (1793),  i.,  v. 

2  Pennsylvania  Chronicle  (1768),  p.  410. 

3  ibid,  p.  275. 

4  Common  Sense  (1776),  pp.  28-9. 

5  J.  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  iii.    392. 

6  Collier's  Musical  Travels  (1775),  p.  89. 


100  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

on  the  banks  of  the  Severn  at  Worcester  in  1775,  lie  heard 
a  boy  whistling  "Yankee  Doodle,"  a  song  "very  popular 
in  America,"  as  the  time  appears  never  to  have  been 
printed  before  1784,  and  the  words  are  certainly  not  older 
than  1755.  In  general,  England's  acquaintance  with  the 
customs  of  her  colonies  was  dim  and  uninquisitive.  Their 
political  experiments  aroused  no  interest.  l Johnson,  for 
instance,  said  in  1762,  "  In  America  there  is  little  to  be 
observed  except  natural  curiosities." 

/Another  reason  for  British  coolness  towards  the 
Americans  was  a  firm  belief  in  their  ingratitude. 
Convinced  that  the  many  sacrifices  of  the  long  French 
and  Spanish  wars  had  been  largely  occasioned  by  colonial 
interests,  the  Englishman  could  not  understand  American 
unwillingness  to  make  England  any  repayment.  As  we 
have  seen  above,  he  did  not  admit  that  the  colonies  had 
contributed  any  assistance  in  those  wars,  nor  did  he 
tolerate  theoretic  objections  to  direct  taxation.  He  had 
no  appreciation  of  the  irritating  incidence  of  the  old 
colonial  system  upon  a  sensitive  and  ambitious  commercial 
people.^>  Consequently  he  could  only  consider  travellers' 
commentaries  upon  the  American  attitude  towards  England 
as  revelations  of  extraordinary  thanklessness.  In  spite  of 
the  British  sentiment  of  many  colonial  traders,  there  was 
already  no  want  of  possible  centres  for  disaffection,  as  the 
origin  of  so  many  colonies  had  simply  been  government 
oppression  at  home.  The  restrictions  on  trade  stung  such 
communities,  and  as  early  as  1703  2the  Abbe  Dubos 
predicted  separation  within  ten  years,  as  the  colonists 
were  not  of  the  same  long-suffering  mould  as  those  of 
Spain.  The  presence  of  the  French  Catholic  power  in 
Canada  did  what  sentiment  alone  could  not  have  done, 

1  Boswell's  Johnson,  ii.    38. 

2  Grosley's  Tour  to  London  (1772),  i.    133-9. 


ENGLISH    FEELING  101 

in  keeping  American  loyalty  alive,  but  an  1731  Gee 
referred  to  1"the  uncommon  stiffness"  of,  .New  England 
towards  Britons  at  home,  due  no  do.ubt  .to  its-,  .earliest 
traditions  as  to  the  character  of  an  England,  'very  idift'ei^nt 
to  the  England  of  George  III.  In  1748  a  Swede,  named 
Peter  Kalm,  visited  North  America,  and  in  the  course  of 
a  bright  narrative  of  his  travels,  2he  predicted  that  the 
colonies  would  seek  independence  within  thirty  or  fifty 
years,  but  for  the  then  fear  of  the  French.  The  same 
tendency  was  noticed  among  the  common  people  by 
3  another  traveller  in  1774.  Such,  indeed,  was  the  general 
opinion  when  once  the  terror  of  the  Canadian  scalping 
knife  had  been  removed.  4The  unanimity  of  the  north 
in  resisting  the  Boston  Port  Act  was  a  striking  and  novel 
sign  of  the  universal  scepticism  as  to  the  value  of  the 
British  connection. 

England  was  also  aware  of  the  presence  of  elements 
in  American  society,  prejudicial  to  the  continuance  of 
community  in  thought  between  the  two  portions  of 
the  empire.  The  strong  Congregationalist  body  in 
Massachusetts  *was  avowedly  hostile  to  monarchical 
institutions,  and  their  chief  minister,  5  May  hew,  of  Boston, 
was  both  an  exponent  of  the  absurdity  of  celebrating 
Charles  I's  memory  on  the  30th  of  January,  and  one  of 
the  earliest  promoters  of  a  colonial  congress.  For  some 
years  before  the  Revolution,  6  Irishmen  used  to  celebrate 
St.  Patrick's  Day  by  drinking  to  the  cause  of  separation 
in  the  City  Tavern  at  Philadelphia.  The  outlying  frontier 
settlements  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge  were  peopled 

1  Gee's  Trade  and  Navigation  of  Gt.  Britain  (1731),  p.  72. 

2  Kalm's  Travels  (1772),  i.  207. 

3  Thoughts  of  a  Traveller  upon  our  American  Disputes  (1774),  p.  7. 

4  Joseph  Priestley's  Memoirs  (1806),  pp.  90,  451. 

5  Memorial  History  of  Boston  (1881),  iii.  20,  119. 

6  Remarks  on  the  Travels  of  Chastellux  (1787),  p.  79. 


102  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

notoriously  fyy  I;cish  and  Scottish  Presbyterian  malcontents. 
,The  .words' (<V' Irish  rogue"  were  used  as  a  common  term 
0$  la.buse.  Hmxm'g  th^  Seneca  Indians.  Such  men  hated  the 

C     *  o  o  ' '       '     '•<          **    l  <         (      « 

Tconnection'wTth  England,  and  public  opinion  was  generally 
with  Dulaney,  when  he  said  of  the  colonies  that  2"for 
food,  thank  God,  they  do  not,  and  for  raiment  they  need 
not,  depend  upon  Great  Britain."  At  home  also,  men 
distrusted  the  numerous  foreign  settlers  among  the  British 
colonists,  especially  in  the  western  provinces, — Swedes, 
German  Lutherans,  Dutch,  Jews,  Frenchmen,  Camisards, 
Swiss,  Italians — and  in  some  cases  their  distrust  was  well 
founded,  for  New  York,  where  the  cosmopolitan  element 
was  strongest,  took  the  lead  in  the  policy  of  non- 
importation. 

f  For  these  reasons  English  feeling  in  1774  was  not 
marked  by  any  widespread  misgiving  as  to  the  justice 
of  the  cause  of  the  government.  In  consequence 
of  the  existing  order  of  events,  there  seemed  nothing 
unnatural  in  forcing  the  old  colonial  policy  upon  fellow 
citizens  in  America  at  the  point  of  the  sworoO  Pitt, 
now  Earl  of  Chatham,  Burke,  and  several  of  tlie  Whig 
nobles,  excluded  from  office  by  the  recent  diplomacy  of 
George  III.,  tried  from  varying  motives  to  prove  the 
struggle  unnatural,  but  in  view  of  the  actual  conditions 
of  the  accepted  imperial  system  of  the  day,  we  cannot 
wonder  at  their  unsuccess.  Franklin,  who  had  once 
described  England  as  3"  this  happy  island,"  and  looked 
forward  4"as  a  Briton"  to  "awing  the  world  with  a 
British  North  America,"  who  had  sought  with  delight 
tne  home  of  his  ancestors,  and  styled  the  victors  of  1763 

1  Taylor's  Voyage  to  N.  America  (1771),  p.  94. 

2  Considerations  on  the  Propriety  of  imposing  Taxes  (1766),  p.  65. 

3  Bigelow's  Franklin,  i.    432. 

4  ibid,  i.    399. 


ENGLISH    FEELING  103 

1  "  that  brave  army  of  veterans,"  had  long  since  despaired 
of  awaking  the  Mother  Country  from  her  fatal  oblivion 
to  the  new  necessities  of  her  dominions  over  sea.  With 
the  exception  of  Chatham,  and  a  few  enlightened  but 
Lininfluential  Whigs,  he  found  every  English  official 
exasperating,  from  the  time  that  he  begged  2  Braddock 
to  listen  to  colonial  experts  in  1755,  to  the  days  when  he 
tried  to  teach  Clare  and  Hillsborough  the  needs  of  the 
empire.  The  profit  of  the  existing  colonial  policy  was 
great  and  obvious  in  England,  and  its  modification 
naturally  appeared  to  be  but  a  needless  concession  to 
selfish  demagogues.  Franklin's  sarcastic  "  Rules  for 
reducing  a  Great  Empire  to  a  Small  one  "  dealt  with  the 
opinion  prevailing  throughout  England,  and  were  not  in 
the  least  personal  to  the  Crown  or  ministry.  A  nation, 
which  had  raised  wild  demonstrations  in  honour  of 
"  Wilkes  and  liberty,"  was  not  so  spiritless  as  to  drift  into 
a  long  war  simply  at  the  will  of  a  king.  The  prospect  of 
stopping  trade  by  insisting  on  the  Stamp  Act  of  1765  had 
aroused  genuine  resistance  in  the  manufacturing  districts 
affected,  but  on  the  larger  question  of  abandoning  the 
economic  pretensions  of  the  old  colonial  theory,  Burke 
himself  admitted  that  the  superficial  advantages  of 
coercion  retained  the  sympathies  of  the  majority  of  the 
nation.  Men  of  the  world  were  with  the  government,  and 
3  Dean  Tucker  provoked  little  criticism,  by  suggesting  an 
appeal  to  the  negroes  and  Red  Indians  in  the  colonies, 
to  join  in  the  comon  cause  of  humbling  the  Americans, 
real  flaw  in  British  imperial  theory  was  its  failure 
to  appreciate  the  idea  of  a  common  membership  in 
the  same  national  community.  In  this  the  American 

1  ibid,  i.    435. 

2  ibid,  i.    316. 

3  Tucker's  Tract    v.  (1775),  p.  v. 


104  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

revolutionaries  were  happier,  as  when  George  Washington 
declared  in  1776  that  ls'I  have  laboured  to  discourage 
all  kinds  of  local  attachments  and  distinctions  of  country, 
denominating  the  whole  by  the  greatest  name  of  America." 
The  founders  of  the  federal  constitution  of  the  United 
States,  notably  Hamilton  and  Washington,  fought 
strenuously  against  2  the  tendency  to  prefer  local  prejudices 
to  the  welfare  of  the  whole  community,  realising  that 
insistence  on  the  special  advantages  of  individual  states 
can  only  lead  to  disintegration.  Englishmen  had  no 
analogous  conception  of  the  British  empire  in  the  days 
before  the  Revolution.  As  yet,  they  were  merely  groping 
towards  the  only  safe  imperialism.  They  still  looked 
exclusively  at  purely  English  interests,  and  their 
particularism  was  the  curse  of  the  old  colonial  system. 

1  Washington^  Official  Correspondence  (1795),  i.    352. 

2  Sparks'  Washington,  viii.    443. 


CHATHAM  AND    BURKE  105 


CHAPTEE   VI. 
CHATHAM  AND  BURKE. 

WHILE  the  old  colonial  system  was  breaking  down,  it  was 
natural  to  look  for  guidance  to  the  statesman,  who  had 
caused  its  greatest  triumphs.  Pitt's  contempt  for  the 
ministers  in  office  at  the  time  of  the  Stamp  Act,  his 
disbelief  in  the  legality  of  direct  taxation,  his  dread  of  the 
re-assertion  of  French  power  in  the  world,  and  his  great 
solicitude  for  the  colonies,  which  he  prized  so  much,  all 
led  him  to  denounce  a  policy,  which  might  throw  Greater 
Britain  into  an  alliance  with  Louis  XVI.  Such  an 
attitude  on  his  part  earned  him  the  affection  of  later  day 
Whigs,  in  spite  of  his  refusal  to  co-operate  effectually  with 
the  opposition  of  his  own  time,  and  it  won  him  also  a 
pathetic  fame  in  America,  in  spite  of  his  adherence  to  the 
economic  principles,  which  really  made  the  Revolution 
inevitable. 

In  actual  fact,  however,  the  latter  years  of  the  Great 
Commoner  did  nothing  to  increase  his  reputation  as  a 
leader  of  men.  An  excessive  pride  made  him  widen  the 
gulf  which  flowed  between  himself  and  the  people.  It  is 
indeed  a  sign  of  high  moral  character  to  follow  the  right, 
disdaining  the  criticisms  of  the  time-serving,  but  there 
is  no  virtue  in  flouting  the  most  cherished  ideals  of  one's 
own  partisans.  Pitt  indeed  maintained  them  against 
Bute,  and  though  so  * " excessively  ill"  as  to  be  unable  to 
stand,  he  spoke  for  three  hours  against  the  too  lenient 
treaty  of  1763.  Yet  his  attitude  towards  Tories  and  Whigs, 

1  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.  xv.  1263. 


106  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

"  King's  friends "  and  Wilkes's  allies,  remained  equally 
scornful  and  cold.  While  he  treated  Grenville 
and  Edgcumbe,  Conway  and  Richmond  with  an  easy 
insolence,  he  also  estranged  many  of  his  less  aristocratic 
Whig  supporters  by  accepting  an  annuity  of  .£3,000  a 
year  for  the  lives  of  himself,  his  wife  and  eldest  son, 
and  a  title  for  his  wife  in  1761.  His  refusal  to  help 
Rockingham's  ministry,  and  his  own  elevation  to  the 
earldom  of  Chatham  in  1766  disentitled  him  to  be 
considered  a  party  leader  at  all,  and  gave  the  lie  to  his 
earlier  democratic  creed.  The  excuse  that  this  step  was 
due  to  ill-health  and  was  a  natural  sequence  to  his 
acceptance  of  the  office  of  Lord  Privy  Seal,  did  not  prevent 
the  mob  from  twisting  his  name  into  l "  Cheat  'em,"  and 
from  2burning  him  in  effigy  in  his  own  former  stronghold 
of  London.  A  great  war  minister  who  scorns  all  party 
connections,  cannot  possess  lasting  magnetism  in  a  country 
subject  to  aristocratic  government,  and  where  interest  in 
politics  is  not  widely  diffused ;  and  the  nation's  response  to 

3  Chatham's  reckless  desire  to  fight  Spain  on  the  question 
of  the  Falkland  Islands  in  1771,  was  but  an  echo  of  its 
earlier  enthusiasm. 

While  thus  losing  popularity,  Chatham  adopted  an 
attitude  of  Elizabethan  deference  towards  royalty.  His 
singular  exaltation  of  George  III.,  even  while  opposing 
him  in  Parliament,  was  always  an  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  any  true  union  between  him  and  the  Whig  nobles. 

4  "  The  least  peep  into  that  closet   intoxicates  him,   and 
will  to  the  end  of  his  life,"  Burke  wrote  to  Rockingham 


1  Bedford  Correspondence,  iii.    51. 

2  ibid,  iii.    54. 

3  Nicholls'  Recollections  (1822),  ii.    129. 

4  Burke's  Correspondence,  i.    506. 


CHATHAM  AND    BURKE  107 

in  1774.  Both  these  men  thoroughly  l  distrusted  him ;  the 
destroyer  of  party  politics  could  hardly  claim  esteem  from 
the  author  of  "Thoughts  on  the  Present  Discontents." 
Physical  weakness,  repeated  attacks  of  gout,  constant 
lethargy,  all  made  him  an  utterly  unreliable  force  in 
English  politics  after  1763.  2  The  loyalist  Galloway  said 
scornfully  that  Chatham  no  longer  lived;  he  merely 
protracted  a  wearisome  existence.  He  refused  to  join 
with  any  of  the  Whig  cliques,  and  when  he  accepted  office 
in  1766  his  dislike  to  party  caused  him  to  select  colleagues 
who  had  nothing  in  common  with  one  another.  He  was 
too  ill  ever  to  act  the  part  of  leader;  his  position  as  Lord 
Privy  Seal  was  a  sinecure,  and  after  living  in  complete 
seclusion  for  over  a  year,  he  resigned  in  1768.  There  was 
a  ferment  of  popular  indignation  against  his  delinquencies 
in  the  matter  of  consistency.  3Hume  said  in  1766  that 
Lord  Chatham  was  as  much  detested  as  Mr.  Pitt  was  ever 
adored,  and  even  his  intimate  associate  and  brother-in-law, 

4  Temple,  turned  against  him.      Innumerable  tracts  satirised 
"Will   Cheat-'em   Esquire,   of   Turn-about   Hall/'       One 
critic,    in    a    pamphlet    called    "  The    Eight    Honourable 
Annuitant  Vindicated,"  said  of  his  pension,  5"if  you  take 
it  beforehand  it  is  a  bribe;  if  you  take  it  afterwards  it  is 
a  gratification."     To  Whig  zealots  it   seemed  deplorable 
that  the  only  man  in  England  with  sufficient  genius  to 
stay  the  drift  towards  despotism  at  home  and  rebellion  in 
the  colonies,  should  have  preferred  to  stand  aloof  from  all 
party  ties.    Partisans  like  Richmond  and  Granby,  Camden 
and  Eockingham  could  not  understand  his  contempt  for 

1  ibid,  ii.    63. 

2  Considerations  upon  the  American  Enquiry  (1779),  p.  9. 

3  Hume's  Private  Correspondence  (ed.  1820),  p.  211. 
*  Grosley's  Tour  to  London  (1772),  ii.    243. 

5  p.  19. 


108  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

their  political  traditions,  failing  to  recognise  that  his 
splendid  war  ministry  would  have  been  impossible  had 
he  worked  in  the  groove  of  party.  Yet  their  failure  was 
natural  and  their  suspicion  powerful. 

"  Mourn,  Albion,  mourn,  the  wretched  chance  deplore ; 

In  Chatham  buried,  William  Pitt's  no  more," 
wrote  one  of  the  hack-writers  employed  by  these  Whig 
aristocrats,  and  2Blackfriars  Bridge  regained  its  old  name 
in  place  of  the  recent  appellation  of  Pitt's  Bridge. 

The  wide  breach  between  Chatham  and  the  Whigs  after 
1766  attests  to  the  independence  of  his  judgment  on  the 
American  question,  for  he  was  as  careless  of  their  favour 
as  he  was  of  the  suspicions  of  the  Court  party.  For  this 
reason  it  might  be  surmised  that  his  previous  views 
on  imperial  government  had  developed  into  broader 
statesmanship,  as  he  showed  much  of  his  old  vehemence 
in  withstanding  the  growing  tendency  to  alienate  the 
colonies  by  insistence  on  direct  taxation.  Gravely 
distrusting  the  King's  avowed  aim  to  become  despotic  in 
England  upon  the  ruins  of  the  party  system,  Chatham 
deemed  the  proposed  extension  of  the  established  colonial 
policy  but  another  step  towards  the  destruction  of  parlia- 
mentary government.  He  considered  the  mediocre  Tory 
ministers  of  the  day  as  oblivious  to  the  national  necessity 
of  maintaining  the  good  feeling  between  the  British 
peoples,  and  hence  such  criticisms  of  them  as  3  "govern- 
ment butchers,"  which  come  amiss  from  one  so  great. 
They  only  typify  his  constitutional  impatience  of  little 
minds  and  special  pleading,  and  not  an  acquiescence  in  the 
suggestion  of  dismembering  the  empire.  When  Chatham 

1  An  Enquiry  into  the  Conduct  of  a  late  Bt.   Hon.   Commoner  (1766), 

p.  70. 

2  Grosley's  Tour  to  London,  i.    30 ;  ii.  241,  245. 

3  Chatham  Correspondence,  iv.    403. 


CHATHAM   AND    BURKE  109 

rejoiced  that  America  had  resisted,  lie  did  not  contemplate 
the  evolution  of  a  protest  for  freedom  into  a  war  for 
absolute  cleavage  from  Great  Britain.  It  should  not  be 
forgotten  that  he  attacked  Rockingham's  proposal  to 
acknowledge  American  independence  in  1778,  and  that  his 
dying  speech  was  directed  against  the  Whig  separatism 
of  the  Duke  of  Richmond.  Such  divergence  from  the 
extremists  among  the  opposition  testifies  to  the  honesty 
of  his  sympathy  with  colonial  opposition  to  arbitrary 
measures,  though  we  cannot  but  doubt  the  goodness  of 
the  precedent  he  set  in  refusing,  from  political  scruples, 
to  allow  his  son  to  serve  in  the  army  during  the  early  years 
of  the  war. 

In  the  controversy  evoked  by  the  projects  of  taxation 
Chatham  strained  every  effort  to  avert  a  scheme  which 
he  saw  would  weaken  the  sentimental  bonds  of  empire. 
1  In  1766  he  pointed  out  the  absurdity  of  Parliament 
purporting  "to  grant"  taxes  on  behalf  of  unrepresented 
Americans.  By  nature,  taxes  were  voluntary  gifts,  not 
compulsory  exactions,  and  Parliament  had  therefore  no 
right  under  heaven  to  enforce  them.  2  The  colonists  were 
the  sons,  not  the  bastards  of  England,  and  as  such  were 
entitled  to  all  our  ancient  liberties.  The  argument  as  to 
taxation  being  applied  to  many  unrepresented  districts  in 
Great  Britain,  he  held  futile  and  foolish.  3  "  The  rotten 
part  of  the  constitution"  deserved  to  be  amputated,  not 
extended.  On  the  purely  legal  side  of  the  dispute, 
however,  Chatham  was  really  a  less  qualified  spokesman  of 
opposition  than  many  less  famous  controversialists.  He 
was  a  4  thorough  believer  in  the  sovereignty  and  supremacy 

1  Fox's  Memoirs  (ed.  1853),  i.    109. 

2  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvi.    99. 

3  ibid,    xvi.     100;   A   Short   View   of  the   Life   of  the   late   Rt.    Hon. 

Commoner  (1766),  p.  53. 

4  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    46. 


110  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

of  Parliament  over  the  colonies,  and  consequently  lie 
could  only  escape  the  conclusion  that  whatever  it 
commanded  was  legal,  by  pleading  the  alleged  difference 
between  external  and  internal  taxation,  and  by  holding 
that  to  give  or  grant  supplies  was  not  a  function  of 
government  or  legislation.  In  fact,  his  admission  of  the 
validity  of  parliamentary  claims  to  rule  the  empire  upon 
the  principles  of  the  old  colonial  system,  put  the  burden 
of  proof  in  the  present  case  upon  his  own  side.  We  can 
hardly  be  surprised  that  the  Whigs  resented  such  difficult 
inconsistency,  and  that  Lord  Hardwicke,  as  a  government 
partisan,  thought  his  doctrines  1 "  absurd  and  pernicious." 
Chatham's  views  are  therefore  far  less  assailable  as 
expositions  of  the  great  lesson  that  expediency  rather  than 
a  false  notion  of  dignity  should  govern  a  nation's  policy. 
It  was  idle  to  tell  a  man,  who  saw  to  what  the  drift  of 
ministerial  coercion  might  lead  the  empire,  that  the  tea 
duty  was  considered  legal  by  the  same  class,  who  had 
justified  ship  money  under  Charles  I.  and  dispensations 
under  Charles  II.  He  had  never  any  taste  for  law  or 
constitutional  history.  A  rather  dim  idea  of  Magna 
Charta,  and  a  very  clear  intuition  as  to  the  meaning  of 
liberty  provided  him  with  a  sufficient  political  philosophy. 
He  had  nothing  whatever  of  Otis'  or  Dickenson's  legal 
acumen;  his  speeches  appealed  to  the  emotions  more  than 
to  intellect,  and  were  characterised  by  a  grasp  of  large 
principles  rather  than  by  accuracy  or  precision.  Such  a 
man  was  bound  to  display  an  almost  dramatic  scorn  for 
academics,  at  a  moment  when  the  country  wanted 
statesmanship,  not  pedantry.  Of  America  he  said  : 

2"  Be  to  her  faults  a  little  blind, 
Be  to  her  virtues  very  kind." 

1  Albemarle's  Rockingham   (1852),  i.   290;   cf.   Hutchinson's  Diary   (ed. 

1883),  ii.    171. 

2  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvi.    109;  A  Short  View  (1766),  p.  64. 


CHATHAM   AND    BURKE  1  1  1 

He  was  of  opinion  that  coercion  would  entail  the  loss  of 
freedom  at  home  as  well  as  over  sea,  and  might  further 
lead  to  the  wreck  of  that  empire,  which  had  just  been 
acclaimed.  luThe  fate  of  Old  England  is  at  stake,"  he 
wrote  to  Shelburne  in  March  1774,  and  to  save  her  he 
advocated  yielding  to  every  colonial  demand  except  that 
of  separation.  In  May  1774  he  drew  an  eloquent  picture 
of  what  the  future  of  Britain  might  be  if  she  chose  gentler 
means  for  retaining  her  hold  over  her  rising  empire. 
"  Length  of  days  be  in  her  right  hand,  and  in  her  left 
hand  riches  and  honour;  may  her  ways  be  ways  of 
pleasantness,  and  all  her  paths  be  peace !"  It  is  easy  to 
realise  the  awe,  which  was  inspired  by  Chatham's  fierce 
declamation,  and  the  English  public,  who  knew  little  in 
those  days  of  the  politicians  who  purported  to  represent 
it,  was  singularly  familiar  with  his  dominating  aspect 
from  the  hawk-like  eyes  down  to  the  ebony  crutch  and 
3  black  velvet  boots. 

Chatham's  attitude  has  endeared  his  memory  to  genera- 
tions of  Americans,  and  his  despair  at  the  prospect  of 
"  pouring  the  riches  of  America  into  the  lap  of  the  House 
of  Bourbon  "  has  given  a  splendid  pathos  to  his  last  days. 
France  and  the  rebels  concluded  a  formal  alliance  in 
February  1778,  and  he  died  three  months  later  in  despair. 
No  one  however,  who  realises  the  inevitable  trend  of  the 
old  colonial  system,  will  allow  that  Chatham's  policy  after 
1764  marked  any  real  advance  from  his  earlier  ideas  on 
imperial  government,  or  that  it  could  have  ever  secured 
the  permanence  of  the  union  between  England  and 
America.  Assuming  even  tha.t  he  had  had  the  tact  to  keep 
the  nation  at  his  back,  he  had  not  that  detachment  from 

1  Chatham  Correspondence,  iv.    336. 

2  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvii.  1356 

3  H.  Walpole's  Last  Journal  (ed.  1859),  i.    369. 


112  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

the  spirit  of  the  age  which  could  alone  have  pointed  out 
the  way  of  escape  from  ultimate  separation.  We  have 
seen  above  that  his  influence  on  popular  thought  never 
touched  the  old  colonial  system  with  the  precious  gift  of 
adaptability,  so  necessary  in  view  of  the  new  conditions 
of  the  time.  Chatham  never  wavered  in  his  belief  in  the 
virtues  of  state  interference  and  of  those  economic 
restrictions,  which  were  in  fact  the  chief  disintegrating 
factors  in  imperial  policy.  He  hated  the  fiscal  aspect  of 
Ameria,n  resistance.  When  New  York  opposed  Grenville's 
attempt  to  enforce  the  Navigation  Act  he  ascribed  such 
opposition  to  a  l"  spirit  of  infatuation."  The  colonial 
contentions  against  economic  restraints  were,  in  his 
opinion,  2"  grossly  fallacious."  The  demagogues  of  1767 
were  3"  irritable  and  umbrageous."  The  Boston  tea  riot 
in  December  1773  was  4"  criminal  violence,"  and  5any 
relaxation  of  the  old  repressive  policy  would  destroy 
England.  Long  before  the  Revolution  he  had  threatened 
America  with  the  full  weight  of  the  government's  power 
to  punish,  if  she  manufactured  a  single  horse-shoe,  and 
6  he  never  contested  the  right  of  the  ministry  to  quarter 
troops  in  the  colonies.  Moreover,  7his  opposition  to  the 
Quebec  Act  of  1774  was  characterised  by  intense  prejudice 
against  that  policy  of  allowing  a  conquered  people  to 
retain  its  own  established  religion  and  laws,  which  has 
since  proved  sound  statesmanship. 

These  considerations  point  to  the  conclusion  that  even  if 
Chatham  had  retained  his  hold  upon  the  nation,  he  was  not 

1  Chatham  Correspondence,  iii.    188. 

2  ibid,  iii.    189. 

3  ibid,  iii.    193. 

4  ibid,  iv.    336. 

5  ibid,  iv.    338. 

6  Russell's  Life  of  Fox  (1859),  i.    187. 

7  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvii.  1403. 


CHATHAM  AND  BURKE  113 

endowed  with  sufficient  insight  into  political  science  to 
save  the  Greater  Britain  of  that  day  from  ruin.  l  "  I  can 
only  say  God's  will  be  done,  with  the  simplicity  of  a  poor 
American,"  he  wrote  on  the  eve  of  the  Revolution,  but 
even  then  he  was  still  a  believer  in  the  old  colonial  system. 
If  it  never  had  another  exponent  so  liberal  as  Chatham, 
it  could  claim  him  none  the  less  as  a  follower,  and  his 
heartiest  eulogist  must  admit  that  if  there  was  much  in 
his  theory  of  empire  to  admire,  there  was  also  much  to 
criticise. 

Edmund  Burke  approached  modern  theory  more  nearly 
than  Chatham,  in  that  he  was  an  advocate  of  Free  Trade, 
and  would  have  been  satisfied  by  ties  of  merely  the 
Hellenic  type  between  England  and  her  colonies.  On  the 
purely  legal  question  at  issue  his  arguments  also  were  only 
general  and  historical,  and  in  fact  he  admitted  the  bare 
legality  of  direct  taxation.  As  to  the  principle  however, 
which  was  involved  by  insistence  on  the  exercise  of  that 
prerogative  of  Parliament,  he  opposed  the  short-sighted 
policy  of  Lord  North's  government  with  brilliant  vigour. 
2  He  argued  that  the  imperial  character  of  Parliament 
entailed  the  imposition  of  strict  checks  upon  its  use  of 
theoretic  powers.  Morally,  it  had  no  claim  to  intrude  into 
the  place  of  its  subordinate  sister  legislatures.  Plainly 
it  was  for  the  latter  to  "grant"  supplies,  and  yet  the 
government  affected  to  "grant"  and  not  to  "impose" 
taxes  payable  in  America.  No  man  appreciated  the  uses 
of  colonisation  more  than  Burke,  and  he  pointed  out  the 
folly  of  dissipating  the  work  of  past  years.  3  He  compared 
the  Boston  rioters  to  Hampden,  and  4  argued  that  the 

1  Chatham  Correspondence,  iv.     387. 

2  Burke's  Select  Works,  i.    15G-7. 

3  ibid,  i.    105. 

4  ibid,  i.    121. 


114  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

adoption  of  a  commercial  monopoly  in  America  marked 
the  abandonment  of  the  alternative  right  of  taxation. 
1To  prove  the  popular  notion  that  dignity  would  suffer 
by  concession  to  be  thoroughly  bad,  he  showed  that  the 
risks,  involved  by  coercion,  were  far  more  vital  than  any 
possible  advantages.  2  Chesterfield  said  that  it  was  absurd 
to  risk  trade  amounting  to  two  million  pounds  a  year  for 
a  tax  which  might  bring  in  one  hundred  thousand,  and 
similarly  Burke  held  that  England  should  be  guided  by 
national  expediency,  not  by  the  latter  of  the  law.  He 
reversed  Gibbon's  method  absolutely,  by  preferring 
imperial  needs  to  legal  argument,  while  the  latter  voted 
with  the  government  in  favour  of  8"the  rights,  though 
not  perhaps  the  interests  of  the  Mother  Country."  When 
he  advised  the  amiable  but  lukewarm  Rockingham  to 
introduce  the  bill  declaring  the  right  of  Parliament  to 
tax  America,  Burke  was  clearly  leaving  the  academics  of 
coercion  to  pass  unrefuted.  He  saw  the  larger  necessity 
for  immediate  concession,  and  he  recognised  that  to  give 
way  only  after  defeat  in  the  field  was  an  impossible  course, 
for  4  "if  we  are  beat,  America  is  gone  irrevocably."  It 
was  far  better  to  associate  the  idea  of  the  British  empire 
with  the  rights  which  the  colonists  enjoyed,  than  with  the 
claims  which  they  disputed. 

His  most  remarkable  speeches  on  the  colonial  question 
are  those  of  the  19th  April,  1774,  and  the  22nd  March, 
1775,  but  the  tone  of  all  his  utterances  at  the  time  is  clear 
and  consistent.  Assuming  the  truth  of  the  current  parallel 
of  England's  relationship  with  her  colonies  to  that  between 
a  parent  and  children,  was  England  to  give  them  a  stone 

1  ibid,  i.    106. 

2  Chatham  Correspondence,  ii.    361. 

3  Gibbon's  Autobiography  (ed.  1896),  p.  310 

4  Burke's  Correspondence,  ii.    38. 


CHATHAM  AND  BURKE  115 

if  they  asked  for  bread?  He  pointed  out  the  immense 
worth  of  the  possession  of  a  British  empire.  The  whole 
export  trade  of  England  in  1704  was  not  much  in  excess 
of  her  exports  to  her  colonies  alone  in,  1772.  He  asked 
old  men  to  go  back  to  the  days  of  their  boyhood,  and 
imagine  what  their  feeling  would  have  been  had  some 
angel  then  opened  to  their  vision  the  future  glories  of 
Britain's  realm  across  the  sea.  x"  Young  man,  there  is 
America,  which  at  this  day  serves  for  little  more  than  to 
amuse  with  stories  of  savage  men  and  uncouth  manners; 
yet  shall  before  you  taste  of  death  show  itself  equal  to 
the  whole  of  that  commerce  which  now  attracts  the  envy 
of  the  world."  He  asked  whether  all  the  glory  and 
progress  of  a  century  was  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  litigious 
obstinacy  of  self-willed  ministers.  In  his  opinion,  the 
danger  of  losing  America  made  concession  the  more 
profitable  as  well  as  the  more  magnanimous  policy. 

The  force  and  beauty  of  Burke's  language  made  him  a 
welcome  ally  to  the  Whig  nobles,  but  under  the  conditions 
of  the  time,  he  had  no  more  power  than  Chatham  to  stay 
the  downfall  of  the  British  empire  in  America.  It  may 
well  be  doubted  if  he  grasped  what  the  American  cause 
really  involved,  for  he  never  felt  the  touch  of  the  new 
Radicalism,  then  slowly  coming  to  birth  in  England, 
and  no  glimmer  of  the  dawning  faith  in  democracy 
emancipated  his  mind  from  the  general  British  devotion 
to  the  established  order  of  things  in  Church  and  State.- 
He  acquiesced  in  the  slave  trade,  and  unlike  Chatham, 
he  opposed  the  tendency  for  Parliament  to  curb  the  East 
India  Company's  maladministration.  He  was  quite  willing 
to  fight  for  the  cause  of  a  wider  theory  of  empire  in  the 
ranks  of  an  aristocracy,  which  had  nothing  of  his  idealism, 

1  Burke's  Select  Works,  i.    173. 


116  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

and  his  later  attitude  towards  the  French  Revolution 
shows  how  little  understanding  he  had  of  the  forces  in 
society  which  made  America  rebel.  l  In  1773  he  told 
Priestley  that  the  hope  of  England  lay  in  increasing  the 
power  of  the  great  Whig  families.  This  was  hardly  a 
creed  to  inspire  a  people  just  emerging  from  a  century 
of  oligarchy.  Burke's  quasi-imperialism  offered  to  the 
country  no  prospect  of  direct  gain  nor  of  any  realisation 
of  its  alleged  legal  rights  over  dependencies.  No  wonder 
his  schemes  were  thought  visionary  and  extravagant.  If 
his  mind  was  slightly  more  balanced  tnaii  Chatham's  it 
had  far  less  captivating  power,  for  to  the  last  Chatham 
was  a  name  to  inspire  awe  and  to  command  attention, 
while  Burke  seemed  but  a  follower  and  an  ex-secretary 
of  Buckingham,  not  a  master  of  men.  Such  certainly 
was  his  estimation  by  the  House  of  Commons  in  1775. 
As  he  said  himself,  2only  angels  or  devils  could  stand 
aloof  from  the  ties  of  existing  parties,  and  so  he  stooped 
to  serve  the  most  hopeful  among  the  groups  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  realising  that  no  plebeian  could  possibly  have 
governed  that  corporate  aristocracy.  Burke  catered  to  its 
moderate  interest  in  territorial  expansion,  and  his  ideal  of 
an  empire  was  that  of  several  communities  federated  by 
the  loosest  of  material  ties,  and  destitute  of  Chatham's 
passionate  centralisation.  3He  reached  the  height  of  his 
influence  in  1779,  when  he  led  the  Rockingham  Whigs  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  and  frustrated  their  proposed  union 
with  the  group  of  more  original  thinkers,  who  gathered 
round  Shelburne  and  Dunning.  Soon  afterwards  he  found 
that  his  leadership  had  passed  to  Fox,  whose  habits  and 
temper  were  more  congenial  to  the  party.  It  is  plain  that 

1  Joseph  Priestley's  Memoirs  (1806),  p.  455. 

2  Burke's  Select  Works,  i.    90. 

3  Nicholl's  Recollections,  i.    39—41. 


CHATHAM  AND   BURKE  117 

Burke's  methods  were  often  unattractive,  and  though  he 
delighted  his  hearers  by  his  wit  and  strength,  his  long, 
vague  and  elaborate  speeches  were  not  of  a  nature  to 
convince  phlegmatic  opponents.  Parliament  had  already 
lost  its  likeness  to  an  open  debating  society,  and  it  listened 
with  settled  convictions  to  partisan  oratory,  never  expected 
to  persuade.  2  Horace  Walpole  said  that  rhetoric  was 
invented  before  the  days  of  places  and  commissions.  To 
such  an  audience  3  Burke's  many  mannerisms  seemed 
grating,  his  emotionalism  repellant,  and  his  eloquence 
rather  won  the  admiration  of  Americans  like  4  Curwen, 
whose  models  were  very  different  from  those  of  the 
ordinary  Englishman.  Even  Tories  like  Johnson  recognized 
Burke's  consummate  genius,  but  they  considered  him  a 
mere  theorist  in  politics,  and  his  friend  Goldsmith  admitted 
the  natural  difficulty  that  prevented  the  House  of  Commons 
from  appreciating  one, 

5  "  Who  too  deep  for  his  hearers  still  went  on  refining, 
And  thought  of  convincing  while  they  thought  of  dining, 
Though  equal  to  all  things,  for  all  things  unfit,    ; 
Too  nice  for  a  statesman,  too  proud  for  a  wit." 
In  spite  of  his  renown,  Burke  never  won  a  place  in  any 
cabinet.      Indeed,   both   these   great   English   politicians, 
Chatham  and  Burke,  by  widely  different  means,  appealed 
to    an   imagination   too   high   for   contemporary   politics, 
without    possessing    quite    enough    genius    to    raise    their 
world  from  its  existing  level.     For  this  reason  Chatham 
passed  as    6"  wholly  mad,"  and  Burke  as  an  unpractical 
enthusiast. 

1  Lord  Teignmouth's  Memoirs  of  Sir  Wm.  Jones  (1806),  i.    294. 

2  Letters  of  H.  Walpole  to  Mann  (1833);  iii.    117. 
Fox's  Memoirs,  i.    163. 

Curwen's  Journal  and  Letters  (ed.  1842),  p.  311. 

5  Goldsmith's  Retaliation. 

6  Hume's  Private  Correspondence  (ed.  1820),  p.  243. 


118  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 


CHAPTER    VII. 

"  UNITED  EMPIRE  "  LOYALTY. 

IT  will  be  clear  from  the  foregoing  pages  that  Great 
Britain  in  1775  was  destitute  of  constructive  imperialism. 
None  of  her  politicians  devised  any  scheme  whereby  strong 
executive  government  for  the  whole  empire  could  be 
reconciled  with  the  particularist  tendencies  then  at  work 
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  Every  great  federation  has 
to  face  some  such  problem,  and  even  to-day  the  present 
relationship  between  the  Mother  Country  and  her  colonies 
appears  to  be  so  transient  that  no  one  would  dare  to 
prophesy  the  ultimate  evolution  of  Greater  Britain. 
Consequently  singular  interest  must  attach  to  the  only 
proposals  made  in  George  III.'s  time  to  solve  the 
perplexities  of  empire  by  giving  real  freedom  to  every 
partner  in  the  British  community,  and  by  subordinating 
each  at  the  same  time  to  the  general  interests  of  that 
community.  In  view  of  the  contemporary  selfishness  of 
English  colonial  ideas,  and  of  the  concurrent  American 
perception  of  an  easier  road  than  that  of  constitutional 
compromise  to  economic  independence,  it  was  a  bold  step 
to  frame  a  scheme  for  unity  among  all  British  peoples. 
Those  who  took  the  risk  spoke  to  deaf  ears.  The  work 
and  even  the  names  of  Thomas  Pownall  and  Joseph 
Galloway  may  be  said  to  have  perished  with  them,  for 
their  ideals  were  less  practicable  than  those  of  Hamilton 
and  Washington,  whose  feat  of  binding  together  the 
United  States  was  less  perfect  in  conception  than  an 
Anglo-Saxon  federation  but  was  in  the  light  of  that  age, 


"UNITED  EMPIRE"  LOYALTY  119 

the  only  feasible  compromise  of  the  warfare  between  the 
larger  and  smaller  political  units. 

As  England's  devotion  to  the  old  colonial  system 
made  the  needs  of  the  whole  empire  irreconcilable 
with  the  individualism  of  its  component  parts,  the 
more  practical  colonial  thinkers  abandoned  British  for 
American  patriotism,  and  organised  trans-Atlantic  rather 
than  Anglo-Saxon  unity.  Nevertheless,  the  courage  and 
ingenuity  of  the  constitutional  theorists  in  the  colonies, 
who  refused  to  despair  of  the  wider  union,  and  who  parted 
company  with  Franklin  upon  reaching  the  point  where 
their  common  patriotism  forced  them  to  choose  between 
plain  rebellion  and  pure  Toryism,  deserve  much  respect. 
The  Falklands  and  Colepepers  of  1775  are  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  blinder  partisans  of  what  was 
called  the  cause  of  the  "  United  Empire."  Not  that  the 
latter  class  do  not  merit  British  gratitude,  for  even  such 
pro-American  zealots  as  Burke  and  Shelburne  recognized 
their  devotion  to  the  Crown,  but  it  was  natural  that  most 
of  them  should  merely  acquiesce  in  the  English  view  of 
the  issue  then  at  stake,  and  should  ask  for  no  amendment 
of  the  existing  imperial  system.  Their  position  was 
simply  that  of  honest  citizens,  who  hated  1"01iverian" 
fanatics,  who  distrusted  radical  changes  in  society,  loved 
old  English  traditions,  and  loathed  the  forensic  and  pulpit 
bluster  of  the  fiercer  revolutionaries.  This  "  Church  and 
King  "  type  is  familiar  to  all,  and  its  scornful  bravery  in 
conflict  is  not  rare.  Jonathan  Boucher,  a  clerical  refugee 
from  Maryland,  told  proudly  of  the  loyalty  of  the  cloth. 
2  "We  did  not  bow  the  knee  to  Baal."  Such  attachment 
however  is  not  often  intellectual.  The  loyalists,  who 
experimented  in  constitutional  science,  who  wished  to 

1  An  Alarm  to  New  York  (1775),  p.  88. 

2  Boucher's  Causes  and  Consequences  of  the  Am.  Rev.   (1797),  p.  xlix. 


120  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

purge  colonial  policy  of  its  particularism,  are  those  in 
whom  modern  participants  in  imperial  politics  have  most 
reason  to  be  interested. 

Such  men  had  all  shared  the  earlier  aim  of  consolidating 
the  British  brotherhood,  which  had  led  Franklin  to 
propose  the  formation  of  a  confederate  council  at  the 
Albany  Congress  of  1754  to  deal  with  such  questions  as 
1  trade,  taxation,  defences  and  Indian  policy.  Many  of 
them  had  been  his  intimates,  but  unlike  that  more 
sceptical  and  calculating  statesman,  they  did  not  discard 
that  brotherhood  while  the  approach  of  rebellion  was  fast 
making  it  an  empty  dream.  When  one  realises  their 
unsentimental  surroundings,  the  attitude  of  these  writers 
seems  precociously  pan-Britannic.  The  whole  race,  said 
Pownall,  once  Lieutenant  Governor  of  New  Jersey,  should 
form  2  "a  grand  marine  dominion  ....  united  in  one 
empire  in  a  one  centre."  It  should  be  knit,  said  Galloway, 
the  leading  lawyer  at  Philadelphia  and  sometime  Speaker 
of  the  General  Assembly  of  Pennsylvania,  3uin  one  grand 
and  illustrious  empire."  The  colonies,  said  Dr.  Chandler, 
should  feel  themselves  4"a  part  of  the  great  British 
community."  Dreading  the  break-up  of  the  empire,  such 
thinkers  aimed  in  the  first  place  at  displaying  to  both 
England  and  America  the  value  of  the  imperial  connection. 
They  tried  to  refute  the  common  British  opinion  that 
colonies,  which  withstood  the  claims  of  taxation,  were  not 
worth  having,  and  the  more  widespread  colonial  belief 
that  the  tie  which  linked  the  two  peoples  was  an  impedi- 
ment to  American  development.  The  first  task  was  best 
attempted  by  Galloway,  the  second  by  Samuel  Seabury, 
afterwards  Bishop  of  Connecticut. 

1  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    37,  52. 

2  Pownall's  Administration  Brit.  Cols.  (5th  ed.  1774),  p.  10. 

3  Galloway's  Reply  to  an  Address    etc.  (1775),  p.  7. 

4  The- American  Querist  (1774),  p.  6. 


"UNITED   EMPIRE"  LOYALTY  121 

Upon  the  facts  of  the  day  Galloway's  was  the  easier 
work,  and  he  succeeded  in  showing  that  expediency  as 
well  as  justice  required  a  modification  of  the  colonial 
system  in  view  of  the  immense  worth  to  England 
of  her  American  possessions.  Galloway  was  so  far 
from  being  an  unthinking  adherent  of  the  existing 
order  as  to  have  acquiesced  in  the  non-importation  policy 
of  the  first  Congress  of  1774,  and  his  loyalty  was  the 
more  magnanimous.  He  tried  to  reveal  the  fallacy  of  the 
doctrine  that  the  ingratitude  of  colonies  proved  the  futility 
of  colonisation.  The  race  wanted  the  readjustment  of  her 
imperial  system,  not  its  disruption.  *  He  ridiculed  the 
complacency  with  which  Dean  Tucker  was  willing  that 
Britain  should  lose  a  vast  territory  and  three  million 
citizens.  2  The  trade  with  the  American  colonies  more 
than  doubled  every  ten  years,  and  British  exports  thither 
had  risen  in  volume  from  £830,000  in  1748  to  nearly 
£4,600,000  in  1771.  3Such  exports  were  many  times  as 
great  as  exports  to  the  West  Indies,  and  amounted  to 
nearly  half  the  volume  of  British  exports  to  all  foreign 
countries,  representing  at  the  same  time  a  safer  and  more 
profitable  trade.  Moreover,  if  England  were  to  lose  her 
American  provinces  by  her  obstinacy  she  would  also  lose 
4  the  West  Indies  in  the  course  of  years,  those  islands 
being  as  natural  appanages  of  North  America  as  the  Isle 
of  Man  and  the  Orkneys  were  of  Great  Britain.  Surely  so 
great  an  empire  was  worth  the  trouble  of  reorganisation; 
without  it  the  home  country  would  dwindle  into  a  second- 
rate  power,  and  its  flag  5"  would  be  no  more  respected  than 

1  Cool  Thoughts  (1780),  p.  11. 

2  ibid,  p.  15. 

3  ibid,  p.  14. 

4  ibid,  p.  26. 

5  ibid,  p.  34. 


122  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

the  lug  sail  of  an  oyster  boat."  This  line  of  argument  has 
an  echo  of  that  of  Burke,  but  Galloway  was  not  a  political 
partisan.  He  was  a  far  clearer  advocate  of  expansion  than 
Burke,  and  he  crowned  his  reasoning  by  propounding  a 
definite  plan  of  imperial  federation. 

A  different  note  was  required  to  sustain  Seabury's 
appeal  to  Americans  to  consider  the  advantages  of  the 
British  connection.  It  was  essential  that  the  loyalist 
drafts  of  remodelled  constitutions  should  be  backed  by 
evidence  of  their  desirability,  and  yet  it  was  hard  to  show 
that  their  adoption  would  provide  as  adequately  for 
national  development  as  the  gaudy  dreams  of  the 
republicans.  The  argument  that  the  colonies  required 
protection  against  foreign  states  was  now  untenable, 
although  apparently  1  unquestioned  as  late  as  1766. 
Under  these  circumstances  we  cannot  but  wonder  at  the 
skill  with  which  Seabury  argued  that  the  young  states  of 
North  America  were  only  benefited  by  dependence.  The 
tracts  which  he  published  under  the  pseudonym  of 
A.  W.  Farmer  are  singularly  clever;  if  he  attempted  the 
impossible,  he  attempted  it  very  well.  First  he  showed 
the  far-reaching  harm  of  the  proposed  non-importation  of 
British  and  West  Indian  goods.  Without  molasses 
2  American  distilleries  would  come  to  a  standstill,  as  maple 
juice  and  honey  were  poor  and  insufficient  substitutes. 
The  one  hundred  thousand  colonial  dram-drinkers  would 
suffer.  Similarly  3  the  farmer  would  be  crippled  by  having 
to  discard  British  clothing  for  the  coarse  and  expensive 
manufactures  of  New  England,  and  the  agricultural  and 
seafaring  elements — the  best  part  of  the  population — 

1  Dissertations  upon  the  Advantages  of  Perpetual  Union  (1766),  pp.  20,  98. 

2  Friendly  Address  to  Reasonable  Americans  (1774),  p.  38. 

3  A  View  of  the  Controversy  (1774),  p.  25;  Free  Thoughts  on  Proceed- 

ings of  Congress  (1774),  p.   17. 


« UNITED   EMPIRE"   LOYALTY  123 

would  bo  exploited  to  enrich  the  commercial  Puritans. 
Again,  independence  would  hurt  the  people  at  every  turn. 
The  Newfoundland  fisheries  would  be  barred  to  Americans, 
and  1  thousands  of  sailors,  shipbuilders,  carmen,  smiths, 
boatmen,  iron  workers  and  pilots  would  lose  their  means 
of  livelihood.  Even  the  West  Indies  would  buy  all  their 
goods  from  England,  and  not  from  the  mainland,  and 
2  their  timber  from  Canada  or  Hamburg.  It  was  foolish 
for  the  various  provinces  to  sacrifice  themselves  for  the  sake 
of  a  few  oppressed  persons  at  Boston,  which  could  surely 
relieve  its  own  sufferers  without  appealing  to  every  colony 
from  Nova  Scotia  to  Georgia.  3"Have  you  no  poor  of 
your  own  to  relieve?"  Britain's  cause  was  just,  for  no 
sovereign's  charter  could  discharge  inferior  bodies  politic 
from  parliamentary  authority,  and  the  colonies  4"as  parts 
of  the  body  must  be  subject  to  the  general  laws  of  the 
body;"  but  even  if  it  were  unjust,  it  was  far  better  to 
remain  part  of  an  empire  able  to  protect  every  member 
from  foreign  aggression  than  to  break  away  into  a  number 
of  discordant  and  segregated  units,  for  it  was  impossible 
that  states  as  hostile  to  each  other  as  5  New  York  and 
New  Jersey  would  ever  unite.  A  similar  spirit  governed 
Daniel  Leonard's  arguments  against  John  Adams  in  the 
Massachusetts  Gazette. 

Assuming  therefore  the  general  necessity  of  preserving 
the  empire,  the  more  capable  loyalists  sketched  various 
plans  whereby  the  colonial  system  might  be  revivified, 
and  the  prejudices  then  aflame  respected.  Thomas 
Pownall  was  a  recognized  authority  on  American 

1  Friendly  Address,  p.  39. 

2  ibid,  p.  43. 

3  Congress  Canvassed  (1775),  p.  33. 

4  Candid  Examination  (1775),  p.  21. 

5  Congress  Canvassed,  p.  25. 


124  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

questions,  who  after  acting  as  Governor  of  Massachusetts 
between  1757  and  1760,  and  afterwards  as  Lieutenaiit- 
Governor  of  New  Jersey  and  Governor  of  South 
Carolina,  sat  between  1768  and  1780  in  the  British 
House  of  Commons.  A  convinced  reformer  but  a  thorough 
loyalist,  he  advocated  the  direct  representation  of  America 
at  Westminster.  1He  abhorred  the  idea  of  using  force 
instead  of  diplomacy,  and  following  a  policy  which  had 
in  its  early  days  received  the  sanction  of  some  random 
remarks  of  Franklin,  he  never  ceased  proclaiming  this 
course  to  be  2  the  only  alternative  to  separation.  3  The 
centre  of  the  empire  would  still  be  in  England,  and  she 
need  not  fear  its  transference  to  America,  a  move  4  which 
would  only  be  justified  upon  the  shifting  of  the  real  heart 
of  the  British  nation  to  the  new  world.  Distance  was  no 
obstacle;  it  only  necessitated  5the  lengthening  of  the 
periods  for  the  issue  and  return  of  writs.  6  The  national 
debts  of  the  Mother  Country  and  her  colonies  might  be 
readily  adjusted  upon  principles  similar  to  those  adopted 
in  the  Anglo-Scottish  union  of  1707.  England  need  not 
fear  that  the  American  members  would  form  7  a  compact 
phalanx,  nor  8need  America  fear  that  her  representatives 
would  be  corrupted  or  overawed  by  British  influences.  If 
the  oppressive  economic  restrictions  upon  the  colonies  had 
to  continue  they  might  be  much  softened  by  opening 
English  trade  depots  on  the  Continent  whither  American 
goods  could  be  shipped  direct. 

1  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  xi. ;  pt.  5,  339. 

2  Admin.  Brit.  Cols.  (5th  ed.  1774),  ii.    82. 

3  ibid, 

4  ibid, 

5  ibid, 


6  ibid, 

7  ibid, 

8  ibid, 


35. 

171. 

174. 

170. 

173. 

172. 


"UNITED   EMPIRE"   LOYALTY  125 

The  "Administration  of  the  British  Colonies,"  in  which 
these  contentions  were  advanced,  appeared  in  1764,  and 
ran  through  six  editions  in  thirteen  years  without  ever 
really  obtaining  a  hold  on  public  opinion.  Neither  side  cared 
for  Pownall's  scheme.  l  George  III.  could  not  tolerate  so 
moderate  a  partisan;  Governor  Hutchinson  said  his 
proposal  was  2"  above  my  capacity;"  3 Franklin  and  his 
friends  had  passed  Pownall's  stage  of  thought  long  since, 
and  scouted  the  idea  of  coming  to  Westminster.  In  fact, 
the  Americans  could  not  possibly  be  satisfied  by  the  right 
of  sending  a  few  members  to  a  distant  assembly,  which 
would  only  look  on  them  as  strange  and  uncultivated 
intruders.  4A  plan  of  representation,  brought  forward  in 
1766,  allowed  for  four  members  from  Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania  and  Virginia  respectively,  "  or  a  smaller 
number  at  their  option."  Nothing  in  such  a  suggestion 
could  attract  Americans.  The  last  two  words  in  the  ciy 
of  "no  taxation  without  representation "  could  well  have 
been  dispensed  with,  as  the  rising  school  of  colonial 
patriots  did  not  dream  of  sinking  their  self-importance 
in  the  back  benches  of  the  English  House  of  Commons, 
and  5  John  Adams,  for  instance,  ridiculed  the  legal  fiction 
by  which  Massachusetts  was  to  be  deemed  part  of  the 
English  soil.  The  spirit  of  Pownall's  plan  is  better  than 
its  details. 

Galloway's  scheme  of  imperial  reorganisation  was  far 
wiser  and  more  original,  and  in  some  respects  it  offers 
useful  suggestions  to  modern  searchers  after  racial  federa- 

1  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.    xi. ;  pt.  5,  440. 

2  Hutchinson's  Diary  (ed.  1883),  i.    355. 

3  ibid,   i.     183;   Galloway's   Rise   and   Progress   of   the   Am.    Rebellion 

(1780),  p.  102;  The  Controversy  between  Gt.  Brit,  and  her  Colonies 

(1769),  p.  91. 

*  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.    xiv.    pt.  10,  51. 
5  J.  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  ii.  191. 


126  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

tion.      Himself  a  member  of  the  Congress  of  1774,  and 
for   long    an   opponent    of   the    government,    he    entirely 
discarded    the    old    folly    of    commercial    restraint,    and 
advocated  the  removal  of  every  colonial  disability.      His 
means,  however,  were  far  removed  from  the  aims  of  the 
revolutionaries,  as  he  intended  such  reform  to  be  but  a 
step  to  a  more  perfect  British  union.     He  wished  to  see 
the    erection    of    an    American    branch    of    the    imperial 
assembly,  *  "incorporated  with  Parliament  for  the  purpose 
of  taxation  and  general  regulations,'7 — coinage,  defence, 
boundary  disputes.     Each  province  would  retain  its  own 
legislature    for  local   affairs,   but   the   formation   of   one 
central    federal    body    would    end    the    silly    distinction 
between  the  Briton  at  home  and  the  Briton  over  sea,  and 
kill    the    grievance    of    taxation    without    representation. 
2  The  American  branch  of  Parliament  was  to  be  a  Grand 
Council  sitting  in  one  of  the  colonies,  elected  every  three 
years,  and  presided  over  by  a  President-General  appointed 
by  the  King,  and  holding  office  during  his  good  pleasure. 
The  Council  was  to  sit  at  least  once  a  year,  and  to  enjoy 
privileges  and  rights  analogous  to  those  of  the  House  of 
Commons.      Every    act    relating    to    matters    of    general 
concern  had  to  be  transmitted  by  the  House  of  Commons 
to  the  Grand  Council    and  vice  versa,  for  their  respective 
approval,  as  the  consent  of  each  house  was  required  in 
imperial  legislation.     The  one  exception  was  in  the  case 
of  aids  granted  in  time  of  war,  when  the  government  need 
not  wait  for  the  consent  of  the  sister  body  over  sea.     In 
theory,  the  scheme  would  have  3  identified  all  the  King's 
subjects  in  one  common  citizenship,  making  it  4  immaterial 

1  Galloway's  Rise  and  Progress  of  the  Am.  Reb.  (1780),  p.  81. 

2  What  think  ye  of  Congress  Now?  (1775),  pp.  71-3. 

3  Rise  of  the  Am.  Rebellion  (1780),  p.  128. 

4  Reply  to  an  Address    etc.   (1775),  p.  8. 


"UNITED   EMPIRE"   LOYALTY  127 

to  Britain  whether  a  man  acquired  riches  in  London  or  on 
the  Ohio. 

In  the  light  of  after  events,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
Galloway's  constitution  could  have  survived  the  many 
changes  in  politics  and  society,  which  came  within  the 
ensuing  fifty  years.  The  growth  of  the  cabinet  at  the 
expense  of  the  legislature  would  have  either  excluded 
Americans  from  all  imperial  business  requiring  secrecy 
and  despatch,  or  else  drawn  the  best  colonial  politicians 
away  from  the  assembly  of  which  they  were  the  chosen 
leaders  and  to  which  they  were  responsible.  However, 
Galloway's  failure  to  convince  his  contemporaries  was  not 
due  to  any  such  defect  in  political  speculation,  but  rather 
to  the  unwillingness  of  both  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies 
to  recognize  the  necessity  for  concession.  No  scheme 
which  provided  for  the  abandonment  of  the  economic 
ideals  of  the  old  colonial  system,  and  which  gave 
Americans  an  equal  voice  in  public  policy  with  the  richer 
and  more  numerous  population  at  home,  could  have 
appealed  successfully  to  Englishmen  before  the  War  of 
Independence,  and  in  America  the  prospect  of  British 
parliamentary  control  was  far  less  alluring  than  the  vision 
of  complete  independence.  The  revolutionary  party 
practically  drove  Galloway  to  join  the  English  in  1776, 
and  as  late  as  1 1847,  its  admirers  could  find  no  other 
epithet  than  "  notorious  "  for  this  admirable  theorist. 

Nevertheless  the  efforts  of  the  loyalists  to  rationalise  the 
imperialism  of  England  deserve  a  separate  chapter  in  any 
review  of  the  old  colonial  system.  They  groped  for  truth 
amid  the  darkness  of  revolution,  and  refused  to  acquiesce 
in  the  alleged  necessity  of  perpetual  misunderstanding. 
It  is  however  easy  to  see  why  they  failed  to  make 

1  Sparks'  Washington,  v.    522. 


128  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

any  impression  upon  British  thought,  which  was  not  of 
such  a  nature  a,s  would  respond  to  obscure  provincial 
appeals  for  moderation  and  reform  when  a  response  would 
have  entailed  the  reversal  of  cherished  economic  ideals. 
Though  it  is  just  as  clear  why  America  ignored  their 
doubts  and  scruples,  we  cannot  but  feel  some  surprise  at 
the  insignificance  of  their  successes,  and  at  the  small 
space  they  filled  in  American  public  life  between  1765  and 
1775,  for  these  loyal  constitution  framers  were  among  the 
first  men  of  the  colonies,  while  the  cultivated  society 
in  which  they  moved  enjoyed  great  social  influence. 
Hutchinson  was  a  great  great-grandson  of  the  famous 
Anne  Hutchinson,  and  in  spite  of  his  disastrous  relations 
with  the  men  whom  he  had  to  govern  after  1771,  he 
was  admittedly  the  leading  authority  on  the  history  of 
Massachusetts.  Sewall  was  Attorney-General  of  that 
colony;  the  De  Lanceys  were  among  the  richest  and  most 
influential  families  in  New  York,  and  some  of  the  best 
names  in  Boston  figured  in  the  list  of  refugees,  who 
formed  the  loyal  *  New  England  Club  in  London  in  1776. 
The  explanation  seems  to  lie  in  the  weakness  inherent 
in  conservatism  in  times  of  national  uprising  and  passion. 
The  allegiance  contemplated  by  Galloway's  constitution 
was  based  on  sentiment  alone,  and  against  such  sentiment 
was  the  armed  enthusiasm  of  zealots  as  well  as  the  clear 
material  advantage  of  the  majority  of  the  people.  Passive 
half  measures  are  of  little  avail  in  the  face  of  the  fierce 
proselytism  of  an  ardent  and  interested  minority,  and  the 
academics,  which  were  to  have  saved  the  empire,  were 
brushed  away  by  the  fierce  rhetoric  of  the  bar  and  the 
dissenting  ministers,  to  whom  George  III.  seemed  diabolic, 
and  the  timorous  2Gage  an  Alva.  More  particularly  was 

1  Memorial  History  of  Boston  (1881),  iii.    175. 

2  John  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  ix.    351. 


"UNITED   EMPIRE"   LOYALTY  129 

the  failure  of  the  Tory  reform  movement  due  to  the 
work  of  debtors  who  wished  to  rid  themselves  of  the 
crushing  burden  of  indebtedness  to  England,  and  of  the 
Congregationalists,  whom  Galloway  considered  the  authors 
of  the  Revolution.  The  first  class  owed  a  sum  variously 
estimated  from  *  three  to  2six  millions  sterling  to  British 
merchants  in  1775,  and  their  dependence  would  in  no  way 
be  relieved  by  mere  constitutional  readjustment.  The 
second  class  realised  that  any  strengthening  of  the  ties 
of  union  would  but  enhance  the  claims  of  the  Anglican 
Church,  suspicion  of  which  lay  at  the  bottom  of  New 
England  animosity.  They  resented  3the  general  choice 
of  government  officials  from  the  ranks  of  the  established 
Church  alone,  and  prophesied  in  the  words  of  Ezra  Stiles, 
President  of  Yale,  that  4  there  would  be  a  Runnymede  in 
America.  5In  1764  a  Presbyterian  synod  at  Philadelphia 
led  the  way  to  repudiation  of  the  empire,  and  from  1766 
onwards  the  6  Congregationalist  ministers  of  Boston,  under 
the  influence  of  Dr.  Jonathan  Mayhew,  preached  open 
resistance.  Their  anti-monarchical  bias  was  profound. 
Only  one  minister  of  their  sect  in  Boston  remained  loyal 
to  the  Crown  in  1775.  7  Seabury  adverted  on  their  former 
practice  of  reading  the  words,  "  Civil  Magistrate "  in  the 
Bible  in  place  of  the  word  "  King,"  and  of  substituting 
for  "  the  kingdom  of  Heaven  "  the  phrase  "  the  Parliament 
of  Heaven."  These  no  doubt  were  obsolete  vagaries,  but 
the  old  spirit  lived  still,  and  the  temper  of  the  Ironsides 
was  the  making  of  the  United  States. 

1  Boucher's  Causes  and  Consequences  of  the  Am.  Rev.  (1797),  p.  xl. 

2  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.    xiv.    pt.  10,  29. 

3  Kingsley's  Life  of  Stiles  (1847),  p.  23. 

4  ibid,  p.  48. 

5  Galloway's  Rise  of  the  Am.  Reb.   (1780),  p.  53. 

6  ibid,    p.    67;    Memorial    History    of    Boston    (1881),    iii.     20,    126; 

Hutchinson's  Diary  (ed.  1883),  i.    169. 

7  Friendly  Address  (1774),  pp.  29,  30. 


130  THE   OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

Thus  the  men  of  thought,  who  strove  for  true 
imperialism,  became  but  part  of  the  flotsam  of  loyal 
America,  cast  upon  the  shores  of  Great  Britain  and 
her  remaining  colonies  during  the  hard  years  of  the 
Revolution.  1  Galloway  left  property  to  the  value  of  forty 
thousand  pounds  behind  him,  while  Seabury  was  not  only 
2  neglected  by  English  churchmen,  but  never  even  won 
credit  for  his  tracts,  as  3they  were  published  under  the 
name  of  a  Farmer  and  were  attributed  to  another.  These 
men  fell  back  into  the  ruck.  Their  cause  nevertheless 
was  great,  and  their  ready  sacrifices  for  the  enlightened 
ideal  of  a  "  United  Empire "  should  keep  their  memories 
green. 


1  Considerations  upon  the  Am.  Enquiry  (1779),  p.  44. 

2  Hoare's  Memoirs  of  Sharp  (1820),  p.  213. 

3  Boucher's  Causes  and  Consequences  (1797),  p.  557. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  131 


CHAPTER   VIII. 
THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN  ENGLAND,  17T5— 1783. 

FEW  governments  have  been  more  unpopular  than  that 
which  was  in  office  in  England  on  the  eve  of  the  War  of 
Independence.  The  growth  of  royal  power,  the  rise  of 
"the  King's  friends,"  the  decline  of  party  politics,  the 
foolish  resistance  to  the  claims  of  John  Wilkes,  all 
contributed  to  lower  the  dignity  of  the  ministry  in 
British  eyes.  Even  if  the  proposal  to  coerce  America  was 
considered  just,  its  expediency  was  questioned  by  many 
powerful  interests.  Until  the  actual  outbreak  of  war,  the 
trading  centres  and  also  x  the  Irish  were  clearly  in  favour 
of  concession.  Trouble  in  America  affected  their  material 
welfare  by  stopping  commerce,  and  their  political  welfare 
by  encouraging  the  pretensions  of  the  Crown.  2  For  many 
years  after  1765  there  was  continuous  distress  in  London, 
Manchester,  Liverpool,  Birmingham,  Lancaster,  Leeds, 
Hull  and  Glasgow  owing  to  the  colonial  policy  of  non- 
importation, and  each  of  these  places  took  an  active  part 
in  obtaining  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act.  3Even  the 
unpolitical  mind  of  Boswell  deprecated  coercion  in  view 
of  trade  depression.  As  late  as  1775,  4many  merchants 
and  most  Dissenters  were  ardent  for  peace.  Yet,  when 
once  the  idea  of  separation  had  been  mooted,  and  it  was 

1  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.  37. 

2  Annual  Register  (1766),  p.  35;  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  xiv.  pt.  10; 

28,  44—47;  ibid,  Rep.  xv.  pt.  1;  220. 

3  Burke's  Correspondence,  ii.    209. 

4  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    47,  240;  Chatham  Correspondence,  iv.    401. 


132  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

clear  that  the  whole  system  of  governing  the  empire  was 
being  called  in  question,  the  bulk  of  the  nation  rallied 
round  the  ministry.  Incidents  like  Franklin's  publication 
of  the  private  letters  of  Governor  Hutchinson,  which  he 
had  obtained  by  surreptitious  means,  and  the  burning  of 
the  revenue  schooner  Gaspee  by  American  patriots  in  1772 
had  embittered  their  feelings.  That  England  was  dragged 
into  the  war  by  George  III.  is  simply  a  Whig  legend.  His 
fatuity  indeed  was  responsible  for  many  administrative 
follies,  but  in  the  American  War  the  British  case  was 
based  on  far  wider  principles  than  royal  desire.  The  cause 
for  which  the  country  fought  was  identical  with  that 
which  had  triumphed  in  the  Seven  Years'  War.  The  old 
colonial  system  was  dear  to  the  heart  of  the  British  people. 
It  was  rudely  challenged  in  1775,  and  naturally  this 
development  of  what  had  once  been  regarded  as  a  mere 
incident  in  the  growing  conflict  between  George  III.  and 
popular  liberties,  entirely  altered  the  national  outlook. 
In  view  of  the  actual  character  of  English  popular  thought 
during  the  War  of  Independence,  it  is  absurd  to  continue 
to  regard  that  war  as  the  effect  of  only  a  legal  or  con- 
stitutional controversy.  Of  course,  it  suited  George  to 
treat  the  struggle  as  a  "  King's  war,"  because  success  would 
lead  to  his  own  exaltation.  Similarly,  it  was  to  the 
advantage  of  the  Whig  oligarchy  to  treat  it  as  but  a  royal 
entanglement,  for  its  failure  would  liberate  their  political 
world  from  the  danger  of  a  new  despotism.  However,  the 
mass  of  Englishmen  had  no  such  bias,  and  they  showed 
the  true  nature  of  public  opinion  by  their  distinctive 
acceptance  of  the  belief  that  their  own  imperial  theory 
was  the  genuine  cause  of  war. 

Surely  this  is  a  more  reasonable  conclusion  than  the 
inference  so  often  drawn  by  writers  bred  in  Whig  tradi- 
tions, that  the  peers  who  led  the  opposition  retained  the 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  133 

heart  of  England,  in  spite  of  the  country  allowing  itself 
to  drift  into  nine  years  of  conflict.  Surely  there  was  a 
more  national  issue  at  stake  than  the  King's  conception  of 
his  own  dignity.  Burke  was  clearly  no  lover  of  the  war- 
party,  and  so  his  picture  of  British  opinion  in  1775  is 
worth  more  than  that  of  later  day  partisans.  1He  described 
the  people  as  curiously  languid  on  the  great  question  of 
the  time,  without  the  fire  and  jealousy  of  1756.  In  the 
main  however,  they  were  out  of  touch  with  the  Whig 
politicians,  who  tried  to  treat  the  attack  on  the  old 
colonial  system  as  only  an  incident  in  the  struggle  with 
the  Crown.  All  the  opposition  could  do  was  2"to  clog" 
the  war,  a  phrase  hardly  characteristic  of  an  ascendent 
party.  3He  said  that  the  business  class  was  pacified  by 
war  contracts,  and  that  the  ill  effects  of  a  stoppage  in  the 
American  trade  were  obscured  by  a  passing  boom  in  trade 
with  the  north  of  Europe,  and  by  the  demand  for  freights 
and  clothing  for  English  and  Canadian  troops.  That 
demand  was  only  enhanced  in  1776,  when  Paul  Jones 
captured  ten  thousand  uniforms  in  a  vessel  outward  bound 
from  Liverpool.  The  old  Whigs  of  the  commercial  districts 
were  being  lured  towards  the  government  policy  by  4"the 
cadaverous  '  haut  gout '  of  lucrative  war."  After  all,  the 
system  then  fundamentally  assailed  by  America,  was  the 
creation  of  Whig  economists,  and  the  type  of  Whig 
ambitions.  The  Duke  of  Richmond,  most  ardent  pioneer 
of  the  new  Radical  school,  5  admitted  that  merchants  would 
not  support  the  opposition  unless  they  felt  the  pinch  of 
bad  trade.  The  early  interference  of  foreign  powers  gave 

1  Burke's  Correspondence,  ii.     48. 

2  ibid,  ii.    55. 

3  ibid,  ii.    49. 

4  ibid,  ii.    50. 

5  Albemarle's  Rockingham  (1852),  ii.  290. 


134  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

additional  impetus  to  the  process  of  nationalising  the 
struggle.  With  France  and  Spain  in  the  field,  it  was 
impossible  to  ignore  the  difference  between  the  state  of  the 
colonial  question  in  1766  and  its  state  in  1778.  The  new 
French  theory  "  f ree  ships  free  goods"  ran  counter  to 
England's  maritime  code.  The  adherence  of  France,  Spain, 
Holland,  Prussia,  Russia,  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Austria 
in  1780  to  that  theory,  and  to  such  doctrines  as  that  which 
condemned  "  paper  blockades "  as  null,  and  that  which 
limited  the  definition  of  contraband  to  sulphur  and  muni- 
tions of  war,  placed  the  British  version  of  International 
Law  upon  its  defence.  English  successes  increased  the 
popularity  of  the  war;  English  failures  increased  the 
determination  with  which  it  was  waged.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances, we  cannot  wonder  that  such  enlightened  Whig 
leaders  as  Temple  and  Cornwallis  tried  to  strengthen  the 
hands  of  the  government,  although  they  had  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  steps  which  led  to  the  Revolution,  and 
disapproved  of  the  royal  conduct  which  had  hastened  its 
outbreak.  They  joined  in  the  defence  of  a  doomed  cause, 
the  success  of  which  would  not  have  contributed  towards 
the  world's  happiness,  but  none  the  less  we  cannot  speak 
too  highly  of  their  attitude,  for  very  few  statesmen  have 
the  courage  to  bury  partisanship  in  patriotism.  When 
Chatham  deplored  the  policy  which  had  made  1"poor 
England"  fall  upon  her  own  sword,  Temple  answered,  2"I 
am  no  party  to  the  war,  nor  am  I  to  the  causes  of  it,  which 
I  think  my  greatest  happiness ;  but  engaged  as  we  are  in, 
I  think,  a  most  just  cause,  I  cannot  but  wish  victory  to 
dear,  dear  England." 

Thus  men  who  had  doubted  the   government's  policy 
originally,  acquiesced  in  their  management  of  the  war, 

1  Grenville  Papers,  iv.  573. 

2  ibid,  iv.    575. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT   IN   ENGLAND  135 

when  conflict  became  inevitable.  North's  tardy  abandon- 
ment of  the  right  to  tax  the  colonies  in  1778  by  the  statute 
18  Geo.  III.  c.  12,  attracted  other  elements  of  earlier 
opposition  to  the  national  camp.  If  we  have  given  a 
faithful  picture  of  the  old  colonial  system  in  the  chapter 
above,  the  adherence  of  most  Englishmen  to  the  cause  of 
its  maintenance  cannot  excite  surprise.  Their  fatal  blind- 
ness to  its  narrowness  and  impolicy  was  more  foolish  than 
dishonest.  l  Camden,  the  Whig  Lord  Chancellor  of  1766 
and  a  keen  foe  to  the  ministry,  admitted  that  the  landed 
interest  was  on  their  side.  Among  the  gentry,  the  war 
spirit  had  something  of  the  fire  of  earlier  days.  By  means 
of  their  voluntary  offers  to  facilitate  army  manoeuvres 
upon  their  lands,  2  army  cadets  were  enabled  to  encamp  on 
Banstead  Downs  in  1773  and  1774,  and  on  Wimbledon 
Common  in  1775  and  1776.  Rural  sportsmen  were  exhorted 
in  1780  to 

3  Leave  fields  of  pleasure  for  the  fields  of  fame, 
The  foes  of  Britain  are  the  noblest  game." 

4  One  Tory  politician  said  wittily  that  on  the  question  of 
the  day,  the  country  gentlemen  were  "  for  their  country  " ; 
many  of  them,  like  5  Lord  Harrington  and  6  Lord  Sheffield, 
raised  regiments  of  light  dragoons,  or  like  Lord  Kenmure 
and  Sir  Boyle  Roche,  beat  up  recruits  for  the  infantry  by 
dint  of  bounties  and  persuasion.  It  was  clear  that  7the 
land  tax,  which  had  been  reduced  by  Townshend  from  four 
to  three  shillings  in  1767,  in  view  of  the  Revenue  Act  of 

1  Chatham  Correspondence,  iv.    401. 

2  Lewis  LocheVs  Essay  on  Military  Education  (1776),  p.  70. 

3  September,  a  Eural  Poem  (1780),  p.  9. 

4  Malmesbury's  Letters  (ed.  1870),  i.    327. 

5  Cowper's  Letters  (ed.  E.T.S.),  p.  207. 

6  Adeane's  Girlhood  of  M.  J.  Holroyd  (1896),  p.  15. 

7  Stephens'  Memoirs  of  J.  H.  Tooke  (1813),  i.    433. 


136  THE   OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

that  year,  would  remain  at  the  lower  figure  if  the  policy  of 
that  Act  could  be  enforced  against  the  colonies.  Old 
adherents  of  the  Jacobite  cause  had  long  since  drifted  into 
the  Tory  ranks.  Scotland  was  on  1  the  side  of  the  govern- 
ment, while  the  English  Church  was  heartily  loyal.  The 
Anglican  attitude  cannot  cause  wonder,  in  view  of 
American  resistance  to  the  proposed  extension  of  Church 
work  in  the  colonies  and  to  the  suggested  establishment  of 
a  colonial  bishopric. 

The  popularity  of  the  British  cause  was  indeed  far  wider 
than  that  of  a  mere  party  cry.  The  towns  were  as  zealous 
as  the  Tory  centres  in  their  support  of  that  colonial  policy, 
on  which  their  trade  with  America  had  been  built  up. 
In  London  the  corporation  was  hostile  to  the  ministry 
and  refused  to  vote  bounties  for  recruits,  but  2  £20,000  were 
collected  by  voluntary  subscriptions  for  the  raising  of 
troops,  and  Burke  himself  admits  the  3  "  wild  tumult  of 
joy,"  aroused  in  the  capital  on  the  arrival  one  Sunday 
morning  in  November  1777  of  the  news  of  the  capture  of 
Philadelphia.  Birmingham,  which  had  welcomed  the 
repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  in  1766,  was  now  heartily  with 
the  war  party,  whether  or  no  we  care  to  accept  4  Horace 
Walpole's  explanation  that  this  was  due  to  its  being  the 
emporium  of  the  swords  and  muskets  of  the  British  army. 
The  growth  of  the  town  between  1770  and  1790  was 
5  generally  attributed  to  its  profits  during  the  American 
^Revolution.  6Its  annual  output  of  gun  barrels  amounted 
to  sixty  thousand.  As  early  as  September  1775  the  ex- 
Jacobites  of  Manchester  presented  George  III.  with  a 

1  A  Second  Appeal  to  the  Justice  of  Gt.  Britain  (1775),  p.  55. 

2  Annual  Kegister  (1778),  p.  85. 

3  Burke's  Correspondence,  ii.    199. 

4  Seeley's  H.  Walpole  and  his  World,  p.   152. 

5  St.  Fond's  Travels  (1799),  i.    341. 

6  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.,  xv.    pt.  1,  180. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  137 

loyal  address,  l" which  really  gives  me  pleasure,"  wrote 
the  King,  "  as  it  comes  unsolicited."  This  town  was 
thoroughly  Tory  in  its  sympathies,  and  2  as  late  as 
1777  it  celebrated  the  royal  oak  day  of  Charles  II.  It  is 
therefore  not  surprising  to  read  that  it  raised  a  regiment 
of  a  thousand  men  for  service  in  America.  The  feeling  in 
3  Liverpool,  where  a  similar  force  was  raised  voluntarily, 
is  really  more  significant,  as  its  inhabitants  were  not  only 
more  Whig  but  had  also  everything  to  gain  by  reconcilia- 
tion. In  spite  of  the  disastrous  effects  of  the  cessation  of 
colonial  trade  upon  Liverpool  shipping,  4  Burke  told  Fox 
that  its  inhabitants  "  loved  "  the  war,  and  5  Gilbert  Wake- 
field's  congregation  objected  to  his  omission  of  what  he 
called  "  unchristian  words  against  the  Americans "  from 
the  special  prayer  ordered  to  be  used  in  churches  during 
the  war.  6  Bristol,  though  also  affected  by  the  depression 
in  colonial  trade,  voted  the  freedom  of  the  city  to  Lords 
Sandwich  and  Suffolk  in  1777,  although  two  most  eager 
advocates  of  coercion.  7Both  Edinburgh  and  Glasgow 
raised  regiments  at  their  own  expense.  In  fact,  as  8  Gibbon, 
a  very  dispassionate  observer,  remarked,  the  people  in 
general  regarded  the  war  as  their  favourite  incident  in 
politics,  and  as  late  as  March  1781,  we  find  Horace  Walpole 
writing,  9"the  nation  is  more  besotted  and  the  ministry 
more  popular  than  ever."  Beyond  the  narrow  if  brilliant 
circle  of  Whig  debaters,  and  the  small  group  of  Whig 

1  Correspondence  of  Geo.  III.  with  North  (ed.  1867),  i.    267. 

2  Curwen's  Journal  (ed.  1842),  p.  137. 

3  Correspondence  of  Geo.  iii.,  ii.  100. 

4  Russell's  Life  of  Fox,  p.  155. 

5  Wakefield's  Memoirs  (1804),  i.     198. 
«   Russell's  Life  of  Fox,  p.  155. 

7  Hist.  MSS,  Comm.  Rep.  on  Amer.  MSS.,  vol.  i.    187. 

8  Gibbon's  Autobiography,  i.    324;  cf.  Hutchinson's  Diary,  i.    506. 

9  Some  Unpublished  Letters  of  H.  Walpole  (1902),  p.  49. 


138  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

philosophers,  whose  Radical  bent  made  them  dissent 
altogether  from  the  prevailing  faith  in  colonisation,  few 
notable  Englishmen  objected  to  the  war  policy.  William 
Scott,  afterwards  the  great  Lord  Stowell,  but  then  not  even 
called  to  the  bar,  wrote  to  his  relations  at  Newcastle  in 
1777  that  he  and  his  brothers  and  sister  in  London  had 
lamented  luthe  fate  of  the  great  Burgoyne.  We  mingled 
our  tears  for  two  days  together,  being  English  folks  of  the 
old  stamp,  and  retaining  in  spite  of  modern  'patriotism,' 
some  affection  and  reverence  for  the  name  of  England." 
He  added  that  if  the  government  wanted  common  sense, 
its  foes  wanted  common  honesty.  His  younger  brother, 
2  John  Scott,  afterwards  Lord  Eldon,  wrote  in  1775  that 
the  American  contentions  were  bad  in  law,  and  that 
England  had  to  decide  between  conquest  and  separation. 
Neither  of  these  men  had  anything  whatever  to  gain  by 
such  opinions.  Lawyers  like  Mansfield,  whose  judgment 
in  the  leading  case  of  3  Campbell  v.  Hall  is  a  model  of 
sound  constitutional  law,  and  Thurlow,  whose  opinions 
were  always  shrewd,  had  come  unhesitatingly  to  the  same 
conclusion,  and  on  the  bare  legal  aspect  of  the  question 
they  4far  outclassed  the  shallower  Lord  Camden.  Even 
5  Jeremy  Bentham  for  once  favoured  the  contentions  of 
the  government. 

It  is  clear  that  the  support  given  to  the  war  could  only 
increase  when  the  colonial  issue  had  been  complicated  by 
foreign  intervention.  It  was  then  too  late  to  gain  by  con- 
cession, and  a  substantial  number  of  moderate  Whigs 
dissociated  themselves  from  leaders,  who  seemed  mere 

1  Townshend's  Lives  of  the  Judges  (1846),  ii.    291. 

2  H.  Twiss's  Life  of  Eldon  (1844),  i.    98. 

3  Loftt's  Reports,  p.  655. 

4  Nicholl's  Recollections  (1822),  ii.  128. 

5  C.  M.  Atkinson's  Bentham  (1905),  p.  23. 


THE  WAR   SPIRIT   IN   ENGLAND  139 

anti-English  extremists.  Thus  Chatham  himself  allowed 
his  son  to  serve  at  Gibraltar  after  the  outbreak  of  war  with 
France.  1  Arthur  Young,  who  had  nothing  of  Toryism, 
warmly  supported  Lord  Bristol's  proposal  to  purchase  a 
74-gun  ship  by  public  subscription  as  a  gift  to  the  nation, 
and  2  Lady  Sarah  Bunbury,  once  the  object  of  the  King's 
admiration  but  a  thorough  Whig,  wrote  that  in  spite  of 
all  her  sympathies  with  America,  she  could  only  wish  the 
English  soldiers  success  in  the  field.  It  is  indeed  palpable 
that  this  was  the  true  type  of  public  opinion.  In  the  heart 
of  the  country,  men  felt  just  as  they  had  done  fifteen  years 
earlier.  For  once  the  placid  monotony  of  3Cowper's 
letters  from  his  Olney  hermitage  was  broken  by  the  joy 
attendant  on  the  capture  of  Charleston  in  1780.  4The 
strains  of  regimental  music  charmed  even  this  recluse, 
while  busier  men  appreciated  the  more  practical  issues  of 
the  struggle,  and  in  1776  Adam  Smith  closed  "The  Wealth 
of  Nations  "  with  the  advice  that  "  if  any  of  the  provinces 
of  the  British  empire  cannot  be  made  to  contribute  towards 
the  support  of  the  whole  empire,  it  is  surely  time  that 
Great  Britain  should  free  herself  from  the  expense  of 
defending  those  provinces  in  time  of  war,  and  of  support- 
ing any  of  their  civil  or  military  establishments  in  time 
of  peace."  Although  a  strong  Whig  in  politics,  Smith  was 
so  far  satisfied  with  the  American  policy  of  Lord  North  as 
to  accept  the  office  of  Commissioner  of  Customs  in  Scotland 
at  his  hands  in  1777.  Indeed  most  thinkers  of  the  con- 
temporary political  school  believed  that  the  only  alterna- 
tive to  the  policy  of  the  government  was  absolute  separa- 


1  A.  Young's  Autobiography  (ed.  1898),  p.  102. 

2  Life  and  Letters  of  Lady  S.  Lennox,  i.    235,  275. 

3  Cowper's  Letters,  p.  129. 
*  ibid,  p.  208. 


140  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

tion,  and  therefore  all  who  held  that  colonies  were  useful 
sided  with  the  Crown.  l"  I  am  more  and  more  convinced,'' 
wrote  Gibbon  to  Holroyd  in  January  1775,  "that  we  have 
both  the  right  and  the  power  on  our  side,  and  that  we  are 
now  arrived  at  the  decisive  moment  of  preserving  or  of 
losing  for  ever  both  our  trade  and  our  empire."  2He 
doubted  in  fact  whether  Lord  North  would  be  firm  enough, 
and  was  agreeably  surprised  by  the  willingness  of  the 
trading  interests  to  embark  on  the  war. 

Indeed,  indirect  evidence  of  the  spirit  with  which  most 
Englishmen  were  ready  to  fight  for  the  colonial  system  lies 
in  the  shortness  of  the  interval  between  1763  and  1775. 
If  the  national  character  in  the  first  year  was  calculated 
to  sustain  a  war  for  empire,  there  was  no  reason  why  it 
should  have  altered  by  the  second,  in  spite  of  the  evolution 
of  domestic  politics  in  the  interim.  3The  army  itself  was 
Tory,  and  its  belief  in  trade  wars  had  not  declined.  A 
few  Whig  soldiers  may  perhaps  have  feared  the  new 
influence  of  the  "  Nabobs,"  and  distrusted  the  com- 
mercialism of  imperial  theory.  Draper,  the  conqueror  of 
Manila,  for  instance,  had  no  idea  of  the  greatness  of 
dive's  work  in  India,  thought  Grenville's  preference  for 
the  latter  4"very  mortifying,"  and  complained  that  the 
only  way  to  gain  success  was  now  to  be  "  a  most  dirty  dog, 
rob  and  pillage  whenever  I  can."  5Burgoyne  had  a 
similar  dislike  for  Clive  and  had  been  one  of  his  least 
scrupulous  assailants.  However,  among  the  people  no 
such  alienation  from  the  policy  of  trade  wars  is  discover- 


1  Gibbon's  Autobiography,  i.    248. 

2  ibid,  i.    250. 

3  H.  Walpole's  Last  Journal,  ii.    242. 

4  Bedford  Correspondence,  iii.    261-2. 

5  H.  Walpole's  Last  Journal,  i.    207. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  141 

able.     On  the  contrary,  the  ardour  of  1756  reappeared  in 
a  modified  form. 

1"0ur  fame  shall  spread  in  every  distant  shore, 

And  in  new  climes  the  British  lion  roar," 
is  a  characteristic  couplet  from  verses  of  1776,  while  2the 
more  prosaic  press  revelled  in  the  news  of  victories.  In 
Scotland,  regiments  of  a  thousand  men  each  were  raised 
by  the  Gordons  and  Macdonalds,  and  several  companies 
were  raised  by  public-spirited  partisans  in  Wales. 

Rodney  represented  the  best  type  of  the  simple  and 
straightforward  Englishman  of  his  day,  and  though  person- 
ally a  Tory,  there  was  nothing  distinctively  partisan  in  his 
thought  or  character.  He  was  clear  indeed  as  to  the  national 
nature  of  England's  war.  In  his  opinion,  party  jealousy 
lost  us  America.  3  "What  is  it  that  party  and  faction  cannot 
do  ?  "  Like  all  his  fellows,  he  saw  only  the  minor  sources 
of  the  war  and  the  less  vital  reasons  of  its  failure,  but  the 
vigour  and  gaiety  of  his  fighting  spirit  throw  a  glow  of 
fancy  that  we  should  not  like  to  miss,  upon  the  cause  for 
which  the  country  fought.  Brightness  of  touch  and 
genuine  love  of  country  serve  to  redeem  much  bad  political 
science.  In  1780  Rodney's  little  daughter  wrote  to  him 
from  London,  4  "  There  are  a  great  number  of  songs  going 
about  the  streets,  the  chorus  always  being,  '  Brave  Rodney 
for  ever.'  Such  rhymes  I  never  saw,  and  if  they  were  not 
about  you,  I  am  sure  I  should  not  have  the  patience  to 
read  them."  5  Rodney  told  her  in  return,  after  his  victory 
over  Grasse,  that  he  had  captured  four  admirals  within  the 
last  two  years,  two  Spanish,  one  French,  and  one  Dutch. 

1  T.  Maurice's  Hagley  (1776),  p.  41. 

2  Cowper's  Letters,  p.  212. 

3  Mundy's  Kodney  (1830),  ii.    329. 

4  ibid,  i.    263. 

5  ibid,  ii.    225. 


142  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

It  is  noteworthy  that  Hhe  Dissenters  were  from  the 
first,  lukewarm  in  their  support  of  the  opposition.  They 
had  little  in  common  with  the  great  Whig  families,  beyond 
a  distrust  of  the  Crown.  It  is  true  that  2the  impolicy, 
which  drove  six  Methodists  from  St.  Edmund  Hall  at 
Oxford  in  1768  was  not  likely  to  attract  their  co-religionists 
towards  Lords  North's  party,  and  in  Priestley  and  Price, 
Franklin  found  two  learned  allies  of  considerable  weight. 
The  former  was  then  minister  of  Mill  Hill  Chapel,  Leeds, 
and  3  his  appeal  to  Dissenters  to  oppose  the  government 
met  with  some  success.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were 
strongest  in  number  in  those  trading  districts  where 
prosperity  was  most  affected  by  the  methods  of  reprisal 
adopted  in  America.  The  threatened  stoppage  of  colonial 
traffic  naturally  estranged  them  from  the  revolutionary 
doctrines.  Hence  their  readiness  to  believe  in  the  then 
orthodox  theory  of  empire,  expounded  by  John  Wesley. 
This  great  man's  exposition  of  the  English  view  of  the  war 
deserves  a  far  wider  fame  than  it  now  enjoys.  If  we 
really  want  to  understand  the  British  standpoint,  and  to 
see  how  naturally  and  inevitably  the  war  spirit  of  1TT5 
evolved  from  the  current  colonial  system,  we  have  only  to 
read  4  Wesley's  eloquent  tracts.  5The  Dartmouth  papers, 
disclosed  by  the  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission, 
reveal  that  he  had  at  one  time  inclined  to  favour  the 
Americans.  In  June  1775  he  wrote  passionately  to  Lord 
Dartmouth  to  abstain  from  the  use  of  force  and  to 
remember  Philip  II  and  Charles  I.  However  as  "  an  High 
Churchman  and  the  son  of  an  High  Churchman,  bred  up 

l  Russell's  Life  of  Fox,  i.     156. 

2BoswelPs  Johnson   (ed.   1896),  iii.   44;    Hist.   MSS.   Comm.   Rep.   xv. 
pt.  1;  187. 

3  Priestley's  Memoirs  (1806),  pp.  149,  457. 

4  See  Malmesbury's  Letters,  i.    328. 

5  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Report  xi. ;  part  v.,  379. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  143 

from  my  childhood  in  the  highest  notions  of  passive 
obedience  and  non-resistance,"  he  soon  came  back  to  the 
orthodox  fold,  and  in  his  "  Calm  Address  to  the  American 
Colonies,"  he  explained  that  emigration  had  modified  the 
original  rights  of  British  settlers,  by  reducing  them  to 
1the  innumerable  multitude  that  have  no  votes."  There 
was  no  hardship  in  that ;  every  colonist  was  suffered  to  live 
undisturbed.  The  question  of  representation  was  dealt 
with  in  "  Observations  on  Liberty,"  which  defended  exist- 
ing constitutional  anomalies.  The  "  Calm  Address  to  the 
Inhabitants  of  England,"  was  a  far  warmer  appeal  to  the 
country  to  avenge  2the  burning  and  devastation  by  the 
enemy  of  loyalists'  property  and  lands  in  America. 
Wesley  spoke  particularly  to  those  3"who  are  vulgarly 
called  Methodists,"  and  asked  for  a  continuance  of  such 
prayer  and  fasting,  as  had  just  effected  the  expulsion  of 
the  rebels  from  New  York  and  Rhode  Island.  "  I  believe 
Americans  cannot  fight,  for  the  hand  of  God  is  upon 
them."  His  subsequent  "  Serious  Address "  is  a  protest 
against  pessimism.  His  arguments,  and  those  of  his  friend 
Fletcher  in  "  The  Bible  and  Sword  "  were  probably  more 
effective  than  the  "Constitutional  Answer"  of  Caleb 
Evans,  and  the  "  Second  Answer  of  W.D."  in  winning  over 
Whig  Dissenters.  Many  of  them  had  always  believed  in 
the  commercial  ideas  of  the  government.  The  more 
extreme  Whigs,  who  disliked  Wesley  as  4"a  declared 
enemy  of  civil  and  religious  liberty,"  found  solace  in 
abuse.  In  the  scurrilous  satire  of  "  The  Saints,"  he  was 
described  as 

5 "  Beating  his  drum  for  murderers  to  enlist," 

1  Calm  Address,  p.  8. 

2  Calm  Address  to  the  Inhabitants  etc.,  p.  21. 

3  ibid,  p.  13. 

4  Constitutional  Answer  to  Wesley's  Calm  Address  (1775),  p.  3. 

5  The  Saints  (1778),  p.  23. 


144  THE   OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

and  he  was  said  to  "  inflame  intestine  broils," 

1  "And  spread  destruction  in  his  Saviour's  name." 
In  prose  he  figured  as  2"a  low  and  puny  tadpole  in 
divinity,"  and  in  caricature  he  was  quaintly  pictured  as 
an  old  fox  dressed  in  clerical  attire  and  tarred  and 
feathered,  but  he  won  the  day  nevertheless  against  his 
more  republican  co-religionists,  and  made  Methodism  a 
conservative  force  in  British  politics.  He  made  the  lower 
middle  class  adherents  of  the  established  order  in  political 
life,  and  left  them  no  spark  of  sympathy  with  the  fiery 
theorists  who  were  leading  New  England  to  rebellion. 

Thus  until  the  war  reached  a  stage  of  absolute  hopeless- 
ness, the  country  supported  the  ministry,  and  the  frequent 
superiority  of  the  opposition  in  Parliament,  both  in  wit 
and  intellect,  does  not  attest  to  any  such  ascendency  out- 
side Westminster.  The  general  belief  in  the  perfection  of 
the  old  colonial  system  was  so  great  that  any  other  national 
outlook  at  this  crisis  would  have  been  extraordinary  and 
unnatural.  The  country  hated  the  rebels,  and  despised  the 
French,  and  when  3  Noailles,  the  French  ambassador  passed 
through  the  streets  of  Canterbury  with  his  wife  on  their 
homeward  journey  in  1778,  the  mob  pelted  them  both, 
conduct  which  Gibbon  coolly  describes  as  4"  some  slight 
expressions  of  ill  humour  from  John  Bull."  In  America, 
there  had  been  an  impression  that  the  Whig  nobles  were 
powerful  enough  to  raise  a  rebellion  in  the  event  of  royal 
policy  causing  a  breach  with  the  colonies,  but  men  who 
had  no  sympathy  with  that  policy  soon  realised  the 
absurdity  of  this  illusion.  Samuel  Curwen,  an  American 
judge  of  admiralty,  whose  moderate  politics  led  him  to 

1  ibid,  p.  24. 

2  An  Old  Fox  Tarred    etc.,  by  an  Hanoverian  (1775). 

3  H.  Walpole's  Last  Journal,  ii.    243 

4  Gibbon's  Autobiography,  i.    333. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  145 

live  in  England  in  1775,  1  described  the  manufacturers  as 
being  so  busy  that  they  had  no  regret  at  the  stoppage  of 
orders  from  the  colonies. 

These  considerations  point  to  the  conclusion  that 
George  Ill's  personal  influence  on  the  war  has  been  often 
exaggerated.  This  reasoning  applies  most  to  events  after 
the  skirmish  at  Lexington,  as  undoubtedly  the  steps 
actually  leading  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  owed 
much  of  their  disastrous  sting  to  the  King's  own  hand.  All 
that  can  be  said  is  that  his  personal  desires  hastened  an  in- 
evitable tendency,  and  made  the  chance  of  a  temporary 
armistice  between  two  incompatible  theories  impossible. 
He  had  none  of  the  scruples  which  troubled  sensitive 
Britons,  and  said  he  would  2"  as  lief  fight  the  Bostonians 
as  the  French."  He  wrote  to  Lord  Dartmouth,  the 
Secretary  of  the  Colonial  Department  in  1775,  that  3"as 
the  rebels  have  got  Indians  to  their  assistance,  we  must 
make  use  of  the  same  desperate  weapons."  He  had  a 
genuine  belief  in  the  virtue  of  the  war;  his  love  of  his 
soldiery  was  remarkably  sincere,  and  he  waived  the  con- 
temporary dignity  of  kingship  when  4he  took  off  his  hat 
to  the  Guards  paraded  on  Wimbledon  Common  in  1776. 
When  he  said,  "the  die  is  cast;  the  colonies  must  either 
triumph  or  submit,"  he  expressed  a  joy,  which  was  not 
less  patriotic  because  it  happened  to  be  utterly  misguided. 
He  could  see  no  honesty  in  the  opposition  to  the  war. 
6 "Thank  God,"  he  wrote  of  Chatham  to  Lord  North,  "the 
nation  does  not  see  the  unhappy  contest  through  his 
mirour"  (sic).  Similarly,  6Anthony  Storer,  one  of  his 

1  Curwen's  Journal  and  Letters  (ed.  1842),  i.    35. 

2  H.  Walpole's  Last  Journal,  i.    366. 

3  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.    xi.  j  pt.  5,  440. 

4  Walpole's  Last  Journal,  ii.  3. 

5  Correspondence  of  Geo.  III.  with  North,  ii.    70. 

6  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Eep.    xv. ;  pt.  6,  317-8. 


146  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

cleverest  supporters,  wrote  of  Fox,  "I  stayed  tete  a  tete 
with  Charles  till  four.  His  ideas,  if  they  are  his  real  ones, 
almost  make  me  think  that  he  is  mad.  I  must  have  per- 
fectly lost  the  use  of  my  eyes  before  I  could  be  made  to 
fancy  things  as  he  represents  them."  In  the  narrower 
mind  of  George  III.  such  criticisms  tended  to  become  wild 
fanaticism.  He  played  aa  pitiful  part  when  he  said  that 
he  deemed  the  country's  demonstrations  of  regret  on 
Chatham's  death  "  offensive  measures  to  me  personally." 
Nevertheless  in  his  meanest,  as  well  as  in  his  bravest 
moments,  he  was  convinced  both  of  the  justice  and  the 
necessity  of  his  war.  In  view  of  the  2opinion  of  such  a 
competent  judge  as  Hutchinson  upon  the  perfection  of  the 
King's  knowledge  of  American  affairs,  it  is  idle  to  treat  his 
attitude  as  blind  and  thoughtless.  However  much  we  may 
deprecate  his  obstinacy  we  cannot  question  the  earnestness 
with  which  he  faced  the  problem  of  the  day.  He  had 
always  wished  to  develope  the  colonies,  and  in  1763  he 
gave  personal  instructions  to  Governor  Murray  to  lay  out 
townships  for  possible  English  emigrants  to  Canada,  who 
were  to  be  provided  with  clergy  and  schoolmasters.  As  an 
enthusiast  in  his  own  narrow  but  fervid  creed  of 
imperialism,  he  did  not  flinch  after  Saratoga,  and  thought 
those  who  wished  to  relax  the  national  efforts  were  3  "  lost 
to  all  ideas  of  self-importance."  4It  was  said  that  the 
Court  resounded  with  "delenda  est  Carthago"  after  that 
reverse.  When  the  ill  news  of  Yorktown  was  brought 
from  Falmouth  to  Pall  Mall  5  "on  Sunday  the  25th 
November  (178.1)  about  noon,"  even  the  cool  and  patient 

1  Russell's  Life  of  Fox,  p.  190. 

2  Hutchinson's  Diary  (ed.  1883),  i.    159. 

3  Correspondence  of  Geo.  III.  with  North,  ii.    310. 

4  Curwen's  Journal,  p.  160. 

5  Wraxall's  Memoirs  (1818),  ii.    433. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  147 

North  lost  his  balance.  He  took  the  news,  says  x  Wraxall, 
"  like  a  ball  in  his  breast,"  and  gave  way  to  the  inevitable 
at  last.  "  Oh  God,  it  is  all  over !  "  George  III.  was  made 
of  different  metal.  Three  days  later,  we  find  him  writing 
to  his  pliant  Prime  Minister,  2"  Many  men  chuse  rather 
to  despond  on  difficulties  than  see  how  to  get  out  of  them. 
A  good  end  may  yet  be  made  of  the  war."  It  was  then  so 
evident  that  the  old  colonial  system  could  never  be  re- 
asserted, that  perhaps  George's  optimism  does  little  credit 
to  his  head,  but  on  the  other  hand,  his  point  of  view  is 
quite  characteristic  of  the  British  people,  and  is  one  of 
which  it  has  often  been  proud.  He  and  his  followers  hoped 
to  see  England  emerge  victorious  from  the  dark  days  of 
blunder  and  defeat.  They  had  no  notion  that  America 
was  fighting  for  any  principle  beyond  that  of  a  selfish 
immunity  from  imperial  obligations,  and  were  oblivious 
to  the  moral  issues  which  the  colonists  believed  to  be 
involved.  A  Scotchman  is  said  to  have  pointed  to  some 
American  prisoners  and  remarked  to  a  Frenchman,  3  "  You 
fought  for  your  master,  I  for  mine;  but  for  whom  were 
these  men  fighting?" 

It  is  possible  also  that  some  high-minded  men  may  have 
been  attracted  towards  the  royal  policy  by  the  frequent 
lapses  of  the  colonists  from  their  high  ideal  of  freedom. 
Paine  and  Jefferson  were  pioneers  of  the  tendency  to  make 
war  upon  all  law-abiding  society,  and  side  by  side  with 
the  true  patriots  of  the  Revolution  were  to  be  found  many 
of  those  bad  men,  who  are  always  thrown  to  the  surface  by 
great  national  uprisings.  These  persons  were  principally 
responsible  for  the  dreadful  treatment  of  the  loyalists,  and 
their  views  on  persecution  infected  even  Washington. 

1  ibid,  ii.    435. 

2  Correspondence  of  Geo.  III.  with  North,  ii.    392. 

3  Lauzun's  Memoirs  (1896),  ii.  216. 


148  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

Their  attitude  towards  the  French  Catholics  of  Canada 
makes  it  also  impossible  in  practice  to  identify  the  colonial 
cause  with  the  toleration  it  purported  to  embrace.  The 
New  Englanders,  whose  Puritanism  was  still  the  un- 
quenchable bigotry  of  1629,  hated  the  British  policy  of 
winning  the  loyalty  of  a  conquered  race  by  the  gift  of 
liberty  to  retain  an  established  religion  and  law.  lu  Since 
they  have  the  Catholic  religion  established  among  them, 
and  are  even  allowed  a  Popish  bishop  in  the  British 
dominions  with  the  French  language  and  customs,  we 
cannot  suppose  that  they  will  ever  become  Englishmen  or 
true  subjects  of  Britain,"  was  the  complaint  of  an  American 
pamphleteer,  who  probably  felt  the  additional  local 
grievance  of  the  annexation  to  Quebec  of  the  undeveloped 
lands  north-west  of  the  Ohio.  With  less  genuine  fear, 
English  Whigs  like  Chatham,  Burke,  Camden,  Savile, 
Horace  Walpole,  and  Barre,  opposed  the  tolerant  Quebec 
Act  of  1774,  which  simply  carried  out  a  pledge  given  in 
article  4  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1763,  and  which  was 
amply  justified  by  North  as  being  2"  thought  better  cal- 
culated to  secure  the  happiness  of  the  Canadians."  The 
Act  secured  Canadian  loyalty  to  England  for  half  a 
century,  and  though  its  details  were  very  open  to  criticism, 
its  spirit  was  certainly  more  liberal  than  that  of  the  policy 
advocated  by  the  usual  preachers  of  freedom.  To  describe 
it  as  3" calculated  for  tyrannical  purposes"  was  unjust. 
In  the  heat  of  the  war,  Richard  Price,  the  Whig 
philosopher,  abused  the  government  for  availing  them- 
selves of  the  services  of  4 "'  French  Papists  from  Canada/' 
but  their  loyalty  at  the  time  of  Montgomery  and  Arnold's 

1  Present  State  of  Great  Britain  and  N.  America,  p.  326. 

2  Debates  of  the  House  of  Commons  in  1774  (ed.  Wright,  1839),  p.  11. 

3  Considerations  on  the  Provisional  Treaty  with  America  (1783),  p.  36. 

4  Price's  Observations  on  Civil  Liberty  (1776),  p.  94. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  149 

invasion  must  surely  have  given  most  Englishmen  of  the 
day  a  far  different  and  more  exhilarating  impression.  The 
best  side  of  the  old  colonial  system  is  brought  out  by  Hhe 
difficulty  experienced  by  Washington's  French  Canadian 
friends  to  raise  more  than  a  handful  of  troops  for  the 
American  cause  in  spite  of  2his  attempt  to  conciliate  them 
by  forbidding  his  army  to  burn  the  Pope's  effigy  on  Guy 
Fawkes'  day,  1775.  3The  parish  priests  and  the  seigneurs 
had  been  won  for  Britain  by  the  Quebec  Act. 

So  far  as  ardent  Whigs  were  concerned,  the  war  must 
have  raised  in  many  cases  the  difficult  and  much  contested 
question  as  to  the  rival  claims  of  country  and  conscience. 
Allowing  for  the  prejudices  of  bitter  partisanship,  there 
must  still  have  been  a  large  element  in  the  Whig  ranks 
who  hated  the  blunders  that  culminated  in  conflict,  and 
4  the  tendency  of  the  Crown  to  use  national  enthusiasm 
for  its  own  despotic  purposes.  In  these  instances,  con- 
demnation of  the  war  can  only  have  been  whole-hearted 
and  sincere.  The  moral  sense  of  mankind  has  hardly 
determined  even  yet  whether  "my  country,  right  or 
wrong,"  is  a  proper  principle  for  the  guidance  of  such 
thinkers,  or  whether  it  were  better  to  run  counter  to  the 
dearest  wishes  of  the  majority  of  our  compatriots  for  the 
sake  of  what  appears  right.  The  problem,  was  then  as 
painful  as  ever,  and  the  interference  of  France  with  the 
avowed  object  of  avenging  her  losses  of  1763  complicated 
its  difficulty.  A  certain  number  of  the  Whigs  whom  it 
perplexed  then  rallied  to  the  government, but  the  majority 
preferred  to  follow  the  example  of  Chatham  and  Burke, 
and  to  make  no  terms  with  the  government.  Probably 

1  Washington's  Official  Correspondence  (1795),  i.    12. 

2  Sparks  Washington,  iii.     144. 

3  Canadian  Freeholder  (1777),  i.    14. 

4  J.  Burgh's  Political  Disquisitions  (1774),  ii.    276. 


150  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

many  of  the  Whig  nohles  and  a  small  element  in  the  great 
towns  honestly  dreaded  both  the  moral  and  the  commercial 
effects  of  alienating  luthe  brave  Americans,"  and  fancied 
that  the  war  would  destroy  2  one-third  of  the  country's 
trade.  Furthermore,  the  conduct  of  George  III.  had  done 
much  to  give  the  war  a  partisan  colour,  which  was  not  its 
natural  guise,  but  which  was  none  the  less  effective  in 
enabling  the  Whigs  to  disclaim  the  slur  arising  from  lack 
of  patriotism.  They  alleged  that  3just  as  Chatham  had 
conquered  America  in  Germany,  so  the  government  was 
now  trying  to  conquer  Great  Britain  in  America.  The 
political  conditions  of  England  were  then  most  unfavour- 
able to  more  disinterested  action,  and  the  chiefs  of  the 
opposition  happened  to  be  aristocrats,  whose  lives  had 
never  come  in  touch  with  the  aspirations  upon  which  wars 
of  trade  were  built,  and  colonial  restrictions  founded.  It 
was  satisfactory  to  them  to  treat  the  revolt  against  the 
existing  English  theory  of  empire  as  a  rising  against  royal 
tyranny  and  Tory  incompetence.  They  were  cheerfully 
indifferent  to  its  effects  on  Greater  Britain.  Thus  Horace 
Walpole  looked  forward  complacently  to  the  country's 
mouldering  again  4"into  our  insignificant  islandhood," 
and  indeed,  5  but  for  the  fierce  rivalry  between  the  opposi- 
tion faction  under  Buckingham,  Burke  and  Fox,  and  that 
under  Shelburne,  the  ministry  could  hardly  have  survived 
so  long. 

The  peace  party  contained  all  the  ablest  parliamentary 
speakers    of    the    day    except    Mansfield,    Thurlow    and 

1  A  Full  Examination  of  Wesley's  Address  by  a  Friend  to  the  People 

(1775),  pp.  3,  15. 

2  Price's  Observations  on  Civil  Liberty  (1776),  p.  85. 

3  Essay  on  Patriotism  (1768),  p.  11. 

4  Seeley's  H.  Walpole  and  his  World,  p.  154. 

5  Nicholls'  Recollections,  i.  296. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  151 

Wedderburn,  and  the  war  spirit  rarely  shone  brightly  in 
debate.  We  cannot  be  surprised  that  Tories  who  disliked 
abstract  rhetoric  on  constitutional  government,  found  the 
speeches  of  Burke  and  Barre  1 "  immoderately  long,"  and 
2  alleged  that  the  former's  diffuse  and  emotional  oratory 
reminded  them  of  Drury  Lane.  The  Whig  advocates  of 
peace  at  any  price  grew  stronger  as  the  struggle  became 
more  and  more  exhausting,  and  as  the  drain  upon  the 
country's  resources  began  to  lead  to  undiscriminating  and 
disastrous  outdoor  relief;  ultimately  they  wore  down  the 
voting  strength  of  the  ministry  as  well  as  its  power  of 
argument.  It  must  however  be  admitted  that  in  many 
cases  their  policy  was  coloured  by  unscrupulous  oppor- 
tunism, and  had  nothing  of  the  sincerity  or  idealism  of 
Burke.  Wedderburn  may  have  been  a  selfish  time-server 
himself,  but  assuredly  he  spoke  the  truth  when  he  said  of 
the  Whigs  after  Cornwallis'  surrender,  3"  It  is  strange  they 
should  never  have  learnt  that  to  show  exultation  in  a 
public  calamity  makes  them  odious,  and  aids  those  they  are 
attacking."  In  the  darkest  hours  of  the  war,  Fox  never 
ceased  to  denounce  the  cause  for  which  Great  Britain  was 
contending,  and  we  cannot  easily  respect  an  English 
statesman,  who  said  4he  heard  the  news  of  Saratoga  and 
Yorktown  with  delight.  His  hate  was  so  great  that  every 
British  success  dismayed  him  in  the  same  way  as  an  un- 
fortunate division  in  the  House.  5"  Whatever  happens," 
he  wrote  after  the  American  disasters  of  June  1776,  "let 
us  all  resolve  to  stick  by  them  as  handsomely  (or  more  so) 
in  their  adversity  as  we  have  done  in  their  glory,"  and  he 

1  Malmesbury's  Letters,  i.    327. 

2  ibid,  i.    321,  396. 

3  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Hep.,  xv. ;  pt.  6,  539. 

4  Gibbon's  Autobiography,  ii.    320  (note). 

5  Fox's  Memoirs,  i.    143. 


152  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

alluded  to  the  tidings  of  Howe's  victory  in  Long  Island  as 
l" terrible  news."  2Shelburne  affected  to  consider  the 
numerous  voluntary  gifts  of  a  military  nature,  which  were 
made  to  the  government,  dangerous  and  unconstitutional, 
and  was  quite  willing  that  3the  sun  of  Britain  should  set 
for  ever  in  the  west. 

We  have  seen  above  that  the  country  in  general  sided 
with  the  war  policy,  but  the  violence  of  these  Whig 
politicians  was  reflected  in  the  conduct  of  their  supporters, 
and  there  are  few  English  struggles  in  which  the  peace 
party  have  made  a  greater  show  of  opposition.  It  had 
such  distinguished  models  as  Chatham  and  Burke,  Camden 
and  Fox,  while  the  ministry  included  unpopular  leaders  of 
doubtful  worth  like  Germain  and  Sandwich.  Lord  Pitt, 
Chatham's  eldest  son,  had  been  serving  as  aide-de-camp  to 
Carleton  in  Canada  since  1773,  but  4he  was  made  by  his 
father  to  stand  idle  from  1776  to  1778,  an  example  followed 
by  Lord  Effingham,  by  Watson  and  Wilson  (two  members 
of  the  Irish  Parliament)  and  by  a  handful  of  other 
enthusiasts.  Granville  Sharp,  the  high-minded  apostle  of 
slave  emancipation,  5  threw  up  his  post  in  the  Ordnance 
Office.  In  1776  Home  Tooke,  an  extreme  Whig  much 
disliked  by  Doctor  Johnson,  collected  £100  at  a  meeting 
of  the  Constitutional  Society  in  the  King's  Arms  Tavern, 
Cornhill,  for  6  "  the  relief  of  the  widows,  orphans,  and  aged 
parents  of  our  beloved  American  subjects,  inhumanly 
murdered  by  the  King's  troops  at  or  near  Lexington  and 

1  ibid,  i.    145. 

2  Fitzmaurice's  Shelburne  (1875),  iii.  13. 

3  Considerations  upon  the  Am.  Enquiry  (1779),  p.  53. 

4  Soulavie,  Memoires   (ed.   1801)   iii.   390;   Chatham  Correspondence  iv. 

292,  420. 

5  Hoare's  Memoirs  of  G.  Sharp  (1820),  p.  126. 

6  Henry  Cowper's  Reports,  ii.     672. 


THE  WAR  SPIRIT  IN   ENGLAND  153 

Concord  in  the  province  of  Massachusetts."  x  He  was 
sentenced  to  a  year's  imprisonment  and  a  fine  of  £200. 
Such  extraordinary  animus  against  the  ministerial  policy 
was  the  common  characteristic  of  all  who  remained  on  the 
side  of  the  opposition,  and  who  were  wittily  described  as 
2  "  the  Americans  in  our  house."  Sir  William  Jones  could 
only  refer  to  the  struggle  as  3"this  abominable  war." 
Party  hack  writers  like  "  Malcolm  Macgregor "  asked 
America  sarcastically  to 

4  "Toast  peace  and  plenty  to  their  mother  nation, 
Give  three  huzzas  to  George  and  to  taxation, 
And  beg,  to  make  their  loyal  hearts  the  lighter, 
He'll  send  them  o'er  Dean  Tucker  with  a  mitre." 

It  will  be  seen  later  why  Tucker  was  thus  pilloried. 

The  vigour  of  the  minority  was  a  great  injury  to  govern- 
ment efficiency.  Home  Tooke,  Priestley,  Price  and 
Hartley  were  almost  more  American  than  the  Americans, 
while  the  Whig  corporation  of  London  conferred  the 
freedom  of  the  city  upon  Price  for  his  "  Observations  on 
Civil  Liberty,"  of  which  sixty  thousand  copies  were  sold 
in  1776.  5  Behind  the  dialectics  of  tracts  such  as  these 
"Observations"  and  the  "Facts"  of  Price  and  Home  Tooke, 
was  the  cold  and  clever  master  mind  of  Shelburne.  The 
ministry  on  the  other  hand  had  few  capable  organisers  on 
whom  to  rely,  and  Lord  George  Germain,  though  6  an  able 
man  with  sound  views  on  7  tactics,  had  too  bad  a  reputa- 
tion to  act  successfully  as  Secretary  of  the  Colonial  Depart- 

1  ibid,  ii.    681. 

2  Malmesbury's  Letters,  i.    328. 

3  Teignmouth's  Memoirs  of  Sir  Wm.  Jones  (1806),  i.    416. 

4  Epistle  to  Dr.  Shebbeare  (1777),  p.   10. 

5  Stephens'  Memoirs  of  J.  H.  Tooke  (1813),  ii.    24. 

6  Nicholls'  Eecollections,  i.    35. 

7  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.    ix. ;  pt.  3,  83. 


154  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

merit  of  the  Board  of  Trade.  1  "The  ghost  of  Minden" 
hung  for  ever  on  his  shoulders.  Consequently  plans  of 
campaign  were  always  impeded.  In  1778  a  wrangle 
between  the  Whig  Admiral  Keppel  and  the  Tory  Yice- 
Admiral  Palliser  developed  into  a  heated  counter- 
agitation  at  home,  and  paralysed  naval  warfare  for  months. 
The  opposition  leaders  were  resolved  to  reverse  the  govern- 
ment policy  completely  as  soon  as  fortune  smiled  upon 
them,  and  thus  E/odney  was  rewarded  for  his  glorious 
victory  over  Grasse  in  April  1782  by  being  displaced  by 
Pigot,  a  Whig  Lord  of  Admiralty.  The  French  writer, 

2  Soulavie    justly  attributed  the  government's  difficulty  in 
raising  troops  to  such  pernicious  party  feeling,  and  John 
Wesley's  remark  that  colonial  resistance  was  helped  by 
Whig   sympathy   in   England     was   accepted   as   true   by 
admirers  of  the  politicians,  whom  he  attacked.     Just  as 
Napoleon    and  in  a  later  age  the  Boers    looked  hopefully 
to   the   British   Opposition   to   defeat   the   policy   of   the 
government  in  office,  so  some  of  the  acutest  intellects  in 
Europe  and  America  expected  co-operation  with  a  large 
party  in  this  country,   and  saw  in  the   Gordon  Riots  a 

3  symptom  of  sympathetic  revolution.  ^Indeed  the  whole 
character  of  British  politics  during  the  War  of  Independ- 
ence illustrates  the  unfortunate  influence  of  faction  upon 
a  country's  activity.     The  old  colonial  system  proved  no 
rallying  point  for  the  nation.     One  of  its  worst  faults  was 
a  complete  want  of  that  idealism,  which  alone  can  unite  a 
whole  people  in  the  hour  of  need,  and  before  which  party 
jealousies  roll  away  like  mists  before  sunshine.     It  failed 
wholly  to  inspire  a  national  conviction  that  justice  was  on 
the  side  of  the  British  arms,  y 

1  ibid,  Itep.  xv. ;  pt.  6,  311. 

2  Soulavie,  Memoires,  iii.  360-1. 

3  Paston's  Little  Memoirs  (1901),  p.  93. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  155 


CHAPTER    IX. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 

IN  view  of  of  the  militant  character  of  the  old  colonial 
system,  the  inadequate  nature  of  the  forces  intended  to 
maintain  it  is  remarkable.  A  policy,  which  aimed  at 
monopoly  and  expansion,  could  only  be  carried  into  effect 
by  the  sword,  and  yet  the  defences  of  the  empire  were 
puny  and  precarious  in  time  of  peace,  and  quite  insufficient 
in  time  of  war.  This  defect  in  the  practical  side  of 
England's  commercial  militarism  was  largely  due  to  the 
old  dread  of  a  standing  army,  which  had  been  perpetuated 
by  Tory  policy  under  Anne,  and  Whig  policy  under 
Walpole,  and  had  even  outlived  the  victories  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War. 

1  In  1733  it  was  asked  whether  an  excise  or  an  army  was 
the  worse  abuse,  while  in  1742  2 David  Hume  considered 
a  standing  army  as  "  a  mortal  distemper  in  the  British 
government,"  and  "  Opposition  not  Faction,"  a  tract  of 
1743,  described  it  as  3"  dreadful  and  dangerous."  Walpole 
preferred  that  creed  to  one  which  might  sacrifice  economy, 
and  his  Tory  opponent,  Shippen  denounced  the  army 
yearly  in  what  he  called  his  4 "  anniversary  oration." 
5  A  Whig  bishop  described  a  standing  force  in  1763  as  a 

1  Appeal  to  Landowners  (1733),  p.  15. 

2  Hume's  Essays  (ed.  1903),  p.  513. 

3  Opposition  not  Faction  (1743),  p.  61. 

4  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xi.    250. 

5  Butler's  Serious  Consultations  (1763),  pp.  15,  16,  20. 


156  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

prop  of  royal  despotism  and  a  haven  for  Scottish 
adventurers,  and  in  1770  when  England  possessed  only 
20,000  soldiers  and  30,000  militia,  ^ord  Chesterfield  re- 
gretted the  existence  of  the  latter  force  as  being  "full  as 
dangerous  to  the  constitution"  as  the  former.  In  1774  a 
writer  called  Burgh  told  2how  soldiers  had  destroyed 
freedom  in  Holland,  Sweden  and  Turkey,  and  quoted 
3  Carteret  and  Chesterfield  in  support  of  the  inference  that 
the  country  needed  no  other  defenders  than  the  militia. 
In  1775  4a  Whig  pamphleteer  protested  against  increasing 
the  resources  of  the  Crown  by  transforming  labourers  out 
of  work  into  soldiers  and  sailors.  In  1784  Stevens'  popular 
lecture  on  "  heads  "  styled  the  army  the  5  "  caterpillars  of 
the  nation,"  and  in  1786  Thomas  Seddon,  minister  of 
Stretford,  warned  his  readers  against  its  6  "  duellists  and 
macaronis."  Such  fears  were  perhaps  not  wholly  ground- 
less at  a  time  when  the  rights  of  the  executive  had  not  yet 
been  fully  reconciled  with  parliamentary  sovereignly  by 
the  growth  of  the  cabinet  system. 

Consequently,  the  army  was  always  neglected,  even  when 
a  passing  wave  of  imperial  sentiment  did  something  for 
7  the  sister  service.  It  was  debated  in  81748  whether  15,000 
or  18,800,  and  in  91752  whether  16,000  or  20,000  would  be 
its  most  proper  size.  Even  in  1759  its  numbers  were  kept 
down  in  order  to  encourage  the  more  10 "  constitutional 

1  Chesterfield's  Letters  to  Faulkner    etc.   (1777),  p.  17. 

2  Burgh's  Political  Disquisitions  (1774),  ii.    370. 

3  ibid,  ii.    448,  451. 

4  Short  Tour  in  the  Midland  Counties  (1775),  p.  33. 

5  Stevens'  Lecture  (1784),  p.  26. 

6  Seddon's  Letters  to  an  Officer  in  the  Army  (1786),  pp.  225,  227. 

7  The  Politics  on  Both  Sides  (1734),  p.  71. 

8  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xiv.    1087. 

9  A  Treatise  concerning  the  Militia  (1752),  p.  11. 
10  Gibbon's  Autobiography,  i.    181-2. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  157 

force,"  the  militia.  In  spite  of  the  systematic  use  of  the 
press,  recruiting  was  extraordinarily  difficult.  The 
limitation  of  recruiting  to  Protestants  made  l  Ireland  a 
most  barren  field  for  the  recruiting  sergeant,  while  in  the 
summer  of  1775,  only  four  hundred  men  enlisted  in 
England.  Though  soldiers  were  2 better  paid  than  in 
France,  the  vocations  just  opened  by  the  industrial  revolu- 
tion were  far  more  lucrative,  and  already  the  factory 
system  was  drawing  recruits  from  the  country  districts, 
which  might  have  sent  thousands  to  the  army.  Arkwright's 
mill  had  been  built  at  Cromford  near  Derby  in  1770,  and 
within  twenty  years,  one  hundred  and  fifty  cotton  spinning 
factories  were  established  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Manchester.  Mining  industries  were  progressing  with 
equal  rapidity,  and  in  1777  Bray  described  the  road 
between  Wakefield  and  Leeds  as  running  3 "  through  a 
country  black  with  coal  pits."  The  increase  of  trade  within 
the  decade  preceding  1776  was  said  by  4  Wesley  to  have 
been  unparalleled,  and  wages  rose  proportionately,  to  the 
detriment  of  the  service.  The  government  was  therefore 
driven  to  extraordinary  shifts,  and  in  1778  5  the  gaols  were 
cleared  of  all  felons  who  could  possibly  be  made  to  handle 
a  weapon,  physique  and  morale  being  considered  negligible 
qualities.  Of  150  recruits  from  London  and  Dublin, 
despatched  from  Chatham  in  1779  to  fill  gaps  in  the  ranks 
of  the  Royal  Highland  regiment,  16  died  on  the  voyage, 
and  75  were  sent  to  the  hospital  immediately  on  dis- 
embarkation. The  2372  recruits,  drafted  to  join  Cornwallis 

1  Bedford  Correspondence,  ii.    387. 

2  Chantreau,  Voyage  dans  les  Trois  Eoyaumes  (1792),  p.  296. 

3  Wm.  Bray!s  Sketch  of  a  Tour  in  Derbyshire  and  Yorkshire  (ed.  1783), 

p.  260. 

4  Wesley's  Journal  (ed.   1902),  p.  407. 

5  Cochrane's  Thoughts  concerning  the  Brit.    Navy  and  Army   (1791), 

pp.  13-4. 


158  THE   OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

in  South  Carolina  in  1780,  were  reported  to  have  been 
1  "very  sickly  and  spread  contagion  through  the  army." 
By  that  time,  volunteers  for  the  navy  had  become  as  scarce, 
and  when  it  was  proposed  to  subscribe  for  a  warship  in 
1781  to  present  to  the  government,  2  Keppel  asked  what 
was  the  good  of  ships  without  sailors  to  man  them. 

Moreover,  there  was  no  encouragement  to  join  the  army. 
Its  punishments  were  horribly  cruel.  In  1757  when  a 
grenadier  was  shot  at  Chatham  for  desertion,  3  another 
deserter  was  made  to  attend  his  execution,  but  had  "only" 
to  receive  500  lashes  by  way  of  caution.  4That  number 
represented  the  standard  penalty  for  drunkenness.  5In 
1788  a  deserter  of  eighteen  died  under  a  sentence  of  650 
lashes,  and  in  1801  6  three  seamen  were  flogged  and  ran 
the  gauntlet  till  they  died.  It  was  also  7  unfortunate  that 
the  exclusive  spirit  of  the  corporations,  and  the  arbitrary 
Statute  of  Apprentices  gave  the  ex-soldier  little  chance  of 
a  career  after  seeing  service,  while  the  custom  of  enlisting 
for  life  was  often  a  cause  of  hardship.  The  army  was 
aristocratic,  and  except  in  a  few  cases  like  that  of  Colonel 
Preston,  who  rose  from  being  a  kettledrummer  to  lead  the 
Scots  Grey  Dragoons  at  Minden,  valour  was  rarely  more 
than  its  own  reward.  80fficers  had  no  means  of  learning 
military  science  at  home,  and  had  to  be  content  with 
9 "dancing,  fencing  and  a  smattering  of  French,"  unless 

1  Cornwallis  Correspondence  (ed.   1859)  ;  schedule. 

2  A.  Young's  Autobiography,  p.  108. 

3  Gent.   Mag.    (1757),  p.  478;  cf.  the  horrible  details  in  R.   v.  Wall, 

28  S.T.  at  p.  56. 
*  J.  Long's  Voyages  of  an  Indian  Interpreter  (1791),  p.  164. 

5  Dibdin's   Musical  Tour  (1788),  p.  233. 

6  Romilly's  Memoirs  (1840),  ii.    133. 

7  A.  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations,  p.  116. 

8  Brown's  Estimate  of  the  Manners  of  the  Times  (1757),  p.  80. 

9  The  Polite  Philosopher  (1750),  p.  26. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  159 

they  went  abroad.  It  was  not  unusual  for  subalterns  to  be 
attached  to  schools  of  instruction  in  French  fortresses  like 
1Metz;  Eliott  learnt  the  art  of  war  at  the  French  college 
of  la  Fere,  and  2Cornwallis,  when  an  ensign,  was  sent  to 
Turin  in  the  charge  of  a  Prussian  captain,  for  England 
herself  gave  no  such  facilities.  The  pay  of  captains  and 
subalterns  forced  them  to  3  "  genteel  beggary,"  and  their 
murmurs  against  "  starving  in  embroidery  "  remind  one  of 
"the  splendid  misery"  of  later  day  German  officers. 
t  Wolfe  made  Shelburne  devote  his  pay  to  a  fund  for  dis- 
tressed officers,  when  he  heard  that  the  latter' s  private 
income  was  considerable,  but  the  defects  in  the  system 
were  ineradicable;  they  outlived  the  century  itself,  and 
survived  even  their  later  masterly  exposure  in  Cobbett's 
Political  Register.  Cumberland,  although  beloved  by  the 
Guards  as  5  "  the  hero  of  Culloden,"  had  not  the  brains  to 
throw  new  life  into  the  bad  system  of  his  day.  His  mistake 
was  to  treat  the  army  6  "  more  like  Germans  than  English- 
men," and  his  favourite  officers  were  the  slow  Loudon,  and 
the  inept  Braddock.  Everything  conduced  to  starve  in- 
itiative. Braddock  had  despised  the  help  of  7  "  George 
Croghan  our  Indian  interpreter  with  one  hundred  Indian 
scouts,"  and  had  preferred  to  advance  in  line  firing  at 
random  and  in  close  order  formation,  against  picked 
marksmen  fighting  under  cover.  He  explained  to  Franklin 
that  8  "  these  savages  may  be  a  formidable  enemy  to  your 
own  American  militia,  but  upon  the  King's  regular  and 

1  Hume's  Private  Correspondence  (1820),  p.  283. 

2  Cornwallis  Correspondence  (ed.  1859),  p.  4. 

3  Observations  upon  the  Pay  of  Subaltern  Officers  (1773),  p.  39. 

4  Fitzmaurice's  Shelburne,  i.    93. 

5  Letter  to  Wm.  Pitt    Esq.  (1746),  p.  28;  Harris's  Hardwicke,  ii.    228. 

6  Waldegrave's  Memoirs,  p.  22. 

7  Bigelow's  Franklin,  i.    324. 

8  ibid,  i.  325. 


160  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

disciplined  troops,  sir,  it  is  impossible  they  should  make 
any  impression.'7  In  a  few  hours,  he  had  lost  63  of  his 
86  officers,  and  714  of  his  1,200  men,  the  rest  naturally 
breaking  away  l "  with  more  cowardice/'  said  Washington, 
"  than  it  is  possible  to  conceive,"  instead  of  fighting  under 
cover  like  their  ally,  2"the  uncorrupted  American." 
"Who  would  have  thought  it?"  were  the  dying  words  of 
Braddock's  aide-de-camp,  Colonel  Orme.  3  It  was  said  that 
no  man  with  brains  would  ever  have  sent  such  a  general 
against  such  a  foe,  but  the  pompous  and  prolix  Burgoyne 
was  certainly  as  incompetent  in  the  next  war.  In  1742 
Pitt  had  expressed  the  wish  that  the  army  could  appear 
4 '"'more  like  soldiers  and  less  like  beaus,"  but  he  had  not 
enough  time  to  transform  the  zest  for  brilliancy  in  equip- 
ment into  zest  for  efficiency  in  action,  and  no  other 
minister  possessed  his  genius  to  single  out  the  best  men  to 
lead  the  forces  of  Great  Britain. 

We  cannot  therefore  wonder  why  recruiting  was 
difficult,  and  why  the  government  had  recourse  to  foreign 
mercenaries.  5"  Conquering  America  without  foreign 
troops  is  entirely  impossible,"  wrote  Storer,  one  of  the 
"  King's  friends  "  in  1775.  During  the  Jacobite  rising  of 
1745  6  General  Wade  had  five  Dutch  regiments  and  three 
battalions  of  Swiss  under  his  command,  and  76000 
Hessians  were  shipped  to  Edinburgh  from  Antwerp.  Pitt 
bought  such  troops  all  over  Europe  in  the  Seven  Years' 

1  Sparks'  Washington,  ii.     87. 

2  A  Letter  to  the  People  of  England  (1755),  p.  48. 
^  ibid,  p.  27. 

4  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xi.  1432. 

5  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.    xv. ;  pt.  6,  315. 

o    Cumberland's  Memoirs  (1767),  pp.  298,  325;  Harris's  Hardwicke,  ii. 

199,  221;  H.  Walpole's  Memoirs  (ed.  1851),  i.    462. 
7   H.  Walpole's  Memoirs,  i.    465. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  161 

War,  especially  Germans  and  Swiss.  In  1755,  1 166,000 
foreign  troops  were  in  England's  pay.  2It  was  alleged 
that  every  alien  employed  meant  the  gain  of  one  man's 
industry  to  the  country,  as  our  population  was  thus  enabled 
to  stay  at  home  instead  of  being  "  dragged  from  the  plough 
and  the  loom."  The  force  of  2,000  men,  which  won 
Manila  under  Draper's  leadership  in  1762,  3  included 
Sepoys,  Kaffirs,  Lascars,  Topasees,  and  French  and  German 
deserters.  There  was  therefore  nothing  at  all  novel  in  the 
purchase  of  German  hirelings  in  the  War  of  Independence. 
This  incident  has  sometimes  been  allowed  to  throw  a 
sinister  shadow  upon  England's  conduct  of  the  war,  but 
the  conditions  of  the  age  entirely  negative  the  idea  that  it 
was  immoral  according  to  contemporary  ethics.  Those 
who  recognized  that  to  hire  German  troops  to  fight  against 
Britons  in  America  was  a  repulsive  system  stood  ahead  of 
their  age. 

The  practice  was  then  universal  in  Europe,  to  whom  it 
has  bequeathed  the  proverb,  "  point  d'argent  point  de 
suisse."  4  In  1756  the  French  army  included  15,400  Swiss, 
12,201  Germans,  2,976  Irish,  1,114  Italians,  992  Scots,  and 
1,056  foreign  cavalry.  In  1754  the  French  actually 
enlisted  recruits  in  5 Scotland  in  spite  of  the  imminence  of 
the  war  with  Great  Britain,  and  their  prisoners  confined  at 
Winchester  in  1759  6  included  men  of  every  nation,  from 
Turkey  to  Ireland.  One  Wiltshire  militiaman  found  his 
own  brother  among  them.  7The  Irish  regiment  in  the 

1  A  Second  Letter  to  the  People  of  England  (1755),  p.  34. 

2  Reasons  in  Support  of  the  War  in  Germany  (1762),  pp.  1-2. 

3  Annual  Register  (1764),  p.  140. 

4  Conway's  Military  Arguments  (1758),  pp.  14-5. 

5  Prior's  Life  of  Goldsmith  (1837),  i.    160. 

6  Grenville  Papers,  i.    315. 

7  Segur's  Memoirs  (1825),  p.  238. 


162  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

service  of  Louis  XV.  was  dressed  in  scarlet,  and  was  mis- 
taken for  an  English  corps  by  our  garrison  in  St.  Eustacius, 
when  surprised  by  Bouille.  The  Dutch  employed  several 
Scotch  regiments,  while  in  1760  l  Spain  had  no  less  than 
3,600  Irish  soldiers,  3,600  Italians  and  Walloons,  and 
9,600  Swiss.  2The  officers  of  the  Irish  corps  had  to  be  of 
British  blood.  The  King  of  Prussia  bought  a  dragoon 
regiment  from  the  Elector  of  Saxony  for  3  "  forty  blue  and 
white  metal  jars."  4  Many  Swiss  and  German  officers 
served  in  Turkey. 

In  view  therefore  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  British 
theory  of  empire  on  the  point  of  imperial  defence,  the  use 
of  mercenary  troops  offered  three  great  advantages  without 
in  the  least  offending  the  current  canons  of  European 
taste.  In  the  first  place,  it  avoided  the  necessity  of  taking 
the  wives  and  children  of  the  soldiery  to  the  campaign. 
The  English  armies  were  notoriously  liable  to  be  hampered 
by  such  useless  impediments;  such  at  all  events  was 
6Marbot's  opinion  delivered  only  thirty  years  afterwards, 
and  it  is  corroborated  by  the  letters  of  General  von 
Riedesel  and  his  wife,  who  showed  her  good  sense  by 
taking  6 "  only  a  small  summer  wardrobe "  with  her  on 
the  Saratoga  campaign.  7  Of  the  16,445  men,  who 
returned  from  service  in  Germany  in  1763,  1666  had  taken 
their  wives  with  them  to  the  war.  Secondly,  the  system 
8  obviated  the  necessity  of  granting  pensions  and  half -pay, 
which  legacies  of  war  are  always  unwelcome  to  a  thrifty 

1  Annual  Register   (1760),  p.  76. 

2  Baretti's  Journey  from  London  to  Genoa  (1770),  iv.    45. 

3  H.  Walpole's  Last  Journal,  i.    404  (note). 

*'  Memoirs  of  the  Bashaw  Count  Bonneval  (1750),  p.  190. 

5  Marbot's  Memoirs  (ed.  1894),  p.  281. 

6  Riedesel  Brief e  und  Berichte  (ed.  1851),  pp.  146-7. 

7  Annual  Register  (1763),  p.  52. 

8  Correspondence  of  Geo.  III.  with  North,  ii.    45. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  163 

people.  Thirdly,  the  Hessians  were  bought  "ready 
made,"  l  to  be  delivered  at  Hamburg  or  Rotterdam,  and 
therefore  required  none  of  the  lengthy  and  expensive 
impressing  and  drilling,  needed  by  British  recruits,  who 
were  usually  ignorant  as  to  the  use  of  arms  before  enlist- 
ment— a  grave  defect  in  view  of  the  urgent  want  of 
soldiers  in  America.  2New  levies  were  sent  out  almost 
as  quickly  as  they  were  enrolled,  after  a  hurried  and  some- 
times merely  perfunctory  medical  examination.  Thus 
shortness  of  time  necessitated  teaching  Scottish  recruits 
the  handling  of  firelocks  by  candle-light  at  Glasgow  before 
embarking  in  April  1776. 

A  further  reason  to  have  recourse  to  Germany  was  that 
3  the  Swiss  cantons  would  not  allow  their  subjects  to  serve 
across  the  Atlantic,  and  4Hussia  refused  to  hire  out  the 
20,000  troops  applied  for  in  1775,  whereas  the  German 
princes  had  no  such  scruples.  Moreover  their  country  had 
the  reputation  of  being  the  best  centre  of  military  skill. 
Assuming  that  the  old  colonial  system  was  so  wholly  un- 
sentimental as  to  treat  a  colonist  as  a  compulsory  customer 
rather  than  as  a  brother  and  an  equal,  it  followed  that  no 
scruples  would  deter  a  government  from  using  as  many 
soldiers  as  it  could  buy  in  Hesse  Cassel  or  Brunswick. 
5  All  Germans  were  then  deemed  born  soldiers.  6Their 
discipline  was  the  model  of  Europe,  and  Pyrch,  a  Prussian 
major,  taught  the  French  army  its  drill.  Frederick  the 
Great  was  the  ideal  general  of  the  day,  and  7  travellers 

1  ibid,  i.    266. 

2  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Eep.  on  Amer.  MSS.,  vol.  i.    253. 

3  Chatham's  Speeches  (ed.  1853),  p.  168. 

*   Hist.    MSS.    Comm.    Rep.     xi.  j    pt.    5,    395;    ibid   on   Amer.    MSS. 
vol.  i.    7. 

5  Annual  Register  (1759),  p.  6. 

6  Segur's  Memoirs,  p.  121. 

7  Sherlock's  Letters  from  an  English  Traveller  (1780),  p.  9. 


164  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

delighted  to  watch  him  manoeuvre  his  glittering  army  in 
the  parade  ground  of  Potsdam.  Every  nation  copied  the 
Prussians,  and  the  famous  order  given  to  the  defenders  of 
Bunker  Hill  to  withhold  their  fire  until  they  could  see 
their  enemies'  eyes,  was  1  "borrowed  deliberately  from  the 
Prussian  orders  at  the  battle  of  Jagerndorf  in  1745.  2  The 
French  accepted  the  Germans'  habit  of  inflicting  corporal 
punishment ;  the  English  imitated  their  custom  of  firing 
by  divisions  and  platoons,  and  their  formations  of  columns 
and  squares.  The  use  of  light  cavalry  and  of  the  bayonet 
were  both  perfected  by  Frederick.  3  The  Prussians  alone 
could  fire  as  quickly  as  four  times  per  minute,  and  all 
armies  tried  to  imitate  such  despatch.  4  "As  ready  as  a 
Prussian  soldier,"  was  a  current  phrase  of  1756,  and  the 
British  army  tried  to  vie  with  his  mechanical  precision. 
They  were  so  far  successful  in  that  their  neat  woollen 
cloth  breeches,  their  spatter  dashes,  and  their  uniformity 
even  to  their  shoe  buckles  left  nothing  to  be  desired, 
though  5  the  Spanish  snuff,  which  was  allowed  to  spoil 
Frederick's  own  simple  blue  coat  and  red  and  yellow  waist- 
coat, might  have  taught  the  larger  lesson  that  a  soldier's 
equipment  is  less  essential  than  his  efficiency.  Indeed,  all 
England  looked  for  guidance  to  Prussia.  Military  teachers 
like  6  Lochee  of  the  Little  Chelsea  academy  and  7«J.  0. 
Vandeleur  of  the  school  of  field  artillery,  used  her  methods, 
and  the  standard  model  for  entrenched  camps  was  that 
constructed  by  Frederick  in  1761  at  Buntzelwitz  near 
Breslau. 

1  Memorial  History  of  Boston  (1881),  iii.    85. 

2  Segur's  Memoirs,  p.  120. 

3  Gibbon's  Autobiography,  i.    229. 

4  Grenville  Papers,  i.    189. 

5  Sherlock's  Letters,  p.  17. 

6  Lochee's  Essay  on  Military  Education  (1776),  p.  72. 

7  Vandeleur's  Duty  of  Officers  (1801),  p.  65. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  165 

For  the  present  purpose  however,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
realise  that  England's  recourse  to  Germany  for  troops  to 
serve  against  her  colonies  was  then  in  the  natural  order 
of  things.  The  policy  in  fact  illustrates  the  peculiarly 
unsentimental  nature  of  the  imperial  theory,  upon  which 
Greater  Britain  had  been  erected.  It  does  not  do  more 
than  this;  in  itself  it  was  neither  strange  nor  immoral. 
The  Briton  felt  no  nearer  in  spirit  to  the  Yankee  than  to  the 
Hessian,  and  when  the  garrison  of  Yorktown  marched  out 
with  the  honours  of  war,  it  was  stipulated  that  the  drums 
might  beat  x"a  British  or  a  German  march."  The  cupidity 
of  the  princes  who  sold  their  subjects  may  well  seem 
disgraceful,  but  unless  we  are  ready  to  judge  all  past 
policies  by  present  codes  of  ethics,  we  cannot  pass  a  similar 
judgment  on  the  ministers  who  bought  them.  As  states- 
manship, their  action  was  possibly  bad,  but  it  was  a  most 
natural  result  of  the  political  conditions  of  the  age.  The 
Americans  welcomed  every  foreign  adherent — Lafayette, 
Rochambeau,  Steuben,  Kosciuszko,  Kowatch,  Pulaski, 
Bosen  — and  England  found  her  alien  troops  of  similar 
service.  In  June  1777  she  had  no  less  than  2 14,749 
Germans  in  the  field.  Their  green  coats  made  them  bad 
targets  for  the  enemy's  fire,  and  there  were  many  3  game- 
keepers and  other  good  shots  among  the  Jager  corps. 
Biedesel,  on  arriving  in  Canada  in  1776,  insisted  on  the 
uses  of  taking  cover,  and  taught  his  men  to  move  in  snow 
shoes.  Galloway,  while  severely  criticising  the  operations 
of  1780,  praised  Kniphausen  almost  alone  as  4"a  truly 
gallant  and  great  officer."  5Burgoyne  was  unappreciative, 

1  Cornwallis's  Answer  to  Clinton  (1783),  p.  221. 

2  Sparks'  Washington,  v.    542. 

3  E.  J.  Lowell's  Hessians  in  the  Kevolutionary  War  (1884),  p.  108. 

4  Letter  to  a  Nobleman  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  (1780),  p.  73. 

5  Riedesel  Briefe  und  Berichte  (ed.  1851),  p.  301. 


166  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

and  1  complaints  were  made  in  1777  that  Waldeck  was 
selling  raw  and  undeveloped  boys  instead  of  men,  but 
Cornwallis  referred  to  2"the  discipline,  alacrity  and 
courage"  of  the  Hessians  and  Anspachers  in  1781,  when 
Bose  and  Buy  helped  to  put  the  American  militia  to  flight 
in  the  woods  near  Guildford  Court  House.  Gibbon 
welcomed  the  idea  of  purchasing  troops  even  from  bar- 
barian Russia. 

The  same  oblivion  to  the  claims  of  brotherhood  led  the 
government  to  employ  Indian  auxiliaries.  No  one  will 
justify  this  unnatural  alliance,  but  on  the  other  hand,  the 
time  has  passed  when  such  policy  could  be  treated  as  a  sign 
of  the  depravity  of  British  statesmanship  under  George  III. 
and  of  a  general  hideousness  in  the  national  standard  of 
morals.  Assuming  that  the  recognition  of  close  kindred 
ties  between  the  belligerents  was  utterly  dim,  the  men  of 
the  time  could  scarcely  have  set  up  a  different  code  for  the 
American  War  than  for  the  late  campaigns  against  the 
French.  The  chief  opponents  of  Indian  alliances  in  1776 
had  been  their  chief  promoters  twenty  years  earlier.  Just 
as  Chatham's  denunciation  of  the  hiring  of  20,000  3"  boors 
and  cut-throats"  from  Germany  was  inconsistent  with 
4  his  own  policy  of  1757,  so  his  indignation  upon  the  news 
of  the  league  with  the  barbarians  against  the  rebels  was 
inconsistent  with  his  earlier  tenets.  In  1755  he  had 
exhorted  the  House  of  Commons  to  join  with  5  "  our  Indian 
allies"  against  the  French.  6His  excuse  that  their  enlist- 
ment had  never  received  his  official  sanction  is  far  from 

1  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  on  Amer.  MSS.,  vol.  i.    121. 

2  Cornwallis'  Answer  to  Clinton,  p.  141. 

3  Gent.  Mag.  (1777),  p.  251. 

4  Harsh  Truths  (1757),  p.   11. 

5  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xv.    604. 

6  Chatham's  Speeches,  p.  165. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  167 

convincing.  The  Iroquois  were  old  friends  of  the  British 
government.  In  1759  ^elawares  tried  to  induce 
Twightwee  Indians  to  help  England  against  France. 
Certainly  French  allegations  as  to  the  horrible  nature  of 
England's  Indian  policy  under  Lord  North  are  very  hollow, 
for  the  influence  of  France  had  always  been  directed 
towards  the  furtherance  of  savage  raids  upon  the  frontiers 
of  British  colonies.  In  21749  a  mixed  horde  of  2,500 
French  and  Indians  ravaged  our  settlements  on  the  Bay  of 
Fundy,  a  measure  repeated  in  31754.  In  1755  the 
Canadian  government  stirred  up  the  Shawnees  and 
Delawares  against  English  settlers.  It  was  4an  old  com- 
plaint that  French  Jesuits  were  at  the  bottom  of  every 
Indian  depredation,  a  tendency  5  supposed  to  be  heightened 
by  the  similiarity  of  their  superstitions.  Ogden  referred 
in  1762  to  the  union  of  6  "  the  fierce  Indian  and  perfidious 
Gaul,"  and  said  of  France, 

"Yet  baffled  in  her  schemes  she  seeks  again 
To  spirit  up  the  Cherokees  in  vain," 

while  Patrick  described  the  enemy  in  1759  as 

7  "Leagued  with  savages,  more  savage  made, 

By  Gallic  perfidy  and  gilded  lies." 

In  1754  Waldegrave  ascribed  French  success  to  their 
influence  over  the  natives.  The  defeats  of  that  year  were 
said  to  be  due  to  the  adherence  of  the  Norridgwalk  Indians 
and  some  of  the  Five  Nations  to  the  French,  while 

1  Gent.  Mag.  (1759),  p.  109. 

2  Mundy's  Rodney,  i.    47. 

3  Patrick's  Quebec,  p.  26. 

4  Interest  of  Gt.  Britain  Considered  (1759),  p.  5. 

5  ibid,  p.  5. 

6  Ogden's  British  Lion  Roused,  p.  204. 

7  Patrick's  Quebec,  p.  3. 


168  THE   OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 


pointed  very  truly  to  the  assimilation  of 
Canadians  to  the  Indian  type.  Nor  was  this  tendency  to 
!"  spirit  the  Indians  up  to  massacre  and  scalp  the  English" 
denied  by  candid  Frenchmen.  Bossu,  a  captain  of  French 
marines,  has  left  us  a  narrative  of  travels  in  Louisiana 
between  1750  and  1757,  in  which  3he  urged  that  the 
Choctaws  should  be  persuaded  to  make  a  foray  into  Georgia 
and  Carolina,  and  to  burn  as  many  crops  as  possible  during 
the  absence  of  the  local  militia  in  the  Louisburg  expedi- 
tion. 4He  wanted  to  attract  the  Chicsaws,  dwelling 
between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Apalachian  mountains,  to 
a  French  alliance.  With  such  ideas  in  the  air  in  1775,  we 
can  hardly  wonder  that  the  British  ministry  was  very 
willing  to  avail  itself  of  such  powerful  allies  in  arduous 
forest  warfare,  for  which  regular  troops  were  little  fitted. 
The  inhuman  aspect  of  the  alliance  could  not  readily 
strike  men  educated  in  the  unsentimental  colonial  system 
of  the  day,  and  the  savages  who  followed  Burgoyne 
5  shouting  "war,  war"  were  treated  as  useful  friends. 
It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  American  forces 
included  many  men  of  colour,  red  and  black.  Even  6  their 
earliest  levies  included  negroes,  and  in  time  few  volunteers 
were  rejected.  7  Impartial  Americans  now  admit  that  the 
Massachusetts  Congress  of  1775  gathered  Red  Indian 
adherents  before  a  shot  had  been  fired,  notably  Mohawks 
and  the  Christian  converts  at  Stockbridge,  and  that  their 
army  was  never  averse  to  using  such  savage  auxiliaries. 

1  Pownall's    Adminstration   of   Brit.    Colonies    (1774),  ii,  187;   Kalm's 

Travels,  ii.    379. 

2  Letter  addressed  to  Two  Great  Men  (1760),  p.  14. 

3  Bossu's  Travels  through  Louisiana  (1771),  i.    293. 

4  ibid,  i.  310. 

5  Riedesel  Briefe  und  Berichte  (ed.  1851),  p.  151. 

6  Washington's  Official  Correspondence,  i.    7. 

7  Sparks'  Washington,  iii.    495. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  169 

Washington,  for  instance,  described  them  in  1778  as  being 
luof  excellent  use  as  scouts  and  light  troops  mixed  with 
our  own  parties,"  and  even  2missionaries  were  employed  to 
bring  in  Cherokee  and  Oneida  recruits.  In  1780  3the 
Richmond  smiths  were  busy  making  axes  and  tomahawks 
for  Gates.  Lauzun  tells  us  of  4  his  Indian  allies'  horrid 
habit  of  eating  British  prisoners,  and  writes  of  Washington's 
army,  5  "  There  are  whole  squads  of  negroes,  and  the  out- 
posts of  black  men  with  white  shirts  such  as  they  wear  in 
this  country,  look  exactly  like  the  negro  harlequins  on  the 
stage." 

In  view  of  this  not  unnatural,  but  still  odious  reliance 
upon  foreign  and  barbarian  troops,  we  cannot  hold  a  high 
opinion  of  the  old  colonial  system's  provision  for  imperial 
defence.  Men  appear  to  have  expected  to  maintain  a  great 
empire  without  any  adequate  safeguards.  A  tradition 
which  dated  from  the  time  when  Cromwell's  Ironsides  were 
the  terror  of  Britain,  but  which  was  strengthened  by  the 
new  fear  of  royal  despotism,  prevented  the  army  acquiring 
either  size  or  efficiency.  In  spite  of  the  long  struggle  to 
win  America,  England  hoped  to  keep  it  by  a  peace 
establishment,  of  which  economy  was  the  only  virtue.  A 
sound  belief  in  the  excellence  of  the  navy  and  in  the 
fighting  capacity  of  a  very  small  army,  made  the  nation 
self-confident  on  every  imperial  question.  War  was 
hardly  considered  as  a  science,  and  high  commands  were 
entrusted  to  parliamentary  soldiers  like  Howe  and 
Burgoyne.  The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  success  in  the 
War  of  Independence  were  immense,  but  no  struggle  was 

1  ibid,  v.    273. 

2  ibid,  v.    274. 

3  Jefferson's  Memoirs  (1829),  i.    176. 

*  Lauzun's  Memoirs  (ed.  1896),  ii.  208. 
5  ibid,  ii.    204. 


170  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

entered  into  with  greater  lightness  of  heart.  The  effects 
of  the  colonial  theory  of  the  time  had  been  to  obscure  the 
true  character  of  British  colonies,  and  also  the  arduous 
character  of  a  great  war,  when  undertaken  by  an  empire 
divided  within  itself. 

The  disadvantages  under  which  Great  Britain  laboured 
cannot  be  over-estimated.  In  the  first  place,  the  nature 
of  the  ground  upon  which  military  operations  were  con- 
ducted was  quite  unsuited  to  the  prevailing  practice  of 
British  manoeuvres.  Wolfe  and  Amherst  had  only  over- 
come this  obstacle  by  dint  of  patience  and  expert  advice, 
but  few  of  their  successors  in  the  next  war  had  their 
talent  or  forbearance.  Hence  the  heroic  frontal  attack  on 
Bunker  Hill,  where  close  lines  of  troops,  burdened  by  a 
load  of  three  days'  provisions  and  a  heavy  knapsack  apiece, 
were  sent  across  open  country  against  entrenched  marks- 
men on  a  hill  top.  It  is  true  that  they  x"trod  the  rugged 
path  where  glory  led  "  with  brilliant  courage  and  ultimate 
success,  but  their  losses  were  enormous — 1,054  casualties 
in  a  force  of  2,200.  2In  one  company  every  man  was 
either  killed  or  wounded.  Such  methods  of  attack  were 
not  repeated,  but  the  improvement  in  British  tactics  was 
not  accompanied  by  improvement  in  strategy.  Our 
generals  failed  signally  to  develope  a  definite  and  con- 
tinuous scheme  of  warfare.  They  alternated  between  a 
policy  of  mere  raids  and  descents,  and  one  of  penetrating 
invasion.  The  first  course  made  thorough  conquest  an 
impossibility;  the  second  was  largely  nullified  by  the 
absence  of  an  enemy's  capital,  the  fall  of  which  might  end 
the  war.  It  entailed  also  long  lines  of  communication, 
which  were  liable  to  interception  and  involved  considerable 
dispersion  of  strength.  More  than  eighty  years  later,  in 

1  Gent.  Mag.  (1775),  p.  396. 

2  Memorial  History  of  Boston  (1881),  iii.    89. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  171 

an  era  of  railways  and  turnpike  roads,  armies  found  the 
wildernesses  of  Virginia  and  the  south  extraordinary 
obstacles  to  penetrate.  The  soldiers  of  George  III.  had  to 
co-operate  in  the  heart  of  this  hostile  country  under  even 
greater  difficulties.  As  early  as  the  retreat  from  Lexington 
they  realised  the  uses  of  l"  flying  parties  from  behind  stone 
walls  along  the  road,"  and  even  in  the  New  York  district 
they  found  the  country  2"  incredibly  strong."  Some 
officers  indeed  rose  to  the  occasion.  Major  Ferguson,  who 
was  killed  at  the  decisive  battle  of  King's  Mountain  in 
1780,  was  the  most  capable  British  tactician  in  wild 
terrain.  The  best  shot  in  the  army,  he  taught  his  corps 
of  marksmen  the  wisdom  of  firing,  3"  lying  upon  the  back 
or  belly,"  and  4Lord  Eawdon,  who  had  been  among  the 
first  to  scale  the  redoubt  at  Bunker  Hill,  utilised  his 
musicians  and  drummers  as  riflemen;  but  many 
regulars  never  relished  such  departures  from  the  orthodox 
Prussian  school.  Certainly  nothing  could  be  more  galling 
than  the  colonial  practice  of  harassing  outposts  at  night, 
and  we  cannot  wonder  at  the  soldiers'  complaint  that  they 
were  5"  fired  upon  by  a  skulking  peasantry,  whom  no  laws 
or  usage  of  European  war  could  justify."  6 Their  own 
plans  of  campaign  were  singularly  wanting  in  the  silence 
and  secrecy,  which  are  essential  to  success.  Thus  men, 
who  were  irresistible  in  the  open,  came  to  be  entangled  in 
rugged  country,  and  baffled  by  far  less  dashing  militiamen, 
a  fact  clearly  understood  by  topical  verses  of  the  day  like 
the  ballad  of  7"the  Sick  Queen."  It  is  really  surprising 

1  Gibbon's  Autobiography,  i.    258. 

2  ibid,  I    299. 

3  Annual  Register  (1781),  p.  52. 

4  Tarleton's  History  of  the  Campaigns  (1787),  p.  462. 

5  Remarks  on  the  Travels  of  Chastellux  (1787),  p.  11. 

6  Riedesel  Briefe  und  Berichte,  p.  147. 

7  The  Sick  Queen  (1784),  p.  10. 


172  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

that  the  light  cavalry,  which  acted  as  a  screen  for 
Cornwallis'  movements  during  the  campaigns  of  1780  and 
1781  should  have  for  several  months  so  triumphed  over 
lihe  difficulties  of  fighting  in  the  hot  regions  of  Georgia 
and  South  Carolina,  where  the  theatre  of  war  was  made 
almost  impassable  by  swamps  and  forests,  and  where  such 
staple  wants  as  bread  and  salt  were  alike  unobtainable. 
2  Nathaniel  Greene  himself  said  that  the  greater  part  of 
that  country  was  a  wilderness,  and  partisans  like  Thomas 
Sumter  and  Francis  Marion  availed  themselves  of  its 
features  in  order  to  baffle  the  strategy  of  Cornwallis  and 
the  tactics  of  Eawdon  and  Tarleton.  The  royal  armies 
having  to  fight  at  great  distances  from  their  base,  had  to 
rely  on  precarious  lines  of  communication,  and  these  were 
constantly  troubled  by  raids  from  the  western  backwoods, 
which  were  peopled  principally  by  Scottish  and  Ulster 
Presbyterians,  uncompromising  rebels  and  direct  ancestors 
of  the  unconquerable  "  valley  army  "  of  Stonewall  Jackson. 
Pownall  had  justly  described  the  Americans  as  3  "  the  best 
of  any  forces  in  the  world"  for  such  irregular  warfare,  and 
in  view  of  their  alliance  with  great  maritime  powers  like 
France  and  Holland,  they  were  really  far  more  powerful 
antagonists  to  the  small  British  forces  of  the  time  than  the 
Boers  were  to  the  infinitely  stronger  England  of  1899. 

Another  ill  effect  of  the  nature  of  the  country  was  the 
impossibility  of  feeding  an  army,  without  carrying  with  it 
a  very  large  transport.  The  resources  of  many  districts 
were  entirely  insufficient  to  sustain  an  invading  force.  In 
1778  Clinton's  baggage  train  was  twelve  miles  long.  The 
distress  of  the  soldiery  when  at  a  distance  from  their  base, 

1  Tarleton's  History  of  the  Campaigns,  pp.  16,  113,  155,  225,  507;  Hist. 

MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  on  Amer.  MSS.,  vol.  i.    473-4. 

2  ibid,  pp.  314-5. 

3  Pownall's  Administration  etc.  (1774),  ii.  232. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  173 

was  consequently  frequent  and  acute.  The  troops  under 
Cornwallis,  who  won  the  battle  at  Guildford  Court  House 
in  March  1781,  had  no  bread  for  two  days  afterwards. 
1Tarleton  fed  his  legion  on  wild  cattle  and  on  potatoes, 
gathered  under  fire.  The  heat  in  Florida  prostrated  the 
garrison  of  Pensacola ;  in  Virginia  it  was  little  less  desolat- 
ing, and  half  the  army  which  surrendered  at  Yorktown 
was  too  ill  to  bear  arms.  All  the  gallantry  in  the  world 
cannot  save  a  force  from  physical  exhaustion. 

Another  reason  for  England's  failure  to  maintain  her 
old  colonial  system  by  force  of  arms  lay  of  course  in  the 
incapacity  of  her  generals,  who  wholly  failed  to  appreciate 
the  advantages  of  their  unusual  freedom  from  civilian 
control.  It  is  easy  to  imagine  how  differently  a  Wellington 
would  have  acted  in  their  place,  for  the  American  Tories 
were  numerous,  and  nine-tenths  of  the  colonial  population 
distrusted  Congress.  Washington's  army  was  often  dis- 
united and  depressed  in  spirit;  a  Salamanca  or  Yittoria 
would  have  dissolved  it.  Again  and  again,  vigour  might 
have  saved  the  existing  government,  at  all  events  for  a 
period,  but  initiative  was  left  to  the  enemy  by  Gage  and 
Howe,  and  Burgoyne  was  quite  as  incompetent.  On  the 
eve  of  his  capitulation  at  Saratoga,  the  last-named  com- 
mander, in  the  words  of  an  eye-witness,  2"  spent  half  the 
night  singing  and  drinking,  and  amused  himself  with  the 
wife  of  a  commissary  who  was  his  mistress,  and  who  (like 
him)  loved  champagne."  In  1777  when  the  American 
forces  numbered  barely  18,000  men  and  Howe  had  40,000, 
the  latter  neglected  the  campaign,  and  allowed  his  forces 
to  ill-treat  their  own  supporters.  His  feebleness  and 
lethargy  contrasted  badly  with  the  dash  of  Arnold  and 

1  Tarleton's  History  of  the  Campaigns,  pp.  507,  511. 

2  Riedesel  Briefe  und  Berichte,  p.  158. 


174  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

Greene.  In  1778  lie  wasted  opportunities  by  frittering 
time  and  money  upon  regattas  and  festivals  at  Phila- 
delphia, his  officers  taking  part  in  a  long  tourney  before 
"seven  of  the  principal  young  ladies  of  the  city,  dressed 
in  Turkish  habits  and  wearing  favours."  2It  was  a  great 
pity,  said  Galloway,  that  such  a  general  was  paid  by  the 
day  and  not  by  the  job.  Burgoyne's  pompous  description 
of  himself  as  3  "dictating"  terms  at  Saratoga  was  character- 
istic of  the  man,  and  it  is  amazing  to  find  4that  his 
"  surrender  value "  was  that  of  1,040  privates.  Only 
Cornwallis  and  Carleton  displayed  any  aptitude  for 
strategy;  5the  former  was  also  a  tactician  and  raised 
sensible  objections  to  the  practice  of  volley-firing. 

It  would  seem  however  more  in  keeping  with  the 
philosophic  spirit  in  history  to  attribute  the  loss  of  America 
not  so  much  to  the  blunders  of  a  few  individuals,  as  to  the 
breakdown  of  a  great  theory.  It  is  quite  questionable 
whether  Clive  and  Wolfe  together  could  have  preserved 
the  empire.  Great  Britain's  failure  was  by  no  means 
primarily  due  to  want  of  military  efficiency,  for  the  men 
and  indeed  6a  large  proportion  of  the  subordinate  officers 
were  good  enough.  In  the  open,  they  were  generally 
victorious,  and  even  at  Yorktown  their  gallant  sortie,  four 
days  before  the  surrender,  fully  upheld  the  old  traditions 
of  the  country.  Twenty  years  later,  7  an  adversary  described 
the  British  army  as  the  best  scouts  and  the  best  marksmen 
in  Europe,  and  within  so  short  an  interval  there  had  been 

1  Annual  Kegister  (1778),  p.   266  cf.  Letter  to  Et.   Hon.  Lord  Howe 

(1781),  p.  13. 

2  Galloway's  Considerations  upon  the  Am.  Enquiry  (1779),  p.  18. 

3  Fox's  Memoirs,  i.     164. 

4  Sparks'  Washington,  viii.    15. 

5  Windham's  Diary  (ed.  1866),  p.  362. 

6  Stair's  Facts  and  their  Consequences  (1782),  pp.  29—31. 

7  Marbot's  Memoirs  (ed.  1894),  p.  423. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  175 

no  revolution  in  the  military  system.  In  the  American 
War  our  soldiers  fought  through  many  years  of  most 
trying  warfare  with  consistent  spirit.  On  the  famous  day 
at  Lexington,  when  the  whole  countryside  was  panting  for 
rebellion,  and  the  minute  guns  were  steadily  beating  up 
the  most  skilful  shots  in  the  world  for  attack,  the  light- 
hearted  English  troops,  in  the  words  of  Captain  Gould, 
an  eye-witness,  l" rushed  on  shouting  and  huzzaing  "to 
meet  the  embattled  farmers  first  at  Lexington  green,  and 
afterwards  on  the  bridge  at  Concord.  2  During  1776  they 
took  nearly  5,000  American  prisoners.  Indeed  success  is 
not  the  touchstone  of  valour,  and  the  men  who  stormed 
Bunker  Hill  in  1775  and  defended  the  Ebenezer  redoubt 
at  Savannah  in  1779  were  worthy  of  the  purest  cause. 
When  the  dragoons  broke  at  the  battle  of  Cowpens  in  1780, 
8  the  artillerymen  refused  to  leave  their  guns,  and  all  died 
at  their  posts.  Victories  like  those  of  Guildford  and 
Camden  were  often  as  brilliant  as  they  were  barren. 

We  should  therefore  find  the  chief  cause  of  the  break- 
down of  the  empire  not  in  the  passing  inefficiency  of 
commanders,  but  in  the  permanent  defects  of  the  old 
colonial  theory  itself.  Its  intense  commercial  selfishness 
alienated  the  colonies,  and  hence  the  Revolution.  Its 
pugnacity  embittered  all  Europe,  and  hence  the 
alliance  between  France,  Spain  and  Holland  with 
America,  and  hence  also  the  armed  neutrality  of  the 
northern  powers.  Later  experience  has  taught  that  a 
comparatively  "open  door"  is  the  only  way  to  reconcile 
one  state  to  another's  expansion.  The  empire  of 
George  III.  had  no  such  key  to  the  art  of  reconciliation. 

1  Gent.  Mag.  (1775),  p.  294;  Cowper's  Keports,  ii.    677-8. 

2  Sparks'  Washington,  iv.    549. 

3  Tarleton's  History  of  the  Campaigns,  p.  218. 


176  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

France  burned  to  avenge  the  losses  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War.  Other  nations  longed  to  efface  from  International 
Law  the  stringent  rules,  devised  by  England  to  strengthen 
her  supremacy  in  maritime  warfare.  Treating  the  law 
of  nations  as  but  a  question  of  expediency  and  opinion, 
exponents  of  the  British  colonial  system  refused  to  admit 
the  rebels'  claim  to  recognition  as  belligerents,  and  availed 
themselves  of  such  maxims  as  "  enemy  ship,  enemy  goods," 
and  "  free  ships  do  not  make  free  goods,"  in  order  to  keep 
all  foreigners  aloof  from  her  intestine  conflicts.  The 
whole  tenor  of  English  political  science  was  one  of 
exclusiveness  towards  other  states,  and  of  monopoly  at 
home.  Hence  Franklin's  appeal  to  France  to  admit  the 
natural  rights  of  Americans  and  neutrals  under  a  more 
liberal  version  of  International  Law,  won  first  sympathy, 
and  then  actual  intervention.  John  Adams  was  similarly 
successful  in  persuading  the  Dutch  that  the  interest  of 
America  was  also  the  interest  of  Europe. 

No  one  can  doubt  the  immense  value  of  European  help 
to  the  struggling  republic.  In  1775  1  Franklin  asked 
Dumas  to  send  him  two  good  engineers  from  Holland,  and 
in  1776  2he  procured  200  brass  field  pieces  and  15,000 
firelocks  from  France.  3  Lafayette  was  valued  by 
Washington  above  all  his  foreign  subordinates,  but  most 
of  them  were  useful.  Eochambeau,  for  instance,  did  great 
work  with  French  contingents,  and  Lauzun  has  left  us  a 
pretty  sketch  of  the  advent  of  the  brilliant  French 
soldiers  among  the  quiet  Quakers  of  Ehode  Island.  The 
rose-colour  facings  and  white  feathers  of  the  Soissons 
brigade  were  alluring  to  the  ladies  of  Philadelphia,  while 
its  own  patrician  officers  fell  victims  to  the  charms  of 

1  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    352. 

2  ibid,  ii.    371. 

3  Sparks'  Washington,  vi.    14. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  177 

Polly  Layton,  the  Quaker  belle  of  Newport,  whom  Segur 
calls  iathat  angel"  and  the  Prince  de  Broglie,  2"  Minerva 
in  person,  a  masterpiece  of  nature."  Such  cavaliers  were 
efficient  in  the  field,  while  on  sea  the  French  alliance  was 
extremely  valuable,  and  prevented  Cornwallis'  escape 
from  Yorktown  in  1781.  Nor  have  the  United  States  for- 
gotten the  services  of  other  European  haters  of  the  British 
policy  of  monopoly  and  repression,  such  as  Kosciuszko, 
who  came  to  help  them  in  1776,  and  the  Prussian  Steuben 
who  came  in  1777,  or  such  guerilla  leaders  as  the  Pole 
Pulaski  who  was  killed  by  a  swivel-shot  before  Savannah 
in  1779,  and  the  Bavarian  de  Kalbe  who  was  mortally 
wounded  in  the  rout  at  Camden  in  1780.  The  rebel  cause 
attracted  3  plenty  of  British  deserters  whose  zeal  was 
heightened  by  their  knowledge  that  they  were  fighting 
with  halters  about  their  necks,  and  probably  no  less  than 
4  5,000  of  the  German  hirelings.  Indeed  the  popularity  of 
the  American  cause  in  Europe  and  the  successive  loans 
raised  in  France,  Holland  and  Spain  in  its  support  attest 
to  the  universal  detestation  of  the  British  imperial  theory. 
There  was  nothing  accidental  in  the  tendency  to  connive 
at  obvious  breaches  of  neutrality  by  subjects  of  neutral 
states.  The  French  playwright,  Beaumarchais  made  a 
fortune  by  unlawful  shipments  of  military  stores  to 
America  from  Bordeaux,  as  did  the  firm  of  Penet  and 
Pliarne  by  similar  shipments  from  Nantes. 

Thus  American  success  has   often  been  ascribed  in   a 
large  measure  to  5  foreign  help,  and  under  the  exasperating 

1  Segur's  Memoirs  (1825),  pp.  358-9. 

2  Lauzun's  Memoirs,  ii.    214. 

3  Sparks'  Washington,  viii.    384. 

4  Lowell's  Hessians  in  the  Revolutionary  War  (1884)  p.  300;  Washing- 

ton's Official  Correspondence,  i.  146;  ii.  293;  Hist.  MSS.  Comm. 
Rep.  on  Amer.  MSS.,  vol.  i.  199,  250. 

5  Remarks  on  the  Travels  of  Chastellux  (1787),  p.  2. 


178  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

old  colonial  system,  such  help  was  inevitable.  It  was  by 
nature  simply  part  and  parcel  of  the  Revolution  itself. 
Apart  from  merely  accidental  causes  of  war  like  Lord 
North's  specific  fiscal  policy,  George  III.'s  ambition  to  be 
despot,  the  coercive  measures  against  Massachusetts  and 
the  special  grievances  of  Boston,  the  real  creative  force  of 
the  Revolution  was  the  feeling  against  the  whole  imperial 
system  of  Great  Britain.  Franklin  realised  that  France 
and  Spain  felt  the  same  irritating  influence  of  the  British 
world  empire  as  the  Americans,  though  in  a  different  way, 
and  from  the  first,  he  laboured  to  draw  these  countries 
towards  an  alliance  by  proving  the  identity  of  their 
interests  with  those  of  the  colonists.  In  1775  he  sent  to 
Holland  for  a  copy  of  Yattel,  and  he  says  himself,  l "  it 
came  to  us  in  good  season,  when  the  circumstances  of  a 
rising  state  make  it  necessary  frequently  to  consult  the 
law  of  nations."  The  new  learning  enabled  the  Americans 
to  assert  that  the  acceptance  of  cartels  for  the  exchange  of 
prisoners  implied  a  British  recognition  of  themselves  as 
belligerents,  and  to  justify  the  enlistment  of  allies  abroad. 
Stationing  himself  at  Passy,  an  object  of  ecstatic  homage 
to  the  French  in  spite  of  his  ignorance  of  their  fashions, 
his  long  grey  locks  and  uncouth  fur  hat,  Franklin  con- 
ducted American  maritime  policy  in  a  manner  calculated 
to  identify  the  spirit  of  their  resistance  with  that  of  the 
Continental  opposition  to  English  doctrines  in  prize  law. 
Thus  in  1780  2he  wrote  from  Passy  that  the  American 
government  should  not  condemn  any  British  goods  other 
than  contraband  when  shipped  in  Dutch  vessels,  as  all  the 
neutral  states  in  Europe  considered  the  old  International 
Law  modified  in  that  respect.  In  December  1781 


1  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    349. 

2  Hid,  ii.    506-7. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  179 

International  Law  l"  according  to  the  general  usages  of 
Europe"  was  declared  to  be  part  of  American  law. 

Thus  the  exclusive  claim  put  forward  by  British 
political  theorists  with  regard  to  the  wide  dominions  added 
to  the  empire  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries, 
made  renewed  war  with  France  as  inevitable  as  colonial 
opposition.  A  time  was  bound  to  come  when  the  Briton 
over  sea  would  object  to  having  his  land  exploited  for  the 
benefit  of  monopolists  at  home,  and  then  the  adherence  to 
his  cause  of  the  excluded  and  supplanted  foreigner  was 
equally  certain.  The  Emperor  Joseph  II.  said,  2"My 
business  is  to  be  a  royalist,"  and  gave  no  countenance  to 
the  Americans,  but  all  other  European  princes  were  zealous 
for  their  cause,  and  allowed  their  subjects  to  commit 
obvious  breaches  of  neutrality  for  their  sake.  Yet  apart 
from  their  hatred  of  the  English  colonial  theory  and  their 
desire  for  revenge,  there  could  be  no  real  sympathy 
between  these  despots  and  the  young  democracy.  What 
had  Marie  Antoinette  in  common  with  the  men,  whom 
she  described  as  3 "  the  good  Americans,  our  dear 
republicans  "  ?  What  had  the  ladies  of  the  French  Court, 
who  wore  head-dresses  4"aux  Insurgens,"  or  the  French 
priests,  who  stamped  their  sacramental  bread  with  the 
word  "  Liberte,"  in  common  with  the  sceptical  and  sober 
Franklin?  The  French  soldier  Segur  was  asked  by  Polly 
Layton  why  France  fought  for  America.  5"The  English 
have  done  thee  no  harm,  and  as  for  our  liberty,  what  con- 
cern is  it  of  thine?  It  is  always  wrong  to  interfere  in 
other  people's  concerns  except  to  make  peace,  and  prevent 

1  Kent's  Commentaries,  p.  1. 

2  Lauzun's  Memoirs  (ed.  1896),  ii.  144. 

3  ibid,  ii.    191. 

4  ibid,  ii.    142. 

5  ibid,  ii.    215. 


180  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

bloodshed."  The  genuine  explanation  lay  in  the  general 
desire  to  retaliate  for  the  former  triumphs  of  the  British 
colonial  system.  The  very  patriotism  of  that  system  had 
injured  its  efficiency  by  leading  to  the  sacrifice  of  colonial 
interests  for  an  ideal  of  s'elf-sufficiency,  which  no  American 
appreciated,  and  by  leading  at  the  same  time  to  the 
alienation  of  every  European  state.  Hence  the  energy  and 
spirit  with  which  first  France  (after  the  surrender  at 
Saratoga  in  1777)  and  afterwards  other  Continental  powers 
embarked  upon  war  with  Great  Britain  during  the  latter's 
struggle  with  her  revolted  colonies.  France  spent  over 
fifty  millions  sterling  on  the  war.  England's  usual 
superiority  over  her  foes  at  sea,  and  the  dissensions  among 
the  rebels  themselves,  enabled  her  to  hold  out  for  several 
years  against  all  comers.  Charleston,  with  a  garrison  of 
over  5,600  soldiers  and  nearly  1,000  seamen,  was  captured 
in  1780.  However,  the  French  won  the  upper  hand  for 
the  moment  on  the  ocean,  and  so  assisted  materially  in 
bringing  about  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis  with  8,000  men 
at  Yorktown  in  1781.  Rodney  won  back  maritime 
ascendency  after  1 "  a  long  day  of  obstinate  fight  over  the 
seas  of  Martinico"  in  April  1782,  when  Grasse  was 
captured  with  eight  warships.  2Lauzun  called  this  battle 
"a  fearful  blow  to  our  navy"  ;  3 Rodney  himself,  writing  to 
Lord  George  Germain,  described  it  as  "the  most  important 
victory  I  believe  ever  gained  against  our  perfidious 
enemies  the  French."  Yet  on  land  ultimate  success  was 
clearly  impossible,  notwithstanding  England's  financial 
superiority,  and  the  peace  of  1783  was  an  admission  that 
the  moral  influence  of  our  old  colonial  system  was  fatal  to 
the  successful  conduct  of  any  war,  in  which  men  of  British 

1  Bigelow's  Franklin,  iii.     60. 

2  Lauzun's  Memoirs,  ii.     253. 

3  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  ix. ;  pt.  3,  116. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  181 

blood  were  driven  to  co-operate  with  the  ancient  enemies 
of  the  empire. 

The  political  ideals,  for  which  Great  Britain  fought  in 
the  American  War,  were  not  by  any  means  sinister,  not- 
withstanding the  use  of  mercenaries,  but  they  were 
lamentably  lacking  in  the  sense  of  brotherhood,  which  we 
now  connect  with  our  conception  of  colonial  relations. 
To  the  English  troops,  the  struggle  never  seemed  a  civil 
war,  and  the  Americans'  indignant  anxiety  to  show  that 
their  courage  was  no  less  than  that  of  British-born 
soldiery  proves  the  power  of  that  English  delusion.  Thus 
Washington  exulted  in  the  news  of  Lexington  as  showing 
Sandwich  luhow  Americans  will  fight  for  their  liberties 
and  property,"  and  Henry  Dearborn,  a  captain  who  served 
in  the  ill-fated  army,  which  struggled  under  Montgomery 
and  Arnold  through  the  wilderness  then  barring  the  way 
to  Quebec,  wrote  in  his  Journal  a  passage  that  illustrates 
the  same  feeling.  He  is  describing  the  attack  on  Quebec 
in  the  grey  dawn  of  New  Year's  Eve  1775  when  the  snow 
was  falling  heavily,  and  the  storming  parties  were  being 
everywhere  repelled.  He  was  suddenly  challenged  by  a 
picquet.  "I  answered  a  friend.  He  asked  me  who  I  was 
a  friend  to.  I  answered  '  to  liberty.'  He  then  replied 
'  God  damn  you,' "  and  Dearborn,  whose  gun  would  not  go 
off,  had  to  surrender  to  the  English  3"and  their  brothers 
the  savages."  He  adds  characteristically,  4"But  we  had 
something  more  at  stake  than  fighting  for  sixpence  a  day. 
We  have  convinced  the  British  butchers  that  the  cowardly 
Yankees  can,  and  when  there  is  a  call  for  it,  will  fight." 
In  wars  between  men  of  the  same  blood  one  would  expect 

1  Sparks'  Washington,  iii.    406. 

2  Dearborn's  Journal  (ed.   1886),  i.  20. 

3  ibid,  ii.    4. 

4  ibid,  ii.    7. 


182  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

combatants  to  treat  each  other  with  more  mutual  respect. 
Joseph  Warren,  who  was  killed  at  the  very  moment  when 
his  men  broke  at  Bunker  Hill,  said  of  the  British,  "These 
fellows  say  we  won't  fight;  by  heaven  I  hope  I  shall  die 
up  to  my  knees  in  blood." 

The  actual  conduct  of  the  war  was  not  indeed  marked  by 
unusual  inhumanity  on  England's  part.  As  America  was 
the  scene  of  hostilities,  she  naturally  suffered  most,  and 
sometimes  the  recollection  of  the  horrors  of  conflict  has 
led  to  many  charges  against  British  methods  of  warfare. 
It  must  indeed  be  admitted  that  the  entire  absence  of 
racial  sentiment  from  the  old  colonial  theory  led  to  the 
encouragement  of  ravages,  which  all  must  condemn.  To 
loyalists  like  Bishop  Inglis,  the  forays  which  took  place 
during  the  last  years  of  the  struggle  were  1  useful  descents, 
deserving  of  support,  but  in  actual  fact  they  left  a  dis- 
astrous effect  upon  American  thought.  2The  depredations 
of  Governor  Tryon  and  of  Arnold  in  the  southern  states, 
and  of  John  Butler  in  Wyoming,  and  3the  misconduct  of 
British  troops  in  New  York  in  1777,  wiped  out  much  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  sentimentality  which  had  previously  been 
far  stronger  in  America  than  England.  Since  then,  the 
warmth  of  that  feeling  has  been  chiefly  on  the  British  side 
of  the  Atlantic. 

On  the  other  hand,  apart  from  these  lapses  from  good 
policy,  the  British  armies  seem  to  have  been  4humane. 
Washington  admitted  that  General  Carleton  treated 
American  prisoners  in  Canada  5 "  with  kindness  and 

1  M.  L.  Davis'  Memoirs  of  Aaron  Burr,  ii.    30. 

2  Ramsay's  Hist.  Am.  Rev.,  ii.     104,   141. 

3  Letters  to  a  Nobleman  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  (1780),  p.  43. 

4  Tarleton's    History   of   the    Campaigns,    p.    110,    but   see   Jefferson's 

Memoirs  (1829),  i.    428. 

5  Sparks'  Washington,  iii.    264. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  183 

humanity."  laWe  were  carried  to  the  guard  house," 
says  Dearborn  in  his  Journal,  "  where  we  had  a  good 
dinner,  and  a  plenty  of  several  sorts  of  wine."  2Hichard 
Montgomery,  the  rebel  general  who  fell  along  with  his 
two  aides-de-camp  in  the  attack  on  Quebec,  was  buried 
with  full  military  honours.  When  3  Segur  was  captured 
by  Nelson,  then  a  young  captain  of  24,  he  was  generously 
treated.  In  view  of  the  customary  embezzlement  of 
prisoners'  supplies  by  fraudulent  intermediaries, 4  charitable 
people  in  Liverpool  took  precautions  for  their  welfare. 
Upon  the  capture  of  Mark  Moore,  captain  of  an  American 
privateer  by  the  Eurydice  in  the  channel,  the  commander 
of  that  vessel  was  chivalry  itself.  5"He  treated  me  very 
genteely,"  says  Moore,  "and  ordered  me  to  mess  with  the 
officers  in  the  gunroom." 

In  discussing  such  questions  as  that  of  clemency  in  this 
war,  it  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  contemporary 
standard  of  ethics  was,  on  this  point,  extremely  low. 
6  Prisoners  were  often  treated  with  scandalous  neglect. 
In  action,  humanity  was  exceptional.  7The  French  had 
used  broken  nails  and  slugs  as  bullets  in  defending 
Ticonderoga  in  1759,  so  that  every  soldier,  wounded  in  the 
attempt  to  storm  it,  was  hurt  incurably.  In  1764  General 
Draper  alleged  that  8 "  it  is  a  known  and  universal  rule  of 
war  amongst  the  most  civilized  nations  that  places  taken 
by  storm  without  any  capitulation  are  subject  to  all  the 
miseries  that  the  conquerors  may  chuse  to  inflict,"  a  canon 

1  Dearborn's  Journal  (ed.  1886),  i.  22. 

2  Remarks  on  Travels  of  Chastellux  (1787),  p.  46. 

3  Segur's  Memoirs  (1825),  p.  427. 

4  Wakefield's  Memoirs  (1804),  i.    190. 

5  Moore's  Memoirs  (1795),  p.   179. 

6  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    404-5. 

7  Annual  Register  (1759),  p.  77. 

8  ibrd  (1764),  p.  139. 


184  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

followed  by  the  Russians  on  storming  the  Turkish  fortress 
of  Ismail  in  1790.  The  French  behaved  with  r"  indescrib- 
able kindness "  to  Cornwallis  on  his  surrender,  but  their 
treatment  of  captured  crews  during  the  American  War 
was  not  always  exemplary.  Lauzun  says,  2  "a  horrible  scene 
of  pillage,  and  men  even  fought  with  each  other,"  when 
mentioning  the  capture  of  an  English  herring  ship  in  1780. 
The  French  had  left  the  bodies  of  Braddock's  army  to  lie 
unburied  from  1754  to  1759,  when  the  Ohio  valley  was 
reconquered.  The  same  implacable  spirit  entered  into  the 
more  legitimate  province  of  traps  and  ruses.  3Bossu 
hoisted  British  colours  in  1757  to  entrap  an  English  ship, 
and  4Lauzun  sailed  to  conquer  Senegal  in  1778  under  the 
Union  Jack,  while  in  one  case,  5  a  French  frigate  availed 
herself  of  Venetian  colours  in  chasing  a  neutral  snow 
bound  for  London.  Spying  was  very  common,  and  one 
American,  who  had  once  served  in  the  royal  navy,  had  no 
scruples  in  using  Flemish  colours  and  an  Austrian  pass- 
port in  order  to  watch  the  English  coast,  and  to  anchor 
even  6 "  in  Brighthelmstone  Bay,  at  a  time  when  the 
London  comedians  were  there."  The  identity  of  the 
language  of  both  armies,  and  apparently  7  their  similarity 
in  dress  made  spying  easy. 

Impartial  critics  will  therefore  be  slow  to  condemn  the 
conduct  of  those  who  fought  on  behalf  of  the  imperial 
theory  of  George  III/s  reign.  Perhaps  it  was  less  excep- 
tionable than  that  of  the  colonists  themselves,  whose 

1  Gcrnwallis'  Answer  to  Clinton,  p.  212. 

2  Lauzun's  Memoirs,  ii.    198. 

3  Bossu's  Travels  through  Louisiana,  ii.     13. 

4  Lauzun's  Memoirs,  ii.    165. 

5  Douglas'  Reports,  p.  576. 

6  Moore's  Memoirs,  p.  175. 

7  1  Dallas  Rep.  33;  Tarleton's  History,  p.  265. 


BRITAIN'S  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR  185 

persecutions  of  loyalists  were  often  appalling,  and  whose 
attitude  towards  the  Indians,  though  not  without  some 
justification,  nevertheless  reveals  the  wide  gulf  between 
colonial  and  British  feeling.  To  the  Englishmen  at  home, 
they  were  regarded  as  brothers  in  theory  and  as  partisans 
in  practice,  and  Hhe  government  had  always  protected 
them  against  the  rapacity  of  civilisation's  pioneers.  One 
Iroquois  told  Burgoyne  in  1778  of  his  tribe's  readiness  to 
serve  against  the  Bostonians,  2"at  the  voice  of  our  great 
father  beyond  the  great  lake."  The  Americans,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  far  more  knowledge  of  Red  Indian  bar- 
barity, and  never  spared  the  savage.  During  the  War  of 
Independence,  the  rebels  punished  the  Six  Nations  and 
the  Creeks  for  their  adherence  to  the  Crown  by  3  general 
slaughter.  Washington  wrote  coolly  of  Sullivan's  warfare 
in  1779,  4"He  had  by  my  last  advice  burned  between 
fifteen  and  twenty  towns,  destroyed  all  their  crops,  and 
was  advancing  to  their  exterior  villages,  the  Indians,  men 
women,  and  children,  flying  before  him  to  Niagara  in  the 
utmost  consternation,  distress  and  confusion."  5  Colonial 
violence  was  often  bitter,  and  Washington  and  Gage  inter- 
changed recriminations  as  to  their  respective  treatment  of 
prisoners.  Burgoyne's  army  was  badly  treated  in  cap- 
tivity, and  Governor  Hamilton,  a  leader  of  British  and 
Red  Indian  irregulars,  was  put  in  irons  when  captured. 
The  guerilla  troops  on  both  sides  fought  with  a  touch  of 
ferocity  during  the  campaign  in  the  southern  colonies,  and 
grave  charges  were  made  against  the  victors  at  King's 
Mountain  in  1780,  Cornwallis  remonstrating  against 

1  Annual  Eegister  (1763),  pp.  32,  212. 

2  Gent.  Mag.  (1778),  p.  123. 

3  Kamsay's  Hist.  Am.  Rev.,  ii.    147;  Jefferson's  Memoirs  (1829),  i.    209. 

4  Spark's  Washington,  vi.    356. 

5  Remarks  on  Travels  of  Chastellux,  pp.  18,  22-3. 


186  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

Gates's  1U scarcely  credible  inhumanity."  The  cases  of 
Andre  and  Asgill  do  not  need  citation,  nor  does  the 
counter-case  of  Nathan  Hale.  The  only  point,  in  fact,  of 
recalling  these  long-forgotten  grievances  on  either  side, 
is  to  show  that  Great  Britain's  conduct  of  the  War  of 
Independence  was  not  below  the  customary  standard  of 
the  day.  The  old  colonial  system  was  of  the  earth  earthy, 
but  if  its  champions  rarely  rose  from  worldliness,  they 
need  not  be  accused  on  the  other  hand  of  having  acted  like 
devils.  David  Hartley,  for  instance,  who  was  the  Whig 
member  for  Hull,  alleged  that  the  army  was  waging  war 
on  2"  defenceless  women  and  children."  Such  polemics 
are  best  buried.  They,  and  the  wars  by  which  they  were 
inspired,  have  passed  into  history  long  ago,  symbolising 
the  fate  of  a  great  scheme  of  colonial  government,  and 
leaving  it  to  us  to  draw  the  moral.  It  is  a  far  better  task 
to  give  judgment  on  a  policy,  than  to  draw  an  indictment 
against  men  long  since  forgiven. 

1  Cornwallis  Correspondence,  i.    144;  cf.    ibid,  i.    67,  75. 

2  Hartley's  Letters  on  the  American  War  (1779),  p.  25. 


COLONIAL  THEORY  IN   1783  187 


CHAPTER   X. 
COLONIAL  THEORY  IN  1783. 

loss  of  America  caused  an  intense  reaction  in  British 
colonial  theory.  For  two  centuries,  the  country  had  fought 
for  supremacy  in  America.  She  had  struggled  long  and 
arduously  with  Spain,  Holland  and  France  in  turn.  She 
had  buried  thousands  of  her  bravest  sons  and  much  capital 
across  the  Atlantic.  Yet  at  the  acme  of  the  imperial 
system  for  which  she  had  made  such  exertions,  her  own 
colonists  had  revolted,  and  justified  Turgot's  oft-quoted 
dictum  as  to  the  likeness  of  daughter  states  to  fruit  which 
drops  from  the  tree  when  ripe.  In  the  face  of  such  seem- 
ing ingratitude,  men  threw  off  their  old  belief  in  the 
utility  of  expansion,  and  acquired  the  new  faith  of 
"laisser  faire."  A  customer  was  a  customer  still,  even  if 
he  traded  under  another  flag,  and  most  Britons  accepted 
JAdam  Smith's  view  that  colonies  which  admitted  no 
obligations  towards  the  Mother  Country,  were  worse  than 
useless.  2The  nation  regretted  the  increase  of  the  national 
debt  far  more  than  its  loss  of  territory.^ 

It  is  to  be  observed  also  that  the  state  of  the  colonies 
still  retained  by  Great  Britain  was  in  no  way  conducive  to 
optimism.  Even  at  the  height  of  the  imperial  enthusiasm 
of  Chatham's  day,  Canada  had  been  regarded  as  of 
doubtful  value;  3the  colonies  which  rebelled  had  been 

1  Wealth  of  Nations,  p.  760. 

2  Remarks  on  the  Travels  of  Chastellux,  p.  63 ;  Tucker's  Life  of  Jefferson 

(1837),  p.  220. 

3  Candid  Examination  (1775),  p.  44. 


188  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

twenty  times  as  populated  and  a  hundred  times  as  wealthy. 
Its  future  development  was  not  dreamed  of  by  the  wisest. 
It  was  thought  to  have  been  iuonly  a  place  of  arms  for 
the  French,  or  a  factory  for  the  fur  trade."  2The  only 
post  in  the  whole  country  was  that  between  Montreal  and 
Quebec,  and  its  exports  to  England  in  1787  amounted  to 
3  but  1/119  of  the  sum  of  the  exports  to  England  from  the 
United  States.  4The  reports  as  to  Liverpool  shipping  show 
that  British  ships  of  21,870  tonnage  plied  between  that 
port  and  the  United  States  in  1785,  but  ships  of  only  2,948 
tonnage  between  it  and  British  North  America.  £lt  was 
therefore  most  natural  for  Englishmen  to  suggest  its 
abandonment  in  view  of  the  probability  that  the  great 
expense  of  its  maintenance  would  be  followed  by  ultimate 
separation^  In  1784  James  Allen,  a  typical  pamphleteer 
of  the  new  school,  5  alleged  that  British  trade  with  Canada 
must  needs  be  profitless,  that  her  wheat  and  lumber  were 
of  inferior  quality,  and  that  her  population  only  consisted 
of  6  100,000  backward  Frenchmen.  The  sprinkling  of 
British  settlers  and  loyalist  refugees  was  too  insignificant 
to  necessitate  the  maintenance  of  so  useless  a  possession. 
Unlike  Lafayette,  7who  held  a  high  opinion  of  the  value 
of  Halifax,  8Turgot  thought  that  it  was  even  to  the  interest 
of  France  that  Great  Britain  should  retain  her  possessions, 
and  great  weight  was  attached  to  his  views  in  England. 
John  Nicholls,  a  Whig  member  of  Parliament  who  has 

1  Present  State  of  Gt.  Britain  and  N.  America  (1767),  pp.  171,  308. 

2  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvi.    138. 

3  Beawes'  Lex  Mercatoria  (ed.  1813),  ii.  91,  104. 

4  Report  on  Slave  Trade  (1789),  Part  iv. 

5  Allen's   Considerations  on  the  Present  State  of   Intercourse  between 

Sugar  Colonies  and  U.S.A.  (1784),  p.  26. 

6  ibid,  p.  30. 

7  Sparks'  Washington,  vii.    480. 

8  Soulavie,  Memoires,  iii.    99. 


COLONIAL  THEORY   IN   1783  189 

left  us  Eecollections, l  argued  that  the  fur  trade  alone  was 
not  a  sufficient  source  of  wealth  to  justify  the  retention  of 
Canada,  and  that  it  was  absurd  to  prefer  its  timber  to  the 
cheaper  and  better  timber  of  Norway.  In  case  of  war  too, 
we  might  hire  Norwegian  sailors  quite  as  profitably  as 
Canadian. 

Nova  Scotia  and  Newfoundland  were  then  equally  un- 
remunerative  dependencies.  2  One  vessel  used  to  make  two 
voyages  a  year  to  the  former  colony  from  England ;  other- 
wise it  enjoyed  no  communication  with  Europe,  and  though 
praised  by  3  Little  in  1748,  it  was  yet  in  its  infancy.  4It 
had  no  ships  of  its  own,  and  only  5 16,000  inhabitants  of 
whom  G  four-fifths  were  immigrant  loyalists,  and  the  re- 
maining fifth  was  hostile  to  England  and  addicted  to  "rum 
and  idle  habits."  Halifax  had  been  founded  in  1749  but 
was  not  allowed  self-government.  7  Newfoundland  did  not 
possess  a  single  coast  road,  and  its  fishermen  were  wretchedly 
poor.  8  "All  government  is  alike  to  them"  runs  a  govern- 
ment report  of  1775,  "when  they  have  bread,  pork  and 
peas  sufficient/'  Hence  many  patriotic  Britons  wanted 
nothing  more  than  to  be  free  again  from  such  unproductive 
possessions.  Colonies  had  been  tested  and  found  wanting, 
and  the  repudiation  of  the  recent  policy  of  expansion  was 
immediate  and  sincere.  The  office  of  Secretary  of  State 
for  the  Colonies,  and  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations 
were  alike  abolished  in  1782,  and  after  certain  makeshifts 
the  concerns  of  Greater  Britain  were  handed  over  to  the 

1  Nicholls'  Eecollections  (1822),  ii.    87-8. 

2  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Rep.  xi.  ;  pt.  5,  355. 

3  Little's  State  of  Trade  in  the  Northern  Colonies,  p.  36. 
>  Allen's  Considerations,  p.  31. 

5  Beawes'  Lex  Mercatoria,  ii.    102. 

6  Cornwallis  Correspondence,  i.     279. 

7  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.  xvi.    138. 

8  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.  Eep.  xi. ;  pt.  5,  384. 


190  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

keeping  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  in  1801.  The 
debates  in  Parliament  in  1783  were  marked  rather  by  relief 
than  regret.  1Yiscount  Howe  said  that  the  greatness  of 
England  did  not  lie  on  the  sands  of  America,  and  2  Onslow 
alleged  that  the  colonies  had  always  hung  like  a  dead 
weight  on  the  neck  of  Great  Britain.  Shelburne  had  been 
at  enmity  with  Burke  and  the  Buckingham  branch  of  the 
Whig  party  for  many  years,  and  though  he  had  acted  as 
colonial  minister  from  1766  to  1768,  he  did  not  feel  a  pang 
at  the  severance  of  the  imperial  tie.  He  found  his  most 
congenial  allies  in  the  philosophic  circle  of  Price  and 
Priestley,  and  from  the  first,  he  had  inclined  strongly  in 
the  direction  of  free  trade  and  British  insularity.  Thus 
he  was  quite  consistent  in  3 minimising  the  advantages 
accruing  from  the  ownership  of  the  lost  dependencies  of 
Florida  and  Tobago.  4  Most  Whigs  indeed  prided  them- 
selves upon  having  asserted  the  futility  of  the  late  scheme 
of  empire  from  the  first  moment  of  colonial  resistance,  and 
5  argued  that  emigration  and  imperial  wars  alike  im- 
poverish a  mother  country.  The  government  with  singular 
irony  entrusted  the  peace  negotiations  to  David  Hartley,  a 
hater  of  militarism  and  empire,  and  an  intimate  of 
Franklin  and  Price.  He  was  hardly  the  man  to  hold  out 
for  British  claims  to  the  unappropriated  lands  lying  north 
and  west  of  the  seceded  states. 

The  only  misgiving  that  accompanied  English  com- 
placency on  the  loss  of  her  colonies  was  that  the  nation's 
lucrative  trade  with  America  might  be  stopped.  As  yet 
however,  the  resources  of  the  United  States  were  so  un- 

1  Gent.  Mag.  (1783),  p.  6. 

2  ibid,  p.  21. 

3  ibid,  p.  300. 

4  Bigelow's  Franklin,  iii.    86. 

5  Consolatory  Thoughts  on  American  Independence  (1782),  pp.  3,  11. 


COLONIAL  THEORY   IN   1783  191 


that  the  danger  was  thought  remote,  and  the 
fear  that  commerce  only  followed  the  flag  was  ably  com- 
bated by  numbers  of  economists.  Thus  a  clever  writer  of 
this  school,  Alexander  Brown,  l  argued  that  Great  Britain 
was  never  personally  benefited  by  the  welfare  of  a  colony 
merely  because  it  was  a  colony.  Newfoundlanders  catch 
fish  for  themselves,  not  for  us.  There  is  no  need  to  spend 
twice  as  much  on  our  timber  as  we  need  do,  simply  because 
the  more  expensive  market  happens  to  be  a  British 
province.  2Free  trade  was  better  for  the  consumer  at 
home.  It  would  be  wrong  to  prefer  colonial  importers  to 
the  former  American  producers,  who  probably  would  sell 
more  cheaply.  3The  wish  to  relieve  the  West  Indies  did 
not  warrant  the  doubling  of  the  price  of  sugar.  He  asked 
with  persuasive  eloquence,  4"How  much  more  are  we 
enriched  by  the  wealth  of  a  man  who  lives  in  Nova  Scotia, 
than  of  one  who  lives  in  Massachusetts?  Does  the  corn 
of  Canada  produce  us  a  greater  revenue  than  that  of 
Pennsylvania?"  We  are  thus  brought  very  near  to  the 
unsentimental  economics  of  the  Manchester  school;  the 
contrast  to  the  prevailing  theory  of  but  twenty  years 
earlier  is  most  striking.  Brown  proved  that  the  effect  of 
regulating  trade  within  the  empire  was  simply  5"  mutual 
oppression." 

The  new  doctrine  was  calculated  to  win  over  a  people 
just  emerging  from  a  burdensome  war  for  empire.  While 
French  doctrinaires  were  teaching  that  the  Greek  plan  of 
colonisation,  with  its  loose  ties  of  6"  reason  and  good 
offices,"  was  alone  effective,  Englishmen  like  Lord  Stair 

1  A.  C.  Brown's  Colony  Commerce,  p.  19. 

2  ibid,  p.  31. 

3  ibid,  p.  74. 

4  ibid,  p.  83. 

5  ibid,  p.  74. 

6  Grosley's  Tour  to  London,  i.    133. 


192  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

considered  x  every  penny  ever  spent  on  colonial  wars  as 
squandered.  Lord  Sheffield's  tracts  tried  to  show  that  loss 
of  sovereignty  could  not  lead  to  loss  of  markets,  and  won 
considerable  popularity.  2 "  Some  great  Frenchman," 
writes  his  daughter  Maria  Josepha  Holroyd,  "talking  of 
Papa's  work,  said  if  he  should  live  to  see  a  French  noble- 
man write  thus  on  commerce  he  should  be  quite  content 
and  satisfied."  Sheffield  argued  that  3the  United  States 
would  still  have  to  depend  on  Great  Britain  for  wool, 
porcelain,  earthenware,  glass,  shoes,  buttons  and  hats.  No 
foreign  rival  could  compete  with  us  as  yet;  4Manchester 
goods  were  twenty  per  cent,  cheaper  than  those  of  Houen, 
and  5  English  shipping  merchants  gave  longer  credits  to 
customers  than  did  the  French.  Like  Washington  and 

6  John  Adams,   Sheffield  thought   that  the   new  republic 
would  never  be  anything  but  an  agricultural  community, 

7  that  emigrants  would  never  be  anything  but  farmers,  and 

8  that  therefore  the  demand  for  British  manufactures  in 
America  would  continue  for  ever  to  expand.     9  Seabury 
had  said  in  1774  that  it  would  need  a  conjuror  to  convert 
the  American  sailor  or  shipwright  into  a  spinner  or  weaver. 
According  to  this  view,  the   States  now  burdened  by  a 
national  debt  mainly  bearing  interest  at  5  per  cent.,  and 
destitute  also  of  capital  and  technical  skill,  would  sadly 
miss  the  £370,000  previously  expended  annually  therein 

1  Stair's  Facts  and  their  Consequences  (1782),  p.  4. 

2  Adeane's  Girlhood  of  M.  J.  Holroyd  (1896),  p.  11. 

3  Sheffield's   Observations   on   the   Commerce   of   the   American   States 

(1783),  pp.  7,  12,  19. 

4  ibid,  p.  20. 

5  Consolatory  Thoughts  on  American  Independence  (1782),  p.  16. 

6  Adams'  Twenty-one  Letters  (1789),  p.  60. 

7  Sheffield's  Observations,  p.  105. 

8  ibid,  p.  101. 

9  A.  W.  Farmer's  View  of  the  Contest  (1774),  p.  25. 


COLONIAL  THEORY  IN   1783  193 

by  the  British  military  establishment,  and  the  loss 
accruing  from  separation  would  be  all  on  the  colonial  side. 
The  dependence  of  Lancashire  upon  the  American  cotton 
supply  was  a  thing  of  the  future,  as  only  l  one  twenty-fifth 
of  the  world's  cotton  was  produced  in  the  United  States  in 
1791.  To-day  they  provide  the  bulk  of  that  supply  and 
export  yearly  to  Great  Britain  nearly  forty  million  pounds 
worth,  but  in  the  light  of  earlier  days  we  can  well  under- 
stand why  both  Washington  and  Henry  Laurens  feared 
the  effect  of  these  derogatory  tenets  upon  American 
thought;  certainly  in  England,  they  helped  to  strengthen 
the  new  idea  that  a  colony  was  never  more  than  2 "  a  mill- 
stone lying  about  the  neck  of  this  country."  The  repeal 
of  all  prohibitory  acts  made  English  ports  again  the 
principal  European  depots  for  American  produce,  while 
the  Americans  on  the  other  hand  experienced  3  the  dis- 
advantages of  being  outside  the  empire  by  being  excluded 
from  trade  with  the  British  West  Indies  until  the  year 
1793,  4  and  by  having  to  face  a  prohibitive  duty  on  the 
importation  of  those  Boston  oils,  which  had  in  previous 
years  illuminated  the  streets  of  London. 

Even  Tories  acquiesced  in  the  opinion  that  empire 
entailed  more  sacrifices  than  benefits.  Josiah  Tucker, 
dean  of  Gloucester,  an  old  antagonist  of  Franklin  and 
persistent  depreciator  of  the  revolutionaries,  was  an  able 
exponent  of  this  view,  and  though  his  claim  to  have 
5  "demolished"  Locke  was  not  convincing,  he  gave 
adequate  expression  to  the  country's  disgust  with  the 
apparently  inevitable  fruits  of  empire-building.  Entirely 

1  Quarterly  Review  (1861),  pp.  422-3. 

2  Tucker's  Four  Letters  on  Important  National  Subjects  (1783),  p.  7. 

3  Nelson's  Dispatches,  i.    9;  Ann.  Register  (1776),  p.  205;  Cornwallis 

Correspondence,  i.    280. 

4  Jefferson's  Memoirs  (1829),  i.    352. 

5  Teignmouth's  Life  of  Sir  Win.  Jones  (1806),  i.  330. 

N 


194  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

distrusting  the  monopolist  tendency  of  the  old  colonial 
system,  and  believing  in  the  new  creed  of  "laisser  faire," 
he  was  almost  the  first  Englishman  to  infer  that  all 
colonies  would  show  the  same  spirit  as  America,  when 
they  reached  a  certain  stage  of  development.  Tucker  was 
a  thinker  of  great  independence ;  he  had  favoured  the  Jew 
Act  of  1753  in  spite  of  much  clerical  bigotry  around  him, 
and  a  peace  policy  in  1756  in  spite  of  the  prevailing  belief 
in  wars  of  trade.  In  sympathy  with  the  opinions  of 
Turgot,  who  appreciated  him,  he  held  that  England  only 
spent  millions  on  her  colonies  with  the  future  prospect  of 
being  abandoned  by  them.  1The  tobacco  of  Virginia  and 
Maryland  would  still  come  first  to  England  as  their  best 
market.  Possessions  were  only  entanglements.  2  Gibraltar 
was  useless  and  3  America  had  been  valueless.  Its  loss  was 
therefore  4"one  of  the  happiest  events"  in  disguise,  and 
we  should  properly  have  cut  the  bond  which  bound  her  to 
us  ourselves ;  the  war  had  simply  been  waged  on  behalf  of 
"  cormorants  and  contractors  here."  It  was  remarkable 
that  the  rebels  had  been  forced  to  buy  English  goods  even 
during  the  struggle,  in  spite  of  their  being  forty  per  cent, 
above  normal  price,  and  with  such  eager  customers 
awaiting  us,  5  Tucker  regarded  the  prolongation  of  the  war 

C  Quixotic  insanity. 
The  consequent  apathy  of  the  government  towards 
colonial  interests,  and  towards  any  idea  of  expansion  was 
great  and  long-lived.  In  the  negotiations  of  1783,  the 
claims  of  the  Newfoundland  fishermen  were  disregarded 
as  irrelevant  to  England's  purpose  of  obtaining  peace,  and 

1  Tucker's  Cui  Bono  (1781),  p.  76. 

2  ibid,  p.  137. 

3  ibid,  p.  127. 

4  Tucker's  Four  Letters  (1783),  pp.  7-8. 

5  Cui  Bono,  pp.  41,  87. 


COLONIAL  THEORY  IN   1783  195 

a  private  undertaking  not  to  annoy  the  French  fishermen 
by  competing  with  them  on  the  French  shore  led  to  a 
century  of  friction.  At  the  same  time,  l  Minorca  was 
abandoned  as  useless,  and  2  Gibraltar  was  nearly  ceded  to 
Spain.  After  1793  United  States  traders  were  allowed  to 
compete  on  equal  terms  with  British  Americans  in  the 
West  India  trade.  Firmly  believing  with  3  Paine  in  the 
uselessness  of  every  possession  from  Halifax  to  Gibraltar, 
ministers  acted  consistently  upon  that  assumption  and 
became  entirely  engrossed  in  the  new  political  and  social 
reforms  at  home.  For  fifty  years,  British  North  America 
was  4  decried  as  a  field  for  emigration,  and  settlers  were 
encouraged  to  drift  in  thousands  to  the  United  States, 
where  they  became  aliens.  In  Queen  Victoria's  reign 
this  tendency  was  strengthened  for  some  years  by 
the  want  of  a  direct  line  of  steamers  to  Canada,  and  the 
absence  of  an  emigration  agency.  Everywhere  the  govern- 
ment floundered  between  such  irreconcilable  motives  as 
philanthropy  and  self-interest,  expediency  and  altruism, 
ultimate  advantage  and  immediate  economy.  Australia 
was  considered  to  be  simply  suitable  for  convicts;  New 
Zealand  all  but  fell  into  the  hands  of  France;  South 
Africa  was  treated  with  habitual  inconsistency  and  weak- 
ness. Canada's  boundaries  were  permitted  to  be  whittled 
down  by  the  surrenders  to  her  southern  neighbours,  known 
in  diplomacy  as  the  Ashburton  Treaty  of  1842  and  the 
Oregon  Treaty  of  1846.  CJn  every  part  of  the  world,  Great 
Britain  pursued  a  negligent  policy  of  non-intervention  in 
questions  involved  by  expansion.  The  empire,  which  was 

1  Considerations  on  the  Provisional  Treaty  with  America  (1783),  p.  10. 

2  ibid,  p.  18;  Pasquin  and  Marforio  (1783),  p.  31. 

3  Paine's  Letter  to  Raynal  (1782),  pp.  69-71. 

4  J.  Knight's  Extracts  from  Letters  written  by  Englishmen  in  the  U.S.A. 

(1818),  p.  25. 


196  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

predicted  in  1763  Ho  vie  one  day  with  that  of  Russia  or 
China  in  extent,  and  that  of  Rome  in  glory,  had  proved 
itself,  in  Franklin's  phrase,  but  a  2"fine  and  noble  China 
vase,"  which  broke  at  the  first  emergency.  We  cannot 
wonder  that  in  the  first  moments  of  disillusion,  men 
reversed  their  opinions  as  completely  as  did  their  ancestors 
when  they  found  the  rule  of  the  saints  impracticable  in 
1660.  The  step  to  the  absolute  insularity  of  early  Victorian 
politics  was  easy  and  short,  and  the  doctrines  of  Poleden 
and  Bright  hark  back  to  those  of  1783.  The/<me  great 
redeeming  feature  of  the  "laisser  faire"  system  was  its 
free  gift  to  the  colonies  of  the  boon  of  self-government, 
which  earned  for  Britain  a  loyalty  impossible  in  her  day 
of  self-conscious  empire ;  so  the  extravagance  of  the 
"  laisser  Jaire  "  policy  in  its  early  phase  worked  at  last  its 
own  cure./ 

It  is  clear  too  that  the  older  belief  in  the  virtues  of  a 
Greater  Britain  never  entirely  died  out.  In  1783  one 
writer  of  "  Political  Memoirs  with  regard  to  French 
Policy'7  deprecated  the  current  3"zeal  for  a  peace  on  any 
terms,"  and  4the  government  eventually  helped  loyalist 
refugees  to  settle  in  Canada,  New  Brunswick  and  Nova 
Scotia,  and  gave  them  three  million  pounds  to  compensate 
for  their  sufferings.  5Some  four  hundred  free  negro 
loyalists  were  planted  in  Sierra  Leone.  The  Napoleonic 
wars  were  breasted  with  a  courage,  much  recruited  by  a 
sense  of  the  value  of  England's  remaining  possessions. 
Napoleon  fully  realised  that  a  maritime  and  colonial 
empire  was  worth  more  than  what  was  suggested  by  Turgot, 

1  Annual  Register  (1763),  p.  15. 

2  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.  364;  Priestley's  Memoirs  (1806),  p.  450. 

3  Political  Memoirs  (1783),  p.  xl. 

4  Sheffield's  Observations  on  Commerce  (1783),  p.  97. 

5  Hoare's  Memoirs  of  G.  Sharp  (1820),  p.  274. 


COLONIAL  THEORY  IN   1783  197 

and  accepted  by  the  "  laisser  f  aire  "  school.  In  the  opinion 
of  many  Britons,  the  individualist  illusion  had  to  be 
tempered  by  Napoleon's  epigrams.  "  The  east  is  worth  a 
turban  and  a  pair  of  trousers."  "  Egypt  once  in  possession 
of  the  French,,  farewell  India  to  the  British."  "  There  are 
only  two  nations,  the  French  and  English;  the  rest  are 
nothing."  The  great  Emperor  fought  avowedly  to  recover 
supremacy  at  sea  and  in  the  east,  and  his  ambitions  thus 
forced  England  into  a  new  struggle  for  dominion.  The 
value  of  the  West  Indies  was  indeed  almost  over-estimated, 
while  the  East  India  Company  was  induced  by  "Wellesley 
to  pursue  a  forward  policy  in  Hindustan/^We  can  there- 
fore trace  the  roots  of  the  imperialist  revival  in  our  own 
times  to  a  very  early  date  in  the  history  of  the  preceding 
school  of  political  thought.  1Hugh  Gray's  "Letters  from 
Canada,"  written  in  1806,  1807  and  1808  proved  that  even 
if  it  were  not.  a  colony's  interest,  to  remain  within  the 
empire,  there  was  no  doubt  that  such  was  England's  interest. 
Better  preserve  a  smaller  market  than  further  the  rise  of  a 
foreign  nation,  which  could  always  vex  the  country  with 
threats  of  trade  embargoes  and  boundary  quarrels.  In 
January  1800  the  laureate  Pye,  heralding  what  he  con- 
sidered to  be  the  opening  of  a  new  century,  had  predicted 
that  2"The  realms  which  God  has  joined  shall  never  man 
divide,"  a  conceit  somewhat  liable  to  the  Gladstonian 
criticism  that  man  cannot  join  realms  which  God  has 
divided  by  oceans.  It  attests  nevertheless  to  the  rise  of  a 
tendency  to  identify  an  active  foreign  policy  with  renewed 
colonial  aspirations,  which  tendency  grew  in  strength  as 
Napoleon  was  slowly  defeated.  Open  as  their  domestic 
policy  was  to  criticism,  the  governments  of  Pitt  and 
Castlereagh  and  Liverpool  at  all  events  handed  on  some- 

1  Gray's  Letters  from  Canada  (1809),  pp.  76,  370. 

2  H.  J.  Pye's  Carmen  Seculare  (1800). 


198  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

thing  of  the  old  tradition  of  the  uses  of  empire  to  practical 
pioneers  of  expansion  like  Lord  Durham  and  Edward 
Gibbon  Wakefield,  and  finally,  almost  in  our  days,  a  new 
imperial  theory  came  into  being,  which  revived  what  was 
most  valuable  in  the  old  colonial  system,  while  retaining 
all  that  was  best  in  the  "  laisser  f aire  "  reaction  of  1783. ^ 


"  HANDS  ACROSS  THE  SEA"  199 


CHAPTER    XI. 

"HANDS  ACROSS  THE  SEA." 

THE  fall  of  the  old  colonial  system  had  little  influence 
upon  British  feelings  towards  America.  Sentiment  had 
never  animated  imperial  policy  before  the  Revolution,  and 
consequently  in  England,  there  had  been  little  brotherly 
love  to  destroy.  When  the  next  generation  sprang  up, 
believing  in  the  new  principle  of  nationality,  and 
accustomed  in  a  measure  at  least  to  the  liberal  ideal  of 
cosmopolitanism,  the  heat  of  the  American  war  was  soon 
forgotten.  Two  causes  helped  to  create  a  novel  affection 
for  the  revolted  colonists.  In  the  first  place,  trade  increased 
between  the  two  peoples  to  an  extent  amazing  to  former 
adherents  of  the  older  economic  school,  and  for  several 
years  after  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  British 
exports  to  the  United  States  we;re  x  twice  or  thrice  as  valu- 
able as  United  States  exports  to  Great  Britain.  The 
Americans  found  England  2a  cheaper  and  better  market 
than  France,  and  were  3  excellent  customers  for  half  a 
century.  4The  export  of  woollen  goods  rose  with  a  bound 
after  1783  while  5our  cotton  trade  became  for  the  first 
time  a  wonder  to  the  world.  6The  scarcity  of  labour  still 
made  the  cost  of  production  in  the  States  comparatively 

1  Hugh  Gray's  Letters  from  Canada  (1809),  pp.  380-1. 

2  Speeches  of   Mr.    Smith  of   S.    Carolina   (1794),   pp.    31-2;   Brissot's 

Travels  in  U.S.A.  in  1788  (1794),  p.  65-6. 

3  Beawes'  Lex  Mercatoria,  ii.    88. 

4  Question  of  Wool  truly  Stated  (1788),  p.  3. 

5  Crisis  in  Calico  and  Muslin  Manufacture  Explained  (1788),  p.  5. 

6  Jefferson's  Memoirs  (1829),  i.    367. 


200  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

high.  Indeed  1it  was  suggested  that  the  economic  in- 
dependence of  America  had  lost  them  the  former  bounties, 
without  enabling  them  to  manufacture  for  themselves, 
and  that  the  4th  of  July  should  be  treated  as  a  2"day  of 
repentence."  Of  course,  such  doubts  soon  passed  away 
along  with  American  free  trade;  even  as  early  as  31788  the 
progress  of  the  States  gave  rise  to  a  disavowal  of  Lord 
Sheffield's  optimism,  but  its  prevalence  at  the  time  made 
Britons  more  inclined  to  forget  the  past  bloodshed. 

Secondly,  the  close  connection  between  the  Whig  party 
and  the  American  revolutionaries  had  had  at  all  events  one 
abiding  advantage.  It  had  lessened  the  impression  that 
the  struggle  was  international.  It  had  preserved  to  some 
extent  the  idea  of  racial  affinity  between  leaders  of  thought 
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  At  the  time  of  his  victory 
at  Saratoga,  4Gates  sent  a  message  of  friendship  to  an 
English  Whig.  Franklin  was  devoted  to  5  "our  dear  good 
friend,  Doctor  Price,"  and  while  hating  the  government, 
he  never  wavered  in  his  sympathy  with  its  opponents. 
6  "But  to  be  serious  my  dear  old  friend,"  he  wrote  to 
Joseph  Priestley  in  1782,  "  I  love  you  as  much  as  ever,  and 
I  love  all  the  honest  souls  that  meet  at  the  London  Coffee- 
House.  ...  I  long  to  see  them  and  you  once  more,  and  I 
labor  for  peace  with  more  earnestness  that  I  may  again  be 
happy  in  your  sweet  society."  7  Granville  Sharp  received 
honorary  degrees  from  no  less  than  three  American  univer- 
sities in  1787.  For  several  generations,  the  Whigs  looked 
on  the  States  as  an  ideal  republic  where  the  poor  man 

1  Kamsay's  Hist.  Am.  Rev.,  ii.    339. 

2  Isaac  Weld's  Travels  in  N.  America  (1799),  p.  156. 

3  Brissot's  Travels  in  U.S.A.  in  1788  (1794),  p.  xi. 

4  Chatham  Correspondence,  iv.    489. 

5  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    347. 

6  ibid,  iii.    61. 

7  Hoare's  Memoirs  of  G.  Sharp  (1820),  p.  253. 


"HANDS  ACROSS  THE  SEA"  201 

could  live  in  happiness  and  plenty,  unhampered  by  peers 
and  prelates. 

Hence  in  England,  large  classes  of  men  were  free  from 
the  resentment  so  often  lingering  after  a  great  war.  They 
had  not  tasted  of  the  bitter  fruit  of  campaigns  upon  their 
own  countryside,  and  they  sank  old  jealousies  in  reviving 
brisk  trade  with  America  and  in  facing  the  entirely  fresh 
problems  presented  by  the  French  Revolution.  l  Burke 
and  2Romilly  both  expected  to  see  the  natural  alliance 
between  England  and  the  United  States  succeed  the  un- 
natural connection  between  the  latter  and  France.  In 
1793  3'Talleyrand  expressed  the  same  opinion.  4  An  English 
writer  pointed  out  that  such  an  alliance  would  be  founded 
on  the  highest  principles,  for  if  old  foes  like  England  and 
France  could  join  in  the  commercial  treaty  of  1787  5  "  shall 
America  retain  the  resentment  of  a  day?"  Moreover  the 
new  colonial  theory  of  1783  was  of  so  pacific  a  nature,  that 
the  birth  of  the  idea  of  nationality  and  of  race  in  politics 
might  well  have  stimulated  both  peoples  to  friendship. 
6Many  Englishmen  seem  to  have  been  proud  of  Washington 
as  a  compatriot,  while  7  Thomas  Erskine  in  his  defence  of 
Paine  on  his  trial  for  seditious  libel  in  1792  dared  to  call 
the  Revolution  glorious,  just  and  happy. 

Some  Americans  responded  to  the  changed  spirit  of 
British  imperial  policy,  like  John  Jay,  who  said  he 
8"should  prefer  a  connexion  with  her  to  a  league 

1  Burke's  Correspondence,  iv.    509. 

2  Romilly's  Memoirs,  i.    183. 

3  Holland's  Foreign  Reminiscences  (1850),  p.  39. 

4  Remarks  on  Travels  of  Chastellux  (1787),  p.  73. 

5  ibid,  p.  75. 

6  Sparks'  Washington,   xi.     210;   Correspondence  of   H.   Walpole  and 

Mann,  ii.    222. 

7  22  State  Trials,  p.  428. 

8  Life  of  John  Jay  by  his  Son  (1833),  ii.    23. 


202  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

with  any  powers  on  earth/'  and  who  looked  with 
something  of  the  new  sentimentality  on  l  "Old 
England,  which  afforded  my  ancestors  an  asylum  from 
persecution."  He  negotiated  a  treaty  between  the  two 
countries  in  1794,  which  was  ratified  by  the  senate  in  1795 
in  spite  of  much  opposition  in  the  States ;  while  the  excesses 
of  the  French  Revolution  gave  Britain  a  new  opportunity. 
The  sober  and  commercial  elements  of  the  American  people 
had  a  profound  dread  of  Jefferson's  radical  propaganda, 
and  were  drawn  back  to  conservative  sentiment  by  the 
prospect  of  attacks  on  property.  A  very  large  number  of 
New  Englanders,  successors  of  the  Federalist  party  of 
1783,  deprecated  the  War  of  1812  as  between  2men  who 
ought  to  feel  and  love  like  brethren,"  and  borrowing  for 
the  occasion  the  constitutional  theories  of  their  opponents, 
denied  that  they  were  under  any  legal  liability  to  help  the 
central  government  in  a  war  of  which  they  disapproved. 

Unfortunately,  the  old  colonial  system  had  so  dominated 
the  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  America  for  two 
centuries,  that  its  iron  had  entered  into  the  soul  of  the 
United  States.  Many  years  had  to  pass  before  new  con- 
ditions could  obliterate  the  recollection  of  the  past.  In 
dealing  therefore,  with  such  a  subject  as  British  colonial 
policy  in  the  reigns  of  George  II.  and  George  III.,  it  is 
quite  relevant  to  examine  the  legacy  which  it  bequeathed 
directly  to  international  thought.  Policy  is  judged  by  its 
fruits,  and  the  system  under  which  England  won  North 
America  ended  not  merely  in  the  loss  of  thirteen  colonies, 
but  in  a  long  period  of  ill  feeling  among  the  people  whom 
she  had  endeavoured  to  suppress.  The  extraordinary  bitter- 
ness, which  prevailed  in  the  United  States  for  some  genera- 

1  ibid,  ii.    24. 

2  M.  Carey's  Olive  Branch  (1815),  pp.  255,  313-15,  320-3. 


" HANDS  ACROSS  THE  SEA"  203 

tioiis  after  the  War  of  Independence,  attests  to  the  total 
failure  of  the  old  colonial  system  to  engender  any  of  the 
true  imperial  spirit,  that  is  to  say,  the  appreciation  of  a 
common  brotherhood  among  men  of  the  same  race  all  over 
the  world.  The  Wars  of  the  Roses  were  forgotten  in  half 
a  century,  and  the  Cromwellian  struggles  passed  into  mere 
history  in  1688,  because  in  each  case,  conflict  had  not  been 
preceded  by  any  sense  of  radical  alienation  between  the 
great  masses  of  combatants  on  either  side.  In  the  American 
War,  the  revolutionaries  had  a  far  more  personal  cause. 
The  old  colonial  system  affected  every  hearth  and  home 
in  the  colonies,  and  consequently  its  downfall  in  1783  did 
not  involve  an  immediate  end  to  the  sense  of  feud  in  the 
United  States,  as  it  did  in  Great  Britain.  For  this  reason, 
just  as  we  deem  colonial  co-operation  with  the  home 
country  in  1899  a  test  of  the  newer  school  of  imperial 
policy,  so  we  are  forced  to  consider  the  American  attitude 
towards  England  after  1783  as  a  factor  to  be  dealt  with 
in  estimating  the  worth  of  its  less  fortunate  fore-runner. 

Throughout  the  War  of  Independence,  the  actual  pre- 
sence of  warfare  on  their  own  soil,  and  the  feeling  that  the 
struggle  involved  the  personal  welfare  of  every  individual 
partisan,  inspired  Americans  with  a  deeper  animosity  than 
that  which  prevailed  in  England.  With  them,  the  causes 
of  the  war  and  the  issues  at  stake  were  alike  far  nearer  to 
the  personality  of  every  citizen.  Great  Britain  fought  for 
empire,  but  America  fought  for  the  Americans.  Its  ardour 
was  more  thorough,  its  hate  deeper,  its  intolerance  more 
bitter.  l  "A  Tory  has  been  properly  defined  to  be  a  traitor 
in  thought  but  not  in  deed,"  wrote  Jefferson,  and  the 
revolutionaries  persecuted  the  loyalists  with  relentless  zeal. 
In  New  York  they  were  stigmatised  as  enslavers  of  their 

1  Jefferson's  Notes  on  Virginia  (1782),  p.  285. 


204  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

own  country,  guilty  of  l "  felony,  murder,  and  every  otlier 
act  of  high  treason."  Such  intemperance  struck  old 
believers  in  the  imperial  creed  of  Chatham's  wars  with 
amazement.  2"Good  God!"  exclaimed  an  American 
writer  in  1774,  "  Can  we  look  forward  to  the  ruin  of  the 
whole  British  empire  without  one  relenting  thought?" 
Was  the  new  republican  ideal  to  be  built  upon  fanaticism 
and  mob  law?  3"0  rare  American  freedom!"  Many 
moderate  colonists  shrank  from  the  burning  zeal  of  the 
enthusiasts,  who  alleged  that  Toryism  was  4"  grievous  to 
all  honest  men,"  and  they  feared  that  "  these  delectable 
provinces"  would  fall  5" under  the  harrow  of  oppressive 
demagogues."  The  Irish  element  in  the  States  had 
too  fresh  a  recollection  of  the  bad  English  government 
in  Ireland  to  abstain  from  fanning  the  fire.  The  earnest 
recommendation  of  Congress  to  the  several  provincial 
legislatures  at  the  end  of  the  war  to  show  mercy  towards 
the  loyalists  was  consistently  ignored. 

Thus  the  general  feeling  against  Britain  in  the  United 
States  proved  that  the  steps  actually  leading  to  the  out- 
break of  the  Revolution,  had  been  but  of  an  incidental 
nature,  and  that  the  old  colonial  system  would  have  led  in 
any  event  to  separation  and  hate.  Franklin  was  the 
coolest  of  men,  but  his  belief  in  the  inherent  tyranny  of 
that  system  made  him  deny  that  the  two  nations  would 
ever  feel  again  the  glow  of  kinship.  6  Priestley  tells  a 
story  that  on  the  day  when  Wedderburn  insulted  Franklin 
before  the  Privy  Council  in  1773  as  having  stolen 

1  Gent.  Mag.  (1783),  p.  884. 

2  A  Farmer's  Free  Thoughts  on  the  Proceedings  of  Congress  (1774),  p.  6 

3  ibid,  p.  36. 

4  Tyranny  Unmasked  (1775),  p.  5. 

5  Candidas'  Plain  Truth  (1776),  p.   38. 

6  Priestley's  Memoirs,  p.  454. 


"HANDS  ACROSS  THE  SEA"  205 

Hutchinson's  letters,  Franklin  put  aside  his  suit  of  spotted 
Manchester  velvet,  and  never  wore  it  again  until  the  day 
when  American  independence  was  acknowledged.  The 
incident  is  not  without  its  moral.  Franklin  would  not 
accept  Hartley's  suggestion  that  Great  Britain  would  be 
for  ever  l"  the  home  "  of  the  Americans,  and  said  that  they 
would  never  forget  2"your  bloody  and  insatiable  malice 
and  wickedness,"  words  which  contrast  strikingly  with  the 
cheerful  optimism  of  British  amity  in  1783.  When  the 
anniversary  of  the  French  alliance  was  celebrated  by 
Washington's  army  in  the  February  of  that  year,  the  pass- 
words of  the  day  were  3  "America  and  France,"  and  "United 
for  ever,"  mottoes  little  calculated  to  further  England's 
hold  upon  American  sentiment,  and  which,  in  the  opinion 
of  4  Frenchmen,  ought  to  have  been  followed  by  an 
abandonment  of  Jamaica  rum  for  French  brandy.  5  Otis 
left  one  of  his  daughters  but  five  shillings  under  his  will, 
to  punish  her  for  marrying  a  British  officer,  while  no 
greater  bitterness  was  ever  displayed  than  that  which 
Samuel  Quincey's  family  expressed  when  he  espoused  the 
loyalist  cause.  Jefferson  and  the  democratic  party,  burn- 
ing with  the  anti-monarchical  fanaticism  engendered  by 
the  French  Revolution,  tried  to  make  hatred  of  England  a 
cardinal  tenet  of  American  patriotism,  and  delighted  to 
vex  6"the  proudest  nation  on  earth." 

Three  causes  contributed  to  strengthen  this  lamentable 
legacy  of  the  abandoned  colonial  theory.  In  the  first 
place,  the  actual  presence  of  war  made  it  harder  for 

1  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    412. 

2  ibid,  ii.    499. 

3  Sparks'  Washington,  viii.    381. 

4  Brissot's  Travels  in  U.S.A.  in  1788  (1794),  p.  398. 

5  Tudor's  Otis  (1823),  p.  483. 

6  Jefferson's  Memoirs  (1829),  i.    153. 


206  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

Americans  to  forget.  1  Paine  said  that  the  sight  of  smoking 
homesteads  and  schools  would  live  forever  in  the  memories 
of  the  youngest.  When  General  von  Biedesel's  wife  asked 
an  American  woman  for  food,  she  was  scolded  in  return, 
"Why  have  you  come  from  your  own  land  to  kill  us  and 
drive  us  out  of  hearth  and  home?"  John  Adams  always 

«/ 

said  that  a  nation  fighting,  like  his  own,  3"  for  her  altars 
and  firesides,"  could  never  be  wholly  conquered,  and  that 
such  a  struggle  was  of  necessity  impressed  for  ever  upon 
her  imagination. 

Secondly,  the  history  of  the  United  States  must  necess- 
arily start  with  the  dramatic  annals  of  the  War  of 
Independence,  and  therefore  those  annals  must  always 
loom  more  largely  upon  the  thought  of  the  young  republic 
than  upon  that  of  Great  Britain.  To  Englishmen  the  war 
would  never  be  more  than  an  incident  in  a  long  history; 
to  Americans  it  would  be  never  less  than  a  national  epic. 
The  consequent  tendency  to  emphasise  the  country's 
wrongs,  to  exalt  the  "patriot"  heroes,  to  depict  the  con- 
stitutions and  declarations  of  the  revolutionary  period  as 
monuments  of  creative  genius,  and  to  darken  the  offences, 
of  which  the  British  government  was  guilty,  would 
necessarily  be  great.  Paine  justly  argued  that  the  children 
of  that  generation  in  America  would  be  England's  foes  for 
all  time  under  the  instruction  that  they  would  inevitably 
receive.  4  Washington  hated  the  idea  of  sending  children 
to  Europe  for  their  education,  and  thus  prevented  the 
softening  influence  of  more  tolerant  schools.  One-sided 
books  like  Paine's  "Common  Sense"  had  5 prodigious 

1  Paine's  Letter  to  Raynal  (1782),  p.  63. 

2  Riedesel  Briefe  und  Berichte  ,  p.  189. 

3  Adams'  Twenty-one  Letters,  pp.  19,  31. 

4  Sparks'  Washington,  xii.    3. 

5  Bigelow's  Franklin,  iii.    374. 


"HANDS  ACROSS  THE  SEA"  207 

effects  upon  American  thought.  The  absence  of  any  real 
wish  in  England  to  inflict  injustice  upon  her  colonies  was 
always  ignored.  It  was  assumed  that  acts  which  seemed 
oppressive  raised  necessarily  the  imputation  of  a  "mens 
rea,"  and  fallacies  in  British  theory  were  treated  as  crimes 
in  fact. 

The  third  motive  power  in  stimulating  this  hostility 
among  Americans  was  derived  from  the  effect  produced  by 
the  contemptuous  disregard  for  their  capacity  under  the 
old  colonial  system.  In  Great  Britain  the  delusion  that 
the  Yankees  were  cowards  had  been  the  folly  of  a  day.  In 
America  it  was  taken  bitterly  to  heart,  and  national  vanity 
prompted  much  of  the  self-assertion,  which  has  since 
hampered  the  hopes  of  the  enlightened  to  join  "hands 
across  the  sea."  So  large  a  number  of  the  vaunts  of  that 
day  justified  themselves  afterwards  by  passing  into  sober 
fact,  that  this  trait  even  now  needs  mitigation.  While 
1Raynal,  in  view  of  the  extreme  depression  in  American 
finance  at  the  close  of  the  war  expressed  the  doubt  whether 
ten  millions  of  people  could  ever  find  subsistence  in  the 
United  States,  Americans  already  boasted  of  the  future 
glories  of  their  republic,  and  looked  forward  to  constituting 
an  immense  agricultural  community.  20tis  had  predicted 
that  in  a  century,  its  population  would  be  greater  than 
that  of  the  British  Isles ;  3  Chauncey  thought  that  this 
event  would  come  to  pass  in  twenty-five  years.  4  Burgh 
and  5  Jefferson  held  that  its  population  would  double  every 
twenty  years;  6  Franklin  every  twenty-five.  The  Americans 

1  Raynal's  Revolution  in  America  (1781),  p.  179. 

2  Otis'  Vindication  of  the  Brit.  Colonies,  p.  20. 

3  J.  Adams'  Works  (ed.  1850),  ii.    305. 

*   Burgh's  Political  Disquisitions  (1774),  ii.    287. 

5  Tucker's  Jefferson  (1837),  i.    229. 

6  Cobbett's  Parl.  Hist.,  xvi.    141. 


208  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

married  more  generally  and  at  a  younger  age  than  Britons 
at  home,  and  l  possibly  lived  longer.  Truly,  as 2  Washington 
told  Lauzun,  the  rising  generation  in  the  colonies  formed 
an  unconquerable  army.  3  Franklin  said  that  they  would 
one  day  rule  the  whole  of  North  America,  and  4  Galloway, 
though  a  loyalist,  anticipated  their  sway  over  Mexico  and 
Brazil,  Chili  and  Peru.  The  French  traveller  Brissot  de 
Warville  flattered  such  dreamers  by  prophesying  5the 
construction  of  a  Nicaragua  canal,  and  the  rise  of  a  great 
pastoral  state  untainted  by  the  lures  of  commerce. 

6  "America,"  he  said,  "will  never  have  enormous  cities  like 
London  and  Paris."     These  hopes  made  many  Americans 
affect  to  treat  every  pretension  of  other  countries   as  a 
slur  on  their  own  national  merits,  and  Sir  Samuel  Eomilly, 
himself  a  great  believer  in  their  future,  had  to  reflect  upon 

7  "  the  American  mania  of  pretending  to  philosophize  upon 
everything,   and   to   treat   all   nations   but  his   own  with 
contempt."     The  Americans  were  too  prone  to  Franklin's 
habit   of   being   unable   to   exalt   8"our   rising   country" 
except    at    the    expense    of    "this    old    rotten    state"    of 
England.      Their   morbid    sensitiveness   to    any   conduct, 
which  might  conceivably  be  due  to  want  of  appreciation  of 
American  greatness,  can  be  reasonably  attributed  to  the 
tendency  under  the  old  colonial  system  to  regard  colonists 
as  but*  a  conquered  race,  and  of  inferior  metal.       This 

1  Bossu's  Travels  (1771),  p.  406;  Brissot's  Travels  in  U.S.A.  in  1788 

(1794),   p.   302;  but  see  Kalm  Travels   (1772),   i.    81,   Robin  and 
Paw. 

2  Lauzun's  Memoirs,  ii.    224. 

3  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    449. 

4  Cool   Thoughts  on  the  Consequences  of  Am.    Independence   (1780), 

p.  13. 

5  Brissot's  Travels  in  U.S.A.  in  1788  (1794),  p.  407. 

6  ibid,  p.  415. 

7  Romilly's  Memoirs,  ii.    37-8. 

8  Bigelow's  Franklin,  ii.    250. 


"HANDS  ACROSS  THE  SEA"  209 

delusion  irritated  the  revolutionaries  above  all  other 
charges,  and  made  Washington  insist  upon  the  necessity 
of  keeping  *"an  American  character/'  independent  of  the 
favour  of  any  European  state. 

Upon  such  grounds  therefore  as  have  been  here  set 
forth,  we  are  obliged  to  condemn  the  old  colonial  system 
as  a  working  policy.  It  is  true  that  some  of  its  principles 
can  still  be  cherished,  and  that  it  inspired  sufficient  interest 
and  ambition  in  the  minds  of  Englishmen  to  win  North 
America  for  Great  Britain,  and  to  give  the  nation  that  gift 
of  expansion,  upon  which  the  future  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
race  depends.  To  that  extent  it  was  indeed  a  fruitful 
factor  in  our  history,  but  it  had  no  further  potentialities, 
and  its 'downfall  led  to  a  long  estrangement,  which  was  a 
worse  result  than  loss  of  mere  territory.  Consolation  (if 
any)  can  only  lie  in  the  lessons  taught  by  its  disastrous 
end. 

l  Sparks'  Washington,  xi.    83;  xii.    392. 


210  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 


CHAPTER   XII. 

LESSONS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION. 

DURING  the  last  century,  the  lessons  taught  by  the 
downfall  of  the  old  colonial  system  have  been  stated  in 
various  manners  according  to  the  imperial  theory  of  the 
hour/To  one  generation  the  chief  inference  to  be  deduced 
from  the  loss  of  our  first  American  colonies  was  the  in- 
trinsic futility  of  our  empire;  to  another,  it  has  been  the 
immense  importance  of  preserving  it.  One  age  has 
regarded  "  laisser  f aire  "  as  the  best  agent  to  effect  separa- 
tion; another  as  the  best  agent  of  unity.  The  modern 
liability  to  be  excluded  forcibly  by  tariffs  from  commerce 
with  foreign  possessions  has  led  recently  to  an  appreciation 
by  all  the  great  powers  of  the  virtues  of  the  national  flag 
as  a  safeguard  of  trade,  and  this  has  combined  with 
political  influences  at  work  in  England  since  Disraeli's 
accession  to  power  in  1874  to  foster  the  imperialist  theory 
at  the  expense  of  quietism^  The  experiences  of  Australia 
and  New  Zealand  have  refuted  the  fallacy  that  democracy 
is  incompatible  with  empire,  while  the  great  work  which 
Britons  have  accomplished  throughout  the  world  in 
furthering  the  prosperity  and  contentment  of  subject 
peoples  has  made  the  nation  realise  the  vast  moral 
advantages  arising  from  the  exercise  of  the  governing 
f  aculty/^Meanwhile  it  is  clear  that  the  intense  commercial 
jealousy  and  monopolist  greed,  which  so  alienated  colonies 
under  the  old  system,  have  quite  disappeared  from 
modern  British  policy,  except  perhaps  in  India,  which  is 
no  colony  at  all.  The  tendency  is  rather  in  the  direction 


THE  AMERICAN   REVOLUTION  211 

of  giving  them  advantages  out  of  proportion  to  their 
natural  weight  and  to  the  scanty  sacrifices  they  make  for 
the  support  of  the  common  empire.  A  most  painstaking 
observer  has  laid  down  that  the  drift  of  the  empire  is  to- 
day towards  alliance  not  l  federation,  towards  a  phase  of 
friendly  con'tract  not  towards  the  status  of  the  old-time 
loyalty^  So  far  then,  one  obvious  lesson  of  the  American 
Revolution  has  been  taken  to  heart.  Since  Lord  North's 
Act  of  1778  it  has  been  illegal  to  impose  direct  taxation 
upon  the  colonies  from  Westminster,  and  few  statesmen 
would  dream  of  meddling  in  their  internal  affairs.  In 
this  sense,  the  suggested  interference  of  Australian  and  of 
some  English  politicians  with  the  internal  policy  of  the 
executive  government  in  the  Transvaal  colony  would  be 
pure  reaction.  With  regard  to  the  self-governing  colonies, 
the  tendency  is  to  make  their  independence  merely 
nominal.  Her  experiences  in  1871  and  1903  are  not  cal- 
culated to  induce  Canada  to  follow  any  future  projects  of 
arbitration  that  emanate  from  Downing  Street,  and  this 
idea  of  limiting  British  interference  to  the  Crown's  power 
of  appointing  governors,  and  to  the  unimpressive  and 
2  unpopular  power  of  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy 
Council  to  hear  appeals  from  colonial  courts  in  certain 
cases,  can  be  clearly  traced  to  the  general  perception  of 
one  of  the  morals  of  the  War  of  Independence.  Its  wisdom 
is  as  palpable  as  that  of  the  larger  lesson  that  love  of 
freedom  is  the  greatest  moral  force  in  political  life. 

Is  there  nothing  more  to  be  learnt  than  such  now 
commonplace  characteristics  of  practical  politics?  Those 
who  aim  at  making  history  a  science  aspire  to  dazzle  the 
world  with  brilliant  deductions  from  any  group  of  cor- 
relative facts,  and  it  might  well  be  thought  disappointing 

1  E.  Jebb's  Studies  in  Colonial  Nationalism  (1905),  p.  viii. 

2  ibid,  pp.  80-1,  302-3. 


212  THE  OLD   COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

to  have  to  content  ourselves  with  such  a  plain  and  currently 
accepted  idea  as  that  of  colonial  internal  independence; 
or  are  historical  lessons  of  a  wider  sort  like  legal  maxims, 
mere  ' minims'  in  practice,  often  misleading  and  never 
conclusive  ? 

In  reality,  history  is  very  far  from  being  an  exact 
science,  and  no  one  who  sifts  its  evidence  judiciously  will 
deem  postulates  of  greater  weight  than  actual  phenomena. 
Admitting  however,  the  many  special  circumstances  of  the 
case  of  the  American  War  of  Independence,  it  does  seem 
possible  to  construct  some  narrower  doctrine  than  the 
general  principle  that  it  is  wrong  to  shackle  fellow  citizens 
over  sea,  from  the  facts  attendant  to  the  downfall  of  the 
eighteenth  century  theory  of  colonial  government.  Its 
failure  was  primarily  due  to  the  absence  of  any  community 
of  interests  between  the  Mother  Country  and  her  colonies. 
There  were  still  some  sentimental  ties  between  them  in 
1763,  and  men  like  Franklin  and  Pownall  were  devoted  to 
the  imperial  ideal.  The  former  said  that  the  colonies  could 
be  led  by  a  mere  thread,  and  both  made  proposals  to 
establish  a  closer  union.  Certainly  in  America,  there  was 
a  true  sense  of  affinity  to  Great  Britain.  It  was  neverthe- 
less too  weak  to  maintain  the  love  of  the  common  empire 
when  the  conquest  of  Canada  broke  the  only  bond  of 
positive  advantage  which  knit  the  colonists  to  England. 
Kindred  blood  and  common  ideas  can  bind  two  peoples 
together  as  strongly  as  links  of  iron,  but  each  must  feel 
that  its  material  privileges  are  associated  with  the  union. 
Such  was  not  the  case  under  our  old  colonial  system,  and 
hence  its  failure.  By  ignoring  the  lesson  of  its  unsuccess, 
Spain  lost  her  trans-Atlantic  possessions,  and  Portugal, 
Brazil.  We  have  now  to  show  that  membership  of  the 
British  empire  conduces  to  the  material  good  of  Canada 
and  Australia,  and  requires  from  each  a  consideration 


THE  AMERICAN   REVOLUTION  213 

more  tangible  than  an  airy  claim  to  loyalty.  Heally  strong 
material  ties  of  union  accrue  to-day  from  the  influence  of 
the  British  connection  in  lightening  the  incidence  of  the 
burden  of  self-defence,  in  providing  security  against 
foreign  aggression,  and  in  enabling  a  colony  to  obtain  the 
loan  of  capital  at  more  moderate  rates  of  interest  than 
independent  countries  of  the  same  standing.  But  for  such 
advantages,  no  such  loose  aggregation  of  states  as  our  own 
could  outlive  the  disintegrating  influences  of  climate  and 
distance.  If  compact  federation  is  impossible,  we  can 
secure  at  all  events  a  working  partnership  between 
sympathetic  and  independent  peoples.  "  Civis  Eomanus 
sum"  becomes  an  empty  catchword  when  citizenship  is 
barren.  Man  will  not  live  politically  on  the  principle  of 
nationality  alone. 

In  a  secondary  degree,  we  can  also  infer  that  community 
of  feeling  is  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  an  empire. 
Alone,  it  will  not  secure  its  continuance,  but  it  is  still  a  vital 
ingredient.  Belief  in  the  higher  character  of  British  ideals 
and  the  natural  antagonism  of  United  States  patriotism 
keep  Canada  prima  facie  loyal,  and  without  such  national 
sentiment  union  may  become  a  mere  question  of  cal- 
culating self-interest.  The  idea  of  racial  unity  was  un- 
discovered in  the  eighteenth  century,  when  Germany  and 
Italy  were  still  but  geographical  expressions.  Pitt's  most 
eager  partisans  never  used  the  phrase  "Anglo-Saxon,"  and 
we  have  seen  how  the  Americans  were  treated  habitually 
as  an  absolutely  alien  people.  We  have  learnt  now  that 
the  tie  of  blood,  however  delusive  historically,  is  the  most 
powerful  political  fiction  in  the  world.  In  the  chief  move- 
ments of  later-day  history,  it  has  been  treated  as  a  rallying 
point,  and  this  alleged  natural  bond  has  proved  a  stronger 
keystone  of  empire  than  all  the  artifices  of  diplomacy. 
Modern  science  has  aided  its  capacity  to  join  people  who 


214  THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM 

are  divided  by  seas,  by  facilitating  inter-communication, 
and  every  step  towards  closer  intimacy  is  good.  It  is  easy 
to  imagine  how  Chatham  would  have  delighted  in  Rhodes's 
dream  of  grafting  the  memories  of  Oxford  upon  the  youth 
of  the  colonies,  and  of  emphasising  the  historical  identity 
of  the  "  island  race."  It  is  clearly  necessary  that  the 
settler  in  lands  beyond  the  sea  must  be  able  to  glory  in  the 
name  of  Briton  in  common  with  his  brothers  in  the  Mother 
Country,  and  in  a  far  wider  and  more  generous  manner 
than  did  George  III.  British  statesmanship  has  to  respect 
the  sensibilities  as  well  as  the  material  interests  of  outlying 
portions  of  the  empire,  and  if  the  necessary  unity  of  ideals 
be  thus  encouraged,  imperial  defence  will  rest  ultimately 
upon  a  sounder  basis  than  the  system  which  broke  down  in 
the  American  Revolution. 

It  is  not  within  the  historian's  province  to  apply  these 
two  principles  to  later-day  controversy.  Academics  end 
and  pure  politics  begin  when  we  raise  the  practical 
questions  of  the  hour.  The  use  of  history  is  simply  to 
furnish  the  records  of  past  experience  for  present  use,  and 
in  that  capacity  its  value  is  genuine  though  limited.  One 
who  understands  the  growth  of  the  empire,  and  who  comes 
also  in  contact  with  the  practical  side  of  life,  is  in  the 
position  of  an  expert  witness  in  political  controversy;  he 
has  materials  analogous  to  the  latter' s  information,  even 
if  he  has  perhaps  something  of  his  bias.  Yet  some 
historical  lessons  like  those  indicated  above  stand  beyond 
the  sphere  of  partisanship.  For  instance,  the  current  fiscal 
dispute  raises  the  issue  whether  or  no  the  existing  relations 
between  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies  provide  sufficient 
community  of  interest  and  sentiment  to  enable  the  empire 
to  endure  the  stress  of  conflicting  aims  and  principles 
without  the  additional  tie  of  preferential  tariffs,  but  as  a 
nation  of  optimists  we  may  perhaps  be  justified  in  assuming 


THE  AMERICAN   REVOLUTION  215 

that  the  best  adherents  of  both  the  affirmative  and  negative 
answers  have  accepted  the  lesson  of  1783,  as  to  the  urgent 
necessity  of  such  a  community.  So  long  as  Parliament 
and  Press  are  not  drowned  by  parochialism,  not  over- 
whelmed by  the  growing  pressure  of  domestic  problems, 
the  British  people  will  not  drop  back  into  mid-Yictorian 
indifference.  For  a  day  at  least,  it  has  passed  out  of  the 
"l  laisser  faire  "  delusion  into  a  clearer  appreciation  of  the 
uses  of  colonisation.  Tkua-ike-Dld  colonial  system  was  not 
wholly  planned  in  vain,  for  it  bequeathed  a  great  racial 
objective  to  later-day  British  politics.  The  deeds  of  our 
empire-builders  were  no  mere  essays  in  powers,  and  the 
rise  of  Greater  Britain  has  been  part  of  God's  "  increasing 
purpose." 


INDEX. 

Adams,  John.  Views  of,  on  Stamp  Act,  81;  on  Paine,  84;  on  War  of 
Independence,  90,  206 ;  on  West  Indies,  98 ;  on  English  affinity,  99 ; 
on  the  future  of  America,  192.  Opposed  by  Leonard,  123.  Work 
in  Holland,  176. 

Adams,  Samuel,  85,  97. 

Akenside,  Mark,  17. 

Albany.     Its  quietism  during  Seven  Years'  War,  76.     Congress,  120. 

Alien  immigration.     In  England,  51 ;  In  the  colonies,  59,  63,  65. 

Allen,  James.     Arguments  of,  against  expansion,  188. 

America.  See  under  various  colonies,  under  "  colonial,"  and  under 
"United  States." 

American  War.     See  under  "  War  of  Independence." 

Amherst,  General,  8,  25,  170. 

Anne,  princess  of  Orange,  18. 

Anti-Gallican  association,  16. 

Antigua.     Cotton  in,  42. 

Army,  British.  Strength  of,  in  1762,  13.  Cost  after  1763,  74.  Troops 
stationed  in  America,  79.  Its  opinion  of  American  forces,  91,  99, 
171.  Manoeuvres  of,  1773—6,  135.  Ordnance,  74,  136,  152.  Toryism 
of,  140.  Distrust  of,  155—7,  169.  Difficulties  in  recruiting,  157—60. 
Hard  discipline  of,  158.  Education  in,  159-60.  Employment  of 
mercenaries,  160 — 6.  Tactics  in  American  War,  170 — 2.  Strategy, 
170.  Difficulties  in  the  war,  171—3.  General  capacity  of,  173-4. 
Marbot's  opinion  of,  162,  174.  Humanity  of,  182-3. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  148,  173,  181,  182. 

Ashley,  John.     Views  of,  on  American  timber,  46 ;  on  colonies,  53. 

Australia.  Convict  transportation  to,  60,  61,  195.  Present  position  of, 
210,  213. 

Austria,  54. 

"Balance  of  trade,"  38,  50. 

Baltimore,  Lord.     Selfishness  of,  76. 

Banstead  Downs,  135. 

Barbados.     Demand   for  goods,   39.     Productiveness  of,   62.     Character 

of  inhabitants,  99. 
Baretti,  Joseph,   14,  17. 
Barnard,  Sir  J.,  51. 
Barre,  John,  13,  148,  151. 
Beaumarchais,  Pierre,   177. 


218  INDEX 

Beaver  hats.  Price  of,  16.  American  manufacture  of,  37.  Trade  in, 
58,  67. 

Beawes,  Windham,  52.     Views  of,  on  Navigation  Act,  55. 

Bedford,  Duke  of,  31,  71. 

Bentham,  Jeremy.     Opinion  of,  on  American  taxation,  138. 

Berkeley,  Bishop,  10,  48. 

Berkeley,  Sir  W.,  56. 

Berlin,  73. 

Bermuda.     Fishermen  of,  54. 

Bernard,  Governor,  68,  75. 

Berwick.     Bounties  to  recruits  offered  by,   13. 

Birmingham.  Growth  of,  5,  136.  In  favour  of  colonial  restrictions,  68. 
Opinion  of,  on  Stamp  Act,  131 ;  on  American  War,  136. 

Blackfriars  Bridge,  34,  108. 

Bland,  Richard.     Opinion  of,  on  bounties,  83. 

Boscawen,  Admiral,  8,  13,  25. 

Bossu,  M.,  168,  184. 

Boston,  62.  Tea  riot,  71.  Address  to  Wilkes,  88.  "Gazette,"  89. 
Puritan  character  of,  97.  Separatism  of,  101,  129.  Port  Act,  101. 
Chatham's  opinion  of,  112.  Burke's  admiration  for,  113.  Oils,  193. 

Boswell,  James,  131. 

Boucher,  Jonathan.     Sermons  of,  88.     Loyalty  of,  119. 

Bounties,  considered,  38,  39,  47,  78,  83. 

Braddock,  General,  2,  76,  91,  103,  159,  160. 

Brazil.     Cotton  in,  42. 

Breslau,  battle  of,  29. 

Brissot  de  Warville.     Anticipations  of,  208. 

Bristol.     Colonial  trade  of,  65.     Opinion  of,  on  American  War,  137. 

Brown,  Alexander.     Arguments  of,  against  expansion,  191. 

Brown,  John.    Views  of,  on  national  deterioration,  4 ;  on  mercenaries,  26. 

Bruce,  P.  H.     Opinion  of,  on  Carolina  timber,  46. 

Bunbury,  Lady  S.,  92,  139. 

Bunker  Hill,  battle  of,  92,  164,  170,  171,  182. 

Burgh,  J.     Remarks  of,  on  American  population,  207. 

Burgoyne,  General,  34,  140,  160,  165,  173. 

Burke,  Edmund.  Contemplated  emigration  of,  64.  Views  of,  on 
colonial  policy,  69,  116-7.  Distrust  of  Chatham,  106-7.  Opinions 
of,  on  American  taxation,  113 — 5,  122,  149;  on  loyalists,  119;  on 
British  politics  in  1775,  133  136-7;  on  Quebec  Act,  148;  on  an 
Anglo-American  alliance,  201.  Eloquence  of,  117. 

"  Calm  Addresses,"  John  Wesley's,  143. 
Camden,  battle  of,  175,  177. 
Camden,  Lord,  107,  135,  138,  148. 


INDEX  219 

Canada.  French  aims  in,  1,  2.  Ceded  to  Britain,  9.  Its  oak,  47,  189; 
hemp,  49.  Retention  of,  in  1763,  66.  Its  resources,  67.  Army  in, 
79.  Emigrants  to,  146,  196.  Loyalty  of,  148,  149.  State  of,  in 
1783,  187-9.  Ignored  by  British  government,  195.  Position  of,  to- 
day, 211-3. 

Canterbury,  144. 

Cape  Breton.     Ceded  to  Great  Britain,  9.     Its  coal,  41 ;  hardwood,  47. 

Carleton,  General,  152,  174,  182. 

Carolina.     See  under  "North"  and  "South  Carolina." 

Carthagena,  5,  80. 

Casanova  de  Seingalt.     Remarks  of,  on  port  wine,  50. 

Chandler,  Doctor,  120. 

Charleston.     Captured  by  the  British,  139,  180. 

Charlotte,  Queen,  52. 

Chatham.     See  under  "Pitt." 

Chauncey,  Charles.     Views  of,  on  American  population,  207. 

Chesterfield,  Lord.     His  dislike  to  standing  army,   156. 

Child,  Josiah.     Opinions  of,  on  Navigation  Act,  59;  on  emigration,  64. 

China.     Trade  with,  61. 

Church  of  England.  Its  position  in  America,  96,  119,  129.  Politics  of, 
136. 

Churchill,  Charles.     Lines  by,  on  transportation,  61. 

Clare,  Lord.  Supports  home  industries,  52.  His  relations  with  Franklin, 
103. 

Clinton,  Sir  H.,  172. 

Clive,  Lord,  9,  16,  27,  140. 

Coal  duties,  49. 

"Cobbler's  Letter,"  10. 

Cochineal  bounty,  39. 

Colonial,  policy  considered,  18,  37—69,  91—104,  147,  154,  165,  175-6, 
187—98,  202—4,  208—15 ;  waterways,  39 ;  disabilities,  37,  58 ;  wealth, 
64,  80;  markets,  64—6;  charters,  67;  taxation,  73—85;  share  in 
Seven  Years'  War,  76 — 80;  soldiery,  91,  168 — 72;  sensitiveness  to 
British  criticism,  91 — 2,  181,  207-8;  want  of  homogenity,  97; 
separatist  tendencies,  97 — 102;  conduct  of  the  War  of  Independence, 
185-6. 

Congregationalists.     Their  share  in  the  American  Revolution,  101,  129. 

Connecticut.     Cotton  in,  44.     Constitution  of,  67.     Gift  to,  79. 

Continental  Congress,   71,   95. 

Convict  emigration  considered,  59-60,  210. 

Copper,  an  "enumerated  article,"  37. 

Cornwallis,  Lord.  Supports  North,  145.  His  army,  157;  education, 
159.  Strategy  and  tactics  of,  170,  172,  174.  Surrender  of,  at  York- 
town,  177,  180,  185. 


220  INDEX 

Cotton,  an  "enumerated  article,"  37.  Grown  in  West  Indies,  42;  in 
Connecticut,  44.  Manchester  trade  in,  65,  199.  Supply  of,  in 
United  States,  193. 

Cowpens,  battle  of,  175. 

Cowper,  William,  139. 

Crefeld,  battle  of,  29.     Emigrants  from,  59. 

Cumberland,  Duke  of,  3,  27,  159. 

Gumming,  Thomas.     A  fighting  Quaker,  21. 

Curwen,  Samuel.  Sensitiveness  of,  to  English  arrogance,  92.  Opinion 
of,  on  Burke,  117;  on  English  feeling  during  the  war,  145. 

Dantzig,  38,  47. 

Dartmouth,  Lord,  142,  145. 

Dearborn,  Henry.     His  account  of  the  American  attack  on  Quebec,  181, 

183. 

Declaration  of  Independence,  45,  85. 
De  Lancey  family,  96,  128. 
Demerara,  42. 
Denmark,^,  134. 
Dickenson,  John,  82,  110. 
Dinwiddie,  Governor,  25,  94. 
Dissenters.     Attitude  of,   during  Seven  Years'  War,   66;  as  to  Stamp 

Act,  131;  during  War  of  Independence,  142 — 4. 
Dobbs,  Governor,  25. 

Dominica.     Ceded  to  Great  Britain,  9.    Cotton  in,  42.     Free  ports  in,  57. 
Draper,  General,  140,  183. 
Dresden,  51. 

Dubos,  Abbe.     Predicts  American  Revolution,  100. 
Dulaney,  Daniel,  94,  102. 
Dundee,  73. 
Dunstable,  52. 
Dutens,  Louis,  25. 
Dyer,  John.     Verses  of,  on  the  rise  of  towns,  5;  on  colonies,  39. 

East  India  Company,  67,  115. 

Edinburgh.     Effect  of  Seven  Years'  War  on,   73.     Attitude  of,   during 

War  of  Independence,  137. 
Effingham,  Lord,  152. 
Egyptian  rice,  57. 

Eldon,  Lord.     Opinion  of,  on  American  taxation,  138. 
Emigration  considered,  58 — 66,  195. 
England.     See  under  "  Great  Britain." 
"Enumerated  articles,"  37,  49. 
Erskine,  Lord.     His  description  of  War  of  Independence,  201. 


INDEX  221 

Ferdinand  of  Brunswick,  27,  29. 

Ferguson,  Major.     His  tactics,  171. 

Finance.     Pitt's,  32;  Grenville's,  70,  74-5. 

Fisheries,  41,  54. 

Flax  bounty,  39. 

Florida.     Ceded  to  Great  Britain,  9.     Climate  of,  173.     Lost,  190. 

Forbes,  General,  8,  77. 

Fox,  Charles  James.  Leads  the  Whigs,  116.  Criticisms  of  Storer  on, 
146.  Want  of  patriotism  of,  151. 

Fox,  Henry,  7. 

France.     See  under  "French." 

Franklin,  Benjamin.  Opinion  of,  on  British  colonial  policy,  68.  Share 
of,  in  Seven  Years'  War,  78,  120.  Views  of,  on  American  taxation, 
80.  Attitude  of,  during  War  of  Independence,  83,  91,  95,  102-3. 
His  publication  of  Hutchinson's  letters  132,  204.  Appeals  to  France, 
176,  178-9.  Opinion  on  British  empire,  196.  Friendship  with 
English  Whigs  200.  His  later  attitude  towards  England,  205. 
Theory  of,  as  to  American  population,  207.  His  anticipations,  208. 

Frederick,  King  of  Prussia,  20,  31,  64,  163-4. 

French,  aims  in  America,  1.  Advantages,  2.  Disadvantages,  3.  Hated 
in  England,  10-1,  25,  50-1,  144.  Jesuits,  2.  Prizes,  12.  Silks,  41. 
Cotton,  42.  Indigo,  43.  Brandy,  48,  205.  Rice  supply,  57. 
Emigrants  to  America,  63.  Interference  in  War  of  Independence, 
134,  146,  176—80,  205.  Attitude  as  to  International  Law,  134,  178. 
Use  of  mercenaries,  161-2.  Red  Indian  alliances,  167-8.  Breaches 
of  neutrality,  177.  Conduct  of  the  war  (1777—83),  184.  Opinion 
on  colonisation,  191-2. 

Gage,  General,  128,  173,  185. 

Galloway,  Joseph.  His  plan  of  union,  88,  118,  125 — 7.  Sensitive  to 
English  arrogance,  92.  Opinions  of,  on  Chatham,  107 ;  on  the 
empire,  120 — 2;  on  Kniphausen,  165.  His  sacrifices,  130. 

Gambia.     Convict  scheme  in,  60. 

Garrick,  David,  11,  12. 

Gates,  Horatio,  78,  200. 

Gee,  Joshua.  Opinions  of,  on  a  self-sufficing  empire,  43,  48 ;  on  colonies, 
101. 

George  II.,  27. 

George  III.  His  political  aims,  36.  Aids  colonial  silk  industry,  44. 
Views  of,  on  American  taxation,  71,  89,  146.  Not  sole  author  of 
War  of  Independence,  71,  90,  132.  His  relations  with  Chatham, 
106,  145-6.  His  dislike  to  Pownall,  125.  Attitude  of,  to  rebels, 
128.  Loyal  addresses  to,  136-7.  Eagerness  of,  for  war,  145. 
Knowledge  of  America,  146.  His  persistency,  146-7. 


222  INDEX 

Georgia.  Its  rice,  37.  Silk,  39,  40,  44.  Wine,  39.  Indigo,  43. 
Slavery,  45.  Immigrants,  59.  Eesources,  62. 

Germain,  Lord  G.,  152,  153,  180. 

German,  soldiers,  13,  161 — 6.  Emigrants  to  America,  59,  63,  65. 
Loyalty  during  the  war,  95-6. 

Germanstown,  founded,  59. 

Gibbon,  Edward,  13.  Opinions  of,  on  Navigation  Act,  55 ;  on  American 
taxation,  82;  on  the  treatment  of  Noailles,  144.  Supports  Lord 
North,  114.  His  attitude  during  War  of  Independence,  140,  166. 

Gibraltar,  194,  195. 

Ginger,  an  "enumerated  article,"  37. 

Glasgow.  Thread  from,  43.  Opinion  of,  as  to  Stamp  Act,  131,  Attitude 
of,  during  War  of  Independence,  137. 

Gloucester,  54. 

Gold  Coast.     Convict  scheme  on  the,  60. 

Goldsmith,  Oliver,  6,  17,  117. 

Gordon  Riots,  154. 

Grafton,  Lord,  70,  71. 

Grant,  Colonel.     Opinion  of,  on  American  soldiers,  91. 

Grant,  Sir  W.     Experiences  of,  in  Canada,  63. 

Granville,  Lord,  7,  156. 

Grasse,  Admiral  de,  141,  180. 

Gray,  Hugh.  Views  of,  as  to  Canadian  hemp,  49.  Advocates  expansion, 
197. 

Great  Britain.  Its  commercialism,  4.  Love  of  excitement,  5.  Views 
on  trade  wars,  10;  on  Seven  Years'  War,  21,  31.  Complacency,  26. 
Its  hatred  of  France,  50-1,  144.  Maritime  ambitions,  53.  Smuggling, 
57.  Appreciation  of  empire,  62 — 6.  Self-denial,  67.  Opinion  on 
American  taxation,  78-9,  85—9.  Want  of  sentiment,  96,  103,  165, 
181.  Ignorance  of  America,  98.  Conduct  during  War  of  Independ- 
ence, 131,  140,  144,  155 — 86.  Subsequent  relations  with  the  United 
States,  199 — 209.  See  also  under  "  Colonial  Policy." 

Greene,  Nathaniel,  172,  174. 

Grenada.     Ceded  to  England,  9. 

Grenville,  George.  Partisan  of  peace  in  1756,  19.  His  views  on  Naviga- 
tion Act,  55 ;  on  American  taxation,  57,  70,  72 — 5,  88.  Disliked  by 
Chatham,  106. 

Grosley,  P.  J.,  66. 

Guildford  Court  House,  battle  of,  166,  175. 

Halifax  (N.  S.),  188,  189. 

Hamburg,  38,  39,  47,  73. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  118. 
Hanover,  23,  31. 


INDEX  223 

Hanway,  Jonas,   12. 

Hardwicke,  Lord,  2,  18,  22,  110. 

Harrington,  Lord,  135. 

Hartley,  David.  Views  of,  on  War  of  Independence,  186.  Negotiates 
peace,  190.  His  desire  for  American  friendship,  205. 

Hats.     See  under  "Beaver." 

Havannah.     Conquest  of,  9. 

Hawke,  Lord,  9,  13,  27,  30. 

Hemp  bounty,  39. 

Hessians.     See  under  "German  soldiers." 

Highland,  Regiments,  27,  34,  141.     Emigrants,  64. 

Hillsborough,  Lord,  19,  103. 

Holderness,  Lord,  13. 

Holland.  Its  attitude  as  to  International  Law,  17,  18,  134,  178.  Com- 
mercial competition,  38,  52.  Aids  smugglers,  57.  Panic  in,  73. 

Holroyd.     See  under  "Sheffield,  Lord." 

Honduras,  9. 

Hops,  in  America,  44. 

House  of  Commons.     Report  of,  on  timber,  47. 

Howe,  General,  92,  152,  173,  174. 

Hull,   131. 

Hume,  David.  Views  of,  on  Seven  Years'  War,  20;  on  balance  of 
trade,  38;  on  a  standing  army,  155. 

Hungarian,  wine,  40.     Timber,  43. 

Hunter,  John.     Ideas  of,  as  to  New  South  Wales,  48. 

Hutchinson,  Governor,  68,  89,  128,  132,  146. 

Indented  servants,  61,  76. 

India,  4,  5,  33,  140,  197. 

Indigo,  American  experiments  as  to,  38,  39,  43. 

International  Law  considered,  17-8,  134,  176,  178. 

Irish,  enlistments,  15,  157.     Linen,  39,  43,  74.     China,  48.     Emigration 

to    America,    63.      Separatism,     101,    204.      Attitude    towards    the 

colonies,  131. 

Iron,  in  the  colonies,  37,  39,  48. 
Isle  of  Man.     Smuggling  in,  57. 

Jamaica,  molasses  and  rum,  50,  58,  205.  Free  ports,  57.  Productive- 
ness, 62. 

Jay,  John.     Opinion  of,  on  England,  201-2. 

Jefferson,  Thomas.  Remarks  of,  on  American  freedom  from  beggars, 
64;  on  the  Tories,  203;  on  American  population,  207.  His  hatred 
of  England,  85,  205.  Extreme  views,  147,  202. 

Jesuits,  in  Canada,  2. 


INDEX 

Johnson,    Samuel.     Opinions    of,    on    American    taxation,    86,    100;    on 

American  population,  87;  on  Burke,  117. 
Jones,  Paul,   133. 

Jones,  Sir  W.     Opposes  North's  government,  153. 
Joseph  II.     Epigram  of,  179. 
Judges.     Frame  the  "Rule  of  1756,"  17.    Their  powers  of  transportation, 

59,  60. 
Junius,  30,  88. 

Kalm,    Peter.     Views   of,   on  American  timber,    46.     Predicts   War   of 

Independence,  101. 
Kendal,  65. 
Kenmure,  Lord,  135. 

Keysler,  John.     Eemarks  of,  as  to  silk  trade,  41. 
King's  Mountain,  battle  of,  171,  185. 
Kniphausen,  General,  165. 
Konigsberg,  38. 
Kosciuszko,  Thaddeus,  165. 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  165,  188. 

Lancaster,  65,  131. 

Lauzun,   Due  de.       Opinions  of,   on  the  American  army,    169;   on  the 

French   troops   in   America,    176 ;    on   Rodney's   victory,    180.      His 

conquest  of  Senegal,  184. 
Layton,  Polly.     Her  fascination,  177.     Observations  of,  to  Count  Segur, 

179. 

Leeds,  12,  131,  157. 
Leonard,  Daniel,  123. 
Lexington,  battle  of,  71,  152,  175. 
Liege,  49. 

Linen  trade,  38,  39. 

Little,  James,  Remarks  of,  on  American  iron,  48;  on  Nova  Scotia,  189. 
Liverpool,  American  trade  of,  65.     Opinion  of,  as  to  Stamp  Act,  131. 

Attitude  of,  during  War  of  Independence,  137.     Shipping  statistics 

in  1785,  188. 
London.     Animosity  of,  against  aliens,   10.     Zeal  of,   for  Seven  Years' 

War,  5,   12,   15.     Opinion  of,  as  to  Stamp  Act,  131.     Attitude  of, 

during  War  of  Independence,  136,   153. 
Long  Island,  battle  of,  152. 
Lotteries,  6. 

Loudon,  General,  3,  159. 
Louisburg,  8,  76,  79,  93. 
Louisiana,  1,  9. 

Loyalists.     See  under  "Tories  (American)." 
Lyttelton,  Lord,  32. 


INDEX  225 

Macgregor,  Malcolm,  153. 

Madder,  experiment  in  America,  44. 

Manchester.     Growth  of,  5,  157.     Cotton  trade  of,  5,  65,  192.     Opinion 

of,  as  to  Stamp  Act,  131.     Attitude  of,  during  American  Revolution, 

136-7. 

"Manchester  School"  considered,  191,  194—6,  210. 
Manila.     Conquest  of,  9,  161. 

Mansfield,  Lord,  18.     Views  of,  on  American  taxation,  82,  138,  150. 
Marblehead  fishermen,  54. 

Marbot,  General.     Opinions  of,  on  the  British  army,  162,  174. 
Marie  Antoinette.     Her  description  of  the  American  rebels,  179. 
Maryland.     Tobacco,    41,   56,    194.     Constitution,    67.     Quietism    during 

Seven  Years'  War,  76-7. 
Massachusetts.     Timber,    41.     Constitution,    67,    80.     Charter    annulled, 

71.     Gift  to,  79.     Character  of,  97.     Separatism  in,  101.     "Gazette," 

123. 

May  hew,  Jonathan,  101. 
Methodists.     See  under  "Dissenters." 
Methuen  Treaty,  50. 

Militia.     Engaged  in  Seven  Years'  War,  13.     Opinion  as  to,  157. 
Minden,  battle  of,  9,  29,  154. 
Minorca,  195. 

Molasses,  in  Jamaica,  37,  50. 
Montgomery,  Richard,  78,   148,   181,   183. 
Moore,  Mark,  52,  184. 
Mosquito  territory,  48. 
Mulberries  in  America,  44. 

"Nabobs,"  16,  34. 

Napoleon.     Opinion  of,  as  to  expansion,  196,  197. 
Naval,  officers,  6.     Stores,  39,  41.     Recruiting,  158. 

749    52—8. 


Nevis  cotton,  42. 

New  Brunswick.     Loyalist  settlers  in,  196. 

New  England.      Alkalies,  43.     Fisheries,  54.     Dissabilities,  37,  58.     Its 

share  in  Seven  Years'  War,  78.     Gift  to,  ib.     Austerity  of,  97.     Its 

policy  in  1812,  202. 
New  Hampshire.     Timber  in,  41. 
New  South  Wales.     Wine  and  limestone  in,  49. 
New  York.     Fishermen,   41,    54.     Timber,   46.     Dutch  trade  with,   52, 

102.     Wealth,  62,  64.     Criticised  by  Chatham,   112.     Its  treatment 

of  Tories,  203. 
New  Zealand,  195,  210. 
Newcastle.     Bounties  offered  to  recruits  by,  12.     Coal,  49. 


226  INDEX 

Newcastle,  Duke  of,  7,  16. 

Newfoundland.  Fisheries,  41,  54.  State  in  1783,  189.  Ignored  by  the 
British  government,  194. 

Newgate.     Emigrants  from,  60. 

Nicaragua  canal.     Prophecy  as  to,  208. 

Nicholls,  John.     Opposition  of,  to  expansion,  188-9. 

Nivernois,  Due  de,  25. 

Noailles,  Due  de,  144. 

Non-importation  policy,  81,  102.  Supported  by  Galloway,  121.  Critic- 
ised by  Seabury,  122.  Effect  of,  on  England,  131. 

Norfolk  shipyards,  46. 

North,  Lord,  71.  Act  of,  regarding  colonial  taxation,  135,  211.  Pro- 
motes Adam  Smith,  139.  Conduct  of,  after  Yorktown,  147. 

North  Carolina.  Naval  stores,  41.  Silk,  42.  Timber,  46-7.  Gift  to, 
79. 

Norway,  41,  189. 

Norwich,   12. 

Nova  Scotia.     State  of,  in  1783,  189,  196. 

Ogden,  James,   14,   167. 

Oglethorpe,   General.     His  colonisation  of  Georgia,   39,   65.     Resistance 

of,  to  slave  trade,  45. 
Ohio  Company,  2. 
Ostend  cotton,  42. 
Otis,  James.     Views  of,  on  American  taxation,  81 — 3,   110;  on  British 

ignorance,   98 ;   on  American  population,   207.     His  loyalty,   83. 

Paine,  Thomas.     His  "Common  Sense,"  84,  206.     Hatred  of  England, 

99,  206.     His  extreme  views,  147.     Defended  by  Erskine,  201. 
Panama  canal,  suggested,  16. 
Paris,  9,   148. 

Parliament  considered,  35,  81-2,  109-10,  117. 
Party  system  considered,  35,  36,  154. 
Patrick,  James,  15,  167. 
Pearl  bounty,  39. 
Pelham,   Henry,  7. 

Penn,  William.     Remarks  of,  on  West  Indian  productiveness,  62. 
Pennington,  William,  46. 
Pennsylvania.     Its  vines,  40.     Timber,  46.     Quietism  of,  during  Seven 

Years'  War,  76.     Expenditure  during  that  war,  80.     Loyalty  of,  95. 

Congress,   ib.     "  Chronicle,"   99. 
Philadelphia.     Its  shipyards,  46.     Races,  62.     Toryism,  96.     Quakers  in, 

98.     Separatism  in,   101.     Captured  by  the  British,   136.     Occupied 

by  Howe,  174. 


INDEX  227 

Piedmont  silk,  40. 

Pines  in  North  America,  46-7. 

Pipestaves,  bounty  on,  39. 

Pitch,  bounty  on,  39. 

Pitt,  Lord,  His  actions  during  War  of  Independence,  139,  152. 

Pitt,  William  (Earl  of  Chatham).  Opinion  of,  on  the  outlook  in  1756, 
3.  His  opportunity,  7 ;  ministry,  8.  Policy  during  Seven  Years' 
War,  18-19,  22,  28-30.  Inconsistencies,  23,  166.  Talents  and 
limitations,  24,  36,  68,  111.  Hatred  of  France,  25.  Raises  Highland 
regiments,  27.  His  finance,  32.  Pvemarks  on  Wolfe,  33.  Personal 
character,  33-4.  Influence  of,  on  colonial  policy,  35-6,  73.  Views 
on  Navigation  Acts,  55.  Peerage,  70,  106.  Political  isolation,  105. 
Unpopularity,  106.  Attitude  towards  George  III.,  106.  Opinions 
of,  on  American  taxation,  108 — 13,  134.  Opposition  of,  to  Quebec 
Act,  112.  Attitude  of,  during  War  of  Independence,  139,  152,  166. 
Remarks  of,  as  to  the  army,  160. 

Port  wine,  50. 

Portugal,  50. 

Potash,  bounty  on,  39. 

Potters  in  South  Carolina,  52. 

Pownall,  Governor.  Opinions  of,  on  pines,  46 ;  on  Navigation  Act,  56 ; 
on  the  empire,  94,  118,  120;  on  American  representation  in  England, 
123—5. 

Preferential  duties,  38,  191. 

Price,  Richard,  143.  Remarks  of,  on  Canadian  loyalty,  148.  Honoured 
by  London,  153. 

Priestley,  Joseph,  116.  His  opposition  to  the  government,  142,  153. 
His  anecdote  of  Franklin,  204. 

Privy   Council.     Slavery  report,   45.     Treatment  of  Franklin,   204. 

Prussian,  share  in  Seven  Years'  War,  28-9.  Alliance  with  Pitt,  29,  37. 
Views  on  International  Law,  134.  Army,  163-4. 

Pulaski,  Casimir,  165,   177. 

Pye,  Henry  James.     Prophecy  of,  as  to  the  British  empire,  197. 

Quakers.       Opposed  to  trade  wars,    10.       Colonisation  by,   59.       Their 

quietism,  76-7.     Loyalty,   95-6. 
Quebec.      Captured  by  Wolfe,   8,   21,    32.      Oak   of,   47.      Attacked   by 

American  rebels,  181. 

Quebec  Act.     Opposed  by  English  Whigs,  112,   148.     Its  effects,   149. 
Quiberon.  battle  of,  9. 
Quincey,  Samuel,  205. 

Raisins.  Bounty  on,  39. 
Rawdon,  Lord,  171,  172. 
Raynal,  Abbe.  His  views  on  American  population,  207. 


228  INDEX 

Bed  Indians.  Six  Nations,  2.  Iroquois,  2,  167.  Their  needs,  06. 
Senecas,  102.  George  III.'s  views  as  to  their  employment,  145  \s 
British  allies,  159,  166—9.  As  allies  of  the  rebels,  168,  169.  Treat- 
ment of,  by  the  Americans,  185. 

Republicanism.     Growth  of,  in  America,  83,  85,  204. 

Revenue  Act  (1767),  70. 

Rhode  Island.  Seamanship,  54.  Constitution,  67.  Occupied  by  the 
French,  176. 

Rice.     Laws  as  to,  37. 

Richmond,  Duke  of,  107,  109,  133. 

Riedesel,  General  von,  162,  165,  206. 

Riga,  43. 

Rochambeau,  Jean,  165,  176. 

Roche,  Sir  B.,  135. 

Rockingham,  Lord,  70,  106,  107,  116,  150. 

Rodney,  Admiral.  Opinions  of,  on  slavery,  45 ;  on  free  ports,  57 ;  on 
American  courage,  92;  on  the  War  of  Independence,  141.  His 
successes,  141,  180.  Attacked  by  the  Whigs,  154. 

Rosin  bounty,  39. 

"Rule  of  1756,"  17-8. 

Rum  in  West  Indies,  52,  205. 

Russian,  iron,  39.  Naval  stores,  41.  Views  on  International  Law,  134. 
Mercenaries,  163,  166. 

Salzburg  emigrants,  65. 

Sandwich,  Lord,  152.  Opinion  of,  on  Americans,  92.  Honoured  by 
Bristol,  137. 

Saratoga.     Capitulation  of,  151,   173-4. 

Savannah.     Silk  from,  44.     Defence  of,   175,   177. 

Scotland,  34.  Feeling  in,  during  American  War,  136,  141,  163.  French 
enlistments  in,  161. 

Scott,  John.     See  under  "Eldon,  Lord." 

Scott,  Sir  W.     See  under  "  Stowell,  Lord." 

Sea  power  considered,  54-5,  177,  180. 

Seabury,  Samuel.  Tracts  of,  88,  120.  His  imperialism,  122-3;  sacri- 
fices, 130.  Views  of,  on  American  agriculture,  192. 

Self-sufficiency.     Ideal  of,  considered,  38—45,  48. 

Selwyn,  G.,  6. 

Senegal,  9,  20,   184. 

Seven  Years'  War.  Considered,  11,  14,  18,  21,  29.  Its  effects  on 
colonial  policy,  35,  72 — 4.  Sacrifices  during,  66.  Colonial  part  in, 
76-7,  80. 

Sharp,  Granville,  152,  200. 

Shebbeare,  John,  4,  19,  50. 


INDEX  229 

Sheffield,  Growth  of,  5. 

Sheffield,   Lord.     Opinion  of,   on  Navigation  Act,   55.     Raises  dragoon 

regiment,   135.     His  tracts  considered,   192,   200. 
Shelburne,  Lord.      Opposed  by  Burke,  116,   150.     Attitude  of,  towards 

loyalists,  119.     His  opposition  to  expansion,  152,  153,  190.     Relations 

with  Wolfe,  159. 
Shippen,  William,  155. 
Sierra  Leone,  founded,   196. 
Silk,  39.     In  Georgia,  40;  North  Carolina,  42;  Savannah,  44;  Virginia, 

41;    Pennsylvania,    ib.;    Spitalfields,    ib.      Failure    of    industry    in 

America,  44.     In  New  Jersey,  ib. 
Slave  trade,  44,  86.     Horrors,  45.     Causes  of,  45,  67.     Effect  on  cotton 

trade,  65.     Supported  by  Burke,  115. 
Smith,  Adam.     Views  of,  on  "  enumerated  articles,"  37 ;  on  Navigation 

Act,  55-6;  on  colonial  policy,  79,  88,  139,  187.     Promotion  of,  139. 
Smuggling,  74. 
Smyrna  cotton,  42. 
"Sons  of  Liberty,"  85. 
Soulavie,  J.  L.     Quoted,  154. 
South  Carolina.     Indigo  in,  43-4.     Silk,  44.     Slavery,  45.     Timber,  46. 

Foreign  immigration,  59,  63.     Climate,  62.     Gift  to,   79. 
Spain.     War  with,  9,  30.     Its  Indies,  42;  interference  in  War  of  In- 
dependence, 134.     Views  of,  on  International  Law,  ib.,  178.     Army 

of,  162. 

St.  Fond,  Faujas  de.     Remarks  of,  on  port  wine,  50. 
St.  Malo,  descent  on,  32. 

St.  Vincent.     Ceded  to  England,  9.     Cotton  in,  42. 
Stair,  Lord.     Views  of,  on  colonisation,  191. 

Stamp  Act,  70,  131,  136.     Considerations  on,  72 — 80.     Legality  of,  81-2. 
Stanley,  Hans,  25. 
Steel  furnaces  in  America,  37,  68. 
Stettin  timber,  47. 
Steuben,  Frederick,  165,  177. 
Stiles,  Ezra,  129. 

Stirling,  Lord.     Remarks  of,  on  American  pines,  46. 
Stockport,  43. 

Storer,  Adam.     Views  of,  on  C.  J.  Fox,  145-6 ;  on  mercenaries,  160. 
Stowell,  Lord.     Opinions  of,  on  the  "Rule  of  1756,"  17;  on  Burgoyne's 

disaster,  138. 

Suffolk,  Lord.     Honoured  by  Bristol,   137. 
Sugar,  Laws  as  to,  37,  42,  82. 
Sunderland,  49. 
Sweden,  39,  41,  134. 
Swiss,  settlers,  63.     Mercenaries,  161. 


-30  INDEX 

Talleyrand,  201. 

Tar  bounty,  39. 

Tarleton,  Col.  B.;  172,  173. 

Taxation,  of  beer  and  cider.  32;  of  land.  135.    American,  considered, 

73—85.     North's  Act  as  to,  135,  211. 
"Taxation  no  Tyranny,"  86. 
Taylor,  G.,  46,  62. 
Tea  duty,  67,  71. 
Temple,    Lord.     Alienated    from    Chatham,    107.     Supports    American 

War,  134. 

Thurlow,  Lord,   150. 
Timber  in  America,  46 — 8. 
Tobacco,   Cultivation  of.      Encouraged  in  America,   45;   prohibited  in 

Great  Britain,  67.     Export  of,  56. 
Tobago.     Ceded  to  England,  9.     Lost,  190. 
Tooke,  Home.     Proceedings  of,  during  American  War,  152-3. 
Tories  (American).     Treatment  of,  by  revolutionaries,  85,  147,  203,  205. 

Arguments  of,   88-9,    117-21,   204.      Strength  of,   96.      Causes  of 

failure,  128 — 30.     Helped  by  British  government,  1%. 
Tories  (British).     Strength  of,  135—7.    Dislike  to  Burke,  151. 
Townshend,  Charles,  32,  70,  97,  135. 
Trade  wars  considered,  10,  140,  150. 
Tucker,  Josiah.     Views  of.  on  American  taxation,  86;  on  Red  Indian 

alliance,  103.     Opposed  by  Galloway,  121.     Attacked  by  Whigs,  153. 

His  tracts  considered,  193-4. 
Turgot,  A.  R.  J.,  187,  188,  194. 
Turkey,  Company,  10.     Cotton,  42. 
Turpentine  bounty,  39. 

"United  Empire."    Phrase,  96.     Sentiment,  118—30. 

United  States  of  America.  Navigation  Act  of,  55.  Difficulties  in  way 
of  federation,  118,  123.  Debt  of,  to  foreign  allies,  177,  192.  Anti- 
cipations as  to  future  of,  192-3,  207-8.  Relations  of,  with  Great 
Britain  since  1783,  199—209. 

Van,  Charles.     Remarks  of,  on  Boston,  91. 

Veal,  George,  99,  100. 

Verhon.  Admiral,  5. 

Vines.     In  Georgia,  39,  44;  Pennsylvania,  40;  Virginia,  44.     Causes  of 

failure  in  America,  ib. 
Virginia.     Its  silk,  41.     Vines,   44.     Tobacco,  4,  56,   194.     Timber,  46, 

47.     As  a  field  for  emigration,  59.     Convicts  in,  60.     As  a  theatre 

of  war,  171,  173. 


INDEX  231 

Wade,  General,  160. 

Wakefield,  157. 

Wakefield,  Gilbert.     Views  of,  on  American  War,  137. 

Waldegrave,  Lord,  34,  167. 

Walker,  Fowler,  12. 

Walpole,  Horace.  Observations  of,  on  the  Seven  Yean*  War,  20;  OB 
oratory,  117;  on  Birmingham,  136;  on  public  opinion  as  to  the 
American  War,  137;  on  the  decline  of  Britain,  150.  Opposed  to 
Quebec  Act,  148. 

Walpole,  Robert,  6,  10,  155. 

War  of  Independence,  71.  Considered,  30,  132—141,  154-S6,  203. 
Effect  of,  on  American  thought,  206-7. 

Warren,  Joseph,  85. 

Washington,  George.  Views  of,  on  the  Seven  Years'  War,  21;  on 
colonial  disabilities,  58;  on  "corners,"  77;  on  Stamp  Act,  81;  on 
Braddock's  disaster,  160;  on  French  help,  176;  on  Lexington,  181; 
on  Carleton,  182;  on  future  of  America,  192,  208;  on  education, 
206.  His  part  in  Seven  Years'  War,  78.  Sensitiveness,  91.  Federal 
policy,  104.  Attitude  to  loyalists,  147;  to  Catholics,  149;  to  Bed 
Indians,  169,  185.  Appreciated  by  English  Whigs,  201. 

Wedderbura,  Alexander.  His  opinion  of  the  Whigs,  151.  Treatment 
of  Franklin,  204. 

Wedgwood,  Josiah,  62. 

Welsh,  Settlers  in  America,  59,  63.     Patriotism,  141. 

Wesley,  John.  Views  of  on  Georgia,  40;  on  American  **r******f  85,  87, 
142;  on  trade,  157.  His  position  during  War  of  Independence, 
143-4,  154. 

West  Indies.  Trade  of,  38,  39,  42,  48,  52,  56,  58,  67.  Slavery,  45. 
Character  of  inhabitants,  98.  Possible  secession  of,  121.  v^-**r-T 
of,  with  United  States,  193. 

Whale  bounties,  39. 

Whigs.  Strength  of,  in  1775,  133.  Policy  of,  during  War  of  Independ- 
ence, 139,  144,  149-50,  154,  186.  Friendship  of,  with  United  States, 
200-1.  Dislike  of,  to  expansion,  150—3,  190-1,  194—6. 

Whitehead,  William,  17. 

Wilkes,  John,  88,  131. 

Wimbledon  Common,  135,  145. 

Winchester,  51. 

Woad,  44. 

Wolfe,  General,  8,  13,  170.  Views  of,  on  army  comforts,  12.  Kstrptnpd 
by  Pitt,  25,  33.  Opinion  of,  on  American  troops,  91 ;  on  army  pay, 
159. 

Woodburn,  Prof.,  82. 

Wool  trade,  37,  42,  199. 


232  INDEX 

Worcester,  43,  100. 

Wraxall,  Sir  N.  W.     Remarks  of,  on  Lord  North,  147. 

Writs  of  assistance,  74. 

"Yankee  Doodle,"  100. 
Yarn  trade,  38. 
Yorkshire,  57. 

Yorktown.     Surrender  of,  146,  165,  173-4,  177,  180. 
Young,  Arthur.     Contemplated  emigration  of,  64.     His  attitude  during 
War  of  Independence,  139. 


or  THE 
UNIVERSITY 

OF 


Manchester  University 
Publications 


MANCHESTER  UNIVERSITY  PUBLICATIONS 


CALENDAR  OF  THE  VICTORIA  UNIVERSITY  OF 
MANCHESTER.  Session  1904-5.  Demy  8vo.  1100  pp. 
Price  3s.  net. 

CALENDAR  OF  THE  VICTORIA  UNIVERSITY  OF 
MANCHESTER.  Session  1905-6.  Demy  8vo.  1100  pp. 
Price  3s.  net. 

THEOLOGICAL  SERIES.     No.  I. 

INAUGURAL    LECTURES    delivered    during    the    Session 
1904-5,  by 

Professor  T.  F.  TOUT,  M.A.   (Oxford). 

Professor  H.  W.  HOGG,  M.  A.   (Edinburgh). 

Professor  A.  S.  PEAKE,  M.A. 

Professor  J.  T.  MARSHALL,  M.A.  (London),  D.D.  (Toronto). 

Professor  T.  W.  RHYS  DAVIDS,  LL.D.  (Edinburgh),  Ph.D. 

(Breslau). 
Rev.  L.  HASSE. 

Rev.  J.  H.  MOTJLTON,  M.A.  (Cambridge),  etc. 
Rev.  A.  GORDON,  M.A.   (Edinburgh). 
Rev.  W.  F.  ADENEY,  M.A.  (London),  D.D.  (St.  Andrews). 
Rev.  CANON  E.  L.  HICKS,  M.A. 
Rev.  H.  D.  LOCKETT,  M.A.  (Oxford). 
Rev.    R.    MACKINTOSH,    B.D.    (Edinburgh),    M.A.,    D.D. 

(Glasgow).     Demy  8vo.  [In  the  Press. 

HISTORICAL  SERIES,  No.  I. 

MEDIAEVAL  MANCHESTER  AND  BEGINNING  OF 
LANCASHIRE.  By  Professor  JAMES  TAIT,  M.A.  Demy 
8vo.  240  pp.  7s.  6d.  net. 

"  We  have  only  praise  for  the  clear  and  instructive  fashion  in 
which  Professor  Tait  has  expounded  the  genesis  of  the  County 
of  Lancaster  ....  Professor  Tait's  book  is  a  model  which 
future  writers  of  local  history  cannot  afford  to  neglect." — 
English  Historical  Review. 


MANCHESTER  UNIVERSITY  PUBLICATIONS 


HISTORICAL  SERIES— Continued. 

"Is  a  welcome  addition  to  the  literature  of  English  Local 
History." — American  Historical  Review. 

"A  substantial  and  valuable  piece  of  research." — Scotsman. 

"For  the  first  time  a  really  scholarly  work  upon  the  early 
History  of  Manchester." — Scottish  Historical  Review. 

No.  II. 

INITIA  OPERUM  LATINORUM  QUAE  SAECULISXIIL, 
XIV.,  XV.  ATTRIBUUNTUR.  By  A.  G.  LITTLE,  M.A., 
Lecturer  in  Palaeography.  Demy  8vo.  300  pp.  (inter- 
leaved), los.  net. 

"  This  laborious  compilation  is  a  remarkably  accurate  piece 
of  lexicography,  in  the  form  of  an  alphabetical  index  to  Latin 
tracts,  treatises,  sermons,  etc.,  of  the  later  Middle  Ages,  origin- 
ally undertaken,  as  the  author  says  in  his  preface,  as  a  pre- 
liminary to  the  drawing  up  of  a  catalogue  of  Franciscan  MSS. 
in  Great  Britain.'" — Manchester  Courier. 

No.  III. 

THE  OLD  COLONIAL  SYSTEM.  By  GERALD  BERKELEY 
HERTZ,  M.A.,  B.C.L.  Demy  8vo.  [In  the  Press. 

ECONOMIC  SERIES.     No.  I. 

HISTORY  OF  THE  COTTON  TRADE.  By  S.  J.  CHAPMAN, 
M.A.,  Jevons  Professor  of  Political  Economy  and  Dean 
of  the  Faculty  of  Commerce.  7s.  6d.  net. 

"  This  work  reflects  great  credit  alike  on  the  author  and  on 
the  University,  of  whose  economic  series  it  forms  the  first 
volume." — Manchester  Guardian. 

"...  A  work  of  fresh  and  diligent  erudition  in  an  interest- 
ing field  of  research,  set  forth  with  notable  lucidity  and  point, 
which  at  once  emphasises  and  explains  a  generally  overlooked 
complexity  of  economic  relationships,  the  book  cannot  but 
prove  highly  valuable  to  all  close  students  of  its  subject." — 
Scotsman. 


MANCHESTER  UNIVERSITY  PUBLICATIONS 


ECONOMIC  SERIES  No.  II.    GARTSIDE  REPORT  No.  I. 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  COTTON  INDUSTEY  IN 
THE  UNITED  STATES.  By  T.  W.  UTTLEY.  Demy  8vo. 

[In  the  Press. 
MEDICAL  SERIES.     No.  I. 

SKETCHES  OF  THE  LIVES  AND  WORK  OF  THE 
HONORARY  MEDICAL  STAFF  OF  THE  ROYAL 
INFIRMARY.  From  its  foundation  in  1752  to  1830,  when 
it  became  the  Royal  Infirmary.  By  EDWARD  MANSFIELD 
BROCKBANK,  M.D.,  M.R.C.P.  Crown  4to  (Illustrated). 
15s.  net. 
"...  Dr.  Brockbank's  is  a  book  of  varied  interest.  It  also 

deserves  a  welcome  as  one  of  the  earliest  of  the  '  Publications 

of  the  University  of  Manchester.'" — Manchester  Guardian. 
"...  We  have  a  very  valuable  contribution  to  local  medical 

literature. " — Manchester  Dispatch. 

No.  II. 

PRACTICAL  PRESCRIBING  AND  DISPENSING.  For 
Medical  Students.  By  WILLIAM  KIRKBY,  sometime 
Lecturer  in  Pharmacognosy  in  the  Owens  College,  Man- 
chester. Crown  8vo.  200  pp.  4s.  6d.  net. 

"  The  whole  of  the  matter  bears  the  impress  of  that  technical 
skill  and  thoroughness  with  which  Mr.  Kirkby's  name  must 
invariably  be  associated,  and  the  book  must  be  welcomed  as 
one  of  the  most  useful  recent  additions  to  the  working  library 
of  prescribers  and  dispensers." — The  Pharmaceutical  Journal. 

No.  III. 

HANDBOOK  OF  SURGICAL  ANATOMY.  By  G.  A. 
WRIGHT,,  B.A.,  M.B.  (Oxon.),  F.R.C.S.,  and  C.  H. 
PRESTON,  M.D.,  F.R.C.S.,  L.D.S.  Crown  8vo.  (Second 
Edition).  5s.  net. 

"A  concise  and  very  readable  little  handbook  of  Surgical 
Applied  Anatomy." — Lancet. 


MANCHESTER  UNIVERSITY  PUBLICATIONS 


MEDICAL  SERIES— Con  tinned. 

No.  IV. 

HANDBOOK  OF  DISEASES  OF  THE  HEART.  By 
GRAHAM  STEELL,  M.D.,  F.R.C.P.,  Lecturer  in  Diseases  of 
the  Heart,  and  Physician  to  the  Manchester  Royal 
Infirmary.  [In  the  Press. 

No.  V. 

TREATISE  ON  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE.  By  W. 
SELLERS,  M.D.  (London),  M.B.,  M.R.C.S.,  etc. 

[In  the  Press. 


FROM   ALL  BOOKSELLERS. 
Other  volumes  in  preparation.       Catalogues  on  application. 


SHERRATT   &   HUGHES, 

Publishers  to  the  Manchester  University, 

65,  LONG  ACRE,  LONDON,  W.C. 

27,    ST.    ANN   STREET,    MANCHESTER. 


Printed  by  SHERRATT  &  HUGHES,  at  the  University  Press,  1  Hulme  Street, 
Manchester. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  5O  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 

DAY     i if  rn    »i  mi   riu  ..THE,  fiFVF"TH   DAY 

OVERDUI 


nee 


SEP  3    1963 


rvr    7  1936 


OCT   9   1936 





MAR  13  1943 


MAR  29  194? 


1W- 


SEP   1 


0- 


3* 


LD  21-100m-8,'34 


IU    U7  ML 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


